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Abstract
Safety-critical systems can be negatively affected by faults such as component failures
or environmental disturbances. One or more occurrences of such faults might lead to
hazards, that is, potentially disastrous situations or conditions that may cause accidents
with economical losses, environmental damage, injuries, or loss of lives. Safety analysis
is the process of identifying such hazards as well as their root causes in order to assess a
system’s overall safety. Traditional safety analysis techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis
or Failure Modes and Effects Analysis help to systematically assess system safety by
informally dissecting the system’s behavior and component interdependencies. However,
the increasing complexity of safety-critical systems, in part due to the introduction of
more and more software-based components, requires more sophisticated safety analysis
techniques to thoroughly analyze system behavior with regard to faults. Additionally,
traditional safety analysis techniques are not suited for the analysis of self-organizing
systems, an emerging class of often safety-critical systems that change their behavior and
structure during operation in a way that cannot be predicted during system development.
Self-organization thus necessitates new safety analysis approaches that are at least
partially conducted at run time while the system is already in operation.
The contribution of this thesis is a systematic design time and run time modeling and
analysis approach for safety-critical systems based on formal methods and executable
models. Its main achievements are threefold: Firstly, a systematic modeling approach
and the executable modeling language S# are introduced. Secondly, a safety analysis
technique based on explicit-state model checking and its formal foundations are defined,
increasing analysis efficiency and practical usability compared to alternative techniques.
Thirdly, a unifiedmodel execution and analysis approach is used to simulate and visualize
S# models and to systematically conduct design time and run time safety analyses for
them with consistent semantics. The contributions are evaluated using different case
studies from multiple application domains.
SystematicModelingwith the ExecutableModeling Language S#. The systematic
modeling approach for safety-critical systems brings forward well-established software
engineering principles and best practices to the modeling and analysis of safety-critical
systems during all phases of development. It fosters the systematic development of
high-quality, comprehensible, adequate, and modular models of such systems, while
also allowing the use of formal safety analysis techniques for rigorous safety assessment.
In doing so, the approach and the executable modeling language S# facilitate safety
analyses throughout the entire system life-cycle, modeling and safety assessment of
design alternatives, as well as model simulation, model visualization, model debugging,
and model-based testing. The S# modeling language and its analysis framework hide
the details of the underlying formal analysis techniques while providing flexible model-
ing composition and instantiation capabilities to conveniently express and configure
different system configurations for formal safety analyses. This flexibility helps with
exploring the design space of a safety-critical system early in its development and also
forms the basis for the run time analysis approach of self-organizing systems.
vii
Formalization of an Efficient Formal Safety Analysis Technique. The S# frame-
work uses Deductive Cause Consequence Analysis (DCCA) as its formal, model-based
safety analysis technique for sound reasoning about the safety-critical aspects of a
system with mathematical rigor. DCCA employs exhaustive model checking to compute
how faults (the causes) such as component failures or environmental disturbances can
cause hazards (the consequences): From a model of a safety-critical system that describes
the system’s nominal behavior as well as the relevant faults, DCCA determines all mini-
mal critical fault sets, i.e., combinations of faults that can cause hazards, allowing the
evaluation of the system’s overall safety. In order to increase the efficiency of DCCA and
the S# framework’s explicit-state model checking approach, fault-aware modeling and
specification formalisms are introduced that decrease explicit-state analysis times by up
to three orders of magnitude. Additionally, conceptual improvements of DCCA enhance
its model checking workflow as well as its applicability, allowing it to be used with a
broader variety of analysis tools besides S#. There also is a new execution variant for
DCCA that reduces analysis times in many cases by taking advantage of explicit-state
model checking: Irrelevant faults can be removed when checking a specific fault set
for criticality, allowing multiple significantly smaller models to be checked instead of a
single large one. Furthermore, heuristics are developed that help to reduce the number
of criticality checks that have to be carried out by a complete DCCA, as DCCA’s worst
case execution time is exponential in the number of analyzed faults.
Unified Model Execution for Design Time & Run Time Analysis. The S# model-
ing and analysis framework for safety-critical systems conducts DCCAs fully automati-
cally using a unified model execution approach based on explicit-state model checking.
The executability of S# models results from S#’s foundation in the ISO-standardized
C# programming language and the .NET run time environment. Instead of relying
on model transformations like most other safety analysis tools, S# unifies simulations,
model-based tests, visualizations, fully exhaustive model checking, and formal safety
analyses by executing the models with consistent semantics regardless of whether a sim-
ulation is run or some formula is model checked. Consequently, S# models are allowed
to use most advanced modeling language features inherited from C# such as inheritance,
generics, virtual dispatch, lambda functions, and so on. Standard C# tools like Visual
Studio can be used for model development and analysis; in particular, models can be
debugged even while model checking. S#’s flexible model composition and instantiation
capabilities also allow for run time safety analyses of self-organizing systems whose
safety cannot be exhaustively assessed during system development. Their typically infi-
nite amount of possible system configurations requires safety analyses to be conducted
at run time using a virtual commissioning process: Whenever a self-organizing system
changes its structure or behavior, safety analyses are conducted for the system’s actual
configuration either before or while the system continues its operation using the newly
computed system configuration.
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Summary. This overview of safety-critical systems and model-based safety
analysis motivates the goals of this thesis and its main contributions. Systems
are safety-critical when they have the potential to cause situations resulting in
environmental damage, economic losses, injuries, or loss of lives. Model-based
safety analysis techniques use formal methods to determine the combinations
of faults that lead to such situations with mathematical rigor. The adequacy of
the results obtained with formal safety analyses depends on the adequacy of
the analyzed models, which can be improved by following a systematic modeling
approach. Additionally, the class of self-organizing systems poses additional
challenges for formal safety analyses due to their high level of redundancy and run
time reconfiguration capabilities. 1
Overview and Motivation
1.1 Formal Safety Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Executable Models of Safety-Critical Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Run Time Safety Analysis of Self-Organizing Systems . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Thesis Outline and Main Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Failures of safety-critical systems result in hazards, i.e., potentially disastrous situations
or conditions that may lead to accidents causing economical losses, environmental
damage, injuries, or deaths [106]. Safety-critical systems have to anticipate various
faults [9] that inevitably occur because of unexpected environmental conditions, delib-
erate or non-deliberate human-made incorrect operational decisions, mistakes made
during system development, or failing hardware and software components that do not
behave as specified, etc. While safety-critical systems are designed to prevent hazards
for as long as possible, various accidents throughout recent history such as the Therac
25 accidents or the Fukushima Daiichi disaster [100, 132] clearly show that hazards
eventually do in fact occur. Consequently, there are always risks associated with build-
ing, operating, and maintaining safety-critical systems. These risks must be justified,
however, in the sense that the money and effort required to further reduce the risks
are greatly disproportionate with the potential risk reductions [25]. The concepts of
acceptable and tolerable risks are based on social consent and are often regulated by
international norms and standards for the development of safety-critical systems such
as IEC 61508 or IEC 61511 [103, 104], among many others [57].
Complex system designs and complicated operational procedures have adverse effects
on system safety as they increase the likelihood of development faults, analysis over-
sights, and operational faults [131, 186, 200]. Still, safety-critical systems continue to
become more complex, partly due to the increasing use of software [25]. Software-based
implementations of system functionality are often more flexible and more cost effective
than hardware implementations, broadening the scope and the field of operations of
safety-critical systems. However, software development and the microprocessor infras-
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Figure 1.1. Simplified overview of the three main phases of the IEC 61511 safety life-cycle [103,
182]: During the analysis phase, hazards are identified and their causes and risks are determined.
Additionally, safety functions are allocated to individual parts of the system under development
and safety requirements are specified and documented. In the implementation phase, the system
is designed, software is implemented, and hardware is fabricated; potentially, additional risk-
reducing safety measures are designed to complement the system. The final phase is operation,
where the system is installed, commissioned, and validated. Maintenance is typically required
during operation until the system is eventually decommissioned. Modifications of the system
necessitate additional safety analyses and implementation work.
tructure required to run software are complex and error-prone: The size of NASA’s
flight control software, for instance, has been shown to grow roughly exponentially
over the years, similar to the software of military aircraft and automobiles [200].
Figure 1.1 gives an overview of the life-cycle of safety-critical systems from conceptual
inception, safety analysis, design and implementation, to operation, maintenance, and
eventual decommissioning. This thesis focuses on the task of safety assessment; the
terms safety assessment and safety analysis are generally used interchangeably. It
is assumed that the hazards of the safety-critical system to be analyzed are already
identified and that all potentially relevant faults are known. Traditional safety analysis
techniques such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), for instance, can be used
to identify the hazards of a safety-critical system [25, 55, 166], while failure modes of
off-the-shelf components are usually provided by the component vendors. In addition
to FMEA, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Hazard and Operability Study, Event Tree Analysis,
and many others allow for systematic safety analyses [25, 55, 88, 193] by identifying
possible combinations of faults that might result in hazards. Therefore, the techniques
help to design and integrate safety measures that reduce risks by making hazards less
likely or by reducing their severity.
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Figure 1.2. Validation and verification during the development process [186]: While the soft-
ware and hardware integration is typically only tested and not formally verified, implementations
of safety-critical components can be shown to adhere to their designs and specifications using
formal verification techniques. A validation against the actual customer requirements shows the
adequacy of the specification and the developed system. No formal validation techniques exist,
although formal specification and modeling often help to improve adequacy indirectly [10].
Many commonly used traditional safety analysis techniques such as FMEA and FTA
were developed in the middle of the last century, in a time when software did not
yet play an important role or was not used at all [166, 193]. Additionally, FMEAs
and FTAs are typically performed manually, relying on human experience and the
ability of a human to understand and predict system behavior. Consequently, there is
a high risk for incomplete, inconsistent, or erroneous analyses. Recent improvements
such as Component Fault Trees [74] help to tackle the increasing complexity; for
software-intensive safety-critical systems, in particular, newmodel-based safety analysis
techniques rooted in formal methods have been developed [82, 113, 135, 151]. This thesis
enhances these formal techniques, formalizing core concepts in the area of safety analysis
such as fault injection and fault removal and improving the applicability and efficiency
of the underlying modeling formalisms and analysis mechanisms. Moreover, a modeling
and analysis framework for safety-critical systems using these formal techniques is
introduced that is based on executable models, thereby also allowing flexible model
composition for run time safety analyses of self-organizing systems that are not possible
with current analysis approaches.
1.1 Formal Safety Analysis
In order to deal with the increasing complexity of systems and software, formal methods
allow for logical reasoning about software and system designs as well as implementa-
tions with mathematical rigor [13]. Mathematical specifications of system requirements,
architectures, and designs improve the likeliness of finding and identifying flaws, mis-
understandings, and inconsistencies before the software is actually written and the
system is assembled, thus reducing the cost to fix these issues [10]. However, formal
methods guarantee neither adequacy nor validity of the analyses, as it is impossible to
decide whether the analyzed system is adequate, that is, whether it fulfills the needs
of the people affected by its operation and use. Consequently, the advantage of using
formal methods is not the guarantee of correctness, but the increased confidence in the
correctness and adequacy of the final product as illustrated by Figure 1.2. Moreover,
development costs are potentially reduced as more flaws are found in earlier stages of
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Figure 1.3. Relationship between traditional and formal safety analysis as well as verification
of functional correctness [80]: From an informal specification of the safety-critical system that
is to be developed, a formal model of the system’s nominal behavior is created; together with
formal specifications of the properties the system should comply with, functional correctness
can be verified. For the hazards identified with traditional safety analysis techniques such as
FMEA, formal safety analyses are conducted based on the formal model of the nominal behavior
that is extended to incorporate the presumably relevant faults. Formal safety analysis subsumes
functional correctness in the sense that safety analyses label functionally incorrect systems as
inherently unsafe, i.e., hazards can occur even without any faults.
the development process where countermeasures are less costly. The downside is the
need for engineers experienced with formal methods and the time it takes to formally
specify and analyze complex systems. Thus, a trade-off must be found to balance these
advantages and disadvantages.
Formal, model-based safety analysis techniques apply formal methods to the field
of safety assessment, automatically computing all minimal critical fault sets of safety-
critical systems [80, 113]. These fault sets represent combinations of faults that can cause
hazards. Deductive Cause Consequence Analysis (DCCA) is one such technique [159],
based on model checking, that rigorously determines the relationships between faults
(the causes) and hazards (the consequences). DCCAs are conducted automatically by
safety analysis tools such as the S# framework or VECS [82, 135], for instance; the
FSAP/Compass toolsets [26, 27] and AltaRica [15] perform similar safety analyses. For-
mal safety analysis is based on formal models of the systems to be analyzed, increasing
consistency and improving adequacy over traditional safety analysis techniques. Ad-
ditionally, completeness can be guaranteed, hence formal safety analysis tools find
all minimal critical fault sets for all analyzed hazards. Model checking-based safety
analysis techniques also generate witnesses that explain how critical fault sets can cause
a hazard, that is, under which circumstances the faults in the critical set can result
in potentially dangerous and harmful situations. In other words, a counterexample
is generated disproving a fault set as safe, providing hints for possible system design
improvements that potentially reduce safety risks. Figure 1.3 illustrates the integration
of formal safety analysis with functional correctness verification and traditional safety
analysis techniques.
Many successful real-world applications of formal methods [25, 90, 134, 206] show the
potential benefits of using formal modeling, specification, and verification techniques for
the development of safety-critical systems. Before the launch of NASA’s Deep Space 1
spacecraft [89], for instance, the SPIN model checker [98] was able to identify five
concurrency errors in a model of the deep space autonomy flight software that had
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remained undetected despite extensive testing. After launch, an isomorphic bug caused
a deadlock in another part of the software that had not been model checked and that
also was not found by tests; a retrospective analysis with SPIN was again able to identify
and diagnose the problem.
Consequently, many international standards like IEC 61508 [104] for safety-critical
software development, EN 50128 [59] in the railway sector, ISO 26262 [107] in the
automotive sector, or DO-178C [174] in the avionics domain highly recommend the use
of formal methods for system design and safety analysis in order to reach the highest
safety levels [11, 71]. Additionally, formal techniques can be used to document the safety
assessment steps performed during the entire life-cycle of a safety-critical system as
required by IEC 61508 or EN 50128. As compliance with these standards is often required
either by law or contractually as well as due to recent usability improvements in both
formal techniques and tools, industry projects increasingly rely on formal methods. A
survey conducted by Woodcock et al. [206], for instance, shows that formal specification
and formal modeling as well as model checking are among the techniques most often
employed in the industry. In particular, the use of model checking has increased from
13% to 51% within the last decade across all examined industry projects. Formal methods
are reported to have an overall positive effect on development time, cost, and quality,
with no participants of the survey reporting quality reductions.
1.2 Executable Models of Safety-Critical Systems
All model-based analysis techniques have one common weakness: Analysis results
are only adequate if the underlying system models are adequate. If the models do not
appropriately represent the real systems, the results obtained from formal analyses do
not necessarily reflect the systems’ actual properties. Adequate models for formal safety
analyses are even harder to create than models used for formal correctness verification
only: The systems’ behavior in the case of faults must be considered and modeled in
addition to the desired functional behavior. Consequently, specifically tailored modeling
language constructs for fault modeling as well as a systematic modeling methodology
are required in order to support the development of adequate models.
Various modeling languages and formalisms with different levels of expressiveness
exist, ranging from low-level Kripke structures to high-level SysML models [13, 153].
The language that fits best usually depends on the system that is to be modeled and
analyzed. The Compass and VECS safety analysis tools [135, 151], for instance, use an
extended subset of AADL or the custom SAML language, respectively. Alternatively,
there are models authored in an executable modeling language that, by contrast, can
immediately be executed just like regular programs without requiring any intermedi-
ate model transformations. SystemC or S# [73, 82] are examples of such executable
formalisms; the latter is used throughout this thesis. As illustrated by Figure 1.4, S#
models readily support model simulations, model visualizations, as well as explicit-state
model checking due to their executability.
Executable models can often be integrated with explicit-state model checkers such as
LTSmin [116], provided that the models have a finite number of reachable states only.
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Figure 1.4. Executable models such as the ones authored in S# do not require any complex
model transformations for simulations or model checking; instead, the models can be directly
executed like regular programs. Visualizations make use of simulations to allow for graphical
inspections of system states and behavior; they additionally support replays of counterexamples
or witnesses generated by the model checker.
Symbolic model checking of executable models, on the other hand, can be problematic
due to complex model transformations that are typically necessary [64]. Model simu-
lations and visualizations are useful to validate the adequacy of the analyzed models
or to view, debug, and understand witnesses for minimal critical fault sets found by a
model checker [61], for example. Non-executable modeling languages like the Com-
pass toolset’s AADL dialect [151] make visualizations more technically challenging as
additional model transformations or run time interpretations are necessary. Thus, the
visualized model is only loosely linked to the model checked one, potentially introducing
discrepancies. Executable models, by contrast, do not suffer this problem, increasing
the confidence in the simulations, visualizations, and formal analyses.
Executable modeling languages weaken the distinction between programs and models
to the point where both terms can often be used interchangeably [198]. In the context of
safety analysis, however, the distinction is clear due to the kinds of components that the
models can consist of: Some model parts represent the physical environment, hardware
components, hydraulic or electrical subsystems, etc., none of which are software-based
in the real system. Even those parts of the models that do in fact represent software
components are generally not intended to be used as the actual implementations of the
real software. The models are usually an abstraction of the real software’s behavior in
order to reduce the state space for model checking-based analysis techniques. Moreover,
actual software implementations for safety-critical systems are typically written in the C
or C++ programming languages [108, 111] for reasons of compatibility and performance.
Of course, C++ programs are also models in the sense that they abstract from the bits
and bytes shifted around by the microcontroller that executes the program, showing that
the level of abstraction is not the distinguishing factor between models and programs.
1.3 Run Time Safety Analysis of Self-Organizing Systems
The techniques and approaches used to model, design, and evaluate safety-critical sys-
tems during development typically depend on the development phase: In the beginning
during early design space exploration, for instance, highly abstract models of the desired
system behavior might first be created disregarding any potential faults, using model
checking to analyze the functional correctness of the system. In a second step, faults
could be added to the model, using model checking to check for the minimal critical
fault sets of the hazards identified for the system. Hazard mitigation strategies could
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subsequently be devised from the witnesses generated by the model checker that show
how minimal critical fault sets actually cause the hazards, making it necessary, for
instance, to increase redundancy or to design additional error detection and recovery
mechanisms. Even in this early stage, model-based safety analysis techniques facilitate
the evaluation of different design alternatives of a system, making it possible to find
acceptable compromises between development effort, costs, and risk reductions early in
the development process [80, 82]. Once a design is chosen, the models could be gradually
refined to be more concrete, potentially making the use of model checking infeasible at
some point. However, models used solely for simulations and visualizations still help
to develop and evaluate the systems [61]. Once actual software is written or hardware
is designed, previously developed simulations and visualizations for the models could
even be extended to hardware- or software-in-the-loop tests [12].
There is an important prerequisite that must be met in order to conduct safety analyses
during system development: The analyzed system’s structure and potential behavior
must be fully known and specified at design time in order to allow model checkers to
deduce the minimal critical fault sets. For safety-critical systems that are self-organizing,
however, this is usually not the case: Self-organizing systems dynamically adapt their
behavior and structure to changing environmental circumstances and to fault occur-
rences in particular, resulting in system configurations and behaviors that emerge
unpredictably in a way that cannot be foreseen during development [81, 184, 202]. The
primary intent of self-organizing systems is to increase system robustness with the help
of a high level of redundancy and the systems’ reconfiguration mechanisms. Due to the
redundancy and the often infinite number of potential system configurations, it becomes
impossible to conduct complete safety analyses at design time. For safety-critical self-
organizing systems, it is therefore necessary to postpone model-based safety analyses
to run time when more information about the actual system configurations and the
emerging behavior is known. That is, safety analyses can no longer be fully conducted
during system design and development, but at least partially require the system to be in
operation already. Run time adaptation of the system models in accordance with the
systems’ self-organization mechanisms [7, 19, 48] enables model-based safety analyses
for self-organizing systems, partially shifting safety analyses to run time [48, 192, 201]
using efficient model checking-based safety analysis techniques.
1.4 Thesis Outline and Main Contributions
This thesis presents an approach for formal safety analyses based on executable models
that can be carried out both at design time as well as at run time. The following gives a
brief outline of the contents as well as the main contributions of each of the subsequent
chapters; an overview of the thesis’ general structure is given by Figure 1.5. Discussions
of related work and evaluations of the techniques introduced throughout this thesis are
generally included in those chapters they conceptually belong to. The results of this
thesis are implemented in the S# formal modeling and safety analysis framework for
safety-critical systems, available online in the S# repository [101]. While some of the
contributions are closely interwoven with the S# framework, the formal foundations,
DCCA, and the run time analysis approach for self-organizing systems are not S#-
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Figure 1.5. An overview of the thesis’ general structure and the dependencies between the
individual chapters. In the Modeling part, a systematic modeling approach for safety-critical
systems is presented that is subsequently used to create executable systemmodels. The modeling
concepts influence the Analysis part that provides the formal foundations for model-based safety
analysis and bridges the gap between the executable models and the formal analysis techniques.
The Application part applies the modeling concepts and analysis techniques to some case studies,
conducting the analyses either at design time or at run time.
specific in any way. Therefore, most of the contributions could be transferred to other
safety analysis tools and techniques as well, many of which are discussed in more detail
in the related work sections throughout this thesis. In general, the S# framework stands
out from these other tools due to its unique unified model execution approach: S#
combines a high-level, executable modeling language rooted in a systematic modeling
approach with various analyses in the form of simulations, visualizations, and efficient,
formal safety analyses; the efficiency of the latter can even be further improved through
the use of model-specific heuristics.
The Introduction to the Case Studies (Chapter 2) describes several different safety-
critical systems that are modeled and analyzed throughout the thesis using S#. Except
for the simple running example, the case studies are inspired by industrial applications
coming from the railway, traffic control, and medical domains as well as the domain of
self-organizing resource-flow systems. Each case study presents a different challenge
for formal safety analysis approaches that are subsequently tackled and discussed in
the remaining chapters.
Systematic Modeling of Safety-Critical Systems (Chapter 3) fosters the creation of
high quality models to improve model comprehensibility as well as model adequacy.
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A SysML-inspired, component-oriented, systematic modeling approach is introduced
based on the control-theoretical core concept of feedback loops between controllers,
sensors, plants, and actuators of safety-critical systems. The approach is amended with
systematic fault modeling concepts based on well-known notions and techniques such as
fault activation or fault injection. Without any crucial restrictions concerning modeling
flexibility, the approach fosters the creation of adequate models by preventing a certain
class of fault modeling mistakes; namely, non-conservative fault injection.
The S# framework facilitates the systematic creation of Executable Models of Safety-
Critical Systems (Chapter 4) based on the C# programming language and the .NET
run time environment [105, 110]. It allows for modular and flexible model composition,
also supporting modeling and analysis of multiple system design variants. First-class
tool support results from not inventing a completely new modeling language; instead,
S# provides a domain specific language embedded into C# that inherits the tooling
available for regular .NET-based software development. When modeling safety-critical
systems with S#, standard .NET development tools and libraries can therefore be used,
including, among others, debuggers, version control software such as Git, continuous
integration with regression tests on build servers, as well as code editing features such
as refactorings and code completion.
Fault-aware Kripke structures and fault-aware Linear Temporal Logic are introduced as
the foundations of Formal Safety Analysis (Chapter 5), making explicit-state model
checking of safety-critical systems feasible: Analysis efficiency is increased by up to
three orders of magnitude by enabling the model checker to ignore faults in situations
they are irrelevant in. Moreover, the notion of critical fault sets is redefined to allow
DCCA, the model checking-based formal safety analysis technique used and improved
throughout this thesis, to be conducted using Linear Temporal Logic in addition to
Computation Tree Logic. More importantly, this change also results in witnesses being
generated by the model checker that show how critical fault sets can indeed cause a
hazard; previously, witnesses showed how non-critical fault sets could not result in a
hazard, which is less useful in practice. Furthermore, the notion of fault injection is
formally specified in order to prevent unintended non-conservative fault injections and
its dual, fault removal, is defined as well; DCCA can make use of the latter to more
efficiently identify minimal critical fault sets. All of these results are not S#-specific in
any way and are therefore also applicable to other safety analysis tools.
ForUnified Analysis of Executable Models (Chapter 6), the S# framework conceptu-
ally generates fault-aware Kripke structures on-the-fly for analysis by an explicit-state
model checker. Thus, Chapter 6 applies the formal foundations from Chapter 5 to S#,
also enhancing DCCA with heuristics that further try to reduce analysis times. Due to
the executability of its models, the S# framework also supports model simulation and
visualization for non-exhaustive model exploration, debugging, and visual inspection of
models of safety-critical systems. S# therefore has an advantage over other tools and
approaches for formal safety analysis by tightly integrating the development, debugging,
and simulation of models with their formal analysis. Additionally, S#’s unified model
execution approach guarantees semantic consistency between model simulations, model
visualizations, and explicit-state model checking.
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A Design Time Analysis of the Height Control Case Study (Chapter 7) with S#
and DCCA evaluates and demonstrates the applicability of the tools and techniques
developed in this thesis. Particular emphasis is placed on the modeling of different design
variants of the height control, with variants of the model being composed together using
the reflection capabilities provided by the .NET framework underlying S#.
For Run Time Analysis of Self-Organizing Systems (Chapter 8), the analyzed mod-
els must be decomposed depending on which faults can be tolerated by the systems’
self-organization mechanisms. Moreover, S#’s flexible model composition capabilities
are taken advantage of to enable virtual commissioning of self-organizing systems, i.e.,
safety analyses are conducted while the systems are already in operation. To cope with
the large state spaces of models of self-organizing systems as well as their typically high
levels of redundancy, DCCA efficiency is improved through model-specific strategies
and heuristics that are designed to find minimal critical fault sets significantly faster in
many cases.
Conclusion and Outlook (Chapter 9) summarize the contributions of this thesis as
well as the lessons learned, also giving an outlook to future work.
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Summary. Six safety-critical systems from a range of different application
domains are introduced in this chapter. Except for the simple running example that
is primarily used to introduce and motivate the modeling and analysis concepts
and improvements of this thesis, each of the other case studies presents a different
challenge for model-based safety analysis. Two of the case studies are only briefly
described as they are only used to evaluate the overall modeling and analysis
approach but are otherwise not discussed in greater detail.
Publications. The case studies are partially modeled and analyzed in [81, 82, 84,
120, 130]; the complete S# models are available in the S# repository [101]. This
introduction is based on the case study descriptions from the S# Wiki [102]. 2
Introduction to the Case Studies
2.1 Pressure Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Height Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Self-Organizing Robot Cell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Self-Organized Production of Personalized Medicine . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 Radio-Controlled Railroad Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6 Hemodialysis Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
This chapter gives an overview of the six safety-critical systems serving as the case stud-
ies throughout this thesis: A controller regulating the pressure within a pressure tank,
the height control system of the Elbe Tunnel in Hamburg, Germany, a self-organizing
robot cell, self-organized production of personalized medicine, a radio-controlled rail-
road crossing, and a hemodialysis machine. The pressure tank case study is used as the
primary running example as it is both small and easy to understand, yet sufficient to
illustrate and motivate the basic concepts of the modeling and analysis techniques. The
height control is a more complex case study, highlighting the flexible model composition
capabilities of the modeling approach as well as the efficiency improvements of the for-
mal analysis techniques introduced in the subsequent chapters. The two self-organizing
systems emphasize the need for more flexible, adaptable, and configurable modeling
capabilities to instantiate their numerous system configurations. Additionally, they also
require significant analysis improvements in the form of heuristics to cope with the
large number of relevant faults and different configurations that have to be analyzed.
The first four of the aforementioned case studies are primarily used to illustrate the main
contributions of this thesis, while the railroad crossing and the hemodialysis machine,
on the other hand, are not discussed in full detail in the remainder. Nevertheless, they
are used to motivate and explain some of the safety analysis concepts and they provide
additional data points for the evaluations of analysis efficiency. Furthermore, they help
to demonstrate the broad applicability of the modeling and analysis techniques to a
wide range of different domains.
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Figure 2.1. A schematic overview of the components constituting the pressure tank case study:
The software controller uses the pressure sensor and the hardware timer to decide whether the
pump should fill the tank with a fluid. The considered faults are indicated by lightning bolts
near the affected components; the sensor’s fault ¬is full, for instance, indicates a suppression of
the sensor’s notification about a full tank.
2.1 Pressure Tank
The pressure tank case study is a very simple safety-critical system that is used to
motivate and explain the concepts of S#’s modeling and analysis approach. In order to
make it as simple as possible while still retaining the spirit of the original version of the
case study [193], the electronic control system of the original version is replaced by a
software-based controller implementing the same functionality. A schematic overview
of the simplified case study is shown in Figure 2.1: The fluid contained in the pressure
tank is refilled by the pump at the tank’s inlet; at the outlet, the fluid can be removed.
The pump is activated and deactivated by a software controller. The pressure sensor
signals the controller when the pressure limit is reached or when the tank is empty,
causing the controller to deactivate or activate the pump, respectively. How and why
fluid is removed from the tank is not considered in detail and thus constant fluid removal
is simply assumed. Once the tank becomes empty, a new refill cycle begins. The system
is safety-critical because of the hazard of tank ruptures that might injure people standing
nearby. To tolerate pressure sensor faults, the controller disables the pump after 60
seconds of continuous operation as it would risk a tank rupture otherwise. For time
measurements, the controller uses the hardware timer.
Faults. Only the four faults shown in Figure 2.1 are considered: The first two faults are
suppression faults of the pressure sensor, causing it to no longer report that either the
pressure limit is reached (¬is full) or that the tank is empty (¬is empty). The third fault
prevents the timer from reporting a timeout (¬timeout) and the fourth one results in a
failure of the pump, preventing it from filling the tank (¬pumping).
Hazards. The main hazard are tank ruptures due to overpressure that might injure
nearby people. A completely empty tank is another hazard as it might cause problems for
the consumer of the fluid stored in the tank. For such a simple system, it is obvious that a
tank rupture can only occur when both the sensor’s ¬is full fault and the timer’s ¬timeout
fault occur. The hazard of a completely depleted tank, by contrast, is caused either by
¬pumping or by ¬is empty. For more complex systems with a wider variety of faults,
however, informal safety analyses typically cannot be carried out as easily. Instead,
model-based safety analysis techniques must be used to compute the relationships
between hazards and fault both automatically and thoroughly.
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Figure 2.2. A schematic overview of the height control case study: There are four lanes
entering and exiting the tunnel’s four tubes at the bottom, with the arrows indicating the driving
direction. Overheight vehicles are only allowed to enter the fourth tube driving downwards.
The height control system consists of a pre, main, and end control and various light barriers and
overhead detectors to check for overheight vehicles on the wrong lane. The considered faults
are the same for each of the five sensors: ¬detection prevents the sensor from detecting a vehicle,
while  detection causes the sensor to spuriously report a vehicle that is not there.
2.2 Height Control System
A height control system was added to the Elbe Tunnel in Hamburg, Germany, when the
fourth tube was built in 2002 [158]. Overheight vehicles are only allowed to use the new
tube; otherwise, they might collide with the ceiling of the tunnel. The height control
is therefore responsible for closing the tunnel when it detects an overheight vehicle
that tries to enter one of the old tubes. Figure 2.2 shows a schematic overview of the
system and the road layout. Only the two lanes from top to bottom are of interest, as
the tunnel is simply closed whenever an overheight vehicle is detected driving into the
other direction. Overall, the height control consists of five sensors: Two light barriers
lb1 and lb2 as well as three overhead detectors odr, odl, and odf. The sensors are grouped
into the pre, main, and end controls, with the latter two also making use of a timer.
The light barriers span the entire width of both lanes, whereas each overhead detector
is positioned hovering only one of the lanes. Consequently, the light barriers can only
report that an overheight vehicle passes by, but cannot distinguish between overheight
vehicles on the left lane or on the right lane; it is physically impossible to install the
light barriers in such a way that they observe a single lane only. The overhead detectors,
by contrast, can in fact distinguish between overheight vehicles on either of the lanes,
but they cannot differentiate between overheight vehicles and regular non-overheight
trucks. They are, however, not triggered by passenger cars. By contrast, the light barriers
are positioned high enough to ensure that they are only triggered by passing overheight
vehicles. The height control therefore has to combine the data of both types of sensors
to determine the positions of overheight vehicles in the observed area.
When no overheight vehicles are approaching the tunnel, only the pre control is active,
i.e., the sensors of the main and end controls are deactivated. When lb1 detects an
overheight vehicle, the main control is activated, enabling its sensors and starting its
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timer. Also, an internal counter is increased that counts the number of overheight
vehicles within the main control area. The main control is deactivated when a vehicle is
reported by lb2 and odr or odl and the counter reaches zero, or the main control’s timer
times out. If the main control discovers an overheight vehicle on the right lane, the
end control enables its sensor and starts its timer; if, on the other hand, an overheight
vehicle is detected on the left lane, the tunnel is closed immediately even though the
vehicle is still able to switch to the right lane. When the end control does not detect an
overheight vehicle before its timer runs out, it is deactivated; otherwise, the tunnel is
closed. The road layout makes it impossible for any vehicle to switch lanes after it has
passed odf, but between the main and end controls, vehicles are free to do so.
Faults. There are two kinds of faults for each of the five sensors: Misdetections
(¬detection) are false negatives, that is, a sensor does not report a vehicle passing by that
it should detect. False detections ( detection), on the contrary, are false positives, so a
sensor detects something that is not a vehicle, but, say, a bird.
Hazards. The two analyzed hazards conflict with each other: On the one hand, the
height control system is designed to prevent collisions by closing the tunnel whenever
an overheight vehicle is about to enter the wrong tube. On the other hand, the height
control is also designed to prevent false alarms for economic reasons, as unnecessary
closures cause traffic jams and economical losses. The system design takes both hazards
into account, trying to strike a balance between them. In the subsequent chapters,
safety analyses are conducted for both hazards, but techniques for safety optimizations
that balance both hazards are out of scope; for example, Güdemann and Ortmeier
[68] discuss multi-objective optimization of antagonistic safety goals in more detail.
Previous analyses [158, 159] of the case study revealed that the height control system
as introduced above is functionally incorrect due to a design flaw, that is, collisions
and false alarms can happen without the occurrence of any hardware faults. Design
alternatives were proposed that add additional sensors in order to fix the problem [158],
while potentially introducing other safety issues at the same time as well.
Challenges. Any changes to the design of a system necessitate additional safety
analyses. Consequently, the case study’s first challenge is convenient support for
variant modeling, preferably also allowing for combinations of different orthogonal
design variants in order to analyze the safety of the different design alternatives that
were proposed. Additionally, the large number of faults for some of the design variants
and the nondeterminism that the vehicles introduce into the model make formal safety
analyses expensive. Therefore, the second challenge is to make the models more modular
and structured in order to increase comprehensibility and to facilitate variant modeling
without sacrificing analysis efficiency at the same time.
2.3 Self-Organizing Robot Cell
The self-organizing robot cell [81] consists of robots and carts. The carts transport
workpieces between the robots that have several switchable tools such as drills and
screwdrivers. A production task requires a workpiece to be processed by a sequence of
tool applications; for the case study, the required processing sequence is to drill a hole,
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(a) The resource flow starts to the left where R1 drills
a hole into incoming workpieces. Workpieces are
successively transported by C1 and C2 to R2 and R3,
applying their insert and tighten tools, respectively.
Once R3 is done, the workpieces leave the system.
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(b) After R2 loses its insert tool, the resource
flow is reconfigured: R2 and R3 switch roles,
each taking over the previous role of the other.
The carts transport the workpieces to R3 before
R2 to guarantee the correct processing order.
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(c) After a failure of R2’s tighten tool, R2 and C2 are
no longer used at all, as R2 has no more working
tools available. Instead, R3 uses two of its tools on
the workpieces successively: Insert, then tighten.
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(d) After R3’s insert tool is lost too, the robot
cell can no longer be reconfigured such that the
task can be completed: There is no robot with
an insert tool that could follow R1’s drilling.
Figure 2.3. A schematic overview of the self-organizing robot cell case study with three robots
R1, R2, and R3 as well as two carts C1 and C2 establishing the resource flow between them. The
task is to apply the drill, insert, and tighten capabilities to all incoming workpieces. Each robot’s
available tools are shown to its right, with D, I, and T denoting the drill, insert, and tighten
tools, respectively; the currently allocated ones are underlined. Figure 2.3a shows an exemplary
configuration of the robot cell. As depicted in Figures 2.3b to 2.3d, faults result in tool losses
that self-organization can cope with by reconfiguring the resource flow; eventually, however, no
further reconfiguration is possible as the system runs out of redundancy.
insert a screw, then tighten the screw. Each robot has roles assigned that indicate which
tools it has to apply on the workpieces and in which order, while the carts know the
robots they have to transport the workpieces between. The robot cell is self-organizing
as it can adapt its structure and behavior by itself to compensate for broken tools or
to incorporate new tools, robots, or carts, for instance. That is, these events result in
reconfigurations of the transportation routes and tools applied by the robots as shown
in Figure 2.3 in order to ensure correct workpiece processing.
Faults. The system’s self-organization capabilities cannot cope with all faults that
occur during the lifetime of the system: Some faults are outside of its reach, either
because their occurrences cannot be detected or there is no appropriate reaction to their
occurrence. For example, carts might move to the wrong robot or robots and carts might
not receive reconfiguration information due to, for instance, networking problems. On
the other hand, there are faults that self-organization is designed to handle such as
broken tools, robots that are no longer working at all, or carts whose assigned paths are
blocked. At some point, however, there is not enough redundancy left in the system
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to continue operating safely after the occurrence of enough faults, in which case no
further configurations exist. In the case study, for instance, no more configurations can
be found as soon as all tools of the same kind no longer work.
Hazards. There are two hazards that are most relevant for the case study: The first
one occurs when a workpiece is damaged, i.e., processed in an incorrect order. The
second hazard occurs when some workpiece is never finished, i.e., not processed any
further. In addition to these system-level hazards, it is also of interest to determine
all combinations of faults that can be compensated through reconfigurations. Safety
analyses can be conducted that show the limits of self-organization, computing the sets
of faults whose occurrences make any further reconfiguration impossible.
Challenges. The robot cell is a complex case study that dynamically adapts its behavior
and structure to changes in its environment and occurrences of faults, resulting in
system configurations that cannot be predicted at design time. It is therefore necessary
to postpone model-based safety analyses to run time when the actual configurations of
the system are known. However, the high level of redundancy resulting from the case
study’s self-organization capabilities is problematic for the efficiency of state-of-the-
art model-based safety analyses techniques: The models have large state spaces both
because of the high number of constituent components as well as the large number
of potential faults. Additionally, the latter results in a combinatorial explosion of the
possible fault sets that may lead to hazards. Therefore, techniques must be developed
in order to modularize safety analyses such that the exponential complexity can be
reduced. Additionally, the functional correctness of the self-organization mechanism
must be established, for instance by systematic testing.
2.4 Self-Organized Production of Personalized Medicine
The self-organizing production system for personalized medicine [37] adapts dosage
and composition of medical ingredients to a specific individual. Personalized medicine
improves treatment efficiency by avoiding costly and potentially dangerous trial and
error processes to find the right kind of medicine for a patient [167]. The case study
consists of several production stations that are connected by conveyor belts as illustrated
by Figure 2.4. There are three kinds of stations: Stations that load pill containers on a
conveyor belt, stations that dispense different ingredients, and stations that remove pro-
cessed containers and palletize them. Additionally, there are three types of ingredients
that are depicted in different shades of gray in Figure 2.4. Recipes specify how the pill
containers should be filled through ordered applications of specific ingredient types
and amounts. These recipes are unknown beforehand as they enter the system during
run time, for example via web services whenever a personalized product is ordered. For
each recipe, the system’s reconfiguration mechanism finds a sequence of neighboring
stations that is capable of processing pill containers according to the recipe. In contrast
to the robot cell case study, the conveyor belts establish the resource flow statically, i.e.,
conveyor belts cannot be dynamically rerouted similar to the carts.
Faults. Each station can fail completely (¬response), representing the total shutdown
of the station due to power loss, a crash in the station’s controller, or similar reasons.
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Figure 2.4. A schematic overview of the self-organizing production system case study for
personalized medicine. The stations are connected by conveyor belts; they either load pill
containers onto the belts, palletize them, or dispense specific amounts of one or more ingredients
into the containers. The overview shows a very simple configuration of the production cell: The
pill containers can take two different routes through the system, with only the upper route being
able to dispense all three ingredient types into the containers. Which routes the pill containers
take therefore depends on their recipes and the amount of ingredients left. For example, the
lower route has only 10 units of the medium gray ingredient left, causing all pill containers
requiring more than 10 units to be routed to the upper section of the production cell.
This fault disables any processing capabilities of the station and also cuts all resource-
flow paths running through it, that is, no pill containers on the station’s associated
conveyor belt can pass through. On the other hand, there are faults representing
situations in which no pill containers are left (¬container), the container loading or
palletization capabilities of a station fails (¬load or ¬palletize, respectively), or the tank
of some ingredient type is no longer able to dispense the ingredient (¬dispense for some
ingredient type). All of these faults only affect the corresponding station’s respective
capabilities, not the resource-flow paths.
Hazard. The case study is only used to determine the limits of the system’s recon-
figuration mechanism, i.e., situations in which the system is incapable of finding any
further configurations. Reconfiguration becomes impossible once fault occurrences
used up all of the system’s redundancy, for instance. Additionally, the system is unable
to continue processing whenever it runs out of ingredients, which is to be expected and
must consequently be considered during operation and reconfiguration.
Challenges. To determine the limits of the case study’s self-organization mechanism,
large numbers of faults must be checked for their potential to prevent the system from
further reconfiguration. Due to the inherent redundancy, the number of faults that
are required to occur before no new configurations can be found is typically rather
large. For example, if there are n stations administering the light gray particulate and
all of them are connected together, all n light gray particulate dispensers must fail to
prevent further reconfiguration. However, model checking-based safety analysis scales
exponentially with the number of faults to be analyzed [83], therefore requiring the
development of heuristics to lessen the combinatorial explosion.
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Figure 2.5. A schematic overview of the radio-controlled railroad crossing case study: The
train approaches the crossing from the left, communicating with the crossing via radio to initiate
its closing procedure. The considered faults are indicated by lightning bolts near the affected
components; for instance, ¬move indicates the barrier motor to be broken such that the barriers
no longer open or close. By contrast,  detection indicates that the sensor reports a detection of a
train even though no train has passed the sensor.
2.5 Radio-Controlled Railroad Crossing
The radio-controlled railroad crossing case study [53, 93] proposes a mechanism to
control railroad crossings in a decentralized way. Many of the sensors and signals
traditionally placed alongside the train tracks are replaced by radio communication
and software computations to make the overall system more robust, scalable, and cost
effective. A control software on-board the trains knows about the locations of the
crossings that lie ahead and secures them just in time via wireless, radio-based commu-
nication. Among other problems, the controller takes lost communication messages and
malfunctions of the crossing into account. It initiates an emergency stop right before
reaching the next crossing on the train’s way if the crossing is not known to be in a
secured state with the barriers closed. Figure 2.5 shows a train approaching a crossing;
it sends a message to the crossing requesting it to initiate its closing procedure. This
procedure takes some time as the traffic lights must first be activated before the barriers
are allowed to begin closing, for instance. Once the barriers are closed, the crossing is
secured and the train is allowed to pass the danger spot. During the time the barriers
are closing, the train continues to approach the crossing. After the crossing has had
enough time to secure itself, the train’s control software queries the crossing’s state via
radio. If everything goes well, the crossing responds with a message indicating that it is
secured and that the train can safely pass. If, however, the train does not receive the
message in time, it initiates an emergency stop. The sensor behind the crossing signals
the crossing to open once the approaching train passes by.
Faults. Seven faults are depicted in Figure 2.5: The train’s odometer might report
incorrect position or speed values (¬position and¬speed, respectively). The train’s brakes
might malfunction, preventing the train from stopping (¬brakes). The sensor checking
whether the barriers are closed might incorrectly report that non-closed barriers are
closed or vice versa (¬report state) or the barrier motor might get stuck, preventing the
barriers from opening or closing (¬move). Lastly, the sensor that causes the crossing
to be opened again might incorrectly report that the train has passed ( detection) or
communication messages transmitted via radio might get lost (¬message).
Hazards. Collision avoidance is the system’s primary safety goal, i.e., the system is
designed to avoid the hazard of a train passing an unsecured crossing. Another hazard
is that of the erratic human behavior where drivers circumvent the closed barriers; it
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Figure 2.6. Overview of a hemodialysis machine connected to a patient. The extracorporeal
blood circuit pumps the blood through the dialyzer, where it is cleaned and subsequently pumped
back into the patient. The dialyzer uses an ultrafiltration process to remove waste products from
the blood with the dialyzing fluid delivery system being responsible for providing the necessary
dialyzing fluid to do so.
occurs if the barriers remain closed for much longer than necessary. These two hazards
are antagonistic, as the former can be avoided by never opening the barriers while
the latter is made impossible by never closing them. Therefore, a tradeoff must be
found that balances both hazards, a problem which has already been discussed in prior
work [68, 80]. In the remainder, the discussion is therefore restricted to the first hazard,
the hazard of collisions.
Challenges. The challenge primarily lies in the systematic creation of a comprehensible
model that reflects the fact that the two physically separate controllers for the train and
the barriers are connected together via a radio-based communication channel. From
an analysis point of view, the case study can have a large state space depending on
the necessary discretizations of the train’s position and speed. However, only a small
percentage of the states are actually reachable.
2.6 Hemodialysis Machine
The human body creates metabolic waste products that the kidneys usually remove from
the blood. When they fail, a hemodialysis machine must be used for this removal process
instead [47, 140]. As such a machine directly influences the chemical composition of a
patient’s blood, it is safety-critical. A conceptual overview of a hemodialysis machine
connected to a patient is given by Figure 2.6. The patient’s artery and vein are connected
to the extracorporeal blood circuit through syringes in order to deliver the blood from
the patient to the dialyzer and subsequently back again to the patient once it has
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been cleaned of the metabolic waste products. The dialyzer cleans the blood with a
semipermeable membrane through which waste products diffuse from the blood into
the dialyzing fluid provided by the dialyzing fluid delivery system. A total of nine faults
are considered in the case study that affect various components of all three parts of
the system. As the case study is only used for analysis efficiency evaluations in the
remainder, its inner workings and the faults are not explained in more detail; Leupolz
et al. [130] give a detailed report on a S#-based analysis of the case study.
Hazards. The hemodialysis machine is used to cleanse a patient’s blood from metabolic
waste products. Consequently, a hazard occurs when the device fails to do so for various
reasons after fault occurrences, that is, dialysis is unsuccessful when the overall dialyzing
process is completed but the patient’s blood is still not fully cleaned. Additionally, there
is the hazard of contaminated blood entering the patient which the safety detector and
the venous tubing valve shown in Figure 2.6 are designed to prevent. But like all safety
measures, they can fail, resulting in potentially lethal doses of contaminated blood being
pumped into the patient.
Challenges. The case study consists of a multitude of different components connected
together through fluid flows. In order to facilitate formal safety analysis, these flows
must be represented in a model, abstracting from the underlying complex physical
laws in order to conduct qualitative safety analyses without taking all physical details
into account. The main challenge therefore lies in a systematic and modular modeling
approach to create a comprehensive model that allows for formal safety analyses.
Summary and Outlook. The challenges provided by the aforementioned case studies fall into
three main categories: Creating adequate models, increasing safety analysis efficiency, and coping
with self-organization. The remainder of this thesis discusses several approaches to tackle these
challenges, applying them to and evaluating them with the height control case study in Chapter 7
as well as the two self-organization case studies in Chapter 8; the pressure tank case study is the
running example used throughout Chapters 3 to 6. A systematic modeling approach for safety-
critical systems is introduced in Chapter 3 and supported by the S# modeling language introduced
in Chapter 4. Subsequently, an efficient safety analysis technique based on model checking is
introduced in Chapter 5 and incorporated into the S# framework in Chapter 6. An approach to
tackle the unique challenges of self-organizing systems by deferring safety analyses to run time is
discussed in Chapter 8.
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Summary. The systematic modeling approach for safety-critical systems intro-
duced in the following supports the creation of adequate models, a prerequisite for
model-based safety analysis. Taking inspirations from SysML modeling concepts
as well as control theory [36, 62, 131, 153], structural and behavioral models are
created for the analyzed systems, emphasizing the feedback loops between plants
and controller components. In a separate step, faults are incorporated into the
models using the fault terminology and error propagation concepts summarized
by Avižienis et al. [9].
Publications. This chapter is an extended version of the work published in [84]. 3
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This chapter introduces and motivates a systematic modeling approach for safety-
critical systems that supports the creation of adequate models for formal safety analysis.
Systematic modeling takes advantage of basic concepts from systems and control theory
as well as embedded systems development, introduced in Section 3.1. Based on these
concepts, structural and behavioral modeling guidelines are discussed in Sections 3.2
and 3.3. Subsequently, Section 3.4 introduces a systematic fault modeling approach
based on well-known fault-related concepts such as fault injection and fault activation.
This chapter exclusively uses SysML [153] for systems modeling. SysML is a semi-formal
systems modeling language based on UML [154] that is well-established in the field
of software engineering and embedded systems development, including safety-critical
systems [79]. SysML defines many different types of models, all of which are tailored
towards describing certain structural or behavioral aspects of a system. For instance,
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sequence diagrams can be used to specify the dynamic behavior of a system while block
definition diagrams depict the different parts a system can be composed of. Overall,
combinations of different SysML model types allow for complete and comprehensive
descriptions of safety-critical systems.
The modeling guidelines presented in this chapter are derived from and strongly influ-
enced by the control-theoretical view of safety-critical systems as discussed by Leveson
[131], highlighting the importance of the correct representation of controllers, sensors,
actuators, and plants within the models for all safety-related modeling and analysis activ-
ities. This partitioning is one of the most fundamental aspects of modeling safety-critical
systems and is therefore imperative to get right, especially once faults are injected into
the models in order to facilitate formal safety analyses. The guidelines for fault modeling
are extensions of the work by Ortmeier et al. [160], systematizing the experiences of
working on the case studies from Chapter 2. On the other hand, some of the guidelines
are derived from general best practices and basic principles of software engineering
that cope with system complexity and increase modularity and comprehensibility; e.g.,
separation of concerns, single responsibility, low coupling, and others [33] apply just as
well when modeling safety-critical systems.
There are both analytical and constructive techniques and guidelines for building safety-
critical systems: The former assess system safety, identifying unacceptable safety issues
that have to be resolved before the system can be built or deployed. The latter, by contrast,
consist of constructive measures for designing and building safety-critical systems.
While both kinds of techniques are important during system development, this thesis
focuses exclusively on analytical activities. Thus, the systematic modeling approach
provides guidelines on how the models of safety-critical systems should be structured,
how behavior should be described, and how faults should be injected into the models to
allow for formal safety analyses. These guidelines, however, are not concerned with
the potential ways to actually architect and design safety-critical systems, nor do they
consider how relevant faults can be identified. Both of these tasks fall into the domain
of constructive safety engineering for which, non-surprisingly, various techniques
exist. For example, there are multiple architectural safety patterns that describe well-
established and proven techniques to design safety-critical functionality of a system [6,
87, 172] such as triple modular redundancy that is briefly discussed in Section 3.2.3. For
fault identification, classical safety analysis techniques such as FMEA [166] can be used,
while more formal approaches such as failure-sensitive specification [155] are available
as well. Additionally, programming libraries, e.g., Uncertain<T> [23] for working with
unreliable sensor data, help to avoid common software bugs, potentially preventing
development faults that might lead to hazards during system operation.
3.1 System and Model Basics
Most safety-critical systems belong to the class of reactive systems [204]: They con-
stantly and continuously interact with their surroundings to enforce reliable and safe
behavior whenever possible. The systems respond to environmental stimuli depending
on their current states, causing internal state changes as well as effects on their envi-
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Figure 3.1. Overview of the basic structure of a system: System inputs trigger internal state
changes, usually depending on the system’s previous state. The outputs represent the responses
to the inputs which are also typically influenced by the system’s state.
ronments. Safety-critical systems only have indirect means to monitor and influence
their environments, so they typically cannot enforce or prevent certain environment
behavior under all circumstances, particularly when their abilities are limited by one
or more faults. In general, safety-critical systems employ a form of control over their
environment. Control is a concept originating from systems theory as well as control
theory, which study systems in general and behavior modifications of dynamic systems
using feedback in particular [36, 62, 131]. The following subsections briefly discuss
some system and control basics that are subsequently applied to safety-critical systems
in order to motivate most aspects of the systematic modeling approach.
3.1.1 System Models
A system is a combination of different elements interacting with each other in order
to achieve the functions that the system is intended to perform [106]. Due to this
open definition of the notion of a system, systems theory is applicable to all sorts of
physical and non-physical objects, including technical hardware- and software-based
controllers, software protocols, natural laws, human behavior, or economic mechanisms.
The distinguishing factor between systems and models is that systems are real, whereas
models are abstractions approximating the systems in accordance with the system
aspects the models are intended to describe. In general, models can be created for all
kinds of systems; the opposite, however, is not necessarily true: Contradictions within a
model or absurd physical assumptions make it impossible to implement the model as
there can be no real system corresponding to it. For instance, a model of the railroad
crossing case study where the train moves faster than the speed of light is certainly
conceivable, yet a corresponding system cannot be implemented (at the moment) due to
the model bending the known laws of physics.
A formal model is a mathematical description of a system that allows for rigorous
reasoning about the system’s behavior. Typically, there are multiple approaches to
mathematically express the system’s behavior, some of which are more appropriate for
the task at hand, such as formal safety analysis, than others. Hence, modeling requires
creativity and cannot be automated in a general way. However, a model always consists
of the three main parts shown in Figure 3.1 that correspond to the system’s inputs, its
internal state updates, as well as its outputs.
Input & Output. In order for a model to be of any value, it must describe the system’s
responses to certain relevant stimuli. Systems generally have a set of inputs that provoke
certain outputs, i.e., the system responds to its input stimuli by producing some output.
For example, a model of the pressure tank might have two inputs: The amount of fluid
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that is pumped into it and the amount of fluid that is removed from it. The tank’s output
could be modeled as a function that indicates whether the tank is full, empty, anything
in between, or ruptured. In general, however, system outputs cannot be defined over
the inputs alone; they also depend on the system’s state as discussed in the following.
State Vector. The system’s state vector contains all the information required to deter-
mine the system’s outputs based on its state as well as the inputs. Due to their inherently
nondeterministic nature, safety-critical systems generally have multiple possible outputs
for the same states and inputs; faults, in particular, can affect the system’s behavior at
unforeseeable times, therefore making the outputs unpredictable. However, the state
vector must allow for predicting all future outputs given some inputs, hence faults must
be contained in the model, for example as additional, nondeterministic system inputs.
For the pressure tank example, the state vector might consist of the tank’s current
pressure level as well as a flag indicating whether the tank is ruptured. The latter must
be part of the state vector as the system’s response to some stimuli obviously depends
on whether the tank is already ruptured; without the knowledge of whether the tank
has already ruptured, future outputs could not be predicted.
State Equations. A system’s state space consists of all possible system states over time,
that is, the state space is induced by the state vector. The state space is completely
specified by giving some initial states of the system as well as state equations describ-
ing how the state changes over time in response to the inputs. For continuous-state,
continuous-time systems, state equations amount to differential equations describing
the overall state vector evolution. Discrete-state systems, on the other hand, generally
use discrete functions to describe the possible state changes, i.e., difference equations.
Discrete-State, Discrete-Time Models. In the pressure tank example, the part of the
state vector representing the pressure level is a subset of the real numbers. The tank’s
rupture flag, on the other hand, is obviously modeled more intuitively as a Boolean value.
The overall state space of the pressure tank model is therefore a hybrid of continuous
and discrete state information. This thesis, however, makes the simplifying assumption
that all state information is modeled in a discrete way. Similarly, the assumption of zero
execution time introduced in Section 3.1.3 approximates time by a sequence of discrete
time points t0 < t1 < . . . with ti+1− ti = ∆t for all i, resulting in discrete-time models
where the same amount of time passes between all consecutive points in time. For digital
systems such as software-based controllers, the above simplifications are inherently
justified as continuous values or continuous time do not exist in the digital space. Most
controllers of the case studies introduced in Chapter 2 are primarily software-based, for
instance, whereas the plants, on the other hand, are often continuous in reality.
Discretization. Continuous state such as the pressure tank’s pressure level or the
train’s position and speed in the railroad crossing case study can be discretized using, for
example, standard numerical procedures for solving ordinary differential equations [34].
One of the most basic methods is the Euler method: To approximate a solution for a
differential equation of the form y˙(t) = f(t, y(t))with initial value y(t0) = y0, the value
yk+1 at time step tk+1 is approximated by yk+1 = yk+∆t ·f(tk, yk), where∆t denotes
the step size and tk = t0 + k ·∆t. For example, the differential equation describing the
train’s position in the railroad crossing case study is x(t) = 12 x¨(t)·t2+x˙(t)·t. Assuming
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Figure 3.2. Illustration of the Euler method’s approximation error. The continuous function
drawn in gray is approximated with a step size of∆t by the discrete function drawn in black,
the error increasing with each time step.
a constant acceleration a = x¨(t), the train’s position p and speed s can be approximated
by pk+1 = pk + sk ·∆t and sk+1 = sk + a ·∆t for each analyzed point in time. The
global error of the Euler method is approximately proportional to the step size ∆t [34]
and can therefore become quite significant over time as illustrated by Figure 3.2. Still,
the Euler method is often sufficient for model checking-based analyses of safety-critical
systems as the number of analyzed steps is typically rather small to reduce analysis times,
keeping the deviation from the actual values at a tolerable level. If necessary, however,
accuracy can be improved by using more precise, but also more complex numerical
techniques such as the Runge-Kutta method or the predictor-corrector method [34].
3.1.2 Control and Feedback
The pressure tank case study can be considered to consist of two main subsystems that
influence each other: The first one is the pressure tank containing the fluid that is added
and removed as previously discussed; the second one is the software controller that
observes the pressure level and controls the pump that fills the tank. As these two parts
can be seen as systems again, the modeling process can often be decomposed along the
hierarchy of systems and subsystems. The distinction between a controller subsystem
and a subsystem that is being controlled is common, especially in the context of safety-
critical systems [137, 204]. In control theory, the controlled subsystem is usually called
the plant [36]. Because of their influence on the systematic modeling approach for
safety-critical systems, the concepts of control and feedback between controllers and
plants are briefly introduced in the following. A structural overview of the closed-loop
systems that result from control and feedback is shown in Figure 3.3.
Control. A controller is tasked with the selection of a plant’s inputs such that the
plant exhibits desirable behavior and fulfills its intended functions: It executes a control
algorithm that sets the plant’s inputs in such a way that undesirable plant behavior is
prevented. In the pressure tank case study, for example, the controller tries to prevent
unacceptable plant behavior such as tank ruptures, that is, the overall system is con-
sidered to be safe with regard to the hazard of ruptures if the controller succeeds in
preventing them. Without any control, ruptures are very likely to occur, as the pump
could be continuously enabled even though no fluid is removed from the tank.
Feedback. Feedback allows a controller to react to unexpected disturbances such as
faults, making corrections to the plant’s inputs in order to stipulate intended behavior.
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Figure 3.3. An overview of a closed-loop system with feedback: The controller modifies the
plant’s inputs to stipulate desired behavior. The plant’s output is fed back into the controller,
allowing it to react to unexpected disturbances such as faults. Similar to the plant, the controller
could also have state (not shown in the figure) affecting its output, i.e., the inputs of the plant.
Typically, feedback means that a controller is able to observe parts of the plant’s state in
order to make more informed control decisions. Observing plant state usually requires
additional sensors which increase development and system costs; in most real systems,
the controller therefore only has access to a fraction of the plant’s entire state vector.
In the pressure tank case study, for example, the controller depends on the pressure
sensor to provide feedback on whether the tank is full, influencing its decision to stop
pumping. Without the sensor, the controller could only assume that the tank is full
after a certain amount of time, which is obviously problematic in situations without
any demand for fluid, for example, causing the tank to be filled faster than usual. The
controller would therefore always have to assume no demand in order to be on the safe
side, a limitation that is unnecessary when feedback is available. To keep the case study
simple, however, fluid removal is assumed to be constant, making the feedback provided
by the sensor unnecessary for reasons of control. But as soon as faults such as ¬timeout
are considered, the sensor’s feedback is indeed relevant as it adds a level of redundancy
to the system. The feedback therefore helps to increase system safety by reducing the
chance of incorrect control decisions that would result in tank ruptures.
3.1.3 Zero Execution Time
The behavior of discrete-time systems is given by a sequence of system steps, where
each step corresponds to a tick of a logical clock with a fixed tick rate∆t. The system’s
real-time behavior is therefore abstractly represented by discrete-time behavior based on
the logical clock. Often, the assumption of zero execution time is made when developing
reactive systems [20, 119] that further allows to abstract from the system’s actual timing
behavior to simplify modeling and analysis: The systems are assumed to react infinitely
fast to any input stimuli, instantly computing their new states and outputs. Figure 3.4
visualizes this concept that it is particularly useful to model controllers: In zero time,
the controllers observe changes in the plants via feedback, compute the appropriate
control actions, and forward the computed actions to the plants.
The zero execution time assumption is justified and adequate only if the actual real-
world system indeed turns out to be faster than its environment, always producing and
emitting its outputs before its environment is able to generate new inputs. State changes
and output generation are only then guaranteed to be completed before any new inputs
are available, thus making it possible to abstract from the system’s precise reaction
times. For example, an electrical circuit stabilizes much faster than a human can switch
a button. In the height control case study, the decision for a tunnel closure is made in
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Figure 3.4. Illustration of the zero execution time assumption: The real-world system takes
some amount of time to react to each input stimuli occurring at different, non-overlapping points
in time. Depending on the inputs and the system’s current state, the length of these response
intervals can vary. The model, on the other hand, abstracts the response intervals into distinct
zero-time response instants over logical time.
a tiny fraction of the time it takes a vehicle to drive from the last sensor to the tunnel
entrance. Hence, it can reasonably be assumed that the height control is able to close
the tunnel before the vehicle collides, even though the actual sensor readouts, decision
computations, and the tunnel closing procedure do in fact take some time. For many
systems it is therefore valid to assume reactions to be instantaneous, simplifying system
modeling and making formal analyses more efficient. To ensure adequacy, techniques
and tools [205] are available to validate that the worst case execution times of all real-
world system reactions do not exceed the step interval ∆t used during analysis. For
software-based systems, it is also possible to rely on implementation languages whose
semantics are built upon the assumption of zero execution time; Esterel and Lustre are
two examples for such languages that are used in practice [20].
3.1.4 Safety-Critical Systems
Safety-critical systems consist of one ormore controllers that monitor one ormore plants,
intervening if necessary to prevent potentially bad plant behavior that might result in
hazards; hence, safety is a control problem [131]. Both plants and controllers are systems
in the systems-theoretical sense, therefore the distinction between both is a question of
perspective: A controller can itself be seen as a plant that can be controlled by another
controller as illustrated by Figure 3.5. A plant is controlled by an automated controller
through sensors and actuators that observe and influence the plant, respectively. Both
the plant and the automated controller can be additionally controlled by a human that
operates the automated controller via a keyboard, for instance, and observes its outputs
on a graphical display. From the human’s point of view, the automated controller is
thus also a plant. Humans are typically better suited to react to completely unforeseen
circumstances than automated controllers [131], and therefore often have the possibility
to override the actions carried out by the automated controllers, if necessary. On the
other hand, they have to keep two models in their head, one for the inner workings of
the plant and one for the automated controller. Operational faults by a human controller
can therefore also cause hazards; standard operational procedures, good training, and
experience, for instance, help to avoid such human mistakes [131]. Figure 3.6 illustrates
the classification of components into sensors, controllers, actuators, and plants as well
as the feedback between them for models of safety-critical systems. Depending on the
system’s complexity and the model’s level of abstraction, however, additional layers of
controllers might be necessary to model systems like the one represented by Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5. Overview of the general structure of safety-critical systems [131]: The plant is
controlled by an automated controller, both of which are in turn controlled by a human. The
plant can be affected by external disturbances that typically have negative impacts on the plant’s
behavior. The automated controller indirectly observes the state and behavior of the plant
using available sensors, utilizing the sensed data as inputs for its control algorithm and to
update its internal model of the plant. The control algorithm predicts the plant’s future behavior
with the help of the internal model, if necessary using the actuators to influence the plant to
prevent possible future undesired behavior. Displays and input devices such as keyboards are
the actuators and sensors that allow a human to observe and control the automated controller.
Plants. Plants can either be part of the safety-critical system under development or
they merely represent some parts of the system’s environment, i.e., the context that
the system is embedded into. In the latter case, the plant is not built and developed,
instead it is simply assumed to exist; the system’s task, however, is still to control the
plant to prevent hazards for as long as possible. For example, the pressure tank is part
of the system under development, whereas the overheight vehicles in the height control
case study are not. In fact, the height control does not influence the vehicles, but the
humans driving those vehicles instead. Humans are notoriously hard to predict and
model adequately, often requiring nondeterministic abstractions. In general, however,
neither the modeling approach nor the model-based safety analysis techniques concern
themselves with the kind of plants that are controlled, i.e., whether the plants consist of
humans, preexisting technical systems, newly developed technical systems, or some
mixtures thereof. The plants must only be modeled in sufficient detail to specify the
hazards and to adequately describe the feedback between plants and controllers.
Sensors & Actuators. The plants represent the entirety of what the controllers are
able to observe and influence. Controllers use some form of sensors for the former and
some kinds of actuators for the latter. For instance, a pressure sensor and a pump are
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(a) The general structure of models of safety-critical
systems. The controller is often a mixture of both
hardware- and software-based components; it too
can be controlled by other controllers, either auto-
mated or human, as illustrated by Figure 3.5.
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(b) The model of the pressure tank case study fol-
lows the general model structure. The pressure tank
is the plant that is controlled; its pressure level is ob-
served by the pressure sensor and influenced by the
pump that is enabled and disabled by the controller.
Figure 3.6. Overview of the basic structure of models of safety-critical systems [131, 186] in
general (left) and specifically for the pressure tank case study (right).
used by the controller of the pressure tank case study to observe the pressure level
within the tank and to start or stop increasing it, respectively. Human controllers, on
the other hand, typically use switches, buttons, and control lamps to control analogous
plants. For digital plants, they use digital input methods such as keyboards and mice
as well as screens and displays for observations. However, all of these different types
of sensors and actuators only allow indirect observations of and indirect influence on
the plants. In particular, sensor faults either prevent the controllers from observing the
plants altogether or they provide incorrect observations, whereas actuator faults either
take away the controllers’ ability to influence a plant or they change the actuators’
effects on the plants.
Controllers. Controllers make use of feedback to cope with faults originating from
either the controllers themselves, the plants, the sensors, or the actuators. Additionally,
feedback enables the controllers to determine whether their control actions are effective,
that is, whether the plants are influenced in a desirable and intended way. To do so,
feedback is used to update the controllers’ internal models of the controlled plants, which
in turn facilitates predictions of possible future plant behavior. Controllers represent
all of the means available to the system under development to influence the plants,
often making use of various different kinds of components: Just like plants, controllers
typically consist of mixtures of digital hardware and software components as well as
analog parts such as electronic circuits or hydraulic systems.
Application to the Case Studies. For some of the case studies, the basic classification
of system components into plants, controllers, sensors, and actuators is shown in Fig-
ures 3.6b and 3.7. Some of the models contain multiple controllers and/or multiple plants
that are observed and influenced by different kinds of sensors and actuators. The robot
cell case study even has nested controllers in the sense that the system’s reconfiguration
mechanism can be seen as a controller for the robots and carts.
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(a) In the radio-controlled railroad crossing case study, there are three plants: The train that approaches and
passes the crossing, the barriers that secure the crossing, and a radio channel that is used by the radio-based
communication and synchronization of the two physically separate train and crossing controllers. All
three plants are preexisting technical systems that are therefore not developed in the context of the case
study, but are slightly modified to allow control by the train and crossing controllers. The train controller
observes the train’s position and speed using an odometer and brings it to a halt during emergency stops
by activating the train’s brakes. The crossing controller uses a sensor to determine whether the barriers
are open or closed and activates the barrier motor to close or open the barriers. Both controllers make use
of radio transceivers to communicate with each other over the radio channel; the radio transceivers are
considered to be both sensors and actuators simultaneously.
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(b) In the height control case study, the controlled
plants are the vehicles driving through the Elbe Tun-
nel. While the light barriers and overhead detectors
observe the vehicles’ positions and, in particular, the
lanes they drive on, the traffic lights actually influ-
ence the human drivers within the vehicles instead
of the vehicles themselves. The overall height con-
trol consists of three subcontrollers responsible for
observing different sections of the road leading to the
tunnel entrance. In contrast to the two controllers of
the railroad crossing case study, however, they are
not physically separated but instead represent a de-
composition of the software constituting the height
control to increase modularity.
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(c) In the self-organizing robot cell case study,
the workpieces are the plants. The carts trans-
port the workpieces between different robots for
processing as well as into and out of the overall
production cell. Robots use their tools to modify
the workpieces in order to complete the tasks that
the workpieces require. Workpiece positions are
tracked through a set of detectors, allowing both
robots and carts to determine whether they can
interact with the workpieces. The reconfiguration
mechanism is a nested controller that observes the
robots and carts, changing their configurations if
they can no longer fulfill a workpiece’s task due
to a fault, for instance.
Figure 3.7. Overview of the model structures induced by control theory for the railroad
crossing, height control, and robot cell case studies. In each subfigure, plants are shown at the
bottom, whereas controllers are at the top. Sensors have arrows leaving the plants and going
into the controllers to indicate observation of plants, whereas the direction of the arrows is
reversed for actuators to represent interferences with the plants.
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(a) An exemplary hierarchical decomposition of the
component C0. Some of its subcomponents such
as C3 are further decomposed whereas C2 does not
require further decomposition for some reason.
C0
C1 C3
C2
in out
(b) An exemplary view of component C0 from the
left, showing its direct subcomponents and the
interdependencies between them that allow C0 to
compute its outputs for its inputs.
Figure 3.8. An illustration of hierarchical system decomposition (left) that allows the root
component C0 to be modeled independently of the rest of the system (right).
3.2 Modeling System Structure
Models of system structure describe the set of components a system consists of as well
as their interrelationships [25, 186]. To cope with complexity, system components are
decomposed into more elementary, less complex subcomponents, iteratively resulting
in a decomposition of the component hierarchy as illustrated by Figure 3.8a [203]. The
leaves of the hierarchy, that is, C2, C4, C6, C7, and C8, represent components for which
further decomposition is not required for one of two reasons: Either the components
are modeled in sufficient detail to be ready for implementation in hardware or software.
Alternatively, they might be standard off-the-shelf components that can be bought from
a third-party vendor and incorporated as-is into the final system such as the pump or
the pressure sensor of the pressure tank case study. In the latter case, the component
vendors already determined all possible component failures using some safety analysis
technique, most likely employing a similar decomposition approach. During safety
analyses of the larger system under development, these failures are used in conjunction
with an abstract model of the third-party component’s behavior [186].
Most models of safety-critical systems make use of such abstractions for off-the-shelf
components. Additional abstractions regarding the actual system’s structure or behavior
are often required to increase the model’s comprehensibility and to facilitate formal
analysis [13, 43, 90, 106]: Details not deemed to be relevant for the purpose of the model
are omitted. Hence, abstractions are crucial to reduce model size and complexity, but
they might also make a model useless for its purpose. In general, which abstractions
are made is somewhat arbitrary and whether the abstractions fulfill their intended
purpose without compromising adequacy can only be checked through verification and
validation. The exclusive use of discrete-state, discrete-time models throughout this
thesis is an abstraction, for instance, which potentially threatens adequacy due to the
approximation errors of the numerical integration methods.
Ideally, the individual components of a safety-critical system are modeled as separately
and independently as possible both to decrease model complexity as well as to increase
model reusability. Components that are not inherently and explicitly tied to other
concrete components are often easier to understand, model, develop, and maintain
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as long as their assumptions about and their guarantees for other components are
known and specified. In this sense, modeling safety-critical systems is no different
than software modeling and systems development in general, that is, fundamentals
such as modularization, encapsulation, low coupling, high cohesion, the open/closed
principle, etc. all apply just as well [161]. However, while the different components can be
modeled and developed separately, they can only be fully analyzed together: Not only the
individual component behavior potentially affects system correctness and system safety,
component interactions within a system can do so as well. Undesired, faulty interactions
of components that individually behave as intended indicate a systematic design flaw or
a communication fault that can potentially result in hazards; with increasing system
complexity, such interaction faults become more likely [131].
SysML block definition diagrams as well as internal block diagrams allow for structural
modeling and system decomposition at various levels of abstraction [33, 96, 153]. The
former describe the individual blocks a model consists of. A block denotes all types of
things within a system or its environment that are of relevance, such as real-world enti-
ties like humans or other systems, larger hardware or software subsystems of the system
under development, individual software classes, microprocessors, hydraulic or electrical
components, and so on. Therefore, the notion of component used so far captures just
a small part of what blocks are actually able to represent; nevertheless, the following
often uses the two terms interchangeably for reasons of simplicity. Block definition
diagrams by themselves are insufficient to completely describe all structural aspects of a
system. Instead, they must be used in conjunction with internal block diagrams that, as
implied by their name, show the internal structure of a block, similar to how Figure 3.8b
illustrates the inner workings of the root component of Figure 3.8a. Consequently, block
definition diagrams show the individual parts a system can be composed of, whereas
internal block diagrams describe how the blocks are used, instantiated, and connected
to compose other blocks and, eventually, the overall system.
3.2.1 Structural Modeling Guidelines
For formal safety analyses, it is important that the models reflect the general control-
theoretical system partitioning into plants, controllers, actuators, and sensors in order
to completely capture the entire feedback cycle between these different parts of the
system. The first core modeling guideline for safety-critical systems is therefore inferred
from control theory:
Guideline 1 (Separation of Plants and Controllers). Models of safety-critical systems
should clearly separate plants and controllers, also denoting the sensors and actuators
available to the controllers for observing and influencing the plants.
A controller internally has an implicit or explicit model of the plant that it controls
in order to reason about the plant’s state and to predict the plant’s future expected
behavior. It influences the plant using the actuators it has available to indirectly change
the plant’s state and therefore its future behavior. The controller uses all sensors it
has access to in order to observe and monitor the plant, trying to deduce the plant’s
current state. As the controller can only indirectly observe the plant using its sensors,
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discrepancies can emerge between the controller’s perceived state and the plant’s actual
state. Typical reasons for such discrepancies are faults or unexpected environmental
disturbances that cause the controller to receive incorrect sensor data or that result
in unintended actuator effects on the plant. State discrepancies might subsequently
result in incorrect controller actions, as the controller is likely to predict the plant’s
future behavior incorrectly. Therefore, it might accidentally and unknowingly execute
destructive control actions, or it might not take an action that it should have taken. Such
control failures do not necessarily result in hazards, however: Due to the feedback the
controller receives from the plant via the sensors, it might be able to discover and resolve
the state discrepancy, aligning its perceived state with the plant’s actual state before it
is too late to prevent a safety-critical situation. Consequently, these state discrepancies
must be part of the analyzed model in order to obtain adequate safety analysis results.
In the pressure tank case study, for instance, the pressure sensor’s ¬is full fault makes
the controller believe that pumping can safely continue whereas in reality, the tank
is about to rupture. If the timer’s ¬timeout fault also occurs, the tank ruptures, as the
controller has no way of observing the tank to be full and consequently does not shut
off the pump. If, on the other hand, the timer does in fact signal a timeout, the controller
is able to update its internal knowledge about the pressure level before it is too late and
it can then disable the pump just in time to prevent a tank rupture.
Guideline 2 (Specification of Hazards). It should be possible to exclusively specify haz-
ards over the models of the controlled plants, thereby ensuring that all influences on system
safety are considered during formal safety analysis.
As hazards typically arise from an inability to control negative influences on the system,
hazards represent control failures that safety analyses are intended to identify [131].
The specification of such failures generally cannot be expressed in terms of the control
mechanisms, but solely in terms of the controlled plants as the controller usually is
not even aware that it failed. In general, violations of properties of the form “for some
plant behavior b, the controller should perform some action a” are issues of functional
correctness which obviously can be safety-critical in many cases. As for components,
however, only considering individual behavior and functional correctness is insufficient:
Hazards often arise due to unintended and more concealed feedback loops between
a plant and its controller, in particular when the controller misinterprets the plant’s
behavior or its control actions do not have the intended effects on the plant due to
actuator faults, for instance. Specifying hazards in terms of the plants allows formal
safety analysis techniques to consider both sources of control failures uniformly. In the
pressure tank case study, for example, the pressure tank is the plant with the hazards
of tank ruptures and complete tank depletions specified exclusively over the tank’s
state. For the formal safety analysis techniques, it is irrelevant whether a tank rupture
is the result of an incorrect controller action because of a design mistake or the result
of an omitted controller action due to ¬is full and ¬timeout. Consequently, Guideline 2
underlines the importance of Guideline 1, requiring that all necessary information for
the adequate specifications of the hazards is contained in the plant models.
Guideline 3 (Structural Modularity & Composability). A modular modeling approach
should be followed that supports system decomposition, block encapsulation, and block
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composition to reduce modeling complexity and to conveniently model and analyze several
combinations of system design alternatives.
A modular modeling approach helps to identify and fix modeling or specification flaws
as it makes it easier to consider blocks in isolation. Modular models increase comprehen-
sibility and composability, resulting in fewer development faults that otherwise might
manifest themselves as hazards during system operation [25, 131]. Guideline 3 therefore
motivates the use of SysML’s component-oriented modeling techniques to iteratively
decompose safety-critical systems. Modeling best practices [161] such as encapsula-
tion, separation of concerns, or the single responsibility principle, for example, help to
ensure modularity and therefore should be adhered to whenever possible. Modularity
and composability are closely related, as the same modeling principles that support
modularity in general also increase composability. Clear interfaces between different
components and, in particular, adherence to the Liskov substitution principle [161]
further support composability and consequently help to follow Guideline 3. There are
several reasons why flexibility in model composition is beneficial: Especially during
early phases of development, different design variants of a system are often evaluated
before one is chosen and actually developed. Moreover, safety analyses might show the
necessity for additional safety measures in order to decrease hazard probabilities, but
their implementations must in turn also be checked for additional safety issues. Finally,
safety-critical product lines are also gaining more traction [16] where multiple different
variants of a safety-critical systems are assembled based on customer wishes.
3.2.2 Component Modeling
SysML blocks are a very general modeling concept with very few constraints restricting
their use for modeling. Similarly, the systematic modeling approach for safety-critical
systems is very liberal regarding both structural and behavioral modeling. In particular,
a strict hierarchical decomposition is not enforced as it is sometimes beneficial for some
blocks of a model to be able to reference other blocks without any physical containment
relationship existing between them. For instance, the modeling approach allows for the
train controller of the railroad crossing case study to reference the physically separate
crossing controller directly. For highly abstract models, this structure might be adequate
to abstract from the radio-based communication between the two controllers. In less
abstract models, by contrast, such direct references must be avoided for reasons of
adequacy, instead requiring a radio channel that handles the communication between
the two controllers as shown in Figure 3.7a. The systematic modeling approach therefore
only gives some basic guidelines and restrictions on how SysML’s modeling flexibility
is best used for model structuring. In the end, adequate structuring depends on both the
system to be modeled as well as the purposes the model is created for.
SysML blocks are defined as a stereotype for UML classes [153]. Blocks therefore support
all features that UML provides for classes, such as generalization, interfaces, properties,
associations, and operations; value types and enumerations can also be declared in
SysML block definition diagrams [33, 153, 154]. Often, blocks have internal state that, at
least ideally, they hide from other blocks to follow the principle of encapsulation [161].
Blocks can be composed of other, more elementary ones to decomposemodels along their
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Figure 3.9. The SysML block definition diagram for the pressure tank case study showing all
of the blocks the model consists of as well as their state values, ports, required and provided
operations, and associations. As per Guideline 1, the overall model is separated into a con-
troller and a plant as indicated by the custom stereotypes «controller» and «plant», respectively.
The Pump and PressureSensor blocks are also clearly labeled with the «actuator» and «sensor»
stereotypes; they are ports of the overall PressureController, allowing the controller to observe
and influence the plant. Guideline 3 is satisfied due to the modular modeling of the individual
components constituting the case study. The analyzed hazards can be completely specified over
Tank::_pressureLevel alone, adhering to Guideline 2.
physical or logical structure. They are allowed to reference arbitrary other blocks they
depend on through SysML’s notation for associations and dependencies. Additionally,
blocks can declare provided and required operations that handle the communication
between them; two such operations of the same signature can be connected in an
internal block diagram, with the connection triggering the behavior associated with the
provided operation whenever the required operation is used. A block definition diagram
containing all of the blocks of the pressure tank case study is shown in Figure 3.9.
Block Relationships. Blocks can be associated with other blocks in multiple ways:
Standard UML associations indicate that a block is somehow able to reference and access
other blocks. Composite associations, by contrast, model part-whole relationships where
the part is physically or logically owned by the parent block but still has an identity of
its own [153, 154]. In the pressure tank case study, for example, the Pump, PressureSensor,
Timer, and SoftwareController are all parts of the overall PressureController as illustrated
by Figure 3.9, whereas the SoftwareController is simply associated with the other three
aforementioned blocks. Using these references, the software reads sensor values, checks
for timeouts, and enables or disables the pump. For formal safety analyses of the case
study, however, the exact sequences of real-world operations that somehow enable the
software to read out and control the hardware components is deemed to be of little
importance. Thus, these associations abstract away the drivers, APIs, operation system,
and digital to analog/analog to digital converters that give the actual controller software
access to the respective real-world hardware components.
State. A block’s values and association ends correspond to a part of the system’s state
vector, whereas the overall state vector of the system is given by the entirety of all block
values and association ends. The operations and state machines associated with the
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blocks, cf. Section 3.3, make up the state equations that change the system’s state and
therefore describe its behavior. In Figure 3.9, for instance, the value Tank::_pressureLevel
denotes the state of the pressure tank block, i.e., the pressure level within the tank.
Similarly, Timer::_remainingTime and Pump::_isEnabled indicate how much time is left
until a timeout occurs and whether the pump is enabled or disabled, respectively.
PressureSensor, on the other hand, has no state. The state of the SoftwareController is
hidden behind its associated state machine as discussed in Section 3.3.
Ports. The «port» stereotype of the Pump and PressureSensor blocks in Figure 3.9 indicate
that these two blocks are ports of the PressureController block. Ports allow for indirect
communication between blocks without the blocks knowing about each other. In SysML,
ports are always typed by blocks that declare provided and required operations for
other blocks to access. Provided operations can be seen as declarations of services
that a block provides for consumption by other blocks. Required operations, on the
other hand, are services that a block requires from other blocks to perform its intended
function. Operations that a block requires must therefore be satisfied by operations
that another block provides when assembling a system. Figure 3.9 shows the operations
that the individual blocks provide or require, like, for instance, PressureSensor::IsFull or
PressureSensor::PhysicalPressure, respectively. The former is used by the control software
to check whether the tank is full and the pump must be shut off. The latter, by contrast,
is a required operation that allows the pressure sensor to determine the actual pressure
level within the tank. Such connections between ports are not shown in block definition
diagrams; they are established by internal block diagrams when larger blocks or the
overall system are assembled out of more elementary blocks.
3.2.3 Component Composition
Block definition diagrams such as the one in Figure 3.9 only show the blocks and their
relationships that make up the overall system model. The actual block and system
composition, on the other hand, can only be shown by internal block diagrams like the
one in Figure 3.10 for the pressure tank case study. Just like objects are instances of
software classes, blocks represent types of things, that is, structural specifications of
sets of block instances. Thus, internal block diagrams show the block instances and the
connections between their ports that constitute other blocks or the overall system.
Port Connections. Required and provided operations of the same signature, that is,
operations with matching return types as well as parameter types, can be connected,
resulting in invocations of the required operation to be forwarded to the connected
provided operation. In the pressure tank case study, for example, the tank::IsBeingFilled
required operation is connected to the pump::IsEnabled provided operation, meaning that
whenever the tank needs to determine whether it is being filled, the pump checks whether
it is enabled. As the tank is only indirectly connected to the pump, there can be other
system configurations with completely different connections to determine whether the
tank is being filled. If this level of indirection is not desired, direct connections between
an operation and block can be established as shown for the software and the timer. In
these cases, the corresponding conjugated operations are either not modeled for reasons
of brevity, or the connections represent invocations through reference associations.
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Figure 3.10. The SysML internal block diagram for the pressure tank case studymodel showing
how the various blocks of Figure 3.9 are composed together. The pump and sensor instances
are shown as nested ports on the controller, with their IsEnabled and PhysicalPressure operations
connected to the tank’s IsBeingFilled and PressureLevel operations, respectively. Required and
provided operations are shown with SysML’s balls and sockets notation, which actually is an
abuse of notation; SysML generally only allows block-typed ports, which, however, would
introduce too much syntactical overhead for this simple model with no benefit. The provided
operations directed inwards into the controller are directly used by the SoftwareController instance
through its associations with pump, sensor, and timer.
Modeling Design Variants. With SysML’s support for modular modeling and flexible
block composition, additional abstractions and levels of indirection can be added to
a model to allow for the composition of different system design variants as shown in
Chapter 7 for the height control case study. Another example is a more reliable pressure
detection mechanism based on the triple modular redundancy safety pattern [6, 25] that
increases the pressure tank case study’s fault tolerance: With triple modular redundancy,
the critical component is replicated three times and a voting mechanism is introduced
that determines the actual outputs through majority voting or other policies. As a
result, fault tolerance improves because a failure of only one of the components no
longer results in incorrect outputs. Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show the application of the
triple modular redundancy pattern to the pressure tank case study’s pressure sensor:
The PressureSensor block from Figure 3.9 is replaced by a new pressure detection block
TripleModularRedundantDetection that incorporates three instances of either the original
pressure sensor or nested triple modular redundant detectors, plus a voting mechanism
to determine the resulting values that should be returned by the IsFull and IsEmpty
provided operations. Consequently, safety improves as now at least two instances of
¬is full must occur in addition to ¬timeout in order to cause a tank rupture.
As shown by Figures 3.11 and 3.12, the two software design patterns Composite and
Strategy can be used to model the improved version of the case study [66]. Following
the Composite pattern, a common interface IPressureDetector is introduced that abstracts
away the differences between the original design and the triple modular redundant
one. For the voting module, an IVotingStrategy interface is introduced that provides a
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Figure 3.11. A partial block definition diagram showing how the reliability of pressure level
detection can be improved through the use of triple modular redundancy. The PressureSensor
block and the TripleModularRedundantDetection block realize the same IPressureDetector interface in
order to allow them to seamlessly replace each other, improving model modularity and compos-
ability. Multiple voting strategies are abstracted away behind a common IVotingStrategy interface;
a non-exhaustive set of three strategies is shown. The unchanged parts of the PressureController
like the Pump or the Timer are omitted.
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Figure 3.12. An internal block diagram showing an instance of the TripleModularRedundantDe-
tection configured to use MajorityStrategy instances to determine the value of the IsEmpty and IsFull
ports. Delegate connections are used to forward the voter’s Result ports to the overall detector’s
IsFull and IsEmpty ports in addition to distributing the incoming PhysicalPressure to the three
PressureSensor instances the overall detector consists of. Connections are established between
the sensorn::IsEmpty provided operations and the emptyVoter::Valuen required operations as well
as between the sensorn::IsFull provided operations and the fullVoter::Valuen required operations
for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. As the sensors within the detector are typed as IPressureDetector, multiple
TripleModularRedundantDetection could be nested for further reliability improvements.
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consistent surface area for different voting mechanisms such as majority voting or
average computations. The voting mechanisms are independent from the PressureSensor
blocks through the use of ports and port connections, making it possible to reuse them
in other situations as well. Overall, this setup allows for modeling and analyzing various
different system variants, including the original one shown in Figure 3.10.
3.3 Modeling System Behavior
There are several behavioral modeling paradigms that can be used to describe the
behavior of a system: Data flow, control flow, state machines, or state equations, for
example [20, 145, 153]. Data flow focuses on functional dependencies between system
inputs and outputs, linking the outputs of a step to the inputs of the next steps. Control
flow, by contrast, clearly shows the sequences of operations as well as the conditions
under which certain operations are executed, deemphasizing the connections between
inputs and outputs. State machines model discrete sequences of system state changes
over time; as in systems theory, a state encompasses all of the information that is
necessary for the specification of the block’s current and future behavior, with transitions
changing the block’s state. State equations are most useful to describe the correlation
between different physical quantities.
Each of these behavioral modeling paradigms has its strengths and weaknesses in
modeling certain behavioral aspects. For instance, while it is possible to model sequential
operations using state machines, the resulting model is less concise and therefore
harder to understand than a control flow-based one. It is therefore often beneficial
to mix several paradigms, modeling the behavior of different components or different
behavioral aspects of the same component using multiple paradigms. The following
mostly focuses on behavioral modeling with state machines and control flow as the
case studies can be adequately modeled without data flow or differential equations. The
physical quantities that are indeed important for the case studies are approximated using
numerical procedures as previously discussed; SysML parametric diagrams describe the
correlations between the different physical quantities in these cases.
Such approximations of differential equations are a form of behavioral abstraction [25,
127]. Other forms of behavioral abstractions also play a crucial role in behavioral
modeling: The leaf components in Figure 3.8a on page 31 are abstractions of the actual
components they represent, because even though they could have been decomposed
even further, the chosen system decomposition was deemed to be appropriate for the
purposes of the model. The behavioral models of the leaf components consequently
have to abstract away how the omitted subcomponents behave and interact with each
other. Even for intermediate components within the hierarchy that are fully decomposed,
behavioral abstraction is sometimes necessary or helpful. For instance, the exact behavior
might be unknown or too complex to specify especially when humans are involved, or
it might unacceptably slow down analyses. Multiple imaginable behaviors are another
potential reasons when the one that will eventually be built into the actual system is
not yet decided during early phases of development. In all of these cases, the actual
behavior is typically abstracted away using nondeterminism.
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3.3.1 Behavioral Modeling Guidelines
There are interdependencies between behavioral modeling and the structural decom-
position into blocks. If the system structure is modeled inappropriately, behavioral
modeling becomes cumbersome and reduces model comprehensibility. Conversely,
good model structuring usually supports behavioral modeling. Models are therefore
created iteratively to cope with the interdependencies between structural and behavioral
aspects of the system: The first iteration structurally decomposes the system before
actual component behavior is modeled, which in turn potentially requires structural
changes and thus additional iterations. The primary goal of structural modeling is thus
to support and ease behavioral modeling as formal safety analyses are mostly concerned
with reasoning about behavior, whereas structure only plays a secondary role. Following
the structural modeling guidelines is still important, however, as model adequacy or
comprehensibility might be compromised otherwise.
Guideline 4 (Behavioral Modularity & Composability). Behavior should be modularized
and modeled for each component individually to allow for behavioral composability.
One of the main reasons for system decomposition is the modularization of behavior,
allowing individual components to be modeled separately. The basic principle of encap-
sulation not only refers to state, but also to behavior [161]: Components expose only
their “what”, but not their “how” [203], meaning that contracts are defined over the
components’ ports that describe what the components do, but abstract away how the
components actually achieve their intended behavior. Consequently, established model-
ing principles such as design to interfaces, polymorphism, and the Liskov substitution
principle also apply when modeling safety-critical systems [161].
Guideline 5 (Adequate Modeling Paradigms). Behavior should be modeled using one or
more behavioral modeling paradigms that increasemodel comprehensibility and adequacy
while still allowing for formal analyses.
Ideally, the most appropriate modeling paradigm would be used for each behavioral
aspect of a system, combining multiple ones to achieve the highest possible model
quality. However, mixing too many different paradigms significantly complicates formal
analyses due to the increased complexity of themodeling language semantics, potentially
making fully exhaustive model checking infeasible [58, 118]. It is therefore necessary
to find a tradeoff that balances formal analysis applicability and efficiency on the one
hand and the model’s level of expressiveness and comprehensibility on the other hand.
The modeling approach outlined in this chapter, for example, abstracts from continuous
quantities that are often best specified using differential equations. For systems where
only a small fraction of the component behavior is continuous, discretizations using
numerical approximations often make the modeling approach applicable nevertheless;
for predominantly continuous systems, however, the approach is likely inappropriate.
Guideline 6 (Feedback). Zero-time feedback loops between plants and controllers should
be avoided as they likely violate the zero execution time assumption.
Despite the assumption of zero execution time, feedback loops are usually required to
take time. That is, the controllers observe the plants, compute the appropriate control
actions, and use the actuators to influence the plants in zero time, while the plants’
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reactions to the control actions can only be observed at a later point in time due to inertia.
It is therefore necessary to identify the feedback loops that exist within a system model
and, if necessary, to break up any zero-time loops by adding time delays. For systems
that are exclusively modeled using differential equations, it must be possible to find a
solution; for control flow- or state machine-based behavior, a fix point must eventually be
reached in which the overall system state is stable until the next inputs arrive. In general,
zero-time feedback loops can usually be broken up by linearizing the components the
loop consists of and adding a non-zero-time delay appropriately. Especially at the level
of abstraction required to formally analyze safety-critical systems, it is often sufficient to
delay the controller actions by one system step before they reach the plants again in order
to break up feedback loops. Some implementation languages like Esterel have complex
semantics that allow them to automatically determine whether zero-time feedback loops
exist [189]; they still must be fixed manually, however. Similarly, real-time critical
robotics applications require the use of special primitives to break up feedback loops
that take no time [196].
Guideline 7 (Closing the Models). Behavior should not depend on any inputs that are
not explicitly modeled to increase analysis efficiency.
The systems-theoretical characterization of safety-critical systems allows for arbitrary
system inputs and outputs, some of which are part of the feedback loop when a con-
troller is introduced to monitor and control a plant. Inputs that are not determined
by some outputs, however, can be problematic for formal safety analysis techniques:
As the model contains no information for these inputs, they must be assumed to be
completely nondeterministic, increasing analysis complexity and therefore reducing
analysis efficiency. Some completely nondeterministic inputs are unavoidable, for in-
stance to model faults and to abstract human behavior when it cannot be predicted.
Other kinds of nondeterministic inputs hint at underspecification, however, making
safety analyses slower and inaccurate or possibly even inadequate.
3.3.2 Model of Computation
Established component- and object-oriented modeling techniques and best practices are
usually sufficient to create behavioral models complying with Guideline 4. Guidelines 5
to 7, by contrast, are primarily concerned with the creation of adequate and comprehen-
sible models that can still be formally analyzed, two goals that are sometimes at odds
with each other. The model of computation that underlies all system models throughout
this thesis tries to strike a balance between these two somewhat antagonistic goals.
It depends on discrete formalizations of system states, without any explicit support
for real-time modeling or continuous variables; such continuous quantities have to be
discretized manually using numerical procedures as discussed before. Consequently, the
systematic modeling approach outlined in this chapter has to be adapted for systems
where such a discretization would be inappropriate, also requiring other formal analysis
tools that support timed or hybrid system models. However, for system models where
neither timed nor continuous behavior plays an important role and can be adequately ab-
stracted from, the discrete-state, discrete-time model of computation allows for efficient
safety analyses as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
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Figure 3.13. Illustration of the micro-macro steps semantics underlying the model of compu-
tation: Solid states drawn at the logical time boundaries t0, t1, . . . are actually observable, while
the intermediate dashed states and micro steps are unobservable, system-internal computations
that are invisible from outside the system. The macro step beginning at time t0, for instance,
consists of four micro steps, resulting in the macro step’s final state in zero time. From this state,
a new macro step starts at time t1 after the step duration ∆t has passed.
Micro & Macro Steps. As illustrated by Figure 3.13, the model of computation imple-
ments the zero execution time assumption for reactive systems by distinguishing be-
tweenmicro andmacro steps, a distinction that is alsomade by the synchronous program-
ming language Esterel as well as by Harel’s transition system formalism [31, 169, 189],
for example. Macro steps describe the observable behavior of a system, whereas the
micro steps illustrate how and why the behavior occurs, e.g., individual steps of control
flow behavior or individual state machine transitions. Overall, the system is seen as
executing a sequence of macro steps beginning at fixed points in time t0, t1, t2, . . ., with
each macro step assumed to take zero time. Between two consecutive macro steps, the
same amount of time∆t passes such that ti = t0+ i ·∆t. Each macro step consists of a
finite amount of zero, one, or more micro steps that are considered to be system-internal
and unobservable from the outside; they are intermediate steps that the system performs
to update its state.
Macro Step Phases. During the macro steps, all of the plants and controllers contained
in the model execute their behavior in a sequence of micro steps. All plants are assumed
to execute their behaviors first, followed by the execution of the controller behaviors.
Macro steps are therefore not only subdivided into finite sequences of micro steps,
but also into two phases as illustrated by Figure 3.14: Plant execution and controller
execution. Conceptually, this two-phase execution approach allows the controllers
to immediately react to changes in their plants’ states: At some time tn, the plants
change their state in zero time through a sequence of micro steps. Within the same
macro step, the controllers observe these changes through their sensors, compute the
appropriate control actions, and update their actuators, all in zero time as well by
performing multiple micro steps. Once all controllers are done, the macro step ends,
time passes, and a new macro step tn+1 begins where the plants are influenced by the
previous changes made to the actuators, causing plant state changes and completing the
feedback loop. Sensors therefore observe the most recent plant states, whereas actuator
effects are deferred to the following step to break up the feedback loop.
Feedback Loops. The model of the railroad crossing case study, for instance, contains
several feedback loops as indicated by Figure 3.7a on page 30 that are broken up by this
two-phase micro-macro steps execution approach: When a new macro step starts, the
train advances its position, taking a potential emergency brake into account. Simul-
taneously, the barriers open or close, if requested, while the radio channel forwards
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Figure 3.14. In addition to the partitioning into multiple micro steps, each macro step also
separates plant behavior from controller behavior, with the plant behavior always executed first.
The controller’s last micro step ends the macro step, causing time to pass and a new macro step
to begin; no time passes between the plant and controller parts of a macro step.
the messages sent between the two controllers. Subsequently, the train and crossing
controllers observe their plants for relevant changes and react accordingly. For instance,
the radio channel might forward the train controller’s approach message to the crossing
controller, causing the controller to activate the barrier motor in order to secure the
crossing. All of these actions are micro steps belonging to the same macro step; starting
with the next macro step, the barriers subsequently begin to close. Similarly, the larger
feedback loop between the train and crossing controllers via the radio channel is broken
up into at least two macro steps: When the train controller sends a message during
macro step tn, it is received by the crossing controller at tn+1. If the latter decides to
send an answer immediately, the train controller receives the response at tn+2, i.e., the
train controller must wait for at least two macro steps before any response can arrive.
Macro Step Execution. Each block in a system model can have two kinds of behavior:
Behavior attached to the block’s operations is executed whenever the corresponding
operation is invoked, whereas the block’s active behavior is executed autonomously
during each macro step; such active behavior is based on the SysML concept of active
blocks [153]. The model of computation places some restrictions on active behavior: The
behavior must be cyclic and cannot terminate, each cycle is not allowed to span multiple
macro steps, and it must start executing a new cycle when the block receives an Update
signal. Each block is free to signal Update to other blocks, in most cases respecting the
decomposition hierarchy while doing so. During a single macro step, the signal can
be sent zero, one, or more times to the same block for maximum modeling flexibility.
For example, a robot in the robot cell case study might never be triggered as long as it
is currently not configured to perform any actions on any workpieces. On the other
hand, multiple signals might be necessary for blocks that are required to reach a fix
point during a macro step. Algorithm 1 illustrates the two phase execution process of
macro steps, showing that each top-level plant or controller block of the overall system
model is signaled exactly once; these blocks can subsequently forward the signals to
other blocks as necessary, taking care of the model-specific distribution.
Concurrency. There are two different kinds of concurrency: Synchronous concurrency
and asynchronous, interleaved concurrency [13]. The former is assumed throughout
this thesis as it subsumes asynchronous concurrency, that is, interleaving executions of
different components can be simulated in a synchronous context, albeit with sacrifices in
analysis efficiency. In general, synchronous concurrency is more adequate for models of
hardware, as different parts of a chip usually run in lockstep. Asynchronous concurrency,
by contrast, is beneficial for interleaving software processes that are running on one
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functionMacroStep(plants : Set<Block>, controllers : Set<Block>)
for p ∈ plants do
Signal(p, Update)
end for
for c ∈ controllers do
Signal(c, Update)
end for
end function
Algorithm 1. An algorithm conceptually describing linearized macro step execution in two
phases: Update signals are first sent in some arbitrary order to all plants before all controllers
are signaled. All signals are sent sequentially, so there is no concurrent execution.
or more CPUs or that are distributed over multiple, mostly independent systems [164].
For safety-critical systems, asynchronous concurrency is inadequate, however, as arbi-
trarily interleaving the execution of plant and controller components would result in
many unrealistic scenarios, making formal safety analysis mostly meaningless: Model
checkers would analyze all situations where plants execute an arbitrary amount of
steps before the controllers are allowed to react, which is completely unrealistic and
violates the assumption of zero execution time. In fact, plant and controller execution
are implicitly synchronized by time, which is more adequately captured by synchronous
concurrency. Asynchronous concurrency, by contrast, is often encountered between
different controllers such as the train and crossing controllers of the railroad case study.
These two controllers are located in two physically separated locations and therefore
execute independently in parallel, only synchronized by radio-based communication.
Linearization. Two blocks are considered to execute synchronously concurrent when
their actions have no effect on each other during the same macro step. During analyses,
the actual execution of these blocks can thus be linearized: If there are multiple plants or
controllers, they execute their behavior sequentially in some unspecified order during
the appropriate phases of the macro steps as shown by Algorithm 1; the resulting flow of
Update signals through a system model is conceptually illustrated by Figure 3.15. Overall,
linearization reduces neither modeling flexibility nor adequacy as both synchronous and
asynchronous concurrent execution can still be explicitly modeled despite sequential
execution during analyses. At the same time, analysis techniques do not have to consider
concurrency explicitly, which canmake themmore efficient. Due to linearization, models
can never assume a specific execution order of different blocks, but it is still possible for
a model to force a specific order if desired: The blocks that should be explicitly ordered
must be grouped together into one common parent block that schedules their executions
appropriately. Algorithm 1 then sends the Update signal to this parent block at some
point during macro step execution, which subsequently coordinates the executions of
the original blocks by sending them Update signals whenever doing so is appropriate.
3.3.3 Modeling Component Behavior
SysML sequence diagrams, parametric diagrams, and state machine diagrams model
behavior based on control flow, state equations, or state machines, respectively [153].
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Figure 3.15. Illustration of the flow of Update signals (indicated by the arrows) through amodel
within a macro step: The plants receive the signal first, in turn signaling their subcomponents
if necessary. During the second phase of the macro step, the controllers process the Update
signal, also orchestrating their subcomponents, if any. The top-level blocks of each phase, i.e.,
P1, P2, and P3 as well as C1 and C2, conceptually execute in parallel in some arbitrary order as
determined by Algorithm 1. The signaling order of A, B, and C as well as D, and E, by contrast,
is explicitly modeled by the parent blocks P2 and C1, respectively. In each macro step, the loop
from C to A can only be taken finitely often as the macro step would not terminate otherwise.
For each behavioral aspect of a block, if there is more than one, the appropriate diagrams
can be combined together to describe the block’s overall behavior.
Modeling Control Flow. Figure 3.16 uses a SysML sequence diagram to give an
overview of the distribution of Update signals to the components of the pressure tank
case study. Due to the simplicity of this case study, the overall Update signal distribution
behavior only consists of a simple sequence of Update notifications; more complex
systems would make use of conditionals, loops, parallelism, and potentially nondeter-
minism. The ability to model control flow-based behavior is redundant when state
machine-based behavior is supported by a modeling formalism but nevertheless useful
for reasons of conciseness: Control flow consists of sequences of variable updates,
conditional statements, loops, and so on, the entirety of which denote a control flow
graph that could alternatively be expressed in a semantically equivalent state machine;
conversely, there is always a control flow-based representation of any state machine. In
most cases, however, one of the two forms of behavioral modeling is more natural than
the other and increases model comprehensibility.
Modeling State Machines. State machines model state-dependent reactions to incom-
ing events. Events can be receptions of Update signals or invocations of a provided
operation of the block the state machine belongs to. The SysML syntax event [guard]
/ action denotes the event that triggers a transition, the guard that must hold for the
transition to be eligible for being taken, as well as the control flow-based action that is
executed when the transition is indeed taken. If multiple transitions are eligible, i.e., the
current state has multiple outgoing transitions for the current event whose guards hold,
one transition is chosen nondeterministically. Even though SysML leaves it undefined
whether a transition takes time [154], the following always considers transitions to be
instantaneous in accordance with the assumption of zero execution time. A state change
therefore is a micro step, thus multiple transitions can be taken within the same macro
step. In particular, the run-to-completion semantics of SysML state machines [121, 154]
selects a maximally consistent set of enabled transitions whenever an event is triggered,
potentially causing multiple transitions to be taken before any new incoming events
are considered. State machines store a queue of incoming events that must be empty at
the end of each macro step in order to facilitate model checking-based analyses.
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sd Update Signals
: PressureTankModel : Timer: PressureController : SoftwareController: Tank
Update
Update
Update Update
Update
Figure 3.16. A SysML sequence diagram showing how Update signals are distributed through
the model of the pressure tank case study. No signals are sent to the pressure sensor and the
pump as they have no active behavior; they would simply ignore any Update signal sent to them.
stm SoftwareController
Inactive
FillingStoppedBySensor StoppedByTimer
Update [Timer.HasElapsed()] 
/ Pump.Disable()
Update [Sensor.IsFull()] / 
Pump.Disable(); 
Timer.Stop();
Update [Sensor.IsEmpty()] /
Pump.Enable(); Timer.Start();
Update [Sensor.IsEmpty()] /
Pump.Enable(); Timer.Start();
Update [Sensor.IsEmpty()] / 
Pump.Enable(); Timer.Start();
Figure 3.17. The SysML state machine representing the active behavior of the pressure tank
case study’s software controller: Initially, the controller is in the Inactive state. It switches to
Filling as soon as the sensor reports that the tank is empty, activating the pump and starting
the timeout. Filling continues until either the sensor reports that the tank is full or the timer
signals a timeout, causing the controller to switch to its StoppedBySensor or StoppedByTimer states,
respectively. The controller remains in these states until the tank is reported to be empty again.
bdd Pressure Constraint
«block, plant»
Tank
values
_pressureLevel : int
_pressureIn : int
_pressureOut : int
1
«constraint»
PressureEquation
constraints
{in + out = dp/dt}
parameters
p : Pa
in : Pa/s
out : Pa/s
t : s
(a) A SysML block definition diagram that adds the
PressureEquation constraint to the Tank block declared
in Figure 3.9 on page 35.
par Tank
_pressureLevel
: PressureEquation
{in + out = dp/dt}
_pressureIn
_pressureOut
in : Pa/s
p : Pa
out : Pa/s
(b) A SysML parametric diagram that establishes
the bindings between the Tank’s values and the
PressureEquation constraint’s parameters.
Figure 3.18. The SysML specification of the relationship between the Tank’s _pressureIn, _pres-
sureOut, and _pressureLevel values using a constraint block and a parametric diagram. The time
parameter t is assumed to be implicitly bound to a clock that is advanced with each macro step.
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Each state machine attached to a block implicitly introduces additional state information,
namely, a reference to the state the state machine is currently in. More advanced SysML
features such as history states further increase the overall state information of the
corresponding block, but are not considered in the remainder of this thesis. In the
pressure tank case study, the state machine in Figure 3.17 represents the overall state
information of the SoftwareController block from Figure 3.9, page 35, in its entirety, as the
block does not declare any values or associations that change during analysis. The state
machine in Figure 3.17 models the control software’s active behavior: Whenever the
controller receives an Update signal, it checks whether it has to change its state, executing
the action associated with the chosen transition. For example, the state machine leaves
the Inactive state when an Update signal is received and the pressure sensor reports the
tank as being empty. Subsequently, the controller takes the transition, which in turn
enables the pump, starts the timer, and changes the state machine’s state to Filling. The
state machine remains in this state at least until the next Update signal is received.
Controllers typically have an implicit or explicit model of their plant. For the pressure
tank case study’s control software, the state machine in Figure 3.17 represents the
controller’s implicit model of the tank: As long as the tank is being filled, i.e., the state
machine is in state Filling, the tank is assumed to be non-ruptured and only partially
filled. Once the controller switches to states StoppedBySensor or StoppedByTimer, it
assumes the tank to be full. Subsequently, the pressure within the tank decreases, and
the controller remains in either of the two states until the sensor reports the tank to
be empty again. The controller’s knowledge about the tank’s actual state is therefore
rather limited: There are only two situations in which it can be reasonably sure about
the tank’s pressure level, namely when the sensor reports the tank to be full or empty
or when the timer signals a timeout. In all other cases, the controller neither knows
nor cares about the tank’s actual state. Sensor and timer faults such as ¬is full, ¬is empty,
and ¬timeout cause the controller’s perceived state of the tank to deviate from the actual
state, potentially resulting in tank ruptures or complete tank depletions.
Modeling Equations. Figure 3.18 declares the equation that constrains the pressure
level within the tank of the pressure tank case study using a SysML constraint block and
a parametric diagram. The former represents a differential equation of the correlation
between the tank’s pressure and the amount of incoming and outgoing fluid, whereas
the latter connects the equation’s parameters to the tank’s actual values. The tank’s
incoming and outgoing pressure is measured in Pascal per second; the outgoing pressure
_pressureOut is assumed to be a negative constant to keep the case study simple, whereas
the incoming pressure _pressureIn depends on the pump: If the pump is disabled, the
incoming pressure is zero, otherwise it is some positive value. As illustrated by the
sequence diagram in Figure 3.19, the tank changes the value of _pressureIn in response to
receiving an Update signal by checking its IsBeingFilled required operation, which in turn
is connected to the pump’s IsEnabled provided port as previously shown in Figure 3.10
on page 37. The overall pressure delta dp/dt for time t is thus equal to _pressureIn +
_pressureOut as established by the PressureEquation constraint in Figure 3.18. For reasons
of conciseness, the SysML model assumes continuous time, using a simple differential
equation to describe the relationship between the pressure level as well as the incoming
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sd Tank Update
: Tank
Update
_pressureIn = 2
_pressureIn = 0
alt
[IsBeingFilled()]
[else]
Figure 3.19. A sequence diagram showing how the tank updates its _pressureIn value in
response to receiving an Update signal depending on whether the required operation IsBeingFilled
returns true or false. As the tank is a plant block, it receives the Update signal before the control
software. Consequently, the pressure tank controller always gets feedback about pressure level
changes resulting from pump activations or deactivations in the previous macro step.
and outgoing pressures. Discretization of the relationship for time intervals∆t yields the
discrete-state, discrete-time state formula pn+1 = pn+(_pressureIn+_pressureOut)·∆t.
3.4 Modeling Faults
Faults are a core concept in the context of safety analysis. They constitute an integral
part of any model used for formal safety analyses even though they do not contribute
to the system’s actual functionality, i.e., to its nominal behavior. Instead, faults are
modeling artifacts that are required to capture the system’s fault behavior, subsequently
allowing safety analysis techniques to reason about their impacts on the system’s overall
behavior as well as the situations leading to hazard occurrences. Consequently, the
models contain both nominal and off-nominal system behavior, that is, the models not
only describe the intended and desired system functionality but also the unintended
behavior in the presence of one or more faults.
The common terms of faults, errors, and failures have been used consistently in the
preceding sections using the terminology summarized by Avižienis et al. [9], but now
require a more thorough explanation in order to establish the relationships between
them as shown in Figure 3.20: Safety analyses consider situations in which faults cause
off-nominal system behavior that would not have occurred otherwise. These situations
represent fault activations, that is, a fault is activated when it influences the system
through effects that change the internal state of affected components, thereby causing
errors. Thus, errors are deviations of the components’ states from what they should
have been, whereas a fault is one of possibly many causes of an error. Errors propagate
through the components, causing other errors. Eventually, errors might result in failures
where the errors manifest themselves in a way that is externally observable. Failures
therefore represent observable errors, i.e., situations in which a component evidently
does not behave as specified or expected. Failures either cause faults in other components
or they represent hazards, that is, safety-critical failures at system level. Safety analyses
are conducted for the latter to determine all faults causing the hazards by uncovering
the cause and consequence relationships between such system-level failures and the
individual faults contained in the system model.
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Fault Error Failure Fault
activation propagation causation
… …
Figure 3.20. Overview of the relationship between faults, error, and failures: Activations
of faults result in errors, which propagate through the system until they become externally
observable failures. Failures, in turn, can cause other faults, continuing the propagation chain [9].
Faults. Faults represent causes for errors. There are three main, partially overlapping
classes of faults that characterize the fault origins [9]: Development, physical, and
interaction faults. Development faults are made during development, the most promi-
nent ones being software bugs, that, when activated, result in errors due to incorrect
computations. Physical faults affect hardware, resulting in hardware failures such as
¬pumping in the pressure tank case study. Interaction faults are external to the system,
i.e., they originate from unexpected environmental disturbances such as flood waves
of ocean water or human-made command faults like physical manipulations of the
pressure tank that destabilize the tank’s structural integrity, increasing the likelihood
of tank ruptures. Omission faults and commission faults, in particular, represent the
absence of required human commands or wrong commands, respectively. A command
fault might be deliberate to prevent other, even more catastrophic consequences, while
malicious command faults are intended to provoke exploits that allow unauthorized
access to or modifications of the system.
Fault Persistency. Faults that are not currently causing an error are dormant until
they are activated and become active, turning dormant again when they are deactivated.
Activations are either triggered from within the system, e.g., by executing certain com-
putations, or by external environmental conditions. A fault’s persistency constrains
the possible transitions between the active and dormant states as illustrated by Fig-
ure 3.21. In the railroad crossing case study, for instance, failures of the train’s brakes
are most adequately modeled as permanent faults: Once they are broken, they cannot
magically repair themselves and start functioning again. If maintenance intervals are to
be considered in the model, a hybrid kind of persistency could be used for brake failures
where the fault is permanent until the brakes are repaired, causing the fault to become
dormant again. On the other hand, communication messages could be lost because
of atmospheric disturbances, e.g., thunderstorms, or large objects such as mountains
blocking the transmission depending on the exact positions the messages are sent from,
for which the exact occurrences cannot be accurately predicted. Such faults are thus
best modeled with transient persistency to capture all possibilities without missing any,
which could otherwise invalidate the adequacy of the safety analyses. Transient faults
represent the general case, subsuming all other kinds of fault persistency, including
permanent faults. It is therefore always possible to assume transient persistency without
risking any safety analysis oversights. Thus, a fault that is permanent in reality but
modeled as transient does not invalidate safety analysis results, even though the system
might seem less safe than it actually is.
Errors. Errors are the results of fault activations and their effects on the affected
components, representing deviations of component states that might eventually lead to
failures. In the pressure tank case study, for example, an activation of the ¬pumping fault
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stm Transient Fault
Dormant Active
(a) Transient faults switch between their active and
dormant states completely nondeterministically.
stm Permanent Fault
Dormant Active
(b) Permanent faults are activated nondeterministi-
cally, but can never reach their dormant state again.
Figure 3.21. SysML state machines describing the transitions of transient and permanent
faults between their active and dormant states. These two kinds of persistency are the most
common ones, but other kinds also exist.
causes the pump to stop even though it should continue to run; the error caused by the
fault is the discrepancy between the pump’s actual running state and the expected one.
In this case, the fault activation results in an error that also immediately represents a
failure of the affected component, whereas in general, some time can pass before an
error becomes externally observable. Not all fault activations must result in failures: On
the one hand, the system could protect itself against individual errors using redundancy,
for instance. On the other hand, some errors never result in failures because, for instance,
they occur in some inactive, unused part of the system; alternatively, an error could be
eliminated unintentionally before it has the chance to cause a failure, e.g., an erroneous
value might be overwritten by a valid one before it is used in a computation. While
there can be many faults that result in the same error, there can also be many errors
caused by the same fault, in particular in different component instances. Such related
errors are the results of common cause faults; e.g., a tsunami set off the sequence of
events that lead to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster by destroying the emergency
power generators, making reactor cooling impossible [100].
Failures. A failure occurs when a component or the entire system observably deviates
from its intended and expected behavior; the different ways that failures can manifest
themselves are called failure modes. Typical failure modes include incorrect or missing
data as well as actions undertaken at the wrong time, i.e., either too early or too
late [9, 131]. For instance, both the ¬is full and ¬is empty faults lead to a failure of the
pressure sensor in the pressure tank case study: Either the sensor reports a full tank
as non-full, or it reports an empty tank as non-empty. In both cases, the sensor does
not behave as specified and hence fails. The failure modes, by contrast, describe how
the sensor deviates from its expected behavior, that is, by either reporting a full or an
empty tank incorrectly. At the level of abstraction that the pressure tank case study
is analyzed in, the pressure senor’s faults and failure modes overlap and there are no
intermediate errors caused by the faults. If the sensor was modeled and analyzed in
more detail, however, its internal errors would become apparent, uncovering the chain
of fault activations, error propagations, and eventual failures.
Relationship between Faults, Errors, and Failures. Figure 3.22 gives a more con-
crete overview of the propagation of faults, errors, and failures than Figure 3.20, showing
that the failure of a component can cause faults in other components that depend on it.
Due to this fundamental chain of error propagation, the faults leading to a hazard might
50
3.4 Modeling Faults
Component A Component B
Error
Internal 
Dormant 
Fault
Error
propagation
External 
Fault
activation
Failure
Input 
Fault
Error Failure
activation
Figure 3.22. Illustration of error propagation between two components [9]: Either a fault
external to component A or an internal, but dormant fault causes an error within A upon
activation. Through a series of state changes or computations, the error propagates through the
component until it eventually reaches the component’s boundary. At the boundary, the error
becomes externally observable, thus representing a failure. Due to an assumed dependency
of component B on A, A’s failure causes an input fault in B, which B is likely to be completely
unaware of. Error propagation continues, eventually causing a failure of B.
lie in various different parts of a system that might seem completely unrelated. Moreover,
faults can be activated a long time before the system actually fails. A non-exhaustive
overview of potential faults affecting the different parts of a safety-critical system is
shown in Figure 3.23: Sensor faults often cause errors in the controller’s internal model
of its plant that remain undetected for some time until a hazard occurs or the controller
is able to correct them through feedback or luck. In the pressure tank case study, the
¬is full fault causes an error in the controller’s perceived plant state, which is corrected
during the next system step through the timer signaling a timeout. A failure of the pump
caused by the ¬pumping fault remains undetected until the sensor continuously reports
the tank to be empty. In general, the same plant could also be affected by multiple
controllers that could issue conflicting control actions due to synchronization issues
or inadvertently due to faults. For example, the controller that handles the removal of
fluid from the pressure tank could potentially also pump fluid into the tank instead of
removing fluid due to a fault reversing the flow of the fluid. Such a situation is also
likely to result in a tank rupture.
Safety versus Functional Correctness. Verification of functional correctness is pri-
marily concerned with the control algorithms, the controllers’ plant models, and updates
of the plant models at run time in accordance with the plants’ actual behavior. That
is, functional correctness deals only with the development faults listed within the con-
troller in Figure 3.23. Additionally, however, inconsistent, incorrect, or incomplete plant
models can also be errors resulting from plant or sensor faults. Development faults
such as software bugs or system design issues can be fixed once discovered during
functional correctness verification, preventing them from causing errors during system
operation. Physical faults as well as interaction faults, by contrast, cannot be prevented
by their very nature; the system can only be designed with error detection and preven-
tion mechanisms such as self-organization that work around the errors caused by the
activations of the faults. For model-based safety analysis, it is thus important to consider
all of these potential sources of faults, additionally requiring the controlled plants to be
modeled as well. Consequently, formal safety analyses subsume functional correctness
verification. However, it is usually already challenging to create adequate models of
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Actuator
Plant
Controller 1
Plant Model
Sensor
incorrect or 
missing input 
inadequate control algorithm
inconsistent, incomplete, incorrect
inadequate operation inadequate operation
inadequate, missing, 
or delayed feedback 
inappropriate, ineffective, 
or missing control action
incorrect, inaccurate, 
delayed, or no information
delayed operation
component failures, changes over time
wrong or missing plant input, 
environmental disturbances Controller 2
conflicting control actions
Figure 3.23. Overview of the basic structure of safety-critical systems, annotated with po-
tential sources of faults and failure modes [131]. Faults are either system-internal or -external,
occurring either in some system component or outside of the system’s boundaries. Incorrect
or missing input that the controller depends on can result in hazards just like environmental
disturbances affecting the plant. Multiple controllers can issue conflicting control actions, while
control actions themselves can be inappropriate, ineffective, delayed, or missing due to actuator
faults. Sensors provide feedback to the controller, allowing it to measure the effects of its control
actions on the system. Feedback is critical for safe system operation, and any incorrect, inac-
curate, inadequate, delayed, or missing feedback due to sensor faults increases the likelihood
of hazards. The plant can also change over time, for example due to wearout or modifications
during maintenance, or its input from other plants might be missing or incorrect.
a system’s nominal behavior. The system’s off-nominal behavior in case of faults is
often even harder to predict and model correctly and adequately. Model checking-based
safety analysis techniques help by making it possible to model the local effects that a
fault has on the affected components only; the model checker is able to uncover the
chain of error propagations automatically in order to the determine the global impacts
of the faults on the system’s overall behavior.
3.4.1 Fault Modeling Guidelines
The following four fault modeling guidelines encourage a strict separation of con-
cerns [33] regarding various fault modeling activities. As reported by Joshi et al. [113],
manual integration of off-nominal behavior into the model of a system’s nominal behav-
ior quickly results in cluttered models in which the nominal behavior is hard to keep
track of. For this reason, it is beneficial to specify nominal and off-nominal behavior
separately, letting a tool generate the combined model automatically [26, 27, 135]. The
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fault modeling guidelines therefore focus on basic principles on how to best describe
faults and their effects, leaving the actual integration of both kinds of behaviors to the
modeling languages and the analysis tools.
Guideline 8 (Separation of Nominal and Off-Nominal Behavior). Nominal and off-
nominal system behavior should be clearly separated, allowing later extensions of the
model with additional off-nominal behavior as well as automated removal of off-nominal
behavior. The integration of both kinds of behavior should be automatic.
The separation of the models into nominal parts and off-nominal parts supports sub-
sequent modeling and analysis tasks [113]: For example, it must be possible to isolate
the nominal behavior contained within a model for verification of functional correct-
ness independently from the off-nominal behavior. Additionally, automated test case
generation for system functionality or code generation can only be supported if the off-
nominal parts of the model can be identified, as obviously no code should be generated
for off-nominal behavior, for instance.
Guideline 9 (Separation of Effects and Persistency). The persistency of a fault and its
effects, i.e., the ways in which the fault causes errors, are orthogonal concerns and should
therefore be modeled separately.
Fault modeling consist of two orthogonal parts [160]: Faults have effects that describe
the affected component instances as well as the errors caused by the faults’ activations,
whereas the faults’ persistencies restrict their transitions between their active and
dormant states. Fault effect modeling is the primary concern; for fault persistency,
transient persistency is often a good initial guess as transient faults are the general case.
If the assumption is invalid, it results in extremely unlikely or physically impossible
situations that are discovered during safety analyses. Due to the separation of effects
and persistency, however, a fault’s persistency can easily be changed without affecting
any other parts of the system model.
Guideline 10 (Effect Localization). Fault effects should be localized to the components
that are directly affected by the faults; in particular, error propagation chains and input
faults should not be modeled explicitly.
Fault identification and modeling is challenging due to the large variety of possible
faults and effects. Explicitly modeling the chains of error propagation, which are often
not particularly obvious, would add even more complexity to the model, increasing the
danger of fatal oversights that invalidate formal safety analysis results. On the other
hand, safety analysis tools such as HiP-HOPS that require explicit error propagation
models [181] are faster than model checking-based analysis techniques that can auto-
matically deduce error propagation sequences. That is, modeling effort reductions due
to implicit error propagation come with the cost of increased analysis effort, which
often is an acceptable tradeoff considering the improvements in safety analysis accuracy
that are achieved by uncovering propagation chains automatically.
Guideline 11 (Effect Compositionality). Fault effects should be modeled composition-
ally, allowing the automated application of multiple fault effects on the same component
instances with optional prioritization.
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As there usually are multiple faults affecting a component, the faults’ effects potentially
cause errors in the same parts of the component’s state. It must not only be possible
to model such faults, but also to analyze combined activations of such conflicting
faults. In the height control case study, for example, there are two faults affecting
the light barriers: ¬detection and  detection both affect the same provided operation
IsVehicleDetected. Either of the faults could take priority, one of the effects could be
chosen nondeterministically, or some computation could be run to combine the two
effects. In this example, nondeterminism seems to be the best choice, as no further
assumptions are made about the inner workings of a light barrier that would justify a
prioritization. However, it is still possible to prioritize either of the faults to improve
model checking efficiency in this case: As the IsVehicleDetected operation only returns
a Boolean value, the nondeterministic choice does not result in any situation that has
not already been discovered by analyzing each fault individually, hence in this case,
combined activations of both faults are irrelevant.
3.4.2 Fault Injection
The nominal behavior of a safety-critical system is commonly modeled first with the
off-nominal behavior added later in a separate step to cope with modeling complexity [5,
9, 24, 65, 80]. The term fault injection is used to describe the process of extending the
nominal behavior with off-nominal behavior in the presence of one or more faults,
resulting in an extended model of the system [24]. Faults are injected into the model in
order to allow formal safety analysis techniques to reason about off-nominal behavior,
facilitating the automatic computation of fault-related causes that lead to a hazard. In
this sense, the meaning of the term fault injection in the context of this thesis is slightly
different than the one sometimes found in literature, where faults are injected into a
model in order to test and validate the validation techniques themselves, i.e., to ascertain
that all injected faults can be found by the verification and validation techniques used
to analyze the system [5]. For formal safety analysis, faults are not injected to validate
the techniques, but to enable the analyses in the first place.
Fault injection is a purely additive process, as it merely extends the nominal system
behavior: As long as no faults are activated, the extended model is behaviorally identical
to the original one, thus, the off-nominal model is a conservative extension of the
nominal one [80]. This restriction is irrelevant for the soundness and completeness
of formal safety analysis techniques, but it is an important consideration for model
adequacy. If the process of extending the nominal model itself ever removed nominal
behavior, it would simply indicate that the faults are modeled inadequately or that the
fault injection mechanism is incorrect. It is of course possible, and very common, that
activations of some faults prevent previously possible nominal behavior, either removing
it entirely or replacing it with other, off-nominal behavior. A fault preventing nominal
behavior captures the intended effects of the fault incorporated into the model, whereas
behavior suppression due to the fault injection process itself is simply a modeling
anomaly that must be avoided. For this reason, S# and many other safety analysis
tools support adequate fault modeling by guaranteeing correct model extension either
syntactically or at least semantically [27, 82].
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bdd Pressure Tank Case Study: Faults
«port, block, actuator»
Pump
values
_isEnabled : bool
operations
prov IsEnabled() : bool
prov Enable() : void
prov Disable() : void
faults
SuppressPumping : PermanentFault
fault effects
«port, block, sensor»
PressureSensor
operations
reqd PhysicalPressure() : int
prov IsEmpty() : bool
prov IsFull() : bool
faults
SuppressIsEmpty : TransientFault
SuppressIsFull : TransientFault
fault effects
«block»
Timer
values
_remainingTime : int
operations
prov HasElapsed() : bool
prov Start() : void
prov Stop() : void
faults
SuppressTimeout : PermanentFault
fault effects
«block, fault effect»
SuppressPumpingEffect
operations
prov IsEnabled() : bool
«block, fault effect»
SuppressIsEmptyEffect
operations
prov IsEmpty() : bool
«block, fault effect»
SuppressIsFullEffect
operations
prov IsFull() : bool
«block, fault effect»
SuppressTimeoutEffect
operations
prov HasElapsed() : bool
Figure 3.24. A SysML block definition diagram showing some of the blocks from Figure 3.9
on page 35 with faults and fault effects. Faults are instances of a Fault-derived type such as
TransientFault or PermanentFault that determine their persistency. Fault effects are nested blocks
marked with the «fault effect» stereotype, overriding the behaviors associated with one or more
required or provided operations of their containing blocks. The overridden behavior is executed
instead of the original one when the fault corresponding to an effect is activated, either leading
to latent errors within the component or to externally observable failures.
ibd PressureSensor
SuppressIsEmpty : 
TransientFault
SuppressIsFull : 
TransientFault
: SuppressIsEmptyEffect
: SuppressIsFullEffect
IsEmpty
IsFull
PhysicalPressure
Figure 3.25. A SysML internal block diagram of the PressureSensor block showing the asso-
ciation between its Fault instances and instances of its «fault effect» blocks. The dashed arrows
indicate which operations are affected by a fault effect.
Figures 3.24 and 3.25 show some of the parts of the SysML model for the pressure tank
case study where the four faults ¬is full, ¬is empty, ¬pumping, and ¬timeout are injected
under the names SuppressIsFull, SuppressIsEmpty, SuppressPumping, and SuppressTimeout,
respectively. Faults are modeled as properties of the blocks they affect, though they
could also be declared in other blocks in case of common cause faults affecting multiple
component instances. Fault effects are modeled as nested blocks, clearly denoted by
the «fault effect» stereotype, indicating the operations of the containing block that they
affect. Blocks marked with the «fault effect» stereotype are also allowed to override the
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containing block’s active behavior, changing how the block reacts to receptions of the
Update signal. There are no limits imposed on what a fault effect is allowed to do: It can
introduce additional state, change the return value of the operation it overrides causing
immediate failures, or change some of the containing block’s values or associations,
causing latent errors.
The extendedmodel of the pressure tank case study shown in Figures 3.24 and 3.25 clearly
separates the nominal and off-nominal behavior of a block in accordancewithGuideline 8.
Additionally, the partitioning into Fault instances and «fault effect» blocks satisfies Guide-
line 9, with internal block diagrams such as the one shown in Figure 3.25 linking the two
parts together. The two fault effects affecting the pressure sensor demonstrate that fault
effect modeling is compositional as required by Guideline 11, while the nesting of «fault
effect» blocks adheres to Guideline 10 by restricting a fault’s effects to the component it
influences directly, instead of explicitly modeling error propagations.
3.5 Related Work
Expressiveness ofModeling Languages. Most model checkers such as NuSMV, SPIN,
LTSmin, Uppaal, Prism, among others, have very low-level specification languages
whose level of expressiveness is only marginally higher than that of Kripke structures
or Markov decision processes in the probabilistic case [17, 38, 98, 116, 123]. Adequate
modeling of complex safety-critical systems directly in the input languages of these
model checkers is therefore quite involved and time-consuming, especially if design
variants of the systems are also to be modeled and analyzed. It is thus beneficial to
use higher-level modeling languages, resorting to a compiler that performs automated
model transformations into the input languages of the target model checkers [195]. This
approach is followed bymost tools for formal safety analysis, including VECS, HiP-HOPS,
Compass, AltaRica, and others [15, 27, 135, 181]. In contrast, the approach followed in
this thesis is completely different: Instead of relying on model transformations, the S#
high-level models, authored in a textual representation of an executable, extended subset
of SysML, are executed during model checking, conceptually generating the low-level
Kripke structures on-the-fly during model execution with the help of the explicit-state
LTSmin model checker as explained in Chapter 6. Compared to model transformations,
S#’s model execution approach is simpler to implement and has no potential issues with
semantic consistency between the high-level and low-level models; still, S#’s analysis
efficiency is in general on par with that of other safety analysis tools, cf. Section 6.5.
Structural Modeling Paradigms. What most safety analysis tools have in common
is their component-oriented approach to system structuring, most likely due to the
fact that system decomposition into an assembly of interconnected components is the
most natural way of thinking about safety-critical systems. The Compass toolset, for
instance, is based on the SAE standardized architecture analysis and design language
(AADL) [60, 151, 183] which uses components as its primary structuring mechanism.
AltaRica and VECS define custom languages around components, even though the
latter does not enforce strong encapsulation of component state [15, 135]. While AADL
even requires explicit interface modeling for all components and therefore supports
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flexible model composition, AltaRica is somewhat less flexible in this regard. VECS,
by contrast, sits in between the two and allows for convenient modeling of functional
design alternatives while structural variants are less well-supported due to its weaker
encapsulation of individual components. Scade, AutoFocus, Quartz, HiP-HOPS, and
Ptolemy are other examples for tools and approaches using custom, component-oriented
modeling languages for safety-critical systems [2, 97, 173, 179, 181], whereas object-
oriented ones exist as well, cf. Modelica, ABS, SystemC, or the HATS project [40, 73,
112, 145]. SysML and UML, on the other hand, can be used in both component-oriented
and object-oriented ways, bridging the gap between both approaches and allowing
models to use the paradigm that is the best fit for the modeled system. In particular, it is
often convenient to model the overall system structure with components, whereas more
detailed models of controller components sometimes benefit from amore object-oriented
approach as can be seen for the robot cell case study in Chapter 8.
SysML- and UML-Based Approaches. SysML- and UML-based safety modeling and
analysis approaches generally use the same models for both safety analysis and general
system modeling, avoiding any discrepancies that could potentially arise if different
models are created manually [142]. Helle [91], for example, uses combinations of SysML
block definition diagrams, internal block diagrams, activity diagrams, and use case
diagrams to describe the nominal and off-nominal behavior of a safety-critical system;
subsequently, it is possible to automatically extract the minimal critical fault sets from
the model. Alternatively, Mhenni et al. [143] use known modeling patterns in the
construction of internal block diagrams to facilitate automatic construction of fault trees
or FMEA tables [144]. SOPHIA and QuantUM [35, 129], on the other hand, define UML
profiles to model quantitative aspects of safety-critical systems, directly calculating
tolerable accident rates or using Prism to compute hazard probabilities, respectively.
The latter maps Prism counterexamples back to UML sequence diagrams, allowing the
counterexamples to be evaluated in the context of the high-level model to improve
their comprehensibility [195]. All of these approaches require explicit error propagation
models, thereby reducing analysis times at the expense of additional modeling effort
and an increased risk of modeling oversights.
Modeling Philosophy. Compared to the modeling approach outlined in this chapter,
the aforementioned tools and techniques have stricter requirements about the way
the systems have to be modeled, which, to a certain extent, limits the expressiveness
provided by SysML that can be used. Such limits can be a good thing and can indeed
help to improve adequacy, but they might be too strict for some systems where they
require workarounds that decrease model comprehensibility. While the guidelines
in the preceding sections encode fundamental suggestions on how to model system
structure, behavior, and faults, they are indeed only suggestions that, with caution, can
be purposely violated if necessary and justified. For example, the VECS tool has stricter
guidelines encoded into the modeling language that, for example, do not allow references
to other components to be stored [135, 188], resulting in a fixed hierarchical component
composition. In particular, self-organizing systems require more modeling flexibility
to cope with the inherent complexity of these systems as discussed in Chapter 8. This
difference between both points of view is a matter of design philosophy: The guidelines
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could be strictly enforced to avoid accidental mistakes, whichmight be acceptable or even
beneficial in many cases but comes with the cost of negatively impacting the remaining
ones in a more or less profound way. Therefore, the guidelines only try to steer the
models towards “the pit of success” [8], meaning that the set of guidelines encourages
the creation of correct and adequate models without compromising expressiveness in
any way. This thesis generally follows the latter philosophy, which is also the governing
design principle [136] for the C# programming language and the .NET framework that
the executable modeling approach presented in the next chapter is based on.
Abstraction of Timing Behavior. The assumption of zero execution time abstracts
the notion of time in the system models, assuming that zero time passes during the
computation of a system’s reaction to its input stimuli. Lustre, Esterel, and Quartz
are well-known examples of programming languages for embedded systems that are
based on the notion of zero execution time [86, 179, 189]. Before the invention of these
languages, physical or bounded execution time were the norm [119] and developers had
to manually consider worst case execution times and process scheduling algorithms.
Logical execution time is another alternative for abstract time modeling [119], supported,
for instance, by the Giotto programming language for embedded control systems [92].
Compared to zero execution time, timing behavior of the system is considered in more
detail, allowing the real time scheduling algorithms of the embedded operating system
running the software to ensure correct timing behavior. As models of safety-critical
systems are typically created with a higher level of abstraction than the actual imple-
mentations of their controller software, zero execution time is a reasonable assumption
to make compared to the aforementioned alternatives [20]. Recent developments also
try to relax the assumption of overall zero execution time to increase modeling flexibility,
allowing less safety- or mission-critical parts of a system to actually take time [207].
Model of Computation. The model of computation presented in this chapter employs
macro and micro steps to capture the notion of zero execution time, similar to syn-
chronous languages such as Esterel or Lustre [20, 86, 189] or programming interfaces
for robotics applications [196]. Alternatively, a delta cycle semantics could have been
used similar to SystemC [73]. SystemC provides a set of C++ classes and a simulation
environment for system-level modeling, software development, and hardware synthesis
based on the tooling and language features provided by the C++ programming language.
SystemC’s delta cycle semantics is based on separate evaluation and update phases to
allow for inter-process communication and coordination within the same cycle. Time
only advances when a fix point is reached, i.e., no system components issue any delta
notifications during the evaluation phase, allowing the update phase to advance time.
In a sense, SystemC therefore also differentiates between macro and micro steps, using
more complex mechanisms to determine the end of a macro step in an attempt to au-
tomatically break up feedback cycles between different system components. In doing
so, it requires queues to track the components that have to be schedule next which can
become problematic for model-based analysis techniques due to state space explosion.
The overall complexity of the delta cycle semantics thus makes it hard to model check
SystemC models efficiently even though some model checking techniques based on
transformations to the SPIN model checker exist [39], for example.
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Hybrid, Timed, and Probabilistic Systems. This thesis considers discrete-state,
discrete-time models only, requiring manual discretization of continuous behavior.
Additionally, the models do not contain any information about fault probabilities, en-
abling only qualitative safety analyses that cannot compute hazard probabilities. Tra-
ditional techniques for probability estimation [80, 156, 193] must be used instead to
compute hazard probabilities from the formal analysis results by making some simplify-
ing assumptions such as stochastical independence of the analyzed faults. Prism and
MRMC [117, 123], on the other hand, are probabilistic model checkers that are used by
the VECS, Compass, and QuantUM tools for more accurate but less efficient probabilistic
safety analyses [129, 135, 151], for example. Some of these tools, such as the Compass
toolset, even support timed or hybrid behavior, whereas Modelica has first-class sup-
port for system modeling with differential equations [27, 145]. While hybrid models
consisting of both discrete-state and continuous-state parts as well as discrete-time and
continuous-time parts can improve modeling adequacy, they are likely to complicate
analysis techniques to the point where they become either completely infeasible or at
least must resort to statistical, non-exhaustive analysis approaches [58, 118].
Error Propagation. Classical safety analysis techniques such as FTA and FMEA [166,
193] or more recently developed variants such as Component Fault Trees [74, 114] do not
require any fault modeling, emphasizing the actual analyses instead of model creation.
Model-based safety analysis techniques and tools, by contrast, play down the importance
of the analysis processes, instead focusing on the modeling activities [25]. These latter
tools fall into two broad categories: Error propagation is either implicit or explicit.
Implicit error propagation to some extent always requires models of system behavior in
order to enable the analysis tools to compute the missing information automatically,
whereas explicit error propagation requires manual identification, understanding, and
analysis of these interdependencies. VECS, Compass, FSAP/NuSMV, xSap, and S#
fall into the former category with implicit error propagation [24, 65, 82, 135, 151], for
instance, whereas HiP-HOPS, failure propagation analysis, QuantUM and other SysML-
or UML-based approaches fall into the latter [70, 129, 162, 163].
Fault Modeling. Most model checkers provide no explicit support for fault model-
ing [38, 98, 116, 123], complicating adequate fault injection by not helping with the
process of conservatively extending the nominal model into the off-nominal one [80].
Tools and techniques specifically developed for formal safety analysis, on the other
hand, often guarantee conservative extension by construction or at least provide mod-
eling guidelines that indicate which changes are permitted during model extension;
e.g., Compass and S# fall into the former category, whereas VECS belongs to the lat-
ter [82, 135, 151]. In contrast to older tools such as FSAP/NuSMV [24], more recent
ones such as VECS, Compass, xSAP, or S# all support flexible modeling of fault persis-
tency [65, 82, 135, 151]. The biggest difference between these tools lies in the way fault
effects are modeled: In VECS, actual component behavior must be changed; in Compass
and xSAP, failure behavior is modeled in separate models that are linked together by a
tool; and in this thesis, both nominal and off-nominal behavior is separately specified
within different parts of the same model, that is, by additional «fault effect» blocks added
to the components that are affected by the faults.
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Summary and Outlook. The systematic modeling guidelines presented in this chapter build upon
established system- and control-theoretical basics as well as software engineering principles and
best practices: Safety-critical systems are decomposed into hierarchies of components that either
represents sensors, controllers, actuators, or plants. The feedback loops between plants and
controllers are important to model in order to enable complete safety analyses; if the plants were
not taken into account, only functional correctness could be verified, in general. Additionally, the
faults that can affect the systems to be analyzed must be injected into the system models, extending
the nominal behavior with off-nominal behavior to allow safety analysis techniques to reason about
chains of error propagations. Most of safety-specific tools and techniques emphasize a more or less
systematic approach to fault modeling, but in general do not provide any guidelines on how to best
model safety-critical systems overall. The systematic modeling guidelines presented in this chapter,
however, are generally applicable and in no way limited to SysML or S#. Thus, these guidelines
can also be followed when other modeling approaches are used, at least as long as the required
modeling mechanisms for compositional modeling, among others, are supported.
The S# modeling and analysis framework for safety-critical systems that is introduced in Chapters 4
and 6 builds upon the modeling guidelines of this chapter. In particular, it closely follows the model
of computation, allowing the creation of discrete-state, discrete-time models with a micro-macro step
semantics. Furthermore, the S# modeling language supports the systematic fault modeling approach
at the syntactic level already, clearly differentiating between faults, their persistencies, as well as
their effects; fault activations and error propagations are implicitly handled during analyses. The
formal techniques that form the foundation of safety analyses carried out by the S# framework are
introduced in Chapter 5. These techniques are also rooted in the systematic fault modeling approach
presented in this chapter, making the concept of fault activations central to the formal models through
a fault-aware modeling and specification approach. Systematic modeling therefore not only helps
to foster the creation of comprehensible and adequate models, it also supports the formalization
of the underlying safety analysis techniques, for instance by facilitating the formal definition of fault
injection and its dual, fault removal. Chapters 7 and 8 subsequently use the modeling and analysis
features offered by S# to systematically model and analyze the height control case study as well as
the self-organization case studies.
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Summary. The S# modeling and analysis framework for safety-critical systems
is based on the ISO-standardized C# programming language and the .NET run
time environment [105, 110]. It is a textual representation of an extended subset
of SysML, allowing the creation of executable models of safety-critical systems
in a systematic and expressive way. Due to its C#-heritage, S# offers flexible
design variant modeling and composition capabilities, while extensions of C# core
concepts allow for systematic fault modeling [102]. Executability is S#’s main
characteristic that facilitates model simulations, visualizations, as well as model
checking-based analyses as explained in subsequent chapters.
Publications. The modeling language and design goals of S# are presented
in [82, 84]. This introduction to the modeling language features is based on the S#
Wiki [102]. 4
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There are three aspects to consider for a systematic modeling approach: The syntax
of the modeling language, its semantics, as well as the methodology supporting the
approach. The latter typically consist of systematic modeling guidelines that are usually
at least partially independent of the modeling languages and are therefore considered
separately. In the preceding chapter, for instance, the high-level modeling language
SysML is used to model safety-critical systems by following the systematic structural,
behavioral, and fault-related modeling guidelines introduced for safety-critical systems;
other modeling languages could make use of the same guidelines. However, while SysML
is an expressive language that is well-established in the field of embedded systems de-
velopment, including safety-critical ones [79], it is not designed for formal analyses:
Its informal semantics leaves up multiple semantic variation points for individual in-
terpretation [153, 154]. Additionally, it does not readily support model checking-based
analyses or model simulations in order to be able to verify and validate whether the
created models are correct and adequate.
The S# modeling and analysis framework for safety-critical systems is designed to work
around SysML’s shortcomings for formal safety analysis while retaining its strengths,
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S#
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Implementation Kripke Structures
+ executability, analyzability
+ expressiveness+ formal safety analysis
Figure 4.1. Illustration of the relationship between S#, SysML, Kripke structures, and actual
implementations of safety-critical systems: S# sits between SysML and Kripke structures with a
level of expressiveness similar to SysML but with the formal analyzability of Kripke structures.
Additionally, S# bridges the gap between SysML modeling and actual implementation-level
languages such as C++, allowing both model execution as well as formal safety analysis.
namely its high level of expressiveness. Figure 4.1 illustrates the gap [79, 85] that S#
is designed to fill, sitting in between informal, high-level modeling languages such as
SysML, low-level formalisms such as Kripke structures used for formal analyses, and the
actual implementations of the safety-critical systems. Both SysML and S# are roughly
comparable concerning modeling expressiveness, but only S# allows its models to be
executed with fixed semantics. SysML can thus be seen as a graphical representation of
S#models that can be used when a graphical notation of a modeling artifact seems more
understandable than a textual one; ideally, there would be a tool for automatic two-way
transformations between the two, however, no such tool exists yet at the time of writing.
On the other hand, S# models are analyzable similar to Kripke structures using the
unified model execution approach discussed in Chapter 6 but have a significantly higher
level of expressiveness. Compared to the actual implementation of a safety-critical
system, which obviously is also executable, S# models facilitate formal safety analyses.
The abstraction levels differ between models and implementations as the former are
typically not concerned with details such as sensor access APIs or low-level network
protocols. Additionally, the models contain plant behavior that often does not have
to be implemented such as the vehicles in the height control case study. Furthermore,
off-nominal behavior is a modeling artifact required for formal safety analyses that is
never implemented at all. Implementations can therefore be checked for functional
correctness via tests, for instance, but only allow for limited safety assessments.
This chapter starts with an overview of the S# modeling and analysis framework in Sec-
tion 4.1. Subsequently, Sections 4.2 to 4.5 give a basic introduction to S# modeling
language features; more details are available in the S#Wiki [102]. S#’s unified execution
approach is subsequently discussed in chapter Chapter 6 after the foundations of formal
safety analysis are established in Chapter 5.
4.1 The S# Modeling and Analysis Framework
The S# framework brings forward well-established software engineering principles and
best practices to the modeling and analysis of safety-critical systems during all phases
of development. It is an integrated approach that fosters the systematic development of
comprehensible, adequate, and modular models of safety-critical systems, while also
allowing the use of efficient, formal safety analysis techniques for rigorous safety assess-
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Figure 4.2. Illustration of S#’s execution-centric architecture: The run time initializes S#
models compiled by a slightly extended version of the C# compiler to ensure the desired S#
semantics of required ports, port bindings, and fault effects. Both the simulator and the model
checker use the run time to execute a model. The only difference between simulation and model
checking is that the latter is exhaustive, checking all combinations of nondeterministic choices
within a model whereas the former considers a single combination only. Model visualizations
build upon the simulator, visualizing the simulated model state.
ment. The guidelines for systematic modeling introduced in Chapter 3 are supported by
the S# modeling language, in particular for fault-related modeling activities. S# is a do-
main specific modeling language embedded into the ISO-standardized C# programming
language, running on top of the ISO-specified .NET run time environment [105, 110]. S#
is based on the model of computation introduced in Chapter 3: The execution of a .NET
instruction corresponds to a micro step, so a macro step ends as soon as S# is finished
executing all active behaviors that react to receptions of the Update signals.
Architecture Overview. The S# framework is based on two .NET libraries that can
be used in any C#-based project: The core library contains the run time, the simulator,
and the infrastructure for explicit-state model checking. Additionally, an extension
library for the open source C# compiler Roslyn [149] checks for and reports S#modeling
errors and does minor code transformations to implement S#’s semantics of faults and
required ports. Model execution is unified, working in the same way regardless of
whether a model is simulated or model checked. The only difference between non-
exhaustive simulations and fully exhaustive model checking lies in the incomplete or
complete enumeration of all combinations of nondeterministic choices within a model,
respectively. S# provides no special visualization infrastructure to visualize a model
other than the ability to use any framework available for C#, including, for instance,
sophisticated GUI frameworks such as the Windows Presentation Foundation [147].
Figure 4.2 gives a brief overview of the individual parts that the S# framework consists
of; more details of S#’s execution semantics are discussed in Chapter 6.
Models versus Programs. While S# models are represented as C# programs, they
are still models of the safety-critical systems to be analyzed. However, S# somewhat
weakens the classical distinction between programs and models which typically views
models as abstractions over programs [198]. In the context of safety analysis, however,
this distinction is in fact clear because the models have to describe the behavior of the
controlled plants, whereas the plants are often not implemented as programs: In the
height control case study, for instance, the vehicles are part of the model even though
they are the plants the height control is designed to control, yet they are not designed,
built, or developed in conjunction with the height control system. Additionally, some
model parts represent hardware components, hydraulic or electrical subsystems, etc.,
none of which are software-based in the real system. Even those parts of the models
that do in fact represent software components are generally not intended to be used as
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C# Language Feature or
.NET Functionality Micro Steps Macro Steps
controlled nondeterminism (Choose methods) X X
uncontrolled nondeterminism (threads, processes, . . . ) depends on use case
managed heap allocations (new of reference types) X ×
unmanaged memory operations (via PInvoke) X ×
asynchronous methods (async and await) X ×
generator methods (yield return) X ×
lambda functions and anonymous delegates X X
dynamic typing (dynamic) X ×
static fields × ×
Table 4.1. Overview of C# language features or .NET functionality that can be used during
model simulations and model checking; all features not explicitly listed are fully supported. If a
feature is only available within micro steps, it cannot be used in a way that spans multiple macro
steps, that is, its computation must be complete before the end of the macro step that started it.
For example, enumerating a generator method is supported, but the entire enumeration must
take place within the same macro step. Similarly, an object newly allocated on the heap can be
used by several micro steps, but no references to it can be persisted between multiple macro
steps. Whether uncontrolled nondeterminism is acceptable depends on the use case.
the actual implementations of the real software: The models are usually an abstraction
of the real software’s behavior in order to increase analysis efficiency. Moreover, actual
software implementations for safety-critical systems are typically written in the C or
C++ programming languages [108, 111] for reasons of compatibility and performance;
alternatively, synchronous languages such as Esterel might be used in order to get
programming language support for the assumption of zero execution time [119, 189].
Off-nominal behavior is also only present in the S# models but is not implemented by
the actual software components of a safety-critical system.
Usage Considerations. S# inherits C#’s language features and expressiveness and
can use first- and third-party .NET libraries even when their original source code is
not available. The general rule of thumb is that everything allowed by C# and .NET is
also allowed by S#; for example, class inheritance, interfaces, virtual dispatch, generics,
lambda functions, among most other features, are fully supported. Table 4.1 shows
some of the advanced C# and .NET framework features that can only be used within
micro steps but are not allowed to span multiple macro steps. Most C# features can
indeed be used during micro step execution, showing the high level of expressiveness
supported by S# models. The biggest exceptions are arbitrary memory allocations and
uncontrolled nondeterminism as discussed in the following.
Memory Allocations. S# is unable to store newly allocated objects within a model’s
state during model execution, that is, any objects that are intended to be used during
model execution must be preallocated. Transient memory allocations, on the other
hand, are indeed supported, i.e., new objects that are allocated during a macro step are
unproblematic as long as they are not persisted across multiple macro steps and are
therefore cleaned up automatically by the .NET garbage collector. Transient allocations
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are often encountered when using advanced C# features or .NET libraries such as lambda
functions or LINQ methods that implicitly cause heap allocations. This restriction is
rooted in a technical decision in the implementation of S# that might be revised in the
future; it is certainly possible to add support for arbitrary object creation and storage to
S# at the expense of a more complicated, less efficient implementation.
Uncontrolled Nondeterminism. Micro steps must be deterministic during model
checking, otherwise S# is unable to guarantee that all possible behaviors are enumerated
or it might fail to create counterexamples. The only source of fully supported nonde-
terminism are invocations of S#’s own family of Choose methods that are the primary
mechanism for nondeterministic S# models. Sources of uncontrolled nondeterminism
during model execution that lie outside of S#’s reach are usages of threads and locks,
process spawning, random number generation, and so on. The possibility to invoke
uncontrolled nondeterministic behavior is nevertheless important for some models, e.g.,
the self-organizing robot cell case study integrates an actual constraint solver into the
model that is invoked during model execution to compute new system configurations,
cf. Chapter 8. While such process spawning is a highly nondeterministic procedure that
can fail for various reasons, a well-tested implementation yields mostly deterministic
results and can thus be acceptable for use during model execution; in case of failure,
an exception can be thrown that S# is able to handle and report back during model
checking. Consequently, uncontrolled nondeterminism can in fact be useful as long as
the result is either highly likely to be deterministic for some reason or else an exception
is thrown; otherwise, model checking silently becomes non-exhaustive. For model sim-
ulations, on the other hand, uncontrolled nondeterministic behavior is likely undesired
if a simulation is used as a regression test, but it might be acceptable in interactive
visualizations. In any case, the S# framework does not attempt to restrict models in any
way, on the one hand because of its design philosophy and on the other hand because it
cannot do so: Guaranteeing determinism would require overapproximating analyses of
compiled .NET code that might render valid use cases impossible.
4.2 Structural Modeling
Like SysML, S# supports both component-oriented and object-oriented modeling con-
cepts as well as data types such as lists or hash tables. C#, on the other hand, is first and
foremost an object-oriented language, so S#’s component-related concepts have to be
mapped onto C#’s object-oriented features. Doing so requires the help of the types in
the SafetySharp.Modeling namespace declared by S#’s core library that constitute the
domain specific language embedded into C# [198]. Concepts that cannot be natively
mapped to standard C# constructs in a convenient way, such as connections between re-
quired and provided ports, make use of some minor code transformations automatically
carried out by S#’s extensions to the C# compiler. All in all, S#’s modeling concepts are
closely related to those of SysML and are embedded into C# in such a way that they do
not feel alien to experienced C# developers. Thanks to the automatic code transforma-
tions of the S# compiler, syntactic overhead within the models is relatively minor and is
generally made up for by S#’s sophisticated tooling inherited from C#, including code
completion and navigation, refactorings, as well as debugging capabilities.
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In S#, the structure of a system is modeled as a non-strict hierarchy of components
with explicit communication ports. S# components are represented by C# classes
derived from the S#-provided type SafetySharp.Modeling.Component. Component
instances are consequently represented by objects, i.e., by instances of the corresponding
Component-derived classes. The PressureSensor component of the pressure tank case
study from Figure 3.9 on page 35, for instance, is declared in S# as follows:
using SafetySharp.Modeling;
class PressureSensor : Component
{
// ...
}
The declaration of the PressureSensor C# class represents a S# component type,
whereas an instantiation of the class, i.e., new PressureSensor(), creates a S# compo-
nent instance of the PressureSensor component type. In the remainder of this thesis,
the namespace SafetySharp.Modeling is always assumed to be imported, that is, the
using directive in the first line above remains implicit in all subsequent S# listings.
4.2.1 Component State and Subcomponents
The state information of a component consists of all fields that the component implicitly
or explicitly declares. Fields can be of any .NET type, only classes that rely upon native
operating system resources are generally problematic as they introduce uncontrolled
nondeterminism, e.g., Thread, Socket, File, and so on. The following .NET types are
consequently supported in S# models:
• primitive types such as bool, int, uint, pointers, object references, . . . ,
• enumeration types,
• struct types consisting of fields of supported types,
• delegate types,
• interface types,
• arrays of supported types, and
• class types consisting of fields of supported types such as List<T>.
As components usually hide their state from other components, fields are typically de-
clared with private accessibility. The following contrived example shows a component
declaring a field _c that stores a reference to some other Component instance, an integer
field _i, a Boolean array field _b, and an additional, implicitly declared private field
of type bool for the auto-implemented property P [105]; as explained later, P addition-
ally declares two public provided ports. Except for field _c, all of the fields can store
different values while the model is executed; _c, by contrast, is declared as readonly,
meaning that its value, i.e., the reference to the other Component instance, can only be
set in C’s constructor as guaranteed by the C# compiler.
class C : Component
{
[Subcomponent] private readonly Component _c;
private int _i;
private bool[] _b;
public bool P { get; set; }
}
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In SysML, regular associations and composite associations between blocks are used
to distinguish between blocks that simply reference each other and blocks that are a
physical part of another block [153]. To express this difference in S#, the [Subcomponent]
attribute can be used. Consequently, fields of a Component-derived type such as _c above
are considered to declare a subcomponent relationship when they are marked with the
[Subcomponent] attribute provided by the S# framework. Without this attribute, an
instance of C would simply reference the component instance stored in _c without any
subcomponent relationship existing between them.
It is occasionally useful to declare certain states as illegal, causing them to be ignored
during model checking. In the height control case study, for instance, it is physically
impossible for more than one vehicle to share the same physical location. Yet this
constraint is surprisingly hard to encode in a control flow- or state machine-based way,
regardless of whether the description is attempted locally for each vehicle or globally
for the set of all vehicles. On the other hand, it is significantly easier to describe such
constraints as Boolean expressions. Therefore, S# allows the specification of such state
constraints as expressions in its models, letting the model checker take care of ignoring
such states. A contrived example for a state constraint forbidding field _x from ever
having the value 17 is shown below; more complex constraints are also possible, as the
AddStateConstraint method also accepts arbitrary delegates, i.e., arbitrary C# code
can be executed to evaluate state constraints. Chapter 7 shows the state constraint for
the height control case study.
class C : Component
{
private int _x;
public C()
{
AddStateConstraint(_x != 17);
}
}
4.2.2 Range Restrictions
Range restrictions are a declarative way to restrict the allowed range of the values that
can be stored in a field. For example, an integer field _fmight only be allowed to contain
values that lie within the range of 0 to 5, inclusively. With range restrictions, the S#
framework can automatically ensure that only the values 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 can be stored
in _f at the end of each macro step; different micro steps during the same macro step
can see values in _f that violate the range temporarily. How such violations are resolved
is determined by the OverflowBehavior: If Clamp is specified, values falling outside of
the range are clamped to the upper or lower bound of the range, whichever is closer.
WrapClamp, by contrast, does the same as Clamp but uses the opposite bound instead.
Error indicates that S# should throw a RangeViolationException whenever the field’s
range is violated. Such exceptions can be checked for using model checking, which also
generates a witness that shows how such a range violation can be reached.
S# provides two mechanisms to declare ranges and overflow behaviors: If the range
boundaries are compile time constants, the Range attribute can be used to declaratively
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specify the range restriction. Sometimes, however, it is not possible to statically de-
termine the range of a field, so alternatively it is possible to specify range restrictions
dynamically in a component’s constructor. The following example shows both ways
to limit the ranges of the fields _f1 and _f2. The upper bound of _f2’s allowed range
is determined dynamically when C is instantiated; it is passed as a parameter to C’s
constructor, hence the attribute-based approach that works for _f1 cannot be used to
restrict the range of _f2.
class C : Component
{
[Range(0, 5, OverflowBehavior.Clamp)]
int _f1;
int _f2;
public C(int upperBound)
{
Range.Restrict(_f2, 0, upperBound, OverflowBehavior.Error);
}
}
4.2.3 Port Declarations
All methods and properties of a component are considered to be either required or
provided ports depending on whether they are declared as extern and have a body;
properties implicitly define methods that correspond to getter and setter functions
in other programming languages [105]. C#’s regular method invocation syntax or
property reads and writes represent invocations of required and provided ports. A
component declares provided ports as regular C# methods or properties; they can
optionally be virtual or abstract to support component inheritance. Required ports
are also declared as regular C# methods or properties, albeit using the extern keyword
without a body; they too can optionally be virtual to support component inheritance,
while abstract required ports are nonsensical as they inherently declare no body. The
following contrived example shows several different ways of declaring provided and
required ports, using a variety of C# features that S# also supports.
class C : Component
{
public virtual bool P1 => /* ... */;
public bool P2
{
get { /* ... */ }
}
public int P3 { get; set; }
public int P4(out bool x)
{
// ...
}
public extern virtual bool R1 { get; }
public extern bool R2 { get; set; }
public extern int R3(ref bool x);
}
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The first two provided ports bool get_P1() and bool get_P2() are declared as two
getter-only properties P1 and P2 of type bool with an expression body and a statement
body, respectively [105]. The auto-implemented property P3 implicitly declares an
int state field and two provided ports, namely the getter int get_P3() and the setter
void set_P3(int value). The last provided port P4 is an int-returning method with a
Boolean out parameter x. The first required port bool get_R1() is declared as a getter-
only property R1 of type bool. The property R2 effectively declares the required ports
bool get_P2() and void set_P2(bool value) without introducing a corresponding
state field. The last required port R3 is an int-returning method with a Boolean ref
parameter. P1 and R1 are declared as virtual, allowing component types derived from
C to override their implementation or connection to a provided port, respectively. All
of the ports in the example have public accessibility, allowing other component types
to invoke or connect to them; accessibility of ports is no different than regular C#
accessibility for methods and properties [105].
4.2.4 Port Bindings
Port bindings in S# correspond to port connections in SysML. As required ports have
no body, they cannot be invoked unless they are bound to a provided port with a
compatible signature. Required ports therefore forward all invocations to the provided
port they are bound to; invoking an unbound required port is an error in which case
the S# framework raises an UnboundPortException during model execution. In S#, port
bindings are established by calling the Bind method, using C#’s nameof operator to
pass the names of the required and provided ports that should be bound. Ports are
bound by name to work around several C# language limitations; the S# compiler ensures
that the bindings are established between ports of compatible signature and rewrites
the invocation of the Bind method such that the actual Component instances that are
bound are also passed along. Ports are always bound for concrete component instances,
never for component types. That is, the Bind method in the following example binds
the required port R of the component instance a1 to the provided port P declared by
component instance a2, where a1 and a2 are passed to C’s constructor. Once bound, an
invocation of a1.R indirectly invokes a2.P such that true is returned by a1.R.
class A : Component
{
public bool P() => true;
public extern bool R();
}
class C : Component
{
public C(A a1, A a2)
{
Bind(requiredPort: nameof(a1.R), providedPort: nameof(a2.P));
}
}
Similar to how direct invocations of provided operations are used in the internal block
diagram shown in Figure 3.10 on page 37, S# allows provided ports of other component
instances to be invoked directly. In the example above, component C is allowed to invoke
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a2.P directly, that is, it does not have to call a required port bound to a2.P. While such
shortcuts potentially break encapsulation and compositionality, they help to reduce
clutter in the models by making them more concise. Whether these shortcuts are used is
a matter of style and eventually comes down to personal preference. In this thesis, direct
calls are used when parent components access subcomponents, while port bindings are
preferred between sibling components, and, in particular, between plants and sensors
or actuators.
4.3 Behavioral Modeling
In S#, behavior is represented by C# code that is executed during model simulations
and model checking. S# supports two kinds of behavior: Control flow-based behavior
in the form of regular C# statements and expressions as well as state machine-based
behavior that builds upon the StateMachine<T> type provided by the S# core library.
The global behavior of a model is implicitly defined by the local behaviors of the
individual components, their ports, as well as their communication interrelationships
via port bindings. The individual instructions that the C# code is compiled into represent
micro steps, therefore a macro step typically consists of quite a few C# statements and
expressions. The following example is a partial model of the pressure sensor of the
pressure tank case study that omits any faults and fault effects:
class PressureSensor : Component
{
public virtual bool IsFull => PhysicalPressure >= Model.SensorFullPressure;
public virtual bool IsEmpty => PhysicalPressure <= Model.SensorEmptyPressure;
public extern int PhysicalPressure { get; }
}
The provided ports IsFull and IsEmpty check whether the tank’s pressure exceeds the
sensor’s reporting limits. The pressure is checked against the value retrieved from the
PhysicalPressure required port that is bound to the tank component. The reporting
limits are given by the global constants Model.SensorFullPressure and Model.Sensor-
EmptyPressure. Alternatively, the limits could have been specified as local constants
within PressureSensor itself or they could have been passed to the sensor as constructor
arguments. All three alternatives yield the same analysis results, they only differ in terms
of model comprehensibility and composability. Collecting all global constants in the
Model class allows them to be viewed and changed in unison but is only possible because
of the case study’s simplicity that does not require any complex model composition.
S# supports nondeterministic models, checking all possible combinations of nonde-
terministic choices during model checking. However, only nondeterminism that is
actually known to S# can be exhaustively checked as discussed previously in Sec-
tion 4.1. Therefore, the only source of nondeterminism within a model should be
uses of S#’s own family of Choose methods; as explained in Chapter 6, these methods
allow the S# run time to exhaustively enumerate all possible combinations of non-
deterministic choices. The following simple example shows how the Choose method
can be used to nondeterministically return either true or false from a provided port.
Based on the Choose method, S# provides some additional helper methods that are
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occasionally useful: The ChooseFromRange(lowerBound, upperBound) method, for ex-
ample, nondeterministically returns a value that lies within the given input range,
while ChooseIndex(elementCount) can be used when working with lists or arrays to
nondeterministically select a valid index.
class C : Component
{
public bool P => Choose(true, false);
}
4.3.1 Active Behavior
Components can optionally have active behavior that is triggered automatically by
Update signals during the execution of a macro step as discussed in Chapter 3. In S#,
receptions of the Update signal are represented by invocations of the Update method
declared by the Component base class that all components are allowed to override.
During model execution, the S# framework calls the Update methods of all top-level
components the model consists of which are subsequently free to distribute the signal
among their subcomponents. If a component does not override the Update method, it
conceptually has no active behavior and therefore does not react to receptions of the
Update signal. Nevertheless, it is best practice to always call the Update method of all
components, regardless of whether they actually have an active behavior; this way,
overriding the Update method becomes an implementation detail of each component
and future additions of active behavior will work correctly. For example, the S# version
of the pressure controller of the pressure tank case study can be declared as follows:
class PressureController : Component
{
[Subcomponent] public readonly Pump Pump;
[Subcomponent] public readonly Timer Timer;
[Subcomponent] public readonly PressureSensor Sensor;
[Subcomponent] public readonly SoftwareController Controller;
// constructor omitted
public override void Update()
{
Update(Sensor, Pump, Timer, Controller);
}
}
Only the Timer and SoftwareController components actually override the Update
method, whereas the Pump and PressureSensor components do not. Nevertheless, the
PressureController component invokes the Update methods of all four subcompo-
nents, as otherwise the controller would be tightly coupled to the concrete types of the
Pump and PressureSensor instances that do not have any active behavior. Therefore, the
controller could not be reused, for instance, when a different sensor type derived from
PressureSensor is available that actually overrides Update, even though all provided
and required ports would otherwise be the same. The order in which Update signals are
distributed through the model might also be relevant; in the example above, the timer is
updated before the software controller gets a chance to do the same, though in this case
the actual ordering is irrelevant for formal safety analysis.
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The active behavior of the Tank component printed below shows the discretization of the
differential equation declared by the PressureEquation constraint in Figure 3.18 on page 46,
updating the pressure level depending on the amount of incoming and outgoing fluid
during each macro step. The actual pressure level within the tank is stored in the
_pressureLevel field whose value is simply returned by the PressureLevel provided
port. The provided ports IsRuptured and IsDepleted are used to specify the hazards
but are otherwise not invoked by any other components. The IsBeingFilled required
port allows the tank to determine whether the pump is enabled; if so, the pressure
level increases, otherwise it decreases in accordance with the range restriction specified
via the attribute on the _pressureLevel field. Once the tank has ruptured, its active
behavior is effectively disabled as it no longer has any side effects. The _pressureOut
field is a constant as the amount of outgoing fluid is not considered in detail whereas
the value of the _pressureIn field depends on whether the pump is enabled.
class Tank : Component
{
[Range(0, Model.PressureLimit, OverflowBehavior.Clamp)]
private int _pressureLevel;
private int _pressureIn = 0;
private const int _pressureOut = -1;
public bool IsRuptured => _pressureLevel >= Model.PressureLimit;
public bool IsDepleted => _pressureLevel <= 0;
public int PressureLevel => _pressureLevel;
public extern bool IsBeingFilled { get; }
public override void Update()
{
if (!IsRuptured)
{
_pressureIn = IsBeingFilled ? 2 : 0;
_pressureLevel += _pressureIn + _pressureOut;
}
}
}
4.3.2 State Machines
State machines are often encountered when modeling safety-critical systems, hence S#
provides language support for a subset of the modeling features offered by SysML state
machines. Compared to SysML, S# does not support history states, event queues, or
state actions, for instance [153]. These limitations, however, are only of technical nature,
so future versions of S# could be extended to support a larger subset of SysML’s state
machine modeling features, if necessary. On the other hand, S# integrates state machines
into the overall control flow of the models, as the S# modeling language is primarily
control flow-based due to its C# heritage; for advanced scenarios, this integration offers
some additional modeling flexibilities. The following example is the S# version of the
SysML state machine shown in Figure 3.17 on page 46, that is, the active behavior of the
pressure tank case study’s software controller:
72
4.3 Behavioral Modeling
class SoftwareController : Component
{
// constructor and declarations of the _pump, _timer, and _sensor fields omitted
private enum State
{
Inactive,
Filling,
StoppedBySensor,
StoppedByTimer
}
private readonly StateMachine<State> _stateMachine = State.Inactive;
public override void Update()
{
_stateMachine
.Transition(
from: State.Filling,
to: State.StoppedByTimer,
guard: _timer.HasElapsed,
action: () => _pump.Disable())
.Transition(
from: State.Filling,
to: State.StoppedBySensor,
guard: _sensor.IsFull,
action: () =>
{
_pump.Disable();
_timer.Stop();
})
.Transition(
from: new[]
{ State.StoppedByTimer, State.StoppedBySensor, State.Inactive },
to: State.Filling,
guard: Sensor.IsEmpty,
action: () =>
{
_pump.Enable();
_timer.Start();
});
}
}
The individual states of a state machine are typically enumeration literals or, in more
advanced scenarios, any other type. The State enumeration declared above names the
four states of the statemachine implementing the SoftwareController’s active behavior.
The _stateMachine field of type StateMachine<State> is declared as readonly, thus
the reference to the state machine can never change during model execution. The state
machine in turn has a field that stores its current state, hence the SoftwareController’s
state conceptually consists of the state machine’s state field. The Inactive state is
the state machine’s initial state as indicated by the conversion assignment in the field
declaration above; it is also possible to assign multiple initial states using C#’s array
syntax, one of which is then chosen nondeterministically.
The Update method of the SoftwareController represents the controller’s active be-
havior. As all transitions of the state machine shown in Figure 3.17, page 46, react
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to receptions of the Update signal, all five transitions are declared within Update by
invoking the Transition method on the _stateMachine field. A transition consists of
one or more mandatory source states, one or more mandatory target states, and optional
guards and actions specified in the from, to, guard, and action parameters, respectively.
If the guard is omitted, it is always assumed to be true; if the action is omitted, it is
assumed to be () => {}, i.e., the empty action without any effects. Guards are specified
as Boolean expressions whereas actions are described by arbitrary lambda functions
with side effects, nondeterministic choices, port invocations, and so on.
A transition is only enabled when the state machine is currently in one of the tran-
sition’s source states and its guard holds. If multiple transitions are enabled, one is
chosen nondeterministically. If a transition has multiple target states and the transition
is enabled and chosen, one target state is chosen nondeterministically. The chosen
transition’s optional action is executed after the state has been updated. The event that
triggers a transition is not directly represented in the Transition method; instead, it is
provided by the context the transition is declared in. In the example above, all transitions
are declared in the component’s Update method, hence all transitions are conceptually
considered to be triggered by receptions of the Update signal. It is also possible to declare
some or all transitions in provided ports, meaning that the transitions can only be taken
when that port is called, the state machine is in one of the transitions’ source states, and
the transitions’ guards hold. Such transitions are also able to reference parameters of
the provided port in their guards or actions. The following contrived example illustrates
a state machine that leaves the state S0 and enters state S1 whenever the provided port
P is invoked with a value greater than zero passed to its parameter x:
public void P(int x)
=> _stateMachine.Transition(from: State.S0, to: State.S1, guard: x > 0);
4.4 Fault Modeling
In S#, faults and their effects are modeled analogously to their specification in SysML,
cf. Figure 3.24 on page 55. Conservative extension, i.e., the preservation of the nominal
behavior before fault injection, is guaranteed as fault effects are only enabled when
their associated faults are activated. Error propagation remains implicit in S# models to
simplify modeling as are failures that cause input faults in other components through
port bindings, for instance; these propagation chains are what S# is designed to uncover
automatically. To add a fault to a model, a field of a Fault-derived type has to be added
to a component. If the fault affects a single component only, it is usually advisable to
add the fault to the affected component itself, as demonstrated for the PressureSensor
component in the following example. As shown below, faults can be initialized with any
object of a Fault-derived type with the two most common kinds of persistency provided
by S#’s core library, namely TransientFault and PermanentFault for transient and
permanent persistency, respectively. It is also possible to implement custom Fault-
derived types to model other kinds of fault persistency as explained in the S#Wiki [102]
using the example of permanent persistency with maintenance. Fault fields are usually
both public and readonly so that faults can be referred to in model visualizations, for
instance, but they cannot be reinitialized from outside the component.
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class PressureSensor : Component
{
public readonly Fault SuppressIsEmpty = new TransientFault();
public readonly Fault SuppressIsFull = new TransientFault();
public virtual bool IsFull => PhysicalPressure >= Model.SensorFullPressure;
public virtual bool IsEmpty => PhysicalPressure <= Model.SensorEmptyPressure;
public extern int PhysicalPressure { get; }
[FaultEffect(Fault = nameof(SuppressIsFull))]
public class SuppressIsFullEffect : PressureSensor
{
public override bool IsFull => false;
}
[FaultEffect(Fault = nameof(SuppressIsEmpty))]
public class SuppressIsEmptyEffect : PressureSensor
{
public override bool IsEmpty => false;
}
}
Fault effects are commonly modeled by adding nested classes derived from the affected
component such as SuppressIsFullEffect and SuppressIsEmptyEffect above. A fault
effect must always be marked with the [FaultEffect] attribute that typically links the
effect to its associated fault by statically setting the attribute’s Fault property to the
fault’s name. Fault effects can override provided ports, required ports, or the Update
method to describe the local effects of the fault on the affected component. In the
example above, the IsFull and IsEmpty provided ports are declared as virtual such
that they can be overridden by the two fault effects using C#’s override modifier.
Consequently, fault effect modeling builds upon C#’s support for class polymorphism
and .NET’s standard virtual dispatch mechanism. On top of that, the S# compiler ensures
the correct execution semantics through minor code transformations so that an effect is
only executed when its associated fault is activated.
For example, when the IsFull port is invoked, either directly or indirectly via a port
binding, the original port behavior declared by the PressureSensor component is
only executed if SuppressIsFull is not activated. Conversely, when the S# frame-
work activates the fault during model execution, the off-nominal behavior declared by
SuppressIsFullEffect is executed instead of the original nominal behavior, in this
case always returning false regardless of the actual physical pressure level in the tank.
Consequently, the fault’s effect causes a failure of the sensor in that it no longer reports
the pressure tank to be full. The fault effect for the SuppressIsEmpty fault works in a
similar way, affecting the IsEmpty port instead. The above example only shows how
fault activations immediately result in observable component failures without first intro-
ducing non-observable errors. It is of course also possible, especially when overriding
the Updatemethod, that fault activations result in errors that are not immediate failures:
The off-nominal active behavior could change some values of the component’s fields,
for instance, resulting in latent errors. The S# framework subsequently determines
automatically how such an error propagates through the component and whether it
eventually becomes an externally observable failure or potentially disappears entirely.
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There can be multiple fault effects affecting the same component port. In that case, how-
ever, the S# compiler by default issues a warning because the fault effect that actually
has an effect is chosen nondeterministically, which is often unintended. The nondeter-
minism can be statically resolved by marking both fault effects with the [Priority]
attribute, giving priority to one of the effects. That is, if both fault effects are enabled,
only the effect with the higher priority is considered. If the nondeterminism is indeed
intentional, both fault effects can be explicitly marked with the same priority level,
e.g., [Priority(0)], to silence the warning and to allow S# to choose between the two
effects nondeterministically.
A fault can affect multiple component instances in order to model common cause faults,
for instance, or in order to speed up safety analyses as shown for the height control
case study in Chapter 7. In that case, it is typically advisable to add the fault to a parent
component of all affected components and pass the reference to the fault to the affected
components’ constructors as shown below. There is a 1 : n correspondence between
faults and fault effects, that is, a fault can have multiple effects, but each effect belongs to
exactly one fault. There are twoways to associate faults and fault effects: Either statically
at compile time as shown above or dynamically at run time as shown below. Statically, a
fault effect is associated with a fault by name matching via the [FaultEffect] attribute;
it is the preferred approach for faults that affect a single component only. If, by contrast,
the association between a fault and its effects cannot be statically determined at compile
time, the Fault.AddEffect<TEffect>(Component) method can be called dynamically
when the model is initialized. In the following example, this method is used to associate
the effect of type E given as a generic parameter with the fault passed to C’s constructor,
affecting the instance of C the constructor is executed for:
class C : Component
{
public C(Fault fault)
{
fault.AddEffect<E>(this);
}
[FaultEffect]
public class E : C
{
// ...
}
// ...
}
4.5 Model Composition
A S# model composes together individual component instances, denoting a set of top-
level or root components that represent the modeled system’s controllers and plants.
Models can be composed together using arbitrary C# code; how a model is constructed
is of no interest during model execution and analysis. For example, valid design variants
could be stored in a database where they are retrieved from and assembled dynamically.
It is also possible to create a custom textual or graphical language for the definition of
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model configurations that is integrated into S# through a parser. The design variants of
the height control case study, on the other hand, are composed together using reflection
as shown in Chapter 7. Components can be parameterized in three main ways to allow
for flexible model composition: They can have generic type parameters, for instance
allowing for substitution of subcomponent or field types. Constructor parameters
can influence ranges, the setup of faults and fault effects, as well as the creation of
subcomponents and port bindings, among many other things. Additionally, component
inheritance or component interfaces can be used to swap out parts of a model with
different structural or behavioral design variants.
A model is declared as a class derived from S#’s ModelBase class as shown below. Models
are assumed to declare properties marked with the [Root] attribute that declare the
model’s top-level components, but are otherwise free to contain arbitrary C# code to
flexibly compose together different variants of a model. For the pressure tank case
study model shown below, however, only the default design is considered, so there is
no complicated model initialization logic. The global constants declared by the model
are used by its constituting components in order to parameterize certain aspects of
the overall model. They are declared in the Model class so that they can be viewed
and changed in unison, while more complicated models with various design variants
typically do not use global constants like this: When different variants of a model make
use of different configuration values, these values must often be passed via constructors
to the respective components, for example.
class Model : ModelBase
{
public const int PressureLimit = 60;
public const int SensorFullPressure = 55;
public const int SensorEmptyPressure = 0;
public const int Timeout = 59;
[Root(RootKind.Plant)]
public Tank Tank { get; } = new Tank();
[Root(RootKind.Controller)]
public PressureController Controller { get; } = new PressureController();
public Model()
{
Bind(nameof(Controller.Sensor.PhysicalPressure), nameof(Tank.PressureLevel));
Bind(nameof(Tank.IsBeingFilled), nameof(Controller.Pump.IsEnabled));
}
}
The two getter-only properties store the model’s Tank and PressureController in-
stances; as is idiomatic in both C# and S#, properties are often named the same as
their underlying types. The declared properties are inline-initialized with new Tank
and PressureController instances; every read of the properties therefore returns the
instances automatically created during the construction of the Model instance [105].
The Tank property is marked with the [Root(RootKind.Plant)] attribute that indicates
to the S# framework that the Component instance stored in the property is part of the
analyzed model’s set of plants. Conversely, the Controller property is marked with the
[Root(RootKind.Controller)] attribute to indicate that the stored Component instance
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is part of the analyzed model’s set of controllers. It is important for the S# framework
to know the distinction between top-level plants and controllers as the Update methods
of all plants must be invoked before the Update methods of the controllers. Whether a
Component instance is considered a plant or a controller is model-specific, as different
views of the analyzed system might require these role allocations to change. Addi-
tionally, the model’s constructor establishes the port bindings that correspond to the
connections between the different ports shown in the internal block diagram of the
pressure tank case study in Figure 3.10, page 37.
4.6 Related Work
Embedded versus Standalone Domain Specific Languages. Building a modeling
and analysis framework for safety-critical systems on top of a standard programming
language is somewhat unorthodox. One of the few other modeling languages taking such
an approach is SystemC [73] that is based on the ISO-standardized C++ programming
language [111]; in contrast to S#, however, SystemC was initially not designed for
formal analyses, though such extensions exist [39]. The main benefits of embedding
S# into C# lie in the inherited tooling and infrastructure support with sophisticated
code completion and code navigation capabilities, various code refactorings that are
also applicable to S# models, debugging facilities, and continuous integration support,
among others. In particular, S# can build upon the open source compiler Roslyn [149]
to access abstract syntax trees and to conduct semantic analyses of the S# models with
extensive error recovery mechanisms that reduce implementation effort and increase
S#’s overall usability. Most notably, basic language features such as the syntax and
semantics of expressions and statements are already specified and implemented, allowing
S# to focus on those aspects of its models that actually matter for safety analysis,
namely fault modeling. Custom languages such as the ones used by VECS or the HATS
project [40, 135], by contrast, require large amounts of work just to implement basic
functionality like expression parsing and type checks. Additionally, S# benefits from
future extensions of C#: The next version is likely to support local functions, tuples, and
a simple form of pattern matching, with more advanced pattern matching capabilities
scheduled for later releases [176]. While these features might require small changes to
S#’s compiler extensions, they are trivially supported during model execution.
S# Semantics & Model Transformations. The S# framework does not rely upon
complex model transformations, only the compiler performs some minor code transfor-
mations that shift some language constructs around without fundamentally changing
the model’s level of abstraction or the expressiveness of the modeling language. Hence
the implementation of these transformations is relatively straightforward, in particular
compared to the transformations carried out by the Compass toolset [151] in order to
transform its high-level AADL models to the low-level NuSMV input language [38]; the
transformations’ complexity results from the completely different levels of expressive-
ness between these two languages. On the other hand, S# models are also transformed,
namely by the C# compiler into intermediate language [110] and then by .NET’s just-
in-time compiler to native CPU instructions. However, both transformations are used
by millions of programs world-wide and therefore have extremely high test coverage,
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making bugs unlikely even though not completely impossible. It is always necessary to
have faith in the correctness of the compilers as well as the CPUs that execute both the
compilers as well as the compiled programs, a problem that international norms for the
development of safety-critical systems [107] try to work around by requiring the use of
multiple tool chains and hardware components in very safety-critical scenarios. From a
formal methods point of view, however, the biggest threat to S#’s semantic consistency
is the lack of a formal specification: The official C# specification [105] is only available
in natural language; older versions of C#, however, have been formalized by Börger et al.
[22]. In contrast to C and C++ [108, 111], C# does not have any intentionally undefined
behavior in its specification [105]. Nevertheless, it does not reach the same level of
formalization as the VECS or Compass toolsets [135, 151], for instance.
Model Composition. Support for modeling design alternatives differs widely between
the different languages used for formal safety analysis. The S# framework is one of the
tools that has the most comprehensive support in this area, allowing for component
inheritance and interfaces, generic components, and component parameterization via
constructor arguments. VECS [135], by contrast, only allows for parameterization of
constants and replacement of components, though components are not fully encapsu-
lated and therefore complicate component exchange [188]. The AADL language used
by the Compass toolset [151], on the other hand, requires component interfaces to be
specified and supports full component encapsulation, though the publicly accessible
case studies do not make use of these functionalities; the large but confidential satellite
case study conducted by the European Space Agency [58] likely takes advantage of
AADL’s modeling capabilities in this area. FSAP/NuSMV and its successor xSap [24, 65]
do not provide any real support for variant modeling. All in all, S# provides the most
features and flexibility for modeling design variants compared to these other tools. Only
SystemC [73] is comparable as it has all language features of C++ at its disposal; in
particular, template meta-programming in C++ [3] is more powerful than S#’s sup-
port for generics, but in contrast to SystemC, S# can make use of reflection [110] as
shown in Chapter 7. Moreover, S# and SystemC can also automate model composition
in contrast to all other aforementioned tools: Arbitrary C# code can be executed to
instantiate components and to connect them together in order to build up the overall
model, thereby providing meta-constructs for model creation. As discussed in Chapter 8,
these capabilities are particularly useful for virtual commissioning and safety analyses
of self-organizing systems.
Fault Injection viaDeltaModeling. Themodeling languages of theHATS project [40]
are custom languages with both functional and object-oriented features; they are in-
tegrated into the Eclipse development environment. The languages are executable
through transformations to Java [72] and formally analyzable through transformations
to the Maude system [141] that is based on rewriting logic. HATS is not primarily
concerned with safety analysis but rather with modeling spatial and temporal variability.
Its support for variability modeling is based on the delta modeling approach and requires
various different modeling languages to describe all variants of a system [85]. Delta
modeling or delta-oriented programming was originally introduced by Schaefer and
Damiani [177] as a novel approach for modeling product lines [16]. It is a modular
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and flexible technique for adding, removing, or modifying parts of a model. In the
context of formal safety analysis, the delta modeling concepts could alternatively be
used to model fault effects on system components by adding, removing, or changing
system behavior as opposed to the approach taken by S# based on virtual dispatch. A
feature very similar to delta modeling is planned for a future version of C# [176], also
enabling method replacement, albeit for completely different reasons: Code generation
by UI frameworks, for instance, often creates additional parts of a class, sometimes
requiring the possibility to replace a handwritten method by a generated one or vice
versa; the replacing method is free to invoke the replaced one if necessary. Once this
method replacement mechanism is indeed available in a future version of C#, it could
be used as an alternative way to model fault effects, using the new mechanism instead
of the current virtual dispatch-based approach. However, both the planned method
replacement feature as well as the delta modeling technique are static in the sense that
the modifications made by them to a model are permanent, hence extensions would be
necessary to support the dynamic nature of fault activations. Such extensions are likely
to be conceptually similar to the way the S# compiler transforms the current virtual
dispatch-based fault injection approach.
Summary and Outlook. The S# modeling and analysis framework for safety-critical systems is
based on the C# programming language and the .NET run time environment in order to allow
systematic modeling in accordance with the guidelines introduced in Chapter 3. As the faults that
can affect the system to be analyzed are of primary interest during safety assessment, the S#
modeling language provides first-class support for faults, different kinds of fault persistency, as well
as the description of off-nominal behavior through fault effects. S# inherits the tooling from the
.NET world, thereby combining the strengths of industrial software development environments and
various tools for safety analysis; namely, the high level of expressiveness and tool support as well
as rigorous formal analysis techniques, respectively. Most safety analysis tools developed in an
academic context have a significantly lower level of usability compared to the software development
tooling available to S# such as refactoring or debugging support. Analysis capabilities provided
by the S# framework include model simulations, model checking, as well as model visualizations
that are discussed in Chapter 6. The formal techniques that the S# framework makes use of are
introduced separately in the next chapter as they are completely independent of S# and could thus
be taken advantage of by other safety analysis tools. Chapter 7 shows the complete S# model of
the height control case study and evaluates its safety, also modeling some of its design variants by
taking advantage of S#’s advanced modeling features inherited from C# and the underlying .NET
framework. In Chapter 8, the flexible model composition capabilities provided by the S# framework
are used for run time analyses of self-organizing systems.
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Summary. A new fault-aware modeling and specification approach for safety-
critical systems amends Kripke structures and Linear Temporal Logic [13] with
information about fault activations in order to increase explicit-state analysis effi-
ciency by up to three orders of magnitude. Defined over these formal foundations,
Deductive Cause Consequence Analysis (DCCA) is an established model checking-
based safety analysis technique that computes all minimal critical fault sets for
a hazard [80]. Conceptual improvements to DCCA enhance the model checking
workflow as witnesses are generated to explain how critical fault sets can cause a
hazard, which is more useful in practice than witnesses showing how non-critical
fault sets cannot do so. Moreover, an additional variant of DCCA further reduces
analysis times in many cases.
Publications. Fault-aware modeling and specification as well as the new DCCA
variants are published in [83]; state-based fault modeling is outlined in [80]. 5
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The focus of this chapter lies on basic and well-known modeling and specification
formalisms, namely Kripke structures and Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [13, 41, 133],
that underlie established model checkers [13, 42] such as LTSmin, SPIN, or NuSMV [38,
98, 116]. As faults are obviously of particular interest in the context of safety analysis,
Kripke structures and LTL are amended to conveniently express the concept of fault
activations, thereby making faults and their effects explicit in the analyzed models. In
contrast to the state-based view of faults that is commonly taken by various safety
analysis tools [24, 135, 151], the extended formalisms consider fault activations [9], only
taking situations into account in which faults actually have effects and cause errors.
The activation-based view potentially reduces model checking times by an exponential
factor compared to the state-based one; efficiency improvements of up to three orders
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of magnitude can be observed for the height control case study, for instance. Section 5.1
introduces the notion of fault-aware Kripke structures, also reviewing the traditional
state-based fault modeling approach. For formal fault modeling, two basic operations
are formally defined and put into correlation in Section 5.2: Fault injection and fault
removal. A definition of fault-aware LTL follows in Section 5.3 and Section 5.4 shows
how fault-aware Kripke structures and LTL can be model checked.
Section 5.5 subsequently improves upon the original formalization of themodel checking-
based safety analysis technique Deductive Cause Consequence Analysis (DCCA) [80].
DCCA is specified over Kripke structures and LTL, making it a tool-independent formal
safety analysis technique that is not tied to any high-level modeling formalisms or any
analysis tool chains. DCCA rigorously assesses the safety of models of safety-critical
systems by automatically computing all minimal critical fault sets for a hazard; these sets
represent combinations of faults that can potentially cause the hazard. DCCA checks a
series of LTL formulas with the help of a model checker [13, 42], thereby determining
the cause consequence relationship between the faults (the causes) and the hazard (the
consequence). By formalizing DCCA using the dual of critical fault sets, namely safe
fault sets, a better model checking workflow results with a useful practical advantage
compared to DCCA’s original formalization: The model checker generates a witness
showing how a critical fault set can actually cause the occurrence of a hazard instead of
returning a witness that demonstrates how a safe fault set cannot do so. Witnesses for
critical fault sets can subsequently be used to devise additional safety measures in order
to improve system safety. Taking advantage of the fault awareness of the underlying
Kripke structures, a variant of DCCA is defined that further reduces analysis times in
many cases: Irrelevant faults can be removed when a fault set is checked for criticality,
generating a smaller version of the analyzed fault-aware Kripke structure specifically
tailored to the check.
Chapter 6 bridges the gap between executable models and the formal foundations pre-
sented in this chapter, discussing how executable models, including S# models, can take
advantage of fault-aware modeling and specification as well as DCCA. Figure 5.1 gives
an overview of the entire formal analysis approach spanning this and the subsequent
chapter, showing the steps necessary to model check S# models and to assess their
safety by carrying out DCCAs. Conceptually, executable models are first transformed
to semantically equivalent fault-aware Kripke structures and fault-aware LTL formulas,
which are subsequently converted to classical Kripke structures as well as classical LTL
formulas. For these resulting Kripke structures and formulas, standard model checkers
can be used for analysis. For reasons of efficiency, the S# framework employs a direct in-
tegration of the explicit-state LTSmin model checker [116] that allows for the execution
of S# models during model checking. Consequently, no Kripke structures or LTL formu-
las ever have to be explicitly created during analyses of S# models. Nevertheless, the
direct analysis approach used by the S# framework is rooted in the formal foundations
established in the remainder of this chapter, in particular allowing for safety analyses
of S# models with DCCA. Consequently, the S# framework is a tool that implements
the formal modeling, specification, and safety analysis techniques introduced in the
following, integrating the formal techniques into a high-level modeling approach.
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Figure 5.1. Overview of the relationship between Chapters 5 and 6: This chapter introduces
fault-aware Kripke structures and fault-aware LTL over which DCCA is defined. Classical Kripke
structures, classical LTL, and model checking are not discussed in greater detail in this thesis
except for transformations of the fault-aware modeling and specification formalisms to their
classical counterparts. Chapter 6 subsequently explains the integration of the S# framework into
the formal foundations established in this chapter: Conceptually, fault-aware Kripke structures
and fault-aware LTL formulas are generated from executable models, thereby given them Kripke
structure semantics. For reasons of efficiency, however, the actual implementation of the S#
framework employs a direct model execution approach instead of generating Kripke structures
during explicit-state model checking with LTSmin [116] as discussed and evaluated in Chapter 6.
5.1 Formal Models of Safety-Critical Systems
Transition systems are a standard class of formal models that are used to describe the
states and the behaviors of hardware and software systems [13, 42, 90]. They can be
defined in many different ways ranging from low-level Kripke structures to complex
high-level SysML state machines [121, 153, 154]. The latter expose more expressive
modeling features that increase model comprehensibility at the expense of potentially
making subsequent verifications less efficient due to the increase in semantic complexity.
Kripke structures, on the other hand, are a well-known discrete-state, discrete-time
modeling formalism [36, 41] that established model checkers such as LTSmin, SPIN, or
NuSMV [38, 98, 116] are based on. Consequently, tools built for formal safety analyses
such as S#, VECS, Compass, FSAP/NuSMV, xSAP, and others [24, 27, 65, 82, 122, 135]
either implicitly or explicitly transform their models to Kripke structures for model
checking, while their actual modeling formalisms are usually higher-level, i.e., more
expressive. Formally [42], a Kripke structure K = (P, S,R,L, I) consists of a set of
atomic propositions P , a set of states S, a left-total transition relation R ⊆ S × S, a
labeling function L : S → 2P , and a non-empty set of initial states I ⊆ S.
For example, Figure 5.2 shows the Kripke structure that is generated from the nominal
parts of the S#model of the pressure tank case study. The Kripke structure is completely
deterministic, meaning that it has only one initial state and that all of its states have
exactly one successor state. The Kripke structure therefore starts at its unique initial
state where the tank is empty, which is eventually reached over and over once the tank
has been fully filled up and completely depleted again. As Kripke structures have no
built-in support for modeling time or duration, the concept of time remains explicit: The
timer is modeled by labeling the states with numbers that indicate the amount of seconds
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…
Figure 5.2. The Kripke structure modeling the pressure tank case study without any faults.
Each box represents a state and contains the relevant atomic propositions that hold in the state:
The label P indicates that the pump is running, whereas the number represents both the pressure
level within the tank as well as the timer’s value. The leftmost state is the initial one: The
pressure in the tank is zero, and the sensor reports that the tank is empty. The next state shows
that the pressure increases as the pump is running. Pumping continues until the rightmost state
is reached, where pumping is stopped as the sensor reported the tank to be full. Subsequently,
the pressure decreases until the tank becomes empty, in which case the initial state is reached
again and the cycle starts anew.
that have passed since the timer’s activation, so each transition implicitly represents the
passing of one second. Due to the simplicity of the case study, its nominal behavior only
consists of the cyclic sequence of tank filling and tank draining, in particular without
ever reaching a state in which the tank is ruptured.
5.1.1 State-Based Fault Modeling
Figure 5.3a shows a simplified part of the pressure tank case study’s Kripke structure
with off-nominal behavior shortly before the tank is fully filled and either the pump
is shut off or the tank ruptures. After 56 seconds of pumping, neither the ¬is full fault
nor the ¬timeout fault has any observable effect on the system. After the next step,
the tank is nearly filled, so the sensor should report the tank to be full. The sensor’s
¬is full fault might prevent it from doing so, however, so the activation of ¬is full has
the observable effect of continued pumping even though the pump should have been
deactivated. Consequently, there are two possible scenarios: Either the sensor works,
pumping is stopped, and the tank’s pressure level decreases, or pumping continues
and the timer might prompt the controller to stop pumping. If the timer’s ¬timeout
fault is also activated, pumping is never stopped and the tank ruptures. Compared
to the Kripke structure of the case study’s nominal behavior in Figure 5.2, the Kripke
structure including the off-nominal behavior is much larger due to its higher number
of states and transitions as well as its additional labels that indicate which faults are
active in a state. This is obviously to be expected, as it is the very nature of faults
to introduce additional behavior and to allow states to be reached that are otherwise
unreachable, such as the state in Figure 5.3a where the tank is ruptured. Kripke structures
including off-nominal behavior are usually also highly nondeterministic, which again is
not particularly surprising due to the nondeterministic nature of fault activations.
New states and transitions are therefore absolutely necessary to model faults, their
persistencies, and their effects. For example, there must be a new state that represents a
tank rupture and it must be possible to reach that state via at least one new transition
when both the pressure sensor fails and the timeout is not triggered. However, the huge
number of superfluous additional states and transitions is problematic for formal analysis
techniques, significantly reducing their efficiency; e.g., there are three additional states
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P;56 P;56;t P;56;f P;56;t;f
P;57 P;57;t P;57;f P;57;t;f
58 58;t P;58;f P;58;t;f
… … … …
57 57;t;f57;t 57;f 59;f P;59;t;f
… … … … ruptured…
(a) The Kripke structure resulting from state-based fault
modeling has a plethora of redundant states and tran-
sitions where faults are active without any observable
effects. In particular, both faults can unnecessarily switch
to their active states in many situations where they have
no effect and hence cannot be activated.
P;56
P;57
58 P;58;f
…
57 59;f P;59;f;t
… ruptured…
P;56;f
P;57;f
…
(b) The activation-minimal version of the
Kripke structure has no redundant states or
transitions by focusing on relevant active
faults. The states labeled with f are required
to encode the fault’s permanent persistency
as the model executes multiple fill cycles.
Figure 5.3. Partial view of the Kripke structures for the pressure tank case study including
off-nominal behavior that shows the potential reductions in state and transition counts between
state-based (left) and activation-minimal (right) fault modeling. The states and transitions
belonging to the nominal behavior are dashed whereas the off-nominal behavior is represented
by solid states and transitions. States are labeled with P when the pump is running; the number
represents both the tank’s pressure level and the timer’s counter. The faults ¬is full and ¬timeout
are active in states that are marked with labels f and t, respectively. For reasons of presentational
clarity, the other two faults are omitted and ¬is full and ¬timeout are assumed to be permanent.
for each state of the nominal behavior in Figure 5.2 as well as many transitions between
them that do not provide any significant information during safety analyses. The Kripke
structure shown in Figure 5.3b can be seen as an activation-minimal abstraction of the
one in Figure 5.3a. It is minimal in the sense that irrelevant active faults are omitted
while all system states remain reachable, including, in particular, the hazard. The notion
of minimality is based on the observation that the exact points in time in which faults
become active are irrelevant as long as they do so when they can affect the system.
States that are equivalent modulo active faults can thus be unified, thereby reducing
both the state and the transition counts significantly. However, the states where ¬is
full is active cannot be unified due to the cyclic nature of the model and the fact that
the fault is assumed to have permanent persistency: Once ¬is full was activated in fill
cycle n, its permanent persistency forces it to remain active in all later fill cycles n′
with n′ > n. Consequently, all states in which the tank is being filled or depleted are
duplicated to correctly encode ¬is full’s persistency.
VECS, Compass, FSAP/NuSMV, xSAP, and other safety analysis tools [24, 27, 65, 122, 135]
share this common, state-based fault modeling approach. All of the redundant states
and transitions in Figure 5.3a are artifacts of the way in which these tools generate the
Kripke structures from their high-level models during model checking: Nominal and
off-nominal behavior is modeled separately and combined together using some product
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automaton construction [80]. The off-nominal parts of the model describe the faults’
effects as well as their persistencies; during transformation, they introduce the expected
additional states and new transitions to represent the off-nominal behavior at the level
of Kripke structures. The product automaton construction, however, is what bloats the
generated Kripke structure, resulting in many superfluous states and transitions that
are irrelevant for the purposes of safety analysis: Each previously existing state of the
nominal system behavior is duplicated for all combinations of active faults with various
transitions between them. As faults usually do not always cause errors, many of the
“activations” that are introduced into the generated Kripke structure in this way are
irrelevant as illustrated by Figure 5.3.
In the high-level models, persistency of a fault is typically modeled using a state machine
like one of those shown in Figure 3.21 on page 50. Consequently, all other states of the
generated Kripke structure have to be combined with the fault’s dormant and active
states and all previously existing transitions must be duplicated to capture fault activa-
tions, deactivations, as well as situations in which the fault remains active or dormant.
Transient faults represent the worst case as they occur completely nondeterministically:
n additional transient faults increase the generated Kripke structure’s reachable state
space by a factor of 2n and each state has an additional 2n successor states due to the
product automaton construction. Permanent faults, by contrast, have an overall lower
number of possible successor states compared to transient faults, so the amount of
reachable states and transitions might not increase as noticeably; model checking and
safety analysis efficiency is reduced significantly with each additional fault in both cases.
In Figure 5.3a, for instance, only two of the four faults are considered as otherwise there
would have been 15 additional states instead of only 3 for each pressure level within the
tank. Moreover, the faults are assumed to be permanent as otherwise all four states of
each pressure level with p < 58would have transitions to all four states at pressure level
p+ 1, making a total of 16 transitions per level instead of 9. Obviously, the differences
between these numbers increase the more faults are injected into a model; similarly,
the benefits of minimization illustrated by Figure 5.3b also increase with the number of
faults, reducing the state and transition counts by exponential factors depending on the
structure of the model and the effects of the injected faults.
5.1.2 Fault-Aware Kripke Structures
Fault-aware modeling and specification is a fundamental change of model-based safety
analysis that inherently considers only activation-minimal Kripke structures similar to
the one shown in Figure 5.3b. Fault awareness emphasizes fault activations, making
them central to the models of safety-critical systems as well as the safety analysis
techniques. The state-based fault modeling approach, by contrast, is primarily concerned
with the activation states of the faults, tracking for each fault whether it is active
or dormant. Fault-aware modeling can thus be seen as an event-based alternative
to state-based fault modeling where events are fault activations and deactivations;
however, only the former are considered in the following as there are not many use
cases that can take advantage of the latter. The significant state and transition count
reductions demonstrated by Figure 5.3b make the potential advantages of fault-aware
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modeling evident, decreasing the complexity of the models and thereby increasing
comprehensibility as well as, in particular, model checking and safety analysis efficiency
as evaluated in Sections 5.4 and 5.5. Additionally, fault awareness introduces formal
domains and notations for faults and fault activations, simplifying the formal definitions
of fault injection, fault removal, fault-aware LTL, and DCCA in Sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5.
Fault-aware Kripke structures amend classical Kripke structures [41, 42] in order to
make the models of safety-critical systems aware of the faults they contain and the
circumstances under which faults are activated. For safety analysis purposes, only actual
fault activations are relevant as they cause some off-nominal behavior that would not
have occurred without the activations. In the state-based fault modeling approach, by
contrast, fault “activations” without any effects introduce additional states that only
differ in the active and dormant faults. Fault awareness thus prevents model checkers
from considering such situations with irrelevant active faults during analyses.
Formal Definition. Fault-aware Kripke structures explicitly denote the faults that can
affect the system they represent. They highlight states in which faults can be activated
by labeling their outgoing transitions with sets of activated faults. In other words,
fault-aware Kripke structures label their transitions with the faults that their transitions
activate, allowing the model checker to reason about these activations. This modification
can be seen as a mixture between regular Kripke structures and the notion of transition
system used by Baier and Katoen [13], the latter allowing arbitrary transition actions in
addition to state labels. Formally, fault-aware Kripke structures are defined as follows:
Definition 5.1 (Fault-Aware Kripke Structures). A fault-aware Kripke structureK is
represented by the tuple (P, F, S,R, L, I) consisting of
• a set of atomic propositions P ,
• a set of faults F ,
• a set of states S,
• a transition relation R ⊆ S × 2F × S labeled with fault activations that is
– left-total, i.e., ∀s ∈ S . ∃s′ ∈ S,Γ ⊆ F . (s,Γ, s′) ∈ R and
– activation-minimal, i.e., (s1,Γ, s2) ∈ R ∧ (s1,Γ′, s′2) ∈ R ∧ Γ ( Γ′ → s2 ̸= s′2,
• a labeling function L : S → 2P indicating the set of atomic propositions holding in
a state, and
• a non-empty set of initial fault activations and states ∅ ≠ I ⊆ 2F × S that is
activation-minimal, i.e., (Γ1, s1) ∈ I ∧ (Γ2, s2) ∈ I ∧ Γ1 ( Γ2 → s1 ̸= s2.
By convention, P (K) stands forP , F (K) forF , and so on. A fault-aware Kripke structure
K is finite if P (K), F (K), and S(K) are finite.
In the following, the term fault-aware is occasionally omitted, in which case Kripke
structure always refers to the fault-aware variant; if the distinction between fault-aware
and classical Kripke structures is important, the kind of Kripke structure is explicitly
specified. Additionally, only finite Kripke structures are considered. Fault-aware Kripke
structures are by definition required to have at least one initial state, that is, I ̸= ∅.
Furthermore, the initial states I and the transition relationRmust be activation-minimal;
the latter must also be left-total. Left totality ensures that for all s ∈ S, there is at
least one outgoing transition (s,Γ, s′) ∈ R. Activation minimality guarantees that two
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…
0
P;1
…
¬is empty
¬pumping
depleted ¬is empty
¬pumping
¬pumping
(a) When the pressure level is or reaches zero
again, the sensor should report the tank to be
empty in order to start the pump. Activations of
either ¬pumping or ¬is empty potentially prevent
the system from doing so, resulting in the hazard
of a full tank depletion.
P;57
58P;58
…
57
…ruptured
¬is full
¬timeout,
59
…
¬pumping
¬pumping
¬is full
P;59
(b) The fault-aware Kripke structure corresponding to
the activation-minimal classical one in Figure 5.3b.
Fault persistency is not encoded into fault-aware
Kripke structures, hence the removal of some addi-
tional states and transitions compared to the Kripke
structure in Figure 5.3b.
Figure 5.4. Parts of the pressure tank case study’s fault-aware Kripke structure that explicitly
labels its transitions with the minimal amount of possible fault activations to avoid any state or
transition redundancy. State label P indicates that the pump is running; the number represents
the pressure level within the tank. In contrast to Figure 5.3, all four faults of the case study are
considered; if a state has no outgoing transitions labeled with any faults, no fault activations are
possible in that state. Transitions are annotated with the faults they activate using a shorthand
notation without set braces, that is, ¬is full means {¬is full} and no label at all abbreviates ∅.
transitions between the same source and target states are labeledwith theminimal causes
for the transition, i.e., the minimal sets of fault activations such that no set subsumes
any others; for initial states, activation minimality ensures that no initial states exist
that can be reached through superfluous fault activations. The benefits of fault-aware
Kripke structures for formal safety analysis mainly result from the activation minimality
of the transition relations, whereas the other two requirements of left totality and
non-empty initial sets are not strictly necessary, they just prevent the Kripke structures
from running into deadlocks. The requirement of deadlock freedom, however, does not
pose any severe limitations in practice: Firstly, an empty set of initial states is trivial
to check for and of little practical use. Secondly, hypothetical deadlock states s can
always be made deadlock-free by adding a fresh state s′ and transitions (s, ∅, s′) and
(s′, ∅, s′). Thirdly, model checkers are typically equipped to detect deadlocks [38, 98, 116].
Deadlock freedom is therefore only required to simplify the formalization, avoiding
some special cases that otherwise would have to be considered later on.
Fault-Aware Model of the Pressure Tank Case Study. Figure 5.4 shows two parts
of the fault-aware Kripke structure for the pressure tank case study. Due to activation
minimality, there are no transitions labeled with ¬is full or ¬timeout between the states
shown in Figure 5.4a as these two faults cannot be activated when the tank is empty.
Conversely, the fault ¬is empty is irrelevant in situations where the tank is not empty as
seen in Figure 5.4b, whereas an activation of¬pumping is unable to prevent a tank rupture
once activations of both ¬is full and ¬timeout maneuvered the system into a situation in
which the tank is fully filled. Transitions labeled with fault activations represent off-
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nominal system behavior, whereas unlabeled transitions, or rather, transitions labeled
with the empty set, are either taken in error-free contexts or propagate previously
introduced errors through the system without any additional fault activations.
The actual state and transition count reductions made possible by activation minimality
depend on how often a fault can be activated: ¬timeout, for instance, is only activatable
right before the hazard occurs, resulting in a significant state space reduction compared
to the state-based fault modeling approach; ¬pumping, by contrast, is activatable in
roughly 50% of all states, namely in all states in which the pump is active, and therefore
introduces less non-minimal states and transitions in the state-based approach. In
contrast to state-based fault modeling, however, there is no duplication of states: Fault-
aware Kripke structures do not encode fault persistency; instead, fault persistency is
determined during analyses via fault-aware LTL formulas as discussed in Section 5.3.
5.1.3 Semantics and Path Equivalence
The semantics of fault-aware Kripke structures is defined by the set of paths through
them. In contrast to the paths of classical Kripke structures [41], the paths of fault-
aware ones not only consist of sequences of states but also of the fault activations that
cause the transitions between the states. Consequently, a path clearly describes one
possible behavior of a system and the circumstances of the fault activations that lead
to off-nominal behavior. As soon as a Kripke structure is nondeterministic, which is
usually the case once faults are considered, there is more than one path; the set of all
such paths describes all possible behaviors of the Kripke structure. Before the notion
of paths of fault-aware Kripke structures is defined, however, the more fundamental
concept of path fragments is introduced first, representing finite or infinite behavioral
sequences of a Kripke structure:
Definition 5.2 (Path Fragments). A finite path fragment Γ0s0Γ1s1 . . .Γnsn of length
n and an infinite path fragment Γ0s0Γ1s1 . . . of a fault-aware Kripke structure K are
alternating sequences of fault activations Γi ⊆ F (K) and states si ∈ S(K) such that
(si,Γi+1, si+1) ∈ R(K) for all i ≥ 0.
For a given finite or infinite path fragment ς , ς[i] selects the path’s i-th fault-activated
state, that is, ς[i] = (Γi, si). When only the activated faults or the state is of interest,
the shorthand notations ςF[i] = Γi and ςS[i] = si are used, respectively. ς[..i] denotes
the finite prefix of a finite or infinite path fragment ς with length i, where i ≤ n for
finite path fragments of length n. ς[i..] denotes the infinite suffix of an infinite path
fragment ς starting at the i-th fault-activated state, that is, ς[i..] = ΓisiΓi+1si+1 . . ..
The concatenation of a finite path fragment ς = Γ0s0 . . .Γnsn and some infinite path
fragment ς ′ is written as ςς ′ = Γ0s0 . . .Γnsn ς ′[1..] if ς[n] = ς ′[0].
Definition 5.3 (Paths). An infinite path fragment ς of a fault-aware Kripke structureK
is a path ofK if ς[0] ∈ I(K). paths(K) denotes the set of all paths ς ofK .
As Kripke structures are required to be deadlock-free, paths(K) is always non-empty
and there can never be such a thing as a finite path. In particular, all finite path fragments
ς with ς[0] ∈ I(K) can be extended into infinity, i.e., there is a path ς ′ ∈ paths(K)
with ς ′[..n] = ς for some n ∈ N. A state s ∈ S(K) is reachable if there is some path
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ς ∈ paths(K) that eventually transitions to s, regardless of potential fault activations;
trivially, all initial states of a fault-aware Kripke structure are reachable:
Definition 5.4 (Reached & Reachable States). The set of reached states R(ς) of an
infinite path fragment ς of a fault-aware Kripke structure K is given by {ςS[i] | i ≥ 0}.
The set of reachable statesR(K) of K is given by ⋃ς∈paths(K)R(ς).
Similarly, a fault f ∈ F (K) is considered to be activatable if there is a path ς ∈ paths(K)
on which f is activated at some point:
Definition 5.5 (Activated & Activatable Faults). The set of activated faults A(ς) of an
infinite path fragment ς of a fault-aware Kripke structure K is given by
⋃
i≥0 ςF[i]. The
set of activatable faults A(K) ofK is given by ⋃ς∈paths(K)A(ς).
Faults f ∈ F (K) that are not activatable are just as unnecessary as states s ∈ S(K)
that are unreachable: Both can be removed from a Kripke structure without changing
its behavior. In order to compare the behavior of two fault-aware Kripke structures, the
following notion of path equivalence modulo faults Γ is introduced. It checks whether
two Kripke structures have identical paths except for the potentially empty fault set Γ,
that is, both Kripke structures must have the same activatable faults except for those
faults in Γ, and the paths not activating any faults f ∈ Γ must be the same:
Definition 5.6 (Path Equivalence). Two fault-aware Kripke structures K1 and K2 are
path-equivalent modulo faults Γ, denoted asK1 ≡Γ K2, if for all infinite path fragments
ς = Γ0s0Γ1s1 . . . with si ∈ S(K1) ∪ S(K2), Γi ⊆ F (K1) ∪ F (K2), and Γi ∩ Γ = ∅
for all i ≥ 0, ς ∈ paths(K1) if and only if ς ∈ paths(K2). K1 ≡∅ K2 is abbreviated as
K1 ≡ K2.
Kripke structuresK1 andK2 can only be path-equivalent when their reachable states
R(K1) andR(K2) lie within the intersection of states S(K1) ∩ S(K2). Additionally,
the activatable faults modulo Γ, that is, A(K1) \ Γ and A(K2) \ Γ, must lie within
the intersection of the fault sets F (K1) ∩ F (K2). If both prerequisites are satisfied,
both Kripke structures must have the exact same paths in order to be considered path-
equivalent, optionally disregarding all paths that activate one or more faults f ∈ Γ. If
Γ = ∅, the entire set of paths of the Kripke structures that are compared must be the
same as there are no faults f ∈ Γ that are disregarded.
5.2 Formal Fault Modeling
The systematic fault modeling approach discussed in Chapter 3 establishes the concep-
tual foundation on which nominal system behavior is conservatively extended through
fault injection to incorporate off-nominal behavior. Fault injection mainly consists of
two orthogonal parts: The persistency of the fault must be described and its effects on
the affected components must be modeled. In accordance with the guidelines for sys-
tematic fault modeling, these two aspects are modeled in a structured and modular way
in SysML or S# models. Fault-aware Kripke structures, on the other hand, are neither
structured nor modular, hence fault modeling at this level is more obscure in the sense
that the effects of a fault are modeled by additional transitions labeled with a non-empty
set of fault activations; what part of the system is affected by these activations cannot
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be easily deduced from fault-aware Kripke structures. Fault persistency, on the other
hand, is not modeled at all. Instead, a fault is activated whenever a transition is taken
that is labeled with it, whether these activations correspond to the fault’s persistency is
checked during analysis. Persistency is thus a requirement on the paths of a fault-aware
Kripke structure as discussed in Section 5.3.
At the level of fault-aware Kripke structures, the informally introduced concept of fault
injection can be formalized to precisely define its meaning and to explore the range of
changes that are allowed to be made to a model during fault injection. Additionally, there
is the dual of fault injection: Fault removal removes off-nominal behavior from a fault-
aware Kripke structure. However, some requirements must be met by the removed faults
in order to guarantee deadlock freedom of the resulting fault-aware Kripke structures.
The combination of fault injection and fault removal facilitates the new DCCA variant
introduced in Section 5.5.
5.2.1 Fault Injection
The nominal behavior of a safety-critical system is commonly modeled first in order to
evaluate the modeled system’s soundness and adequacy. Subsequently in a separate step,
faults are injected into the model to describe the system’s off-nominal behavior, enabling
formal safety analyses [24, 27, 80]. The kind of changes that are allowed to be made to
a model during fault injection are clearly restricted by high-level modeling approaches
such as the S# framework or the Compass toolset [82, 151]. Similar restrictions cannot
be made for fault-aware Kripke structures, however, due to their unstructured nature.
Instead, it is necessary to define a fault injection operationK ▹ F that injects the fault
set F into a fault-aware Kripke structureK . As the actual effects of the injected faults
are highly model-specific, the injection operation cannot yield a single extended Kripke
structure but rather describes a set of resulting models incorporating the injected off-
nominal behavior. K▹F is therefore an abstraction of the notion of fault injection where
the precise details of the injected off-nominal behavior are irrelevant; eachK ′ ∈ K ▹ F
therefore represents one possible injection of faults F into Kripke structureK .
Definition 5.7 (Fault Injection). Injecting the faults F into a fault-aware Kripke struc-
ture K yields the set of extended fault-aware Kripke structures K ▹ F , where for all
K ′ ∈ K ▹ F ,
• P (K ′) ⊇ P (K),
• F (K ′) = F (K) ∪ F ,
• S(K ′) ⊇ S(K),
• R(K ′) ⊇ R(K) such that for all (s,Γ, s′) ∈ R(K ′) \R(K), s ∈ S → Γ ∩ F ̸= ∅,
• L(K ′)(s) ⊇ L(K)(s) for all s ∈ S(K), and
• I(K ′) ⊇ I(K) such that for all (Γ, s) ∈ I(K ′) \ I(K), Γ ∩ F ̸= ∅.
As fault injection extends the nominal behavior with off-nominal behavior, additional
propositions, faults, states, labels, transitions, and initial states can be added. However,
the original fault-aware Kripke structure must remain intact, i.e., it must be fully embed-
ded into all extended Kripke structures, making it impossible to remove any previously
existing parts. In other words, fault injection may add new off-nominal behavior, but
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it can never remove previously existing nominal behavior. These restrictions on the
allowed changes during fault injection are not required to conduct safety analyses from
a formal point of view, they are only necessary for reasons of adequacy: The nominal
behavior is carefully modeled and checked for soundness and adequacy, so subsequent
fault injections for formal safety analyses should not invalidate any of the previous
analyses of the nominal behavior. Despite its abstractness, the formal definition of fault
injection is sufficient to formalize and prove the notion conservative extension, that is,
it is possible to show that the original Kripke structure and all possible extensions are
path-equivalent as long as the injected faults are never activated:
Proposition 5.1 (Conservative Extension). For a fault set F and fault-aware Kripke
structuresK andKF ∈ K ▹ F ,K ≡F KF .
Proof. “⇒”: We have to show that ς ∈ paths(K) implies ς ∈ paths(KF ). For a
contradiction, assume that i is the position of the first fault-activated state in ς for
which KF cannot continue. If i = 0, ς[0] ∈ I(K) and thus ς[0] ∈ I(KF ) due to
I(K) ⊆ I(KF ), a contradiction. If i > 0, (ςS[i], ςF[i+ 1], ςS[i+ 1]) ∈ R(K) and from
R(K) ⊆ R(KF ) follows that (ςS[i], ςF[i+1], ςS[i+1]) ∈ R(KF ), again a contradiction.
“⇐”: We have to show that ς ∈ paths(KF ) with A(ς) ∩ F = ∅ implies ς ∈ paths(K).
For a contradiction, assume that i is the position of the first fault-activated state in ς for
whichK cannot continue. If i = 0, ς[0] ∈ I(KF )\ I(K) and thus ςF[0]∩F ̸= ∅, which
is a contradiction. If i > 0, ςS[i] ∈ S(K) and (ςS[i], ςF[i+1], ςS[i+1]) ∈ R(KF )\R(K),
hence ςF[i] ∩ F ̸= ∅, which again yields a contradiction.
Conservative extension shows that the formal definition of fault injection is purely
additive, as previously existing nominal behavior is still exposed by the extended Kripke
structures. Newly injected off-nominal behavior can only be reached by activations of
injected faults; until then, the extended models behave like the original one. Conse-
quently, all fault injections that adhere to the limitations imposed by Definition 5.7 are
guaranteed to be adequate concerning the aspect of conservative extension; whether
they adequately describe the off-nominal behavior of a system is outside the scope of
the formal techniques. In particular, manyK ′ ∈ K ▹ F are conservative extensions of
K but are still practically useless due to improper effect modeling.
Once an activation causes the original part of the Kripke structure to be left, it might
potentially be left forever, or the model eventually returns to its nominal behavior. For
instance, the fault-aware Kripke structure of the pressure tank case study partially
shown in Figure 5.4 only reaches the ruptured state when both faults ¬is full and ¬timeout
are activated; once the tank has ruptured, it is never repaired, thus the model never
reaches its nominal behavior again. Activations of ¬is empty, on the other hand, can
result in the hazard of a complete tank depletion; the Kripke structure is able to reach
its nominal behavior again if neither ¬is empty nor ¬pumping are activated.
Comparison to State-Based Fault Injection. State-based fault modeling requires
additional states, labels, and transitions for injected faults just to distinguish between
the faults’ active and dormant states. Additionally, the classical Kripke structures have to
incorporate the faults’ effects on the system. For fault-aware Kripke structures, however,
injecting a fault can only add new transitions when the fault is actually activated;
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additional states, labels, and transitions are only required to model the faults’ effects
on the system. In particular, fault-aware Kripke structures are not concerned with
fault persistency, leaving the original behavior completely unmodified. For classical
Kripke structures, by contrast, the product automaton construction of the high-level
models that incorporates the fault persistency into the extended model [80] also changes
the nominal parts of the Kripke structure even though they otherwise have to remain
unchanged to ensure conservative extension.
There is anothermodeling artifact resulting from the state-based fault modeling approach
that does not pester fault-aware Kripke structures: With the classical approach, it is
always necessary to explicitly forbid previously existing transitions to be takenwhenever
new transitions are added during fault injection [80, 160]. If the previous behavior is
not restricted in such a way, fault “activations” would only nondeterministically have
an effect on the system, which would mix up the two orthogonal aspects of fault effects
and fault persistency. With fault-aware modeling and specification, such a mix-up
cannot happen because effects are described in fault-aware Kripke structures, whereas
persistency is described in fault-aware LTL formulas. Figure 5.5 illustrates this difference
between both fault modeling approaches.
5.2.2 Fault Removal
Fault injection is a creative activity in the sense that appropriate fault persistencies must
be chosen and the faults’ local effects must be modeled, typically using a high-level
modeling language for safety-critical systems. The actual fault injection process can
subsequently be carried out automatically by a tool like the S# framework or the Compass
toolset in order to generate the extended fault-aware Kripke structure including both
nominal and off-nominal behavior. As discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.5, it is sometimes
beneficial to remove some of the injected faults during analysis in order to increase
analysis efficiency without compromising soundness or completeness of the formal
analyses. In contrast to fault injection, however, fault removal is mechanic and can
therefore be carried out automatically by a tool such as the S# framework. All of the
information necessary to automatically remove one or more faults from a fault-aware
Kripke structure is readily available in the model itself, making it unnecessary to track
any metadata during fault injection. Analogously to the fault injection operatorK ▹ F ,
a fault removal operatorK ) F is defined that removes the faults f ∈ F fromK . The
following definition of the operator leaves some degree of freedom, allowing different
tool implementations that generate varying reduced Kripke structures. As all of these
reduced Kripke structures can only differ in irrelevant details such as unreachable states
or transitions, they are pairwise path-equivalent.
Definition 5.8 (Fault Removal). Removing the fault set F ⊆ F (K) from a fault-aware
Kripke structureK yields the set of reduced fault-aware Kripke structuresK )F , where
for allK ′ ∈ K ) F ,
• P (K ′) ⊆ P (K),
• F (K ′) = F (K) \ F ,
• R(K) ⊆ S(K ′) ⊆ S(K),
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stm S
A
B C
Update [¬f] Update [f] 
Update
(a) A state machine that determinis-
tically enters state C when the per-
manent fault f is active.
A;fA;¬f
B;¬f B;f C;f
(b) The classical Kripke struc-
ture resulting from the state
machine to the left.
A
B C
f 
(c) The fault-aware Kripke struc-
ture resulting from the state ma-
chine to the left.
stm S
A
B C
Update Update [f] 
Update
(d) A state machine that nonde-
terministically enters state B or C
when the permanent fault f is active,
mixing up effects and persistency.
A;fA;¬f
B;¬f B;f C;f
(e) The classical Kripke struc-
ture for the state machine to
the left where an active perma-
nent fault can have no effect.
A
B C
f 
(f) The fault-aware Kripke struc-
ture naturally allows the behavior
of the state machine to the left, as
persistency is not considered.
Figure 5.5. Comparison of fault-aware and state-based modeling regarding enforcement of
fault effects: In the upper row, an activation of fault f in state A deterministically transitions the
state machine to state C. The classical Kripke structure in Figure 5.5b and the fault-aware one in
Figure 5.5c do the same. In the lower row, by contrast, fault f is not enforced to have any effect,
hence the state machine can nondeterministically choose between states B and C, leading to
an additional transition in the corresponding classical Kripke structure in Figure 5.5e. Yet, the
fault-aware Kripke structure in Figure 5.5f is the same as the one in Figure 5.5c: A transition to
state B with the “activation” of fault f is not activation-minimal, hence f has no effect and thus
cannot be activated in the first place. In particular, the state machine in Figure 5.5d is nonsensical
when f has permanent persistency, as f would be allowed to have no effect even though once it
has previously been activated, it is always supposed to have an effect by its very nature. Thus, f
would behave like a transient fault even though it is modeled as a permanent one.
• R(K ′) = {(s,Γ, s′) ∈ R(K) | s, s′ ∈ S(K ′) ∧ Γ ∩ F = ∅},
• L(K ′)(s) = L(K)(s) for all s ∈ S(K ′), and
• I(K ′) = {(Γ, s) ∈ I(K) | s ∈ S(K ′) ∧ Γ ∩ F = ∅}.
As fault removal prevents off-nominal behavior, some propositions, faults, states, labels,
transitions, and initial states can be removed that would become superfluous after fault
removal anyway. However, the original behavior of the fault-aware Kripke structure
must remain intact as long as none of the removed faults are activated, i.e., it is impossible
to remove any parts that are not related to the removed faults or to add additional parts
to the Kripke structure that result in new behavior. In other words, fault removal may
remove previously existing off-nominal behavior, but it can never remove previously
existing nominal behavior or add any new behavior. Similar to fault injection, these
restrictions on the allowed changes during fault removal are not required to conduct
formal analyses from a formal point of view, they are only necessary for reasons of
adequacy: Fault removal is an optimization that under no circumstances is allowed to
influence the analysis results. Despite its abstractness, the formal definition of fault
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removal is sufficient to formalize and prove the notion of conservative subtraction, that
is, it is possible to show that the original Kripke structure and all possible reduced ones
are path-equivalent as long as the removed faults are never activated:
Proposition 5.2 (Conservative Subtraction). For fault set F ⊆ F (K) and fault-aware
Kripke structuresK andK\F ∈ K ) F ,K ≡F K\F .
Proof. “⇒”: We have to show that ς ∈ paths(K) with A(ς) ∩ F = ∅ implies ς ∈
paths(K\F ). For a contradiction, assume that i is the position of the first fault-activated
state in ς for which K\F cannot continue. If i = 0, ς[0] /∈ I(K\F ) and thus either
ςS[0] /∈ S(K\F ) or ςF[0] ∩ F ̸= ∅. The former is impossible as ςS[0] is reachable in
K , the latter is a contradiction. If i > 0, (ςS[i], ςF[i+ 1], ςS[i+ 1]) /∈ R(K\F ) because
either ςS[i] /∈ S(K\F ), ςS[i+ 1] /∈ S(K\F ) or ςF[i+ 1] ∩ F ̸= ∅. The former two are
impossible as both states are reachable inK and the latter is a contradiction.
“⇐”: We have to show that ς ∈ paths(K\F ) implies ς ∈ paths(K). For a contradiction,
assume that i is the position of the first fault-activated state in ς for whichK cannot
continue. If i = 0, ς[0] ∈ I(K\F ) and thus ς[0] ∈ I(K) due to I(K\F ) ⊆ I(K), a
contradiction. If i > 0, (ςS[i], ςF[i+1], ςS[i+1]) ∈ R(K\F ) and fromR(K\F ) ⊆ R(K)
follows that (ςS[i], ςF[i+ 1], ςS[i+ 1]) ∈ R(K), again a contradiction.
Conservative subtraction guarantees that the formal definition of fault removal is purely
subtractive, adding no new behavior while preserving all nominal behavior as well as all
off-nominal behavior unrelated to the removed faults. Previously possible off-nominal
behavior due to activations of one or more removed faults is no longer reachable. It is
possible, and very likely, that some previously reachable states are no longer reachable,
or similarly, that some previously activatable faults are no longer activatable even though
they are not removed during fault removal. For example, after removing the ¬is full fault
from the pressure tank case study’s Kripke structure shown in Figure 5.4, the state where
the tank is ruptured is no longer reachable and ¬timeout is no longer activatable. All fault
removals carried out in accordance with Definition 5.8 are guaranteed not to influence
analysis results as they only yield pair-wise path-equivalent Kripke structures:
Corollary 5.1. For fault set F ⊆ F (K) and fault-aware Kripke structures K and
K\F ,K ′\F ∈ K ) F ,K\F ≡ K ′\F .
Proof. Trivially follows from the fact that there is no choice for the set of initial states,
that is, I(K\F ) = I(K ′\F ) during fault removal. Moreover, for all states s ∈ R(K)
originally reachable inK , there is no choice for the successors in the transition relation
during fault removal, i.e., (s,Γ, s′) ∈ R(K\F ) if and only if (s,Γ, s′) ∈ R(K ′\F ).
The only differences between two reduced Kripke structures concern unreachable
states and unused propositions or state labels. For symbolic model checkers, it is thus
beneficial to remove as many unreachable states as possible during fault removal in order
to decrease the model checker workload. Explicit-state model checkers, by contrast,
inherently do not consider unreachable states, so they in general do not care which of
the reduced Kripke structures they analyze from a performance point of view.
In contrast to fault injection, fault removal is an operation that can potentially fail, that
is, the set of reduced Kripke structures generated byK)F can be empty: Depending on
the faults that are removed, it is possible that the initial states or the transition relations
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of all reduced Kripke structures would be empty or non-left-total, respectively, which is
explicitly forbidden by the definition of fault-aware Kripke structures. Consequently,
if the faults cannot be removed in a way that results in at least one deadlock-free
Kripke structure, fault removal fails as no proper reduced Kripke structure exists. A
necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees the non-emptiness of K ) F is
activation independence of the removed fault set. A fault set is activation-independent
if activations are never forced, that is, there is always an alternative future in which
none of the faults are activated.
Definition 5.9 (Activation Independence). A fault set Γ ⊆ F (K) of a fault-aware
Kripke structureK is activation-independent inK if there is some (Γ′, s′) ∈ I(K) such
that Γ′ ∩ Γ = ∅ and for all reachable states s ∈ R(K) there is a transition (s,Γ′′, s′′) ∈
R(K) such that Γ′′ ∩ Γ = ∅.
A fault set is thus considered to be activation-independent when none of its contained
faults must be activated in an initial state and all reachable states can branch into at
least one future successor state such that the taken transition does not activate any of
the faults contained in the set. Fault injection automatically guarantees the first part
of activation independence in most modeling and analysis scenarios encountered in
practice: Starting from a fault-aware Kripke structureK that does not contain any faults,
i.e., F (K) = ∅, fault injection retains all of the original initial states I(K) that obviously
cannot activate any faults. In general, a fault set Γ being activation-independent in a
fault-aware Kripke structureK is equivalent to being able to remove Γ fromK such
that at least one reduced Kripke structure exists:
Theorem 5.1 (Removal of Activation-Independent Faults). For a fault-aware Kripke
structure K and a fault set F ⊆ F (K), F is activation-independent in K if and only if
K ) F ̸= ∅.
Proof. “⇒”: For a fault-aware Kripke structureK with activation-independent faults
F ⊆ F (K), we construct K\F ∈ K ) F such that P (K\F ) = P (K), F (K\F ) =
F (K)\F , S(K\F ) = R(K),R(K\F ) = {(s,Γ, s′) ∈ R(K) | s, s′ ∈ S(K\F )∧Γ∩F =
∅}, L(K\F )(s) = L(K)(s) for all s ∈ S(K\F ), and I(K\F ) = {(Γ, s) ∈ I(K) | s ∈
S(K\F ) ∧ Γ ∩ F = ∅}. Indeed, I(K\F ) ̸= ∅ as I(K) ̸= ∅ and there is a (Γ, s) ∈ I(K)
such that Γ∩F = ∅ due to the activation independence of F and the reachability of s in
K , i.e., s ∈ S(K\F ). Moreover, for all s ∈ R(K) = S(K\F ), there is a (s,Γ, s′) ∈ R(K)
such that Γ ∩ F = ∅ due to the activation independence of F . Hence, s and s′ are
reachable inK , i.e., s, s′ ∈ S(K\F ), and thus (s,Γ, s′) ∈ R(K\F ). Additionally,K\F
is activation-minimal asK is activation-minimal and no new transitions or initial states
are introduced during fault removal.
“⇐”: LetK\F ∈ K)F be a reduced Kripke structure forK . For a contradiction, assume
that F is not activation-independent in K , so there either is no (Γ, s) ∈ I(K) such
that Γ ∩ F = ∅ or there is some reachable state s′ ∈ R(K) such that no transition
(s′,Γ′, s′′) ∈ R(K) exists with Γ′ ∩ F = ∅. In the former case, I(K\F ) = ∅, thus
K\F would not be a fault-aware Kripke structure, a contradiction. In the latter case,
s′ ∈ R(K) ⊆ S(K\F ) but there would be no outgoing transition in R(K\F ) for s′,
henceK\F would not be a Kripke structure, again a contradiction.
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K
K ▹ F1 ⊎ F2 +3
K ▹ F1

KF1⊎F2
KF1⊎F2 ) F2

KF1 (KF1⊎F2)\F2≡
Figure 5.6. Illustration of the relationship between fault injection and fault removal: Starting
with a fault-aware Kripke structureK and two disjoint fault sets F1 and F2, path-equivalent
fault-aware Kripke structures can be obtained by either injecting the relevant faults F1 only or
by first injecting all faults F1 ⊎ F2 and subsequently removing the irrelevant faults F2.
Due to Theorem 5.1, it is not necessary to check whether a fault set that is to be removed
is activation-independent before the set can safely be removed from a fault-aware
Kripke structure; if the removal operation succeeds, the removed faults are activation
independent in the original Kripke structure. When fault-aware Kripke structures are
generated from S# models, activation independence is guaranteed for both transient
and permanent faults, thus enabling fault removal.
5.2.3 Removal of Injected Faults
Fault injection and fault removal are two orthogonal operations that can be performed
independently on any fault-aware Kripke structure. On the other hand, it is also possible
to remove previously injected faults: If some of the injected faults should be suppressed
during some analysis activities, their activations could either be ignored by the model
checker or they could be removed from the model in the first place, potentially increas-
ing analysis performance. As shown by Proposition 5.2, fault removal preserves all
behavior modulo the removed faults, hence such a fault removal optimization does not
influence analysis results in any way other than analysis efficiency. However, injecting
a potentially large set of faults just to remove most or all of them later on also seems
inefficient; especially when DCCAs are conducted, the fault-aware Kripke structures
are often checked with only very few relevant faults as discussed in Section 5.5.
Figure 5.6 illustrates that it is in fact irrelevant whether a large set of faults is injected first
and a subset of those faults is removed, or whether only the complement of the removed
faults is injected in the first place. Regardless of which path is taken through Figure 5.6,
it is always possible to construct two path-equivalent fault-aware Kripke structures.
Automated analysis tools such as the S# framework are therefore allowed to choose the
path that is most convenient and efficient. Formally, the following proposition shows
that it is indeed valid to inject only the smaller fault set for analysis instead of injecting
all faults and subsequently removing a large portion of them:
Proposition 5.3 (Removal of Injected Faults). For fault sets F and F ′ ⊆ F and all
fault-aware Kripke structures K , KF ∈ K ▹ F , and (KF )\F ′ ∈ KF ) F ′, there is a
KF\F ′ ∈ K ▹ (F \ F ′) such thatKF\F ′ ≡ (KF )\F ′ .
Proof. By conservative extension we can choose KF\F ′ ∈ K ▹ (F \ F ′) such that
KF\F ′ ≡F ′ KF . ThenKF\F ′ ≡ (KF )\F ′ because of Proposition 5.2.
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At the formal level, Proposition 5.3 can only show the existence of path-equivalent
Kripke structures as the fault injection operation abstracts from concrete fault effects,
yielding sets of extended Kripke structures that represent all conceivable fault effects
that could potentially be added to a Kripke structure. The reverse of Proposition 5.3, i.e.,
the other path through Figure 5.6, trivially holds considering that for allKF1 ∈ K ▹ F1
there is a KF1⊎F2 ∈ K ▹ F1 ⊎ F2 that does simply not add any new transitions or
initial states for faults f ∈ F2 and is otherwise equivalent toKF1 , essentially making
the subsequent removal operation unnecessary. For the special case of removing all
injected faults, it is possible to formally show that the original Kripke structure K is
path-equivalent to all extended and subsequently reduced ones. However,K itself does
not result from the injection-removal process as long as at least one new reachable state
s is added during fault injection, as s cannot be removed again during fault removal; no
reachable states of the extended Kripke structures can be removed.
Proposition 5.4 (Removal of All Injected Faults). For a fault set F and a fault-aware
Kripke structureK ,K ≡ KF\F for allKF ∈ K ▹ F andKF\F ∈ KF ) F .
Proof. Let KF and KF\F be two arbitrary fault-aware Kripke structures such that
KF ∈ K ▹ F and KF\F ∈ KF ) F . I(K) = I(KF\F ) as I(K) ⊆ I(KF ) and all
additional (Γ, s) ∈ I(KF ) \ I(K) with Γ ∩ F ̸= ∅ are removed from I(KF ) during
fault removal. Similarly, R(K) = R(KF\F ) as R(K) ⊆ R(KF ) and all additional
(s,Γ, s′) ∈ R(KF ) \ R(K) with Γ ∩ F ̸= ∅ are removed from R(KF ) during fault
removal. Thus,K ≡ KF\F .
5.3 Formal Properties of Safety-Critical Systems
Formal system specifications describe the properties that a system is expected to exhibit.
They are derived from informally stated system requirements in order to formally
check that the system model satisfies the requirements. There is a wide variety of
specification languages for formalizing system properties, with the class of temporal
logics being one possible choice [90]. The following introduces LTL with the standard
set of future and past operators [13, 133]. It is amended with explicit support to express
actual and potential fault activations in order to formally specify properties over safety-
critical systems modeled as fault-aware Kripke structures. Other temporal logics such as
Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [13] could also be extended with fault awareness similar
to fault-aware LTL.
5.3.1 Fault-Aware Linear Temporal Logic
Fault-aware LTL is an extension of propositional logic that adds temporal modalities for
expressing constraints over multiple fault-activated states of infinite paths of fault-aware
Kripke structures. For instance, events such as fault activations, hazard occurrences,
or the pressure sensor reporting that the tank is full can be expressed using LTL. In
contrast to what the adjective “temporal” might suggest, LTL cannot specify the real-
time behavior of a system [13, 17]; rather, LTL is based on an abstract time model
that refers to the relative order of events only, thereby mimicking the discrete-state,
discrete-time nature of Kripke structures [36]. For example, it is possible to express
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linear time properties such as “the pressure tank cannot rupture as long as the pressure
sensor’s ¬is full fault is not activated”, which establishes a constraint between a tank
rupture and the activation of ¬is full for all paths of a fault-aware Kripke structure. By
contrast, it is impossible to specify properties that refer to the real-world timing or
duration of events such as “it takes at least one minute of continuous pumping before
the tank ruptures“.
The following syntax definition of fault-aware LTL formulas lists the propositional logic
operators ¬ and ∧ only from which all other propositional logic operators such as ∨ and
→ can be derived in the usual way [13]. Additionally, it defines two future modalities
X (next) andU (until) as well as two past modalities P (previously) and S (since) with
additional modalities defined as usual [13, 133]. Past modalities do not increase the
expressiveness of the logic, but can make some formulas exponentially more succinct
compared to ones that only use future modalities [139] while in many practical cases
still allowing for efficient model checking [18, 170]. Compared to standard definitions of
classical LTL with future and past modalities, fault-aware LTL is extended with two new
operators related to fault activations: Formula Γ requires that at least the faults in Γwere
activated to reach a state, that is, it allows to check whether the Kripke structure reached
a state because of the activations of all f ∈ Γ, and potentially more, during the last
transition. Formula Γ therefore allows a glimpse into the immediate past, whereas the
other new operator supported by fault-aware LTL conceptually looks into the immediate
future: Formula Γ? checks whether exactly the fault set Γmight potentially be activated
when leaving a state, i.e., it allows to check whether precisely the faults f ∈ Γ can be
activated to reach the next state. The Γ? operator therefore considers multiple distinct
futures that are possible instead of one single future as is usually the case with LTL; the
operator is conceptually similar to EX in CTL. Fault-aware LTL is unable to directly
express that a fault is currently active or dormant, a limitation that does not affect
analyses of the case studies in any way.
Definition 5.10 (Syntax of Fault-Aware LTL). Fault-aware LTL formulas Φ are formed
over a set P of atomic propositions and a set F of faults according to the following gram-
mar, where ϕ, ϕ1, and ϕ2 are fault-aware LTL formulas over P and F , p ∈ P , and
Γ ⊆ F :
Φ , true | p | Γ | Γ? | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | Xϕ | ϕ1Uϕ2 | Pϕ | ϕ1 Sϕ2
Other propositional connectives are defined as usual. Additionally, ϕ1U= ϕ2 is defined as
ϕ1U (ϕ1∧ϕ2),Fϕ (finally) abbreviates trueUϕ, andGϕ (globally) stands for¬F¬ϕ.
Analogously,Oϕ (once) abbreviates trueSϕ andHϕ (historically) stands for ¬O¬ϕ.
The semantics of a fault-aware LTL formula is defined over an infinite path fragment ς
of a fault-aware Kripke structureK for a given fault-activated state at position i. While
an atomic proposition p ∈ P (K) holds in state s = ςS[i] of ς when p is in the state’s set
of labels, that is, p ∈ L(K)(s), a fault formula Γ with Γ ⊆ F (K) holds if state s = ςS[i]
of ς is reached by the activation of at least the faults f ∈ Γ, i.e., Γ ⊆ ςF[i]. Consequently,
there can be additional faults f ∈ F (K) \ Γ activated to reach s that are ignored by
the formula Γ. The formula’s semantics represents the common case without loss of
generality, as fault activations are also precisely expressible: State s is reached precisely
99
5 Formal Safety Analysis
because of the activations of faults Γ ⊆ F (K), but no others, if Γ ∧∧f∈F (K)\Γ ¬f . On
the other hand, Γ? with Γ ⊆ F (K) holds if state ςS[i] of ς can be left by a transition that
activates precisely the faults f ∈ Γ, which fits the common use cases of the operator.
The next state operator Xϕ checks whether ϕ holds in the next state of path ς , i.e.,
at i + 1. Conversely, the previous state operator Pϕ checks whether ϕ holds in the
previous state of path ς , i.e., at i− 1; if i = 0, it does not hold. For instance, the formula
p→ X f with f abbreviating {f} checks whether proposition p holding in the current
state with index i must subsequently result in the activation of fault f at i + 1. The
finally operator Fϕ and the globally operatorGϕ ensure that ϕ holds in at least one
or in all future states, including the current one, respectively. Formulas F f andG f
can therefore be used to check whether fault f will be activated somewhere along the
path, or whether it will always be activated on the path. By contrast, the once operator
Oϕ and the historically operatorHϕ ensure that ϕ held in at least one or in all past
states, including the current one, respectively. FormulaO f , for instance, can thus be
used to check whether fault f was previously activated at least once. The until operator
ϕ1Uϕ2 requires ϕ2 to hold at some point on the path, and up to this point, ϕ1 must
hold. For example, pU f requires that eventually fault f is activated and as long as the
activation has not happened yet, the proposition p must hold. The since operator is
until’s dual for the past, meaning that ϕ1 Sϕ2 holds if ϕ2 held previously or holds now,
and since then ϕ1 holds. The following definition of the fault-aware LTL semantics is
based on the standard semantics of the temporal operators [13, 133]; their semantics
are nevertheless defined below for reasons of completeness as they are used extensively
in the remainder of this thesis.
Definition 5.11 (Semantics of Fault-Aware LTL). A fault-aware LTL formula ϕ ∈ Φ is
valid at a position i ≥ 0 of an infinite path fragment ς of a fault-aware Kripke structure
K , written as ς, i |= ϕ, if:
ς, i |= true
ς, i |= p iff p ∈ L(K)(ςS[i])
ς, i |= Γ iff Γ ⊆ ςF[i]
ς, i |= Γ? iff (ςS[i],Γ, s) ∈ R(K) for some s ∈ S(K)
ς, i |= ¬ϕ iff ς, i ̸|= ϕ
ς, i |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff ς, i |= ϕ1 and ς, i |= ϕ2
ς, i |= Xϕ iff ς, i+ 1 |= ϕ
ς, i |= ϕ1Uϕ2 iff there is a k ≥ i with ς, k |= ϕ2 and
ς, j |= ϕ1 for all i ≤ j < k
ς, i |= Pϕ iff i > 0 and ς, i− 1 |= ϕ
ς, i |= ϕ1 Sϕ2 iff there is a 0 ≤ k ≤ i with ς, k |= ϕ2 and
ς, j |= ϕ1 for all k < j ≤ i
ς |= ϕ abbreviates ς, 0 |= ϕ. ϕ is valid inK , written asK |= ϕ, if and only if ς |= ϕ for
all ς ∈ paths(K).
Due to the implicit universal quantification over all paths ς ofK , ς |= ϕ if and only if
ς ̸|= ¬ϕ, butK |= ¬ϕ only impliesK ̸|= ϕ and not vice versa. It is sometimes difficult
or somewhat unintuitive to correctly devise adequate LTL formulas from informal
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requirements even though LTL is a comparatively simple temporal logic; µ-calculus,
for instance, subsumes LTL and quickly becomes incomprehensible once multiple fix
points are nested [54]. It is therefore advisable to consult a standard library of property
patterns [21, 49] whenever possible. Such libraries contain various templates, albeit
disregarding fault activations, for temporal properties formulated in multiple temporal
logics that can be useful to formally specify properties of safety-critical systems.
5.3.2 Fault Suppression and Fault Removal
LTL considers each path of a fault-aware Kripke structure individually, allowing only
to get a brief glimpse of other potential paths through the Γ? operator. It is therefore
possible to use implications in order to filter out those paths of a Kripke structure that
do not satisfy a certain precondition. That is, an LTL formula of the form (Gϕ1)→ ϕ2
partitions the set of analyzed paths into those that trivially satisfy the formula due
to a violation of ϕ1 as well as the remaining paths for which ϕ2 must then hold. In
particular, LTL formulas of the pattern (G
∧
f∈Γ ¬f) → ϕ check whether ϕ holds
under the assumption that none of the faults f ∈ Γ are activated, or conversely, the
formula suppresses the activations of the faults f ∈ Γ while checking ϕ. Such formulas
are common in plausibility checks that verify certain nominal behavior of a model
disregarding all or some of the modeled faults; moreover, DCCA can use these kinds of
formulas to check for minimal critical fault sets as explained in Section 5.5.
When checking a formula that suppresses some or all faults Γ ⊆ F (K), the paths
of Kripke structure K are partitioned into two disjoint sets Σs and Σa such that
paths(K) = Σs ⊎ Σa with the former containing the paths on which the suppressed
faults are never activated and the latter containing the paths that activate some or all
of the suppressed faults. Consequently, for all paths ς ∈ Σs, A(ς) ∩ Γ = ∅ and thus
ς |= G∧f∈Γ ¬f , while for the paths ς ∈ Σa, on the other hand, A(ς) ∩ Γ ̸= ∅ and
therefore ς ̸|= G∧f∈Γ ¬f . Instead of simply discarding Σa during model checking,
the paths it contains can alternatively be removed from the model in the first place
by removing the suppressed faults F from the Kripke structure entirely. The reduced
Kripke structure does not contain any paths ς ∈ Σa, but still retains all other paths
ς ∈ Σs as shown by the following proposition. Therefore, fault removal at the level of
Kripke structures makes it possible to increase analysis efficiency compared to fault
suppression with formulas without affecting the outcome of the analyses:
Proposition 5.5 (Fault Suppression). For a fault-aware Kripke structure K , a fault set
Γ ⊆ F (K), and an LTL formula ϕ ∈ Φ expressible over both K and all K\Γ ∈ K ) Γ,
K |= (G∧f∈Γ ¬f)→ ϕ if and only ifK\Γ |= ϕ for allK\Γ ∈ K ) Γ.
Proof. Let K\Γ ∈ K ) Γ and ς ∈ paths(K). If ς ̸|= G∧f∈Γ ¬f , ς /∈ paths(K\Γ) due
to fault removal as defined in Definition 5.8. Otherwise, ς |= ϕ and henceK\Γ |= ϕ as
K ≡Γ K\Γ due to Proposition 5.2.
Proposition 5.5 also shows that all formulas ϕ holding when faults f ∈ Γ are suppressed
hold for all of the reduced Kripke structures resulting from the removal of Γ from the
original model. As shown more generally by the following corollary, an LTL formula ϕ
either holds in all reduced Kripke structures or in none of them at all as all of the reduced
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models are path-equivalent. Consequently, the concrete choice of the reduced Kripke
structure that is checked does not affect the outcome of the analysis, but potentially
decreases model checking efficiency when a Kripke structure is chosen with many
unreachable states.
Corollary 5.2. For fault set Γ ⊆ F (K), fault-aware Kripke structures K and K\Γ,
K ′\Γ ∈ K ) Γ, as well as an LTL formula ϕ ∈ Φ expressible over both K\Γ and K ′\Γ,
K\Γ |= ϕ if and only ifK ′\Γ |= ϕ.
Proof. Follows from the fact thatK\Γ andK ′\Γ are path-equivalent as shown by Corol-
lary 5.1. Additionally, the labels of all states s ∈ R(K) originally reachable inK remain
unchanged during fault removal.
Fault-aware LTL is also able to check whether a fault set Γ ⊆ F (K) is activation-
independent in K . Due to the equivalence of activation independence and the non-
emptiness of the set of reduced Kripke structures K ) Γ, it is thus possible to check
whether fault removal succeeds before attempting the operation:
Proposition 5.6 (LTL-Based Characterization of Activation Independence). A non-
empty fault set ∅ ̸= Γ ⊆ F (K) is activation-independent in a fault-aware Kripke struc-
tureK if and only ifK ̸|= Γ andK |= G∨Γ′⊆F (K)\Γ Γ′?.
Proof. K ̸|= Γ if and only if there is some (Γ′, s′) ∈ I(K) such that Γ′ ∩ Γ = ∅
and Γ ̸= ∅. Moreover, K |= G∨Γ′⊆F (K)\Γ Γ′? if and only if for all reachable states
s ∈ R(K) there is a transition (s,Γ′′, s′′) ∈ R(K) such that Γ′′ ∩ Γ = ∅.
5.3.3 Persistency Constraints
The orthogonality of fault effects and fault persistency is clearly represented by the
fault-aware modeling and specification approach: Effects are modeled in the fault-aware
Kripke structures whereas persistency constraints are specified via fault-aware LTL
formulas. The former only describe the effects of fault activations, disregarding any
persistency constraints. It is therefore possible to use the same fault-aware Kripke
structure in multiple analyses with different persistency constraints specified for its
faults. The constraints are encoded into the analyzed LTL formulas to filter out paths
violating any of them. This separation of concerns reflects the fact that the most
important aspect of fault modeling is the adequate injection of fault effects into a model,
whereas fault persistency is more of a secondary concern as transient persistency
subsumes all other kinds of persistency.
A persistency constraint ψ ∈ Φ is a fault-aware LTL formula that specifies the allowed
transitions between the active and dormant states of a fault set, that is, it determines
the circumstances under which the faults can, cannot, or must be activated. Assuming a
set Ψ of persistency constraints that must be satisfied during analyses of a fault-aware
LTL formula ϕ ∈ Φ, K |= (∧ψ∈Ψ ψ) → ϕ is checked instead of K |= ϕ in order
to determine the validity of ϕ in K . Consequently, all paths violating one or more
persistency constraints ψ ∈ Ψ are ignored during analysis, making it possible to choose
the kind of persistency of each fault for each analyzed formula individually without
requiring any modifications to the underlying fault-aware Kripke structure.
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Transient Persistency. Activations of a transient fault f ∈ F (K) must always be
completely nondeterministic: Whenever f can be activated, there must also be a transi-
tion that does not activate it and its activation must also not be enforced in all initial
states. Otherwise, f ’s activation would be deterministically enforced at some point, con-
tradicting the informal notion of transient persistency. Consequently, a fault f ∈ F (K)
has transient persistency if it is activation-independent inK . Transient faults do not
require any persistency constraints during model checking as long as the faults are
activation-independent in the underlying Kripke structure; otherwise, a constraint simi-
lar to the one given in Proposition 5.6 must be taken into account. Compared to the
state-based fault modeling approach, transient faults do not introduce any additional
states at all to model their activation states; they only introduce new states if their
activations actually lead to new off-nominal behavior. Due to fault awareness, transient
faults thus no longer represent the worst case as with state-based fault modeling, but
the best case instead; a significant advantage given that transient faults subsume all
other kinds of persistency and are thus most commonly used.
Permanent Persistency. Similar to transient faults, a permanent fault f ∈ F (K) also
requires completely nondeterministic activation, that is, activation independence inK .
Additionally, however, a permanent fault also requires that after its first activation, it
must always be activated when an activation is again possible. It is therefore necessary
to ignore all paths ς ∈ paths(K) during the analysis ofK where an activation of f is
not enforced after the first activation has already happened. Using fault-aware LTL, the
constraint can be specified as
perm(f) , G((f? ∧O f)→ X f)
for a fault f ∈ F (K): If an activation of f is possible in any state and it has previously
been activated at least once, it must also be activated in the next state. Thus, the con-
straint ensures that the first activation of a permanent fault enforces all subsequently
possible activations despite the fault being activation-independent inK ; activation inde-
pendence is only considered for the first activation on a path, all subsequent activations
are deterministically enforced by the constraint. In general, however, the persistency
constraint for permanent faults is not compositional as illustrated by Figure 5.7 and must
therefore be specified globally for all persistent faults Γ ⊆ (K) of a fault-aware Kripke
structure, basically considering each subset of Γ to be a permanent fault as well:
perm(Γ) ,
∧
∅≠Γ′⊆ΓG((Γ
′? ∧∧f∈Γ′O f)→ XΓ′)
Permanent Persistency with Maintenance. Another kind of persistency is intro-
duced by permanent faults that can become dormant again through maintenance, that
is, the faults can be repaired. They act like regular permanent faults, except that a
maintenance operation repairs the cause for their initial activations, no longer enforcing
their activations until they are nondeterministically activated again. For example, the
pressure sensor’s ¬is full fault of the pressure tank case study could be specified as a
permanent fault that can be repaired during regular maintenance intervals. As long as
the sensor is broken, ¬is full must always be activated, but once the sensor is repaired,
these activations are no longer required; of course, there will be future activations as
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A
B D
f1, f2f1
C f2
Figure 5.7. A fault-aware Kripke structure with activation-independent fault sets {f1}, {f2},
and {f1, f2} illustrating that the persistency constraints for permanent faults are not composi-
tional: Assuming only perm(f1) and perm(f2), the finite path fragment ∅Af1B∅Cf2D∅Af1B would
be allowed. The fragment’s last transition violates the informal notion of permanent persistency
as the previous activations of f1 and f2 only allow A’s outgoing transition to D that activates both
faults simultaneously. However, the individual persistency constraints perm(f1) and perm(f2)
do not enforce the selection of this transition, only the combined constraint perm({f1, f2}) does
by considering the entirety of all previous and future activations of all subsets of {f1, f2}.
soon as the sensor becomes broken again. Repairable permanent faults act like regular
permanent ones within a single maintenance interval, but are more similar to transient
ones across multiple maintenance intervals. The situations in which maintenance occurs
have to be specified in the analyzed fault-aware Kripke structure through one or more
state labels, mapping each fault to its corresponding maintenance label with a function
M : F (K)→ P (K);M is not required to be injective, as more than one fault can be
repaired during maintenance. The persistency constraint for a fault set Γ ⊆ F (K) of
repairable permanent faults is thus given by
perm(Γ,M) =
∧
∅≠Γ′⊆ΓG((Γ
′? ∧∧f∈Γ′(O f ∧ ¬(¬f SM(f))))→ XΓ′),
that is: Whenever the faults Γ can be activated, they must be activated in the next state
provided that all faults f ∈ Γ have previously been activated at least once since the last
maintenance, if any. As for regular permanent faults, the constraint must be globally
specified for all repairable permanent faults. In fact, whenever both repairable and
non-repairable permanent faults are analyzed, the constraint must not only be used for
the repairable ones, but also for all non-repairable ones Γ′ ⊆ F (K) instead of perm(Γ′).
Otherwise, the same situation as in Figure 5.7 would arise for combinations of different
kinds of permanent faults. To adequately use the constraint with non-repairable faults,
M(f) must be some proposition p ∈ P (K) for all f ∈ Γ′ such that no state is ever
labeled with p, ensuring that no non-repairable f ∈ Γ′ can ever be repaired.
5.4 Model Checking Safety-Critical Systems
In order to check whether some path through a fault-aware Kripke structure violates
a fault-aware LTL formula, a model checker fully automatically explores the Kripke
structure in order to unequivocally determine whether the analyzed formula is satisfied
or violated. In case of a violation, the model checker additionally yields a (prefix of)
a path that explains the circumstances of how the Kripke structure is able to reach a
state in which the analyzed formula is violated. Such a counterexample to the formula’s
validity is useful to determine the causes of the violation, therefore contributing to the
understanding and the fix of the problem. As there are no model checkers that directly
support fault-aware Kripke structures and fault-aware LTL, the two formalisms must be
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A
B
f2f1
f1,f2
(a)A fault-aware Kripke structure
with two states and two faults
that are only independently acti-
vatable in state A and only jointly
activatable in state B.
A,∅,∅?,f1
?,f2
?
B,∅,∅?,{f1,f2}
?A,f1,∅
?,f1
?,f2
? A,f2,∅
?,f1
?,f2
? B,{f1,f2},∅
?,{f1,f2}
?
(b) The classical Kripke structure generated from the fault-aware
one to the left in accordance with Definition 5.12 requires additional
states labeled with actual fault activations f1,f2, and {f1, f2} as well as
potential fault activations f1?,f2?, and {f1, f2}?. As usual, f abbreviates
{f} while f? abbreviates {f}?.
A,f2A A,f1 A,f1,f2
B,f2B B,f1 B,f1,f2
(c) The classical Kripke structure corresponding to the fault-aware one above using state-based fault
encoding under the assumption that both f1 and f2 are permanent faults.
Figure 5.8. Illustration of the increase in states and transitions when converting fault-aware
Kripke structures to classical ones. The fault-aware Kripke structure has two states and five
transitions, whereas the classical one requires five states and thirteen transitions to encode the
information about actual and potential fault activations. With state-based fault modeling, on the
other hand, the increase is even worse, requiring a total of eight states in order to also encode
the activation states of the two faults as well as 18 transitions. If the two faults were transient,
the transition count would be even higher.
mapped to their classical counterparts for analysis. The mapping encodes actual and
potential fault activations of a fault-aware Kripke structure into atomic propositions Γ
and Γ?, respectively, to support the transformation of fault-aware LTL; furthermore,
all states of the classical Kripke structure are conceptually duplicated for each fault set
that can be activated to reach them. Fault-aware LTL formulas can then be mapped in a
straightforward way as the formulas Γ and Γ? are simply considered to be propositions;
the generated Kripke structure already contains the required state labels to do so. If
necessary, past modalities are dealt with in the usual way for model checkers that only
support future operators [18, 170].
Definition 5.12. A fault-aware Kripke structure K = (P, F, S,R, L, I) corresponds to
a classical Kripke structureK ′ = (P ′, S′, R′, L′, I ′) where
• P ′ = P ∪ 2F ∪ {Γ? | Γ ⊆ F},
• S′ = 2F × S,
• R′ = {((Γ, s), (Γ′, s′)) | (s,Γ′, s′) ∈ R},
• L′(Γ, s) = Γ ∪ L(s) ∪ {Γ′? | ∃s′ ∈ S . (s,Γ′, s′) ∈ R}, and
• I ′ = I .
Figure 5.8 illustrates the conversion of a fault-aware Kripke structure to a classical
one, contrasting the conversion with a classical Kripke structure using state-based fault
modeling. The generated Kripke structure has more states, state labels, and transitions
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State-Based Fault-Aware
Case Study States Transitions Time States Transitions Time
Height Control 249 1,219,724 1.5d 1.3 57.4 14.2s 9127x
Railroad Crossing 116 10,564 12m 2.5 8.5 1.9s 379x
Hemodialysis Machine 13 6,819 42m 0.4 108.1 38.2s 66x
Table 5.1. The results of the S#-based evaluation of the explicit-state efficiency improvements
that can be achieved with fault-aware modeling and specification compared to state-based fault
modeling. Three of the case studies were evaluated on a 3.4 GHz quad-core CPU: A scaled-down
version of the height control system, the radio-controlled railroad crossing, and the hemodialysis
machine. The “States” columns show the models’ approximate amount of reachable states in
millions, “Transitions” the approximate amount of reachable transitions in millions, and “Time”
the time it takes to enumerate all states. The last column shows the analysis time speedup that
varies greatly depending on the case study. For the height control, analysis efficiency improves
by almost four orders of magnitude due to the large number of faults that cannot be activated
in many situations. Activation minimality suppresses these redundant activations, leading to
significant reductions especially since there are many other sources of nondeterminism in the
model. The hemodialysis machine, on the other hand, profits the least with lower reductions
of both state and transition counts compared to the other two case studies. Nevertheless, fault
awareness still results in a notable analysis time improvement.
than the fault-aware one in order to support fault-aware LTL, in particular its Γ and Γ?
operators. However, the additional states and transitions are only reachable when some
faults are actually activatable in a state of the fault-aware Kripke structure, whereas
state-based fault modeling introduces many additional and often superfluous states and
transitions in all situations. Moreover, the transition count increases more noticeably
for transient faults than for permanent ones with the state-based approach, whereas
fault persistency is not expressed in and therefore irrelevant for fault-aware Kripke
structures. In the worst case, the set of reachable states increases by an exponential
factor when converting a fault-aware Kripke structure into a classical one; fault-aware
modeling and specification therefore is an optimization that is not necessarily better
than state-based fault modeling in the general case, that is, it is trivial to construct
fault-aware Kripke structures that are just as large as their state-based counterparts.
Explicit-state model checkers check the validity of the analyzed formulas as they explore
the states of the analyzed Kripke structure [41]. Their performance is mostly dominated
by two factors: The number of states that have to be scanned as well as the number of
transitions that have to be explored. Highly nondeterministic models, in particular ones
including many fault activations, typically have many outgoing transitions per state,
slowing down explicit-state model checkers. Fault-aware modeling and specification
reduces state and transition counts through the activation minimality of the fault-aware
Kripke structures in order to increase explicit-state analysis efficiency. Table 5.1 shows
the analysis time improvements for three of the case studies, comparing the state and
transition counts as well as the analysis time reductions of the S# models when either
using state-based fault encoding or activation-minimal model execution. At the formal
level, these two execution modes correspond to analyses using classical or fault-aware
Kripke structures, respectively.
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5.5 Deductive Cause Consequence Analysis
DCCA is a fully automated, model checking-based safety analysis technique originally
introduced by Ortmeier et al. [159]. In the following, it is redefined over fault-aware
Kripke structures using fault-aware LTL with some conceptual improvements that
increase its applicability, usability, and efficiency. The following assumes a finite fault-
aware Kripke structureK to be given that represents the system to be analyzed for a
hazard H , with H specified as a propositional logic formula over K not referencing
any faults f ∈ F (K). By model checking a series of formulas for hazard H and Kripke
structureK , DCCA computes all minimal critical fault sets Γ ⊆ F (K) that can cause an
occurrence ofH . DCCA thus uncovers cause consequence relationships between faults
(the causes) and hazards (the consequences). Three basic principles of causality [128]
underlie DCCA that capture the intuitive notion of what is considered to be a cause for
a consequence and what cannot possibly be a cause:
• Ordering. The causes identified by DCCA occur strictly before the consequence. A
fault that is activated for the first time after the hazard has already occurred cannot
reasonably be expected to have caused the hazard. In fact, it is more likely that the
activation of the fault is a result of the hazard so that the hazard is the cause for
the fault and not vice versa. For instance, a tank rupture in the pressure tank case
study could potentially destroy the pump, thus activating the ¬pumping fault; in such
a situation, the tank rupture is the cause for the pump failure and not the other way
around. Whether a cause must occur strictly before its consequence or whether both
can occur simultaneously depends on the modeling formalism and can be debatable.
In the state-based fault modeling approach, for instance, original Kripke structures
label their states with the faults’ activation states. It can thus be somewhat obscure
whether a state representing the hazard and making a fault active for the first time is
a witness showing that the fault caused the hazard. Fault-aware Kripke structures
do not have such ambiguities: Transitions are labeled with fault activations, hence
activations conceptually always occur precisely in those situations where they have
an effect, i.e., a state representing the hazard that is entered through a transition
labeled with a fault activation naturally is a witness for the fault causing the hazard.
• Traceability. All causes identified by DCCA are in fact able to cause the consequence
in at least one scenario. It is unrealistic to expect that a fault activation always results in
a hazard under all circumstances; there might be situations in which the consequence
is avoided because of sheer luck or for some systematical reason resulting from the
interactions of a system’s components. In the pressure tank case study, for example,
an activation of ¬is full does not always result in a tank rupture; only under special
circumstances, namely when ¬timeout is activated as well, a rupture occurs. However,
in order for a fault to be considered a cause for a hazard, there must indeed be at
least one situation where its causation of the hazard is traceable; the aforementioned
situation in the pressure tank case study is such a witness showing how activations
of ¬is full and ¬timeout can lead to tank ruptures.
• Minimality. The causes identified by DCCA are minimal as there are no spurious
causes that are actually irrelevant for the occurrence of the consequence. Taken to
107
5 Formal Safety Analysis
the extreme, the set of all faults is most likely a cause for a hazard. However, no
information can be derived from such a point of view, i.e., it is impossible to devise
any additional measures to increase system safety. Therefore, the smallest sets of
faults that can lead to a hazard are of primary interest. In the pressure tank case
study, the fault set consisting of ¬is full and ¬timeout is one minimal cause for a tank
rupture; spurious additional causes such as ¬pumping are not only irrelevant for the
occurrence of the hazard, they might even work to prevent the hazard: Activations of
¬pumping can prevent tank ruptures as the tank is never fully filled, potentially even
circumventing activations of ¬is full, for instance.
The three principles of causality lead to the notions of potential and effective causes
for a consequence [80, 128]. Events such as fault activations are potential causes for a
consequence if they adhere to the ordering principle, that is, they must occur before the
consequence. Effective causes, on the other hand, are potential causes that also satisfy the
other two principles, namely traceability and minimality. Potential causes are therefore
hypothesized causes for a consequence whose effectiveness requires further analysis.
DCCA is a formal analysis technique that systematically checks all combinations of
modeled faults to determine whether they are potential causes. Additionally, it reasons
about the implicitly modeled error propagation chains in order to trace fault activations
to subsequent hazard occurrences as well as to determine the minimal sets of faults that
do so. Once DCCA identified all minimal critical fault sets, all effective causes for the
hazard that are related to fault activations are uncovered.
5.5.1 Critical and Safe Fault Sets
Depending on whether a set of faults Γ ⊆ F (K) is an effective cause for a hazardH ,
DCCA classifies Γ as either minimal critical or safe, respectively. The activation of a
minimal critical fault set might therefore result in the occurrence of the hazard later on,
but the hazard can potentially be avoided under certain circumstances such as changing
environmental conditions or additional fault activations that counteract the negative
effects of the previously activated ones. Activations of all faults contained in a safe fault
set, however, are guaranteed to be unproblematic insofar as they themselves cannot lead
to the hazard; of course, the more faults are activated, the more likely it is that additional
fault activations lead the system into critical situations. The criticality property of a
fault set is formally defined as follows:
Definition 5.13 (Critical Fault Sets). Let H be a propositional logic formula not refer-
encing any faults f ∈ F (K). A fault set Γ ⊆ F (K) is critical for hazard H if and only
if there is some ς ∈ paths(K) with ς |= onlyΓU=H and onlyΓ ,
∧
f∈F (K)\Γ ¬f .
A fault set Γ is thus critical for a hazard H if there is the possibility that H occurs
and up to and including that point, at most the faults in Γ occur. TheU= operator is
defined in Definition 5.10 as ϕ1U= ϕ2 , ϕ1U(ϕ2 ∧ ϕ1), requiring ϕ1 to continue to
hold even for the state where ϕ2 is already satisfied. For critical fault sets, the use of the
U= operator guarantees that the transition leading to the state where the hazard occurs
still enables at most the faults f ∈ Γ; ifU was used instead, there could be activations
of faults f ∈ F (K) \ Γ right before the hazard occurs, which would be inadequate.
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The criticality property grossly overestimates the impact of a fault set on the modeled
system by not even requiring all contained faults to be activated before the hazard
occurs; therefore, criticality does not even satisfy the ordering requirement of causality.
A critical fault set only is a potential cause for the hazard in the sense that simultaneous
or consecutive activations of some of its contained faults can lead to the hazard. Minimal
critical fault sets, on the other hand, adhere to all three principles and thus represent
effective causes for the analyzed hazard as they exclusively contain relevant faults, that
is, if one of the faults is removed form the set, it is no longer critical at all:
Definition 5.14 (Minimal Critical Fault Sets). A critical fault set Γ is minimal if no
proper subset Γ′ ( Γ is critical.
The ordering principle is satisfied by minimal critical fault sets even though it is only
checked implicitly: For some minimal critical fault set Γ ⊆ F (K), there is a path
ς ∈ paths(K) that shows Γ’s criticality, albeit without requiring any faults f ∈ Γ to be
activated before the analyzed hazard H occurs; instead, the criticality property only
checks that all other faults f ∈ F (K) \ Γ are not activated before the occurrence of H .
As Γ is minimal critical, there are no subsets Γ′ ( Γ such that Γ′ is critical, as otherwise
Γ would not have been minimal critical. Consequently, ς is a witness showing how and
when all f ∈ Γ must be activated prior to the occurrence of H . Moreover, ς also fulfills
the traceability requirement as it clearly shows how the fault set Γ can cause H . The
minimality principle is also satisfied by definition, as the removal of a single fault f ∈ Γ
from Γ results in Γ \ {f} to no longer be critical at all.
Most model checkers do not support checking whether an LTL formula holds for at
least one path instead of checking whether it holds for all paths, making it infeasible to
identify critical fault sets directly; a notable exception is SPIN [98]. On the other hand,
the dual of critical fault sets, safe fault sets, can be checked using regular LTL:
Definition 5.15 (Safe Fault Sets). LetH be a propositional logic formula not referencing
any faults f ∈ F (K). A fault set Γ ⊆ F (K) is safe for hazard H if and only if K |=
¬(onlyΓU=H) with onlyΓ as in Definition 5.13.
A fault set Γ is thus considered safe for a hazard H if it is impossible that at most the
activations of faults f ∈ Γ result in an occurrence ofH . In some situations, however,
a safe fault set can nevertheless be seen as a potential cause for the analyzed hazard,
for instance when it is possible to activate some or all of its containing faults before
additional fault activations lead to the hazard. But only the activations of faults contained
in the set never lead to the hazard, hence safe fault sets are never effective causes.
Intuitively, a fault set is critical if and only if it is not safe; formally, this correlation
trivially follows from Definitions 5.13 and 5.15 and the semantics of LTL’s satisfaction
relation from Definition 5.11.
Corollary 5.3 (Equivalence of Safe and Non-Critical Fault Sets). A fault set Γ ⊆ F (K)
is safe for a hazard H if and only if it is not critical for H .
Proof. For a safe fault set Γ ⊆ F (K), K |= ¬(onlyΓU=H) is equivalent to ς |=
¬(onlyΓU=H) for all ς ∈ paths(K) due to Definition 5.11. Therefore, there is no
ς ∈ paths(K) such that ς |= onlyΓU=H by semantic extraction of the negation also
in accordance with Definition 5.11. Thus, Γ is not critical and vice versa.
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A complete DCCA for a hazard H checks all combinations of faults Γ ⊆ F (K) to
determine whether they are safe, thereby implicitly deducing those fault sets that are
minimal critical for the analyzed hazard. While safe fault sets are checked mostly due
to the limitations of the formal analysis tools that do not support existential LTL over
individual paths of a Kripke structure, the minimal critical fault sets are the actual
results that are expected from safety analysis techniques: Minimal critical sets are
minimal root causes for a hazard, identifying the “simplest” circumstances under which
a safety-critical system potentially causes harm. In particular, critical fault sets violate
the formula shown in Definition 5.15 and the model checker generates a counterexample,
that is, a witness that precisely shows one situation in which the activations of (a subset
of) the faults contained in the set can lead to the analyzed hazard.
Definition 5.16 (Deductive Cause Consequence Analysis). Let H be a propositional
logic formula not referencing any faults f ∈ F (K). Deductive Cause Consequence
Analysis is the identification of the set of all minimal critical fault sets ΛH = {Γ ⊆
F (K) | Γ is minimal critical for H}.
DCCA guarantees that for every minimal critical fault set, there is at least one path in
which the hazard is caused precisely by the faults contained in this set, satisfying all
three principles of causality. As DCCA identifies all effective causes for a hazard, there
can neither be any additional minimal critical fault sets nor can there be any irrelevant
ones. In order to compute all minimal critical fault sets for a hazard, however, all 2|F (K)|
subsets of F (K) have to be checked in the worst case. Such a brute force approach thus
requires an effort exponential in the number of analyzed faults. In practice, however,
the number of required checks is usually significantly lower, as the criticality property
is monotonic with respect to set inclusion: Once a fault set Γ ⊆ F (K) is known to be
critical, all supersetsΓ ⊆ Γ′ ⊆ F (K) are critical as well since additional fault activations
cannot be relied upon to fix negative effects of other faults [193]; consequently, more
fault activations never make a system safer. Conversely, for all safe fault sets Γ ⊆ F (K),
all subsets Γ′ ⊆ Γ are safe as well: Less fault activations never make a system less safe.
Notably, both claims hold regardless of the modeled system and whether the fault sets
Γ ⊆ F (K) are activation-independent inK; DCCA never forces their activation, but
instead suppresses the activations of the complement set F (K) \ Γ.
Theorem 5.2 (Monotonicity). For fault sets Γ,Γ′ ⊆ F (K) with Γ ( Γ′:
1. If Γ is critical for a hazard H , so is Γ′.
2. If Γ′ is safe for a hazard H , so is Γ.
Proof. The definition of onlyΓ does not require the faults in Γ to be activated. Con-
sequently, if there is a path ς ∈ paths(K) such that ς |= onlyΓU=H , we also have
ς |= onlyΓ′U=H . Conversely, if Γ′ is safe then there is no path ς ∈ paths(K) such
that ς |= onlyΓ′U=H , so there can be no such path for Γ either.
A bottom-up approach taking advantage of monotonicity to conduct DCCAs more
efficiently than the naïve brute force way is illustrated in Figure 5.9: All subsets of F (K)
can be checked by increasing cardinality, that is, the empty set of faults is checked first,
subsequently all sets of cardinality one are checked, and so on. At each cardinality level,
all sets that are supersets of some previously found critical fault set are skipped as the
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Cardinality 0 ∅
Cardinality 1
Cardinality 2
Cardinality 3
¬is empty ¬is full ¬pumping ¬timeout
¬is empty, 
¬is full
¬is empty, 
¬pumping
¬is empty, 
¬timeout
¬is full, 
¬pumping
¬is full, 
¬timeout
¬pumping, 
¬timeout
¬is empty, ¬is full, ¬pumping ¬is empty, ¬pumping, ¬timeout
(a) For the hazard of tank ruptures, 13 out of 16 fault sets have to be checked for criticality in order to
identify the hazard’s only minimal critical fault set {¬is full,¬timeout}.
Cardinality 0 ∅
Cardinality 1
Cardinality 2
¬is empty ¬is full ¬pumping ¬timeout
¬is full, ¬timeout
(b) For the hazard of tank depletions, only 6 out of 16 fault sets have to be checked for criticality due to
monotonicity in order to identify the hazard’s two minimal critical fault sets {¬is empty} and {¬pumping}.
Figure 5.9. Overview of the fault sets that are checked by Algorithm 2 for the two hazards of
the pressure tank case study. Safe fault sets are indicated by a dashed outline, whereas minimal
critical ones are solid; non-minimal critical ones are not shown.
outcome of the check is already known: Because of the monotonicity of the criticality
property, such fault sets are critical as well, but certainly not minimal critical. With this
analysis approach, all critical sets that are found are immediately known to be minimal
and no unnecessary checks are carried out. Additionally, minimal critical fault sets are
often rather small and are thus found quickly when checking by increasing cardinality
as they consist of very few faults only. Algorithm 2 shows an anytime algorithm for
conducting DCCAs bottom-up using the monotonicity of criticality; the S# framework
can additionally take advantage of the monotonicity of safe fault sets to further reduce
the number of required checks as explained in Chapter 6.
Original Definition of Criticality. DCCA was originally introduced using CTL [159].
The following definition is the original one of the criticality property that uses CTL’s
exists-until quantifierEU= to check whether for all initial states (Γ, s) ∈ I(K), there is
an infinite path fragment ς forK with ς[0] = (Γ, s) on which the hazard H occurs and
before that, at most the faults f ∈ Γ are activated. CTL could be extended to support
fault-aware Kripke structures similar to fault-aware LTL.
Definition 5.17. Let |I(K)| = 1 and H be a propositional logic formula not referenc-
ing any faults f ∈ F (K). A fault set Γ ⊆ F (K) is critical for hazard H if K |=
onlyΓ EU
=H with onlyΓ as in Definition 5.13.
As even CTL’s exists-until quantifier EU= is all-quantified over all initial states when
it is used as the top-level operator of a CTL formula, criticality thus originally had to
assume Kripke structures to have a single initial state only, whereas Definition 5.15
for safe fault sets does not have to make this assumption. For Kripke structures with
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function DCCA(K , H , kmax )
∆check ← {∅}
ΛH ← ∅
k ← 0
while ∆check ̸= ∅ ∧ k ≤ kmax do
∆safe,k ← ∅
for Γ ∈ ∆check do
if K |= ¬(onlyΓU=H) then
∆safe,k ← ∆safe,k ∪ {Γ}
else
ΛH ← ΛH ∪ {Γ}
end if
end for
∆check ← GeneratePowerSetLevel(F (K), ΛH ,∆safe,k)
k ← k + 1
end while
return ΛH
end function
function GeneratePowerSetLevel(F , ΛH , ∆safe,k)
return {Γ ∪ {f} | Γ ∈ ∆safe,k ∧ f ∈ F \ Γ ∧ ¬∃Γ′ ∈ ΛH .Γ′ ⊆ Γ ∪ {f}}
end function
Algorithm 2. Overview of a DCCA algorithm for a hazard H and a fault-aware Kripke
structureK . A maximum cardinality level kmax can be specified such that only minimal critical
fault sets up to a maximum cardinality of kmax are computed. It is an anytime algorithm [30]
that incrementally computes the minimal critical fault sets ΛH for H by increasing cardinality.
If the algorithm is aborted before it terminates by itself or kmax < |F (K)|, an incomplete set
ΛH might be returned; however, all fault sets contained in ΛH are indeed minimal critical for
H . It is therefore possible to abort long-running DCCAs and still profit from the incomplete
results, as the most important minimal critical fault sets with the highest impact on hazard
probability [80] are typically those of lower cardinalities that the algorithm finds first.
The algorithm conducts a bottom-up, breadth-first search through all fault sets Γ ⊆ F (K),
taking advantage of the monotonicity of the criticality property. ΛH stores all minimal critical
fault sets identified so far. The variable∆check contains the fault sets that have yet to be checked
for a cardinality level k; the algorithm therefore begins by checking the empty set of faults
for criticality. If a fault set Γ ∈ ∆check is indeed critical, it is known to be minimal critical as
otherwise one of its subsets would have to be critical as well, which would have been found in a
previous iteration of the loop for some k′ < k. Thus, Γ is added to ΛH . If Γ is safe, by contrast,
it is added to the loop-local variable ∆safe,k that stores all safe fault sets of cardinality k.
Once all Γ ∈ ∆check have been classified as either safe or critical,∆check is updated to contain
all fault sets of cardinality k+1 that have to be checked next. To each safe fault set Γ ∈ ∆safe,k ,
the GeneratePowerSetLevel function adds another fault f ∈ F (K) \Γ such that Γ′ = Γ∪ {f}
is not trivially critical, i.e., there is no subset Γ′′ ⊆ Γ′ such that Γ′′ ∈ ΛH , and |Γ′| = k + 1.
Subsequently, k is incremented and the newly computed fault sets Γ ∈ ∆check of cardinality
k + 1 are checked for criticality.
The algorithm terminates and returns ΛH at the latest when k = |F (K)|+ 1, i.e., the set of all
faults F (K) is safe for H . More likely, however, either the maximum cardinality level kmax is
reached or all minimal critical fault sets ΛH are identified at some cardinality level k < |F (K)|;
in the latter case, GeneratePowerSetLevel returns the empty set, subsequently causing the
termination of the algorithm.
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multiple initial states, the original DCCA would potentially classify some critical fault
sets as safe in certain cases, which obviously is unacceptable. Overall, using safe fault
sets to conduct DCCAs results in a couple of notable improvements in practice:
• Initial States. DCCA now supports multiple initial states without workarounds
that construct a unique pseudo initial state by changing the model and the analyzed
formula. Ironically, LTSmin only supports a unique initial state [116], forcing the S#
framework to work around this limitation nevertheless.
• Witnesses. The model checker now generates a counterexample when a fault set Γ
is critical, i.e., it constructs a witness that explains how Γ is able to cause the hazard.
Hence, the model checking workflow is improved as originally, witnesses for safe
fault sets showed how a hazard is not caused, which is typically of no practical use.
• Tool Support. The new variant of DCCA is compatible with a broader variety of
modeling formalisms and model checkers as it can be formulated using either LTL or
CTL. In order to check whether a fault set Γ is safe using CTL, Definition 5.15 could
be reformulated to use the CTL formulaK |= ¬(onlyΓEU=H).
• Persistency Constraints. Similar to fairness conditions, persistency constraints
cannot be enforced in CTL formulas [13]. Consequently, the use of LTL is required in
order to specify persistency constraints when conducting DCCAs; with CTL, these
constraints would have to be encoded into the analyzed models.
5.5.2 Completeness and Minimality
DCCA is a complete safety analysis technique [80] in the sense that the analyzed hazard
cannot occur as long as at least one fault of each minimal critical fault set is never
activated; thus, preventing the activations of all minimal critical fault sets effectively
prevents the hazard from occurring. The minimal critical fault sets therefore show
the weak points in the design of a safety-critical system, making it possible to devise
additional safety measures to improve the system’s overall safety. In the pressure tank
case study, for example, the very first system design might not have included the timer,
in which case activations of ¬is full alone could lead to tank ruptures. Safety analyses of
this design revealed this single point of failure, so the timer was added to the controller in
order to compensate for sensor failures. As a result, both¬is full and¬timeout are required
to cause the hazard. DCCA’s completeness formally backs this development approach
for safety-critical systems, proving that it is indeed possible to circumvent hazard H by
preventing the complete activations of all minimal critical fault sets Γ ∈ ΛH .
Definition 5.18 (Completeness). Let ∆ be a set of fault sets causing some hazard H
of a fault-aware Kripke structure K . ∆ is complete if preventing the activations of at
least one fault f ∈ F (K) of each fault set Γ ∈ ∆ prevents the occurrence of H , that is,
K |= (∧Γ∈∆ ¬∧f∈ΓF f)→ G¬H .
Theorem 5.3 (Completeness of DCCA). The set of minimal critical fault sets ΛH for
some hazard H of a fault-aware Kripke structureK is complete.
Proof. To construct a contradiction, let ς ∈ paths(K) be a path of K with ς ̸|=
(
∧
Γ∈ΛH ¬
∧
f∈ΓF f) → G¬H or equivalently, ς |= (
∧
Γ∈ΛH ¬
∧
f∈ΓF f) and ς |=
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FH . The second conjunct gives us some k with ς, k |= H . Let Γ′ = {f ∈ F (K) |
ς, i |= f for some 0 ≤ i ≤ k} denote the set of faults that are activated before or at step
k. Consequently, Γ′ is critical, i.e., ς |= onlyΓ′U=H , and, in particular, ς |=
∧
f∈Γ′ F f .
Additionally, there is some minimal critical fault set Γ′′ ∈ ΛH with Γ′′ ⊆ Γ′. It follows
that ς |= ∧f∈Γ′′ F f , which contradicts the first conjunct.
There is the corner case of the empty fault set being minimal critical for hazard H ,
i.e., ΛH = {∅}. In that case, it is possible for the hazard to occur without any fault
activations, indicating that the system has a safety-critical design flaw. Thus, DCCA
fails to identify any causes as there are none, at least none related to the activations of
one or more modeled faults. Consequently, the completeness theorem trivially holds as
it is impossible to prevent the hazard by somehow suppressing a fault; the hazard can
occur seemingly without a cause as it is not the result of any fault activations but rather
results from a functionally incorrect system design. While Theorem 5.3 shows that all
relevant causes are indeed identified by DCCA, it neither establishes traceability nor
minimality on its own: There could still be many irrelevant fault sets Γ ∈ ΛH that do
not actually contribute to the occurrence ofH ; the prevention of a fault f ∈ Γ contained
in such an irrelevant set does not necessarily affect whether the hazard occurs.
Definition 5.19 (Minimality). Let∆ be a complete set of fault sets causing some hazard
H of a fault-aware Kripke structureK . ∆ is minimal for H if for all Γ ∈ ∆, ∆ \ {Γ} is
incomplete for H .
Despite its high practical relevance, Theorem 5.3 is too weak to show the minimality of
the set ΛH computed by DCCA, necessitating a stronger claim:
Lemma 5.1. Let ΛH be the set of all minimal critical fault sets for some hazard H of
a fault-aware Kripke structure K . All occurrences of H require the prior activation of
all faults of at least one minimal critical fault set Γ ∈ ΛH , that is, K |= FH →
¬HU∨Γ∈ΛH ∧f∈ΓO f .
Proof. For a contradiction, assume a path ς ∈ paths(K) with ς |= FH such that ς ̸|=
¬HU∨Γ∈ΛH ∧f∈ΓO f . Hence, ς, k |= H for some k but ς, k ̸|= ∨Γ∈ΛH ∧f∈ΓO f
or equivalently, for all minimal critical fault sets Γ ∈ ΛH we have ς, k |=
∨
f∈Γ ¬O f .
However, for Γ′ =
⋃
Γ′′∈{ςF[i]|0≤i≤k} Γ
′′, ς |= onlyΓ′U=H , thus Γ′ is critical and there
is a Γ′′ ⊆ Γ′ that is minimal critical but Γ′′ /∈ ΛH , a contradiction to the assumption
that ΛH contains all minimal critical fault sets.
Theorem 5.4 (Minimality of DCCA). The set of minimal critical fault sets ΛH for some
hazard H of a fault-aware Kripke structureK is minimal.
Proof. To construct a contradiction using Lemma 5.1, assume an irrelevant fault set
Γ− ∈ ΛH such that K |= FH → ¬HU
∨
Γ∈ΛH\{Γ−}
∧
f∈ΓO f . However, as Γ−
is minimal critical for H , there is some ς ∈ paths(K) such that ς |= onlyΓ−U=H .
Thus, there is a k such that ς, k |= H and for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k, ς, i |= ∧f∈F (K)\Γ− ¬f .
Moreover, for all Γ ∈ ΛH \ {Γ−}, there is a f ∈ Γ such that f /∈ Γ−; otherwise,
Γ− ⊆ Γ, a contradiction to the monotonicity of criticality as shown by Theorem 5.2
and the fact that ΛH contains only minimal critical fault sets. Consequently, there is
no Γ ∈ ΛH \ {Γ−} such that ς, k |=
∧
f∈ΓO f , that is, no minimal critical fault set is
completely activated before H occurs in step k, a contradiction.
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DCCA always yields a complete and minimal set ΛH of minimal critical fault sets,
regardless of whether faults are injected into a fault-aware Kripke structure in accordance
with Definition 5.7 or added in some other, arbitrary way. Adequacy, however, is only
guaranteed for fault-aware Kripke structuresKF ∈ K▹F with injected faults F . In this
case, DCCA subsumes functional correctness with respect to a hazard H by checking
the empty set of faults for criticality:
Proposition 5.7 (Subsumption of Functional Correctness). For a fault set F , fault-
aware Kripke structures K and KF ∈ K ▹ F , and a propositional logic formula H not
referencing any faults f ∈ F ,K |= G¬H if and only if ∅ is safe for H inKF .
Proof. “⇒”: K ≡F KF due to Proposition 5.1, thus paths(K) ⊆ paths(KF ) and
paths(K) ̸= ∅ as Kripke structures are deadlock-free. For ς ∈ paths(K) with ς ∈
paths(KF ), we trivially obtain ς |= ¬(only∅U=H) as there is no k such that ς, k |= H .
For all other paths ς ∈ paths(KF ) \ paths(K), either ς |= G¬H or there is a k such
that ς, k |= H and there is a 0 ≤ i ≤ k with ς, i |= ¬only∅. Thus, at least one fault
f ∈ F must be activated before H occurs, so ∅ is safe.
“⇐“: Let ς ∈ paths(KF ) with ς |= ¬(only∅U=H). If there is a k such that ς, k |= H ,
there is a 0 ≤ i ≤ k such that ς, i |= ¬only∅, hence ς ̸∈ paths(K) as A(ς) ̸= ∅.
Otherwise, ς |= G¬H and ς ∈ paths(K) if and only ifA(ς) = ∅ and thusK |= G¬H
asK ≡F KF due to Proposition 5.1.
5.5.3 Fault Removal Optimization
Instead of using a series of LTL formulas to check for safe fault sets within a model, the
model could alternatively be changed to make the checks more efficient: Faults F (K)\Γ
are not allowed to be activated during a check of Γ for criticality due to onlyΓ, so they
could just as well be removed from the model entirely, reducing the number of states and
transitions. Thus, instead of checking multiple formulas on the same model, a simplified
formula could be checked for multiple reduced models. The following formalizes a fault
removal variant of DCCA based on this idea, which generalizes an ad hoc approach to
conduct DCCAs within the Scade tool [76]. To do so, an alternative characterization of
safe fault sets Γ ⊆ F (K) based on a different fault-aware LTL formula is first shown to
be equivalent to Definition 5.15 under the assumption that the complement fault set
F (K) \ Γ is activation-independent in the analyzed Kripke structure:
Proposition 5.8. Let H be a propositional logic formula not referencing any faults f ∈
F (K) and Γ ⊆ F (K) be a fault set such that F (K) \ Γ is activation-independent inK .
Γ is safe for hazard H if and only ifK |= G onlyΓ → G¬H .
Proof. “⇒”: Let ς ∈ paths(K) such that ς |= G onlyΓ. We have to show that ς |= G¬H .
For a contradiction, assume that i is the first step in which H occurs, i.e., ς, i |= H .
Either ς, j |= onlyΓ for all 0 ≤ j ≤ i, a contradiction toK |= ¬(onlyΓU=H), or there
is a 0 ≤ j ≤ i such that ς, j ̸|= onlyΓ, contradicting the assumption that ς |= G onlyΓ.
“⇐”: Let K |= G onlyΓ → G¬H . For a contradiction, assume that there is a ς ∈
paths(K) such that ς |= onlyΓU=H . Thus, there is a k ≥ 0 with ς, k |= H and for
all 0 ≤ i ≤ k, ς, i |= onlyΓ. Either ς |= G onlyΓ, a contradiction to K |= G onlyΓ →
G¬H . Alternatively, ς ̸|= G onlyΓ and l > k is the first step such that ς, l ̸|= onlyΓ.
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Due to activation independence of F (K) \ Γ, there is an infinite path fragment ς ′
for K with ς ′ |= G onlyΓ such that ς ′′ = ς[l − 1..]ς ′ ∈ paths(K). Consequently,
ς ′′ |= G onlyΓ and ς ′′, k |= H , a contradiction toK |= G onlyΓ → G¬H .
Similar to how persistency constraints suppress undesirable fault activations, fault-
aware LTL can thus be used to effectively suppress activations of faults F (K)\Γ during
the check whether Γ ⊆ F (K) is safe, at least as long as the fault set F (K) \ Γ is
activation-independent inK . It is then possible to remove these faults from the model
instead of suppressing them with the formula as shown by Proposition 5.5, thereby
replacing checks of multiple LTL formulas on the same fault-aware Kripke structure
with all faults by a series of reachability checks on multiple reduced Kripke structures:
Theorem 5.5 (Fault Removal Optimization). LetH be a propositional logic formula not
referencing any faults f ∈ F (K) and Γ ⊆ F (K) be a fault set such that F (K) \ Γ is
activation-independent inK . Γ is safe for hazardH if and only ifK\(F (K)\Γ) |= G¬H
for allK\(F (K)\Γ) ∈ K ) F (K) \ Γ.
Proof. Follows directly from Propositions 5.5 and 5.8.
The proof of Theorem 5.5 generalizes and completes the one outlined for the ad hoc
approach of conducting DCCAs in Scade [76]. In particular, at least one reduced Kripke
structure K\(F (K)\Γ) ∈ K ) F (K) \ Γ is guaranteed to exist due to the activation
independence inK that is assumed for F (K) \ Γ as well as Theorem 5.1. Additionally,
Proposition 5.3 establishes the adequacy of the fault removal optimization for injected,
activation-independent faults Γ′ ⊆ F (K), i.e., the criticality of Γ = F (K) \ Γ′ can be
determined by either removing Γ′ or by injecting only Γ in the first place. It is thus not
even necessary to construct the complete fault-aware Kripke structure containing all
analyzed faults and to subsequently remove the faults that the analyzed DCCA formula
would suppress anyway; instead, only the analyzed faults can be injected into the model,
avoiding any potential analysis tool overhead when carrying out the fault removals.
By removing all faults from the analyzed Kripke structure whose activations would be
discarded by the unoptimized DCCA formula, the fault removal optimization reduces the
number of reachable states and transitions significantly: For a fault set Γ ⊆ F (K), the
number of transitions decreases by a factor of 2|F (K)|−|Γ| in the best case. As minimal
critical fault sets are usually rather small, these reductions can be significant and they
add up, as an exponential number of checks has to be carried out in the worst case.
Moreover, it is possible to replace the reachability formula G¬H by an equivalent
invariant check for ¬H , which avoids LTL model checking overhead [13, 116]. The
overall potential analysis time reductions depend on the model adaptation overhead,
the number of faults |F (K)| to be analyzed, the size of the minimal critical fault sets,
and potentially on some other tool-specific factors.
Table 5.2 shows a S#-based evaluation of the optimization’s effects on analysis efficiency
with notable analysis time reductions for some case studies as well as increases for
others. S# provides two modes to conduct DCCAs: The unoptimized approach first
pre-generates the state space of the analyzed system including all modeled faults before
it subsequently checks all fault sets Γ ⊆ F (K) for criticality; instead of LTL model
checking, however, S# uses a slightly more efficient approach that integrates the DCCA
116
5.5 Deductive Cause Consequence Analysis
# Checked # Minimal Unoptimized Optimized
Case Study # Faults Fault Sets Critical Sets Time Time
Height Control 13
Collisions 53 4 (2.0) 83.6s 3.4s 24.6x
False Alarms 43 5 (1.0) 101s 2.9s 35.8x
Railroad Crossing 7
Potential Collisions 11 6 (1.3) 3.4s 1.2s 2.8x
Hemodialysis Machine 9
Contamination 54 3 (2.0) 43.8s 6.5s 6.7x
Dialysis Failure 14 6 (1.0) 35.9s 0.9s 39.8x
Personalized Medicine
No Configuration 14 144 20 (1.8) 1.4s 1.7s 0.8x
No Configuration 18 1340 57 (2.0) 15.5s 13.1s 1.2x
No Configuration 18 3702 27 (2.0) 10.3s 38.0s 0.3x
No Configuration 23 76639 130 (3.3) 14.8m 65.9m 0.2x
Table 5.2. The results of the S#-based evaluation of the explicit-state safety analysis efficiency
improvements, comparing both optimized and unoptimized DCCA times. Four S# case studies
were evaluated on a 3.4 GHz quad-core CPU: The analyzed hazards are tunnel collisions and
false alarms for the height control; trains on unsecured crossings for the railroad crossing case
study; contaminated blood entering the patient’s vein as well as overall dialysis failures for the
hemodialysis machine; and situations in which reconfigurations of the personalized medicine
production cell become impossible once all redundancy is used up. The table reports the number
of faults contained in the model, the number of fault sets that had to be checked taking advantage
of the monotonicity of the criticality property, the number of minimal critical sets and their
average cardinality, the time with and without the optimization, as well as the overall analysis
speedup or reduction. With and without the fault removal optimization, the same minimal
critical sets are found and the same number of fault sets has to be checked for criticality.
formula directly into the model checker. Alternatively, the fault removal optimization
can be enabled to check the criticality of Γ ⊆ F (K) on-the-fly [124] with the other
faults F (K) \ Γ removed. In both cases, minimal critical fault sets are searched for
using the bottom-up strategy. The height control, railroad crossing, and hemodialysis
machine case studies show notable analysis time reductions when the fault removal
optimization is enabled, at least halving analysis times.
The personalized medicine case study, by contrast, does not profit at all from the
optimization; in fact, analysis times are significantly worsened it, taking up to 4.5 times
longer than with unoptimized DCCA. There are two main reasons for this effect: The
number of fault sets that have to be checked for criticality can become huge but execution
of the case study model is extremely inefficient, computing only 215 transitions per
second due to the case study’s extremely large state vector. When the fault removal
optimization is enabled, the S# model has to be executed up to 76639 times whereas
without the optimization, it only has to be executed once to pre-generate the state
space that is subsequently very cheap to analyze. For the largest configuration of the
personalized medicine case study listed in Table 5.2, for example, state space generation
takes the majority of the time with 844 seconds, while the subsequent 76639 checks for
criticality are carried out much faster in roughly 42 seconds. For both DCCA variants,
however, the personalized medicine case study clearly shows a scalability issue as the
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number of fault sets that have to be checked increases exponentially for larger models.
Chapter 8 discusses approaches for coping with this issue, bringing analysis times down
to merely 4.6s even for the largest of the configurations shown in Table 5.2. With these
additional optimizations, it becomes possible to analyze even larger configurations for
which the full state spaces cannot be pre-generated due to memory constraints; for these
configurations, the fault removal optimization is the only chance to conduct DCCAs.
5.6 Related Work
Limits of Model Checking. There are formal safety analysis techniques such as
Formal Fault Tree Analysis that are based on interactive theorem proving instead of
model checking [56, 80]. In contrast to model checkers, interactive theorem provers
are only semi-automatic, requiring manual input and therefore making the verification
more time-consuming. Model checking, on the other hand, is limited to systems with a
finite amount of states, which makes model checking inappropriate for data-intensive
systems [13]. In fact, many real-world systems quickly reach a size that precludes the
use of model checkers due to computation time and memory constraints. One way to
reduce the size of the state spaces is to use more aggressive abstractions, which, if not
enough care is taken, can invalidate formal analysis results: The abstract models might
no longer be adequate, that is, the actual real-world systems might expose nominal or
off-nominal behavior that is not captured by the models. Therefore, abstractions are
ideally carried out automatically by a tool in a way that the adequacy of the abstractions
can be guaranteed. For example, counterexample-guided abstraction refinement is
such a technique [43] that tries to automatically abstract from irrelevant states during
analysis. Fault-aware modeling and fault removal DCCA can also be seen as automatic
and adequate fault abstraction techniques.
Partial Order Reduction. Partial order reduction is an optimization technique that
tries to reduce the amount of transitions that have to be considered during model
checking [13, 164]. Instead of considering all transitions leaving a certain state, only
a subset is considered, exploiting the fact that multiple sequences of transitions are
often commutative, particularly when the high-level models of the analyzed system use
asynchronous concurrency. Activation minimality of a fault-aware Kripke structure is
similar to partial order reduction as it ignores irrelevant transitions “activating” faults
without any effects. In a sense, activation minimality is partial order reduction for
faults statically constructed into the model, therefore introducing less overhead during
analyses. On the other hand, partial order reduction also optimizes transitions that are
not related to faults, hence the technique could be combined with fault-aware modeling
for further analysis efficiency improvements. In contrast to partial order reduction,
activation minimality is not a true abstraction mechanism as it can affect whether a
formula holds: For instance, an LTL formulaG¬f checking that f ∈ F (K) is never
activated might hold for some activation-minimal Kripke structureK , whereas the same
formula likely does not hold when superfluous activations are allowed with state-based
fault modeling. However, fault-aware modeling and specification openly changes the
meaning of f within a formula from “f is currently in its active state” to “f was activated
as it had an effect”, while true abstraction techniques such as partial order reduction
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or counterexample-guided abstraction refinement are internal optimizations that the
analysis tools carry out automatically and transparently [43, 164].
Formal Fault Tree Analysis. In contrast to a non-formal fault tree, a formal one
contains temporal logic formulas over the underlying systemmodel in each event instead
of a description in natural language. Additionally, all gates are given a precise temporal
semantics that combines the input and output events appropriately [80, 157]. Each gate
as well as its inputs and outputs can subsequently be analyzed in conjunction with the
formal model, using either model checking or interactive theorem proving [56, 157, 158].
Similar to DCCA, Formal Fault Tree Analysis also determines fault sets that can cause
the analyzed hazard, however, it cannot find only effective causes. For a minimal critical
fault set Γ ∈ ΛH for hazardH , Formal Fault Tree Analysis in general either also finds Γ
or it finds one of its subsets Γ′ ⊆ Γ [80]. Consequently, a completeness theorem similar
to the one for DCCA given in Theorem 5.3 can also be proven for formal fault trees;
the effectiveness of the identified fault sets, however, cannot be shown as the analysis
technique cannot guarantee traceability [80]. Therefore, Formal Fault Tree Analysis in
general considers a system to be less safe than it actually is.
Automatic Fault Tree Generation. Fault Tree Analysis is a technique that is often
required by international norms in order to assess the safety of the system under devel-
opment. During safety certification [186, 193], fault trees are particularly convenient:
They document a decomposition of the system that clearly shows which faults cause
errors and how these errors propagate through the system and eventually result in a
hazard. Model checking-based analysis techniques such as DCCA, by contrast, do not
provide such insights. It is trivially possible to construct flat fault trees from minimal
critical fault sets; however, such fault trees are of no practical use as they do not show
why and how the minimal critical fault sets were determined to cause the hazard [113].
For example, the FSAP tool and the Compass toolset [24, 151] generate such trivial fault
trees based on their formal analyses. Other approaches use contract-based design to
automatically generate hierarchically organized fault trees [29], requiring the manual
specification of assumptions and guarantees for all system components. The resulting
fault trees are structured along the component hierarchy, giving more insights into the
internal error propagation chains and thus improving the fault tree’s usefulness at the
expense of an overall reduced level of analysis automation compared to DCCA.
Safety Analysis with BT Analyser. The symbolic LTL model checker BT Anal-
yser [122] allows its search for counterexamples to be directed through the specification
of constraints. To conduct safety analyses under the assumption that all modeled faults
have permanent persistency, minimal critical fault sets can automatically be extracted
from the counterexamples generated for the analyzed hazard, specified as an LTL for-
mula. The constraints that are generated in order to guide the counterexample search
take advantage of the monotonicity of criticality, overall resulting in an analysis tech-
nique that is very similar to DCCA. However, DCCA is more generally applicable: It
does not restrict faults to permanent persistency, which is a strong assumption to make
given that transient faults are the more general case, and it can be used with any model
checker supporting either LTL or CTL.
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NuSMV-Based Safety Analysis Techniques. Bozzano et al. [26] introduced a sym-
bolic safety analysis technique integrated into the NuSMV model checker around the
same time that Ortmeier et al. [159] developed DCCA. Even though the two techniques
are similar and produce comparable minimal critical fault sets, they differ in their practi-
cal usability. The symbolic technique requires changes to the underlying model checker,
generally allowing it to avoid the CTL or LTL model checking overhead introduced
by DCCA; due to the optimized integration of DCCA into the S# framework, however,
DCCA also profits from tight tool integration while still being tool-independent in
general. Efficiency comparisons between DCCAs conducted by S# and safety analyses
carried out by FSAP/NuSMV, xSAP, or the Compass toolset [24, 65, 151], all of which use
the symbolic analysis technique, are still inherently unfair to either of the two sides: S#
uses explicit-state model checking whereas NuSMV is a symbolic model checker. This
difference predominantly influences analysis efficiency depending on the analyzed sys-
tem and particularly its amount of nondeterminism, so the two techniques themselves
cannot be easily benchmarked against each other.
Monotonicity. In contrast to DCCA, the symbolic techniques by Bozzano et al. [26]
require all faults f ∈ Γ of a fault set Γ ⊆ F (K) to occur before a hazard in order for Γ
to be considered critical. In general, the notion of criticality used by the technique is
therefore not monotonic with respect to set inclusion, as additional fault activations
can potentially make the larger set non-critical. It is thus necessary to consider all com-
binations of faults for criticality instead of following a bottom-up search strategy based
on the level of cardinality similar to DCCA. Nevertheless, an optimization opportunity
exists that allows NuSMV to prune paths during analysis that are known not to yield
any minimal critical fault sets [26]. Under the assumption of monotonicity, the symbolic
technique can be further optimized using SAT-based model checking [30], increasing
the efficiency compared to the original analysis approach significantly: Bottom-up
searches similar to DCCA become possible even though they are obviously incorrect if
the assumption of monotonicity is violated. An additional search heuristic that only
activates faults when they can indeed have an effect is conceptually similar to fault-
aware modeling; however, no optimization similar to DCCA’s fault removal can be
taken advantage of as the underlying symbolic techniques must consider all modeled
faults in unison. The SAT-based analysis approach also allows for underapproximations
if analyses take too long as the technique guarantees the currently analyzed set of faults
to be a subset of a minimal critical set. The analyses can thus be aborted after some
time, potentially yielding some safe fault sets for which a minimal critical superset is
known to exist. In such a situation, the system’s safety is knowingly considered to be
worse than it actually is, which can be an acceptable tradeoff for larger minimal critical
fault sets that only marginally influence the probability of a hazard.
Incremental Safety Analysis. Safety-critical systems are typically developed itera-
tively and incrementally [161, 186], requiring multiple safety analyses at different stages
of development as the minimal critical fault sets are likely to change over time. It can
be useful to keep an eye on these changes as large differences might hint at modeling
or specification errors [138]. In particular, late changes to a system design should only
remove minimal critical fault sets or enlarge them, but they should never reduce any
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previously found minimal critical fault sets or introduce new ones. However, when new
functionality is added incrementally to the system design, new critical fault sets are
typically introduced. When the comparison detects new minimal critical fault sets, it
might have identified new behavior that has to be considered and approved under the
point of view of overall system safety. Comparisons of minimal critical fault sets of
different versions of the same product are also considered in Chapters 6 and 8: Previously
determined safe or minimal critical fault sets can be used as inputs for future analyses,
likely speeding them up as fewer checks have to be made to find all new minimal critical
fault sets given the ones that are already known and are likely still valid.
Error Detection & Identification. While DCCA determines the cause consequence
relationships between fault sets and hazards, it is only indirectly able to show the
effectiveness of error detection and identification mechanisms typically built into safety-
critical systems. Such mechanisms are supposed to monitor a plant, raising an alarm
whenever a fault is detected by observing one of its effects [25]. Bozzano et al. [28]
introduced a pattern-based language using epistemic temporal logic to formalize error
detection and identification requirements based on the relation between observable
signals and desired alarms. In particular, their formal framework allows to show the
soundness and completeness of alarms, i.e., it is possible to determine whether the
alarms are only raised when the faults were indeed activated and whether the absence
of any alarms guarantees that the faults were not activated, respectively. Additionally,
it is possible to characterize the diagnosability of the plant as well as the maximality
of the diagnoser, showing that the available sensors are sufficient to diagnose the
problem in the first place and that alarms are raised as soon as possible. DCCA can be
used for similar analyses using violations of the aforementioned properties as hazards,
potentially requiring some changes to the models, however, in order to be able to express
the required formal properties.
Additional DCCA Variants. There are two additional variants of the original version
of DCCA [159]: Adaptive-DCCA and Deductive Failure Order Analysis [75, 78]. The
first variant replaces the specification of the hazard as a propositional formula with a
more complex temporal one in order to support the analysis of self-organizing systems,
allowing the hazard to occur multiple times before it is actually considered to occur.
As discussed in Chapter 8, such an extension of DCCA can be avoided by following a
systematic decomposition approach for the analysis of self-organizing systems. The
second DCCA variant does not only determine whether a fault set Γ ⊆ F (K) is
minimal critical, it additionally checks the relative order of activations of faults f ∈ Γ.
For example, DCCA computes the minimal critical fault set {¬is full,¬timeout} for the
hazard of tank ruptures in the pressure tank case study, but the hazard can only occur
if ¬is full is activated before ¬timeout is activated. Consequently, Deductive Failure
Order Analysis would only consider the fault sequence [¬is full,¬timeout] to be minimal
critical, whereas [¬timeout,¬is full] would be classified as safe; both the S# framework
and the Compass toolset, for instance, can be configured to check for such ordering
dependencies [151]. The relative order of fault activations often provides additional
information that can be helpful in designing hazard prevention mechanisms, although
safety analyses become more time-consuming as additional checks have to be made.
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Causality Checking. Leitner-Fischer [128] presents an approach for model checking-
based causality checking that yields all effective causes for a consequence. Based
on an event order logic that allows to formally express the occurrences and order of
events, causal relationships between events can be deduced automatically, also capturing
ordering information similar to Deductive Failure Order Analysis. The approach also
supports probabilistic analyses, working around the efficiency issues of the probabilistic
model checkers by a combination of probabilistic and non-probabilistic checks. Even for
small-sized case studies with around 1.2 million states, 7.5 million transitions, and only
five faults, non-probabilistic causality analysis has relatively high execution times and
memory requirements compared to DCCA. In contrast to DCCA, however, causality
checking generates all witnesses for the criticality of a fault set, which can be helpful
in order to understand all the situations in which a fault set leads to the analyzed
hazard. On the other hand, for some analyzed case studies, thousands of witnesses were
reportedly generated which does not seem useful in practice. Ideally, a middle ground
could be found between the two extremes of DCCA and causality checking that either
generate one or all witnesses, respectively.
Summary and Outlook. Fault-aware modeling and specification focuses on fault activations, making
them central to the Kripke structures by explicitly denoting the minimal set of faults that are activated
by each transition. In contrast to the traditional state-based fault modeling approach, fault persistency
is not encoded into fault-aware Kripke structures, instead relying on fault persistency constraints
in the fault-aware LTL formulas analyzed over the Kripke structures. In general, fault awareness
results in large reductions of the number of reachable states and transitions within a Kripke structure
compared to state-based fault modeling: Even though analysis efficiency might in fact not improve
in the worst case of degenerate models, realistic case studies such as the height control show
efficiency improvements of up to three orders of magnitude. Moreover, the formal definitions of fault
injection and fault removal clearly show the changes that can adequately be made to a model in
order to incorporate or remove off-nominal behavior. After fault injection, DCCA can compute all
minimal critical fault sets for a hazard using an anytime algorithm that checks fault sets by increasing
cardinality due to the monotonicity of the criticality property, optionally taking advantage of the fault
removal optimization to further speed up the analyses.
The high-level modeling languages that are used to create fault-aware Kripke structures are mostly
irrelevant for the applicability of the formal techniques presented in this chapter as long as they
are able to fulfill the prerequisites. For example, they must guarantee activation independence of
the injected faults if the fault removal variant of DCCA is used. Moreover, they must adhere to the
definition of fault injection in order to guarantee conservative extension for reasons of adequacy in
accordance with the systematic fault modeling approach presented in Chapter 3. In particular, S#
models can be analyzed with all of the formal techniques as explained in Chapter 6, taking advantage
of fault awareness to reduce the impact of fault injection on analysis times as well as fault removal to
speed up DCCAs. Furthermore, Chapter 6 also introduces heuristics for safe fault sets, allowing
DCCA to combine its usual bottom-up search strategy with some top-down searches to decrease
the number of criticality checks that have to be made. In Chapter 7, the formal techniques are used
to analyze a S# model of the height control case study, showing their applicability in more detail.
Furthermore, Chapter 8 extends the modeling and analysis approach to self-organizing systems,
allowing the formal techniques presented in this chapter to be used at run time in order to cope with
the unique challenges presented by self-organization.
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Summary. S#’s integration of the explicit-state model checker LTSmin [116] allows
for an analysis approach based on model execution that unifies non-exhaustive
model simulation and fully exhaustive model checking. The unification guarantees
semantic consistency between model simulations and formal analyses, including
visual replays of model checking counterexamples as well as safety analyses
based on DCCA. S# employs various optimizations to increase analysis efficiency,
one of which relies on heuristics that try to guess safe fault sets of high cardinalities
in order to reduce the number of fault sets that have to be checked for criticality.
Publications. The unified model execution approach is partially published
in [82, 84]. DCCA heuristics are introduced in [120] while the analysis capabilities
provided by the S# framework are described in the S# Wiki [102]. 6
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While S# models have a significantly higher level of expressiveness than fault-aware
Kripke structures and are hence preferable for modeling safety-critical systems, Kripke
structures have a formal semantics and can thus be exhaustively analyzed using a model
checker. In order to enable formal analyses in general and DCCAs in particular, S#
models must therefore either be explicitly converted into fault-aware Kripke structures
or at least their execution semantics must be made compatible with the path semantics
of Kripke structures. As illustrated by Figure 6.1, the S# framework uses the latter
approach by executing models in such a way that fault-aware Kripke structures are
implicitly generated on-the-fly for model checking, even though they never really exist
at all during analyses. Nevertheless, the relation between S# models and fault-aware
Kripke structures is important to establish as it allows the use of the formal techniques
presented in Chapter 5 such as fault injection, fault removal, and DCCA. Section 6.1
consequently defines the Kripke structure semantics of executable models.
Section 6.2 subsequently discusses the S# framework’s unified model execution approach
in more detail. S# takes advantage of the explicit-state model checker LTSmin [116] that
provides a programmable interface for the integration of various modeling languages,
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Figure 6.1. This chapter discusses a unified modeling and analysis approach for executable
models. Conceptually, executable models integrate into the formal foundations established in
Chapter 5 by generating fault-aware Kripke structures and fault-aware LTL formulas from the
models. For reasons of efficiency, however, the model execution approach uses on-the-fly model
checking based on LTSmin [116] to avoid the explicit creation of Kripke structures. As the
model execution approach is nevertheless equivalent to fault-aware modeling and specification,
it allows the use of the formal techniques introduced in Chapter 5 such as fault injection, fault
removal, and DCCA, while also inheriting the efficiency gains over state-based fault modeling.
Moreover, the S# framework can take advantage of the fault removal variant of DCCA.
allowing S#models to be executed using their regular C# and .NET semantics while they
are being model checked. This model execution approach is unified with simulations
and visualizations of S# models, guaranteeing that models are executed in the exact
same way with consistent semantics regardless of whether a simulation is run or some
formula is model checked. Unifiedmodel execution therefore forms the basis for all kinds
of S#-based analyses as presented in Section 6.3, including simulations, visualizations,
model checking, safety analyses using DCCA, model testing, and replays of model
checking counterexamples. In order to further improve DCCA efficiency, S#’s DCCA
implementation not only takes advantage of the fault removal optimization formally
introduced in Chapter 5, but also allows the use of heuristics that try to guess safe fault
sets of large cardinalities as explained in Section 6.4.
6.1 Kripke Structure Semantics of Executable Models
Figure 6.2 gives an overview of the structure of S# models as well as their partitioning
intomacro andmicro steps. The fields of all component instances contained in a S#model
constitute the model’s state vector, i.e., the entirety of the information preserved between
different macro steps to correctly describe the system’s behavior. In the pressure tank
case study, for example, the state vector consists of the pressure level within the tank,
the time remaining until a timeout, a flag indicating whether the pump is active, and the
software controller’s state of its state machine. All of the variables in the state vector are
initialized to some value; by default, C# zero-initializes all variables, e.g., integer fields
are 0, Boolean fields are false, and fields of reference types are null. The components
can declare other initial values, and they can even choose them nondeterministically, in
which case all possibilities are enumerated during model checking.
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Macro Steps
Micro Steps
Local Variables
Initialization
State Vectorint x;
x = Choose(1, 2);
while (true)
{
int y;
y = Choose(0, x – 1);
x = y * 2;
}
Figure 6.2. Conceptual overview of the structure of S# models: The state vector consists
of globally declared state variables whose values are preserved across different macro steps;
initial values of all state variables can be set nondeterministically. After initialization, an infinite
sequence of macro steps is executed, taking all combinations of nondeterministic choices into
consideration (not shown in the figure). In each macro step, step-local variables can be declared
whose values are preserved within the same macro step but are lost as soon as a macro step
ends. Micro steps consist of all C# statements executed during a macro step.
Once model initialization is complete, the actual execution of the model begins by
computing an infinite sequence of macro steps. During each macro step, local variables
can be used with C#’s regular stack-unwinding semantics; e.g., the value of a local
variable declared in an Updatemethod of some component is automatically discarded as
soon as the method returns execution to its caller. All C# operations executed during a
macro step are considered to be micro steps that are invisible to the model checker. It is
the task of the S# framework to ensure that all nondeterministic micro steps involving
one of S#’s Choose methods are executed exhaustively such that all combinations of
nondeterministic choices are considered during model checking. Additionally, faults in
S# also make use of the Choose methods to trigger their activations, hence all combi-
nations of fault activations are inherently considered as they are simply mapped back
onto S#’s standard nondeterminism mechanism.
Listing 6.1 shows a simple S#model whose state vector exclusively consists of the integer
field x that can only have a value of zero, one, or two, with zero being its initial value.
The instance of component C is the only component instance assumed to be contained
in the model, hence each macro step corresponds to an invocation of C’s Updatemethod.
Thus, micro steps are executions of lines 8 to 11, 14 and 19. Activations of the fault f are
also implicitly considered to be micro steps, that is, whenever the GetValue provided
port is invoked, the S# framework checks whether the fault can be activated, which is
always the case in this example, before it subsequently invokes the appropriate method
override. As discussed in the next subsection, however, not all fault activations during
the micro step execution phase are necessarily activation-minimal at the macro step
level, requiring the S# framework to filter out spurious activations.
6.1.1 Formal Program Semantics
Kripke structure semantics cannot only be given to S#models, they can in fact be defined
for all kinds of executable languages. For instance, the software model checker Java
Pathfinder [194] analyzes programs written in the Java programming language [72] by
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1 class C : Component
2 {
3 int x = 0;
4 Fault f = new TransientFault();
5
6 public override void Update()
7 {
8 int y = 0;
9 if (Choose(true, false))
10 y = GetValue();
11 x = x + y > 2 ? 2 : x + y;
12 }
13
14 public virtual int GetValue() => 1;
15
16 [FaultEffect(Fault = nameof(f))]
17 public class E : C
18 {
19 public override int GetValue() => 2;
20 }
21 }
Listing 6.1. An exemplary S# model that is
assumed to consist of a single instance of component
C. The state vector only contains the integer field
x, and there is a single transient fault f. C’s Update
method is nondeterministic and indirectly affected
by activations of fault f during invocations of the
GetValue method. The local variable y is used to
update the value of the state variable x.
y = 0
b = true or b = false
if b then
if f then
y = 2
else
y = 1
else
skip
if x + y > 2 then
x = 2
else
x = x + y
Listing 6.2. The formal program that
corresponds to the Update method of
component C to the left; sequential
composition is indicated by newlines to
increase readability. The local variable b
handles the nondeterministic condition of
the original if statement. Invocations of
the GetValuemethod and S#’s fault effect
semantics are inlined. The value of the
fault f can only be read in expressions
whereas its actual value is determined
by the Kripke structure semantics of
executable models.
assigning Kripke structure-like semantics to Java byte code. The following therefore
does not consider S# specifically, instead using a formally defined language with simple
syntax and semantics for a more general representation of executable languages such
as S# or Java. Additionally, the reduction to formal programs is made for reasons of
brevity and comprehensibility, as high-level languages have many language features
that are only important for conciseness and convenience but are otherwise irrelevant
from a semantical point of view. The reduction comes without loss of generality, as
formal programs are Turing complete and can therefore be converted to and from all
other executable languages. In particular, S# inherits most of C#’s language features
with the formal semantics given by Börger et al. [22] demonstrating that the complexity
of the C#’s semantics would needlessly obfuscate the definition of the Kripke structure
semantics for executable models.
The formal programs defined thereafter are illustrated in Listing 6.2 through the manual
conversion of the S# model in Listing 6.1. The simple imperative language [150, 168]
supports integer and Boolean variables as well as assignment, sequential composition,
conditional, loop, and nondeterministic choice statements. No other types of variables,
object-oriented concepts, or functions exist for reasons of conciseness; however, faults
are explicitly represented in the language due to their importance for safety analysis
and fault-aware Kripke structures that the formal programs are subsequently converted
into. The formal programs support integer and Boolean literal values v ∈ Val as well
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as variables x ∈ V of integer or Boolean types. Faults f ∈ F are Boolean flags in this
context, representing potential fault activations. During program execution, variable
values are stored in variable environments σ ∈ Σ , V ⇀ Val , i.e., partial functions
that map each variable to the last assigned value. Thus, σ(x) returns the value last
stored in a variable x ∈ V , if any, while σ[x 7→ v] updates the value of x such that
σ[x 7→ v](x) = v and σ[x 7→ v](x′) = σ(x′) if x′ ̸= x. The initial variable environment
in which no values are stored yet is denoted by ∅Σ.
Formal expressions are side effect-free and consist of literal values, read operations of
variables, checks for potential fault activations, as well as a set of unary and binary
operator applications uop and bop, respectively, that correspond to the usual operators
supported by most executable languages:
e ∈ Expr , v | x | f | uop e | e1 bop e2
The partial function EΓJ−K : Expr → Σ ⇀ Val defines the semantics of expressions
relative to the potentially activated faults Γ ⊆ F . For a variable environment σ ∈ Σ, the
given expression e ∈ Expr is evaluated to its current value, provided that all variables
referenced by e have previously been assigned. The semantics of unary and binary
operators are defined as usual and are thus omitted.
EΓJvKσ = v
EΓJxKσ = σ(x)
EΓJfKσ = f ∈ Γ
EΓJuop eKσ = JuopK(EΓJeKσ)
EΓJe1 bop e2Kσ = JbopK(EΓJe1Kσ, EΓJe2Kσ)
The grammar for formal programs provides skip statements, variable assignments,
sequential compositions, nondeterministic choices, conditionals, and loops. Potential
fault activations cannot be influenced by any kind of statement, instead they are handled
at themacro step level as discussed later on in order to adequately capture the assumption
of zero execution time: Either a fault is active during all micro steps of a macro step, or it
is dormant during all of them. If it is activated, all of the fault’s effects that are somehow
able to affect the system must be executed, that is, it is invalid to nondeterministically
discard some of a fault’s effects during the execution of a single macro step.
ρ ∈ Prog , skip | x = e | ρ1 ; ρ2 | ρ1 or ρ2 | if e then ρ1 else ρ2 | while e do ρ
The denotational semantics [150] of the language constructs given below highlights
both the nondeterministic nature of the choice statement as well as the fact that program
execution corresponds to macro steps that cannot be interrupted. The partial function
PΓJ−K : Prog ⇀ 2Σ×Σ defines the macro step semantics of formal programs with
each statement of a program representing a micro step. The set of all fault-activated
successors of a variable environment σ ∈ Σ for a program ρ ∈ Prog is denoted by
PΓJρKσ = {(Γ, σ′) | (σ, σ′) ∈ PΓJρK}; the program ρ ∈ Prog is terminating for
variable environment σ ∈ Σ if PΓJρKσ ̸= ∅.
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PΓJskipK = {(σ, σ) | σ ∈ Σ}
PΓJx = eK = {(σ, σ[x 7→ EΓJeKσ]) | σ ∈ Σ}
PΓJρ1 ; ρ2K = PΓJρ2K ◦ PΓJρ1K
PΓJρ1 or ρ2K = PΓJρ1K ∪ PΓJρ2K
PΓJif e then ρ1 else ρ2K = {(σ, σ′) ∈ PΓJρ1K | EΓJeKσ = true} ∪
{(σ, σ′) ∈ PΓJρ2K | EΓJeKσ = false}
PΓJwhile e do ρK = µ(λW . {(σ, σ′) ∈W ◦ PΓJρK | EΓJeKσ = true} ∪
{(σ, σ) | EΓJeKσ = false})
The skip statement has no effect and is simply discarded. Assignments update the vari-
able environment accordingly, replacing the assigned variable’s current value with the
value of the evaluated expression. Sequential composition executes the two statements
consecutively whereas choices nondeterministically execute one of their two statements.
Conditional statements execute either of their two statements depending on whether
the provided condition holds. Loops are executed as long as their condition continues
to hold, requiring the computation of the least fix point [150] using the least fix point
operator µ on the lambda function representing a single execution of the loop. If the
number of loop iterations is infinite, model checking does not terminate. In such a
situation, one of the model of computation’s basic requirements is violated, namely that
all macro steps are only allowed to contain a finite amount of micro steps.
6.1.2 Induced Fault-Aware Kripke Structures
Based on formal programs, executable models can be formalized as shown below; the
actual connection to the S# framework’s data structures is subsequently discussed in
Section 6.2. The executability of the models is apparent in several ways compared
to fault-aware Kripke structures: Instead of simple atomic propositions, executable
models provide expressions over their state vector that can be evaluated to determine
whether a proposition holds for some state. As for fault-aware Kripke structures, state
expressions and faults are assumed to be orthogonal concepts, hence state expressions
cannot reference any faults. The transition relation is implicitly specified by an execution
program that allows the computation all successors for all states encountered during
execution. Similarly, there is an initialization program that is executed to determine the
initial values of all state variables contained in the model.
Definition 6.1 (Executable Models). An executable model is represented by the tuple
(P, F, S, V,E, I) consisting of
• a set of state expressions P ⊆ Expr not referencing any faults f ∈ F ,
• a set of faults F ,
• a set of state variables S comprising the state vector,
• a set of local variables V such that V ∩ S = ∅,
• a terminating execution program E ∈ Prog , and
• a terminating initialization program I ∈ Prog .
By convention, P (M) stands for P , F (M) for F , and so on.
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Figure 6.3. The fault-aware Kripke structure induced by the formal program in Listing 6.2.
There are only three states in total with the label indicating the value of x; the value of the local
variable y is irrelevant for the Kripke structure. Only one transition is able to activate fault f; all
other potential activations are not activation-minimal at the macro step level.
The initialization and execution programs are required to be terminating as checking
for termination is an undecidable problem. The S# framework, for instance, assumes
termination, resulting in the overall model checking process of a S# model not terminat-
ing when either initialization or execution of the model is infinite. Additionally, formal
programs do not support abnormal termination, for instance due to exceptions. The
S# framework, by contrast, is in fact able to handle abnormal termination because of
unhandled exceptions, performing the model checking process until the exception is
encountered. Subsequently, the S# framework is able to generate a counterexample that
shows how the exception can be generated, thereby providing additional information
that helps to debug and fix such exceptions. Moreover, exceptions are occasionally useful
for some types of analyses as discussed in Section 8.3, for example. Other reasons for
abnormal termination, e.g., access violations due to unmanaged, out-of-bounds memory
reads or writes, cannot be captured by the S# framework, thus resulting in an immediate
termination of the entire model checking process.
Executable models induce fault-aware Kripke structures like the one shown in Figure 6.3
for Listing 6.2. Conceptually, such a fault-aware Kripke structure starts by executing
the initialization statement I(M) of the executable model M to compute all initial
states σ ∈ Σ for all combinations of activatable faults Γ ⊆ F (M). Subsequently, each
newly encountered state triggers a computation of the execution statement E(M) for
all activatable fault sets until no new states are found. During program execution, all
possible combinations of potential fault activations are considered so that no activatable
fault set is overlooked. However, some of these fault sets might only have an effect at
the micro step level without any noticeably impact on the outcome of a macro step, i.e.,
they would result in transitions that are not activation-minimal. For example, the fault
f of Listing 6.2 can be activated during micro step execution as it affects the value of
the local variable y which is always zero-initialized at the point of the activation. At the
macro step level, however, “activations” of f have no effect on the model’s state unless
x is zero, thus such spurious activations must be discarded during model checking as
illustrated by the induced Kripke structure in Figure 6.3. Consequently, an activation
minimization function act-min : 22F×Σ → 22F×Σ is assumed such that (Γ, σ) ∈
act-min(R) if and only if there is no (Γ′, σ) ∈ R with Γ′ ( Γ, i.e., the function must
filter out all non-activation-minimal transitions generated during program execution.
For each state encountered during model checking, the state expressions P (M) are eval-
uated in order to determine the validity of the analyzed fault-aware LTL formula whose
propositions p ∈ Φ refer to state expressions p ∈ P (M). The local variables V (M) are
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not part of the induced Kripke structure’s state as they represent intermediate results
during executions of I(M) and E(M); such temporary computations are invisible for
the model checker due to the assumption of zero execution time. In particular, the value
of the local variable y of the formal program in Listing 6.2 does not have to be tracked
in the state vector of the induced Kripke structure shown in Figure 6.3; within a single
macro step, however, the micro steps of the original S# model shown in Listing 6.1 are
executed using the regular C# and .NET semantics, hence y’s value is preserved as long
as the variable is in scope. As formal programs do not have a scoping concept, the values
of all local variables must be cleared after macro step execution to avoid accidental reads
of invalid values. Formally, the notation σ′ = ∅σ(S(M))Σ is used to denote the empty
variable environment that only has the variables contained in the executable model’s
state vector S(M) set to the values stored in the variable environment σ ∈ Σ. Thus,
σ′(x) does not exist if x ̸∈ S(M), whereas σ′(x) = σ(x) for all x ∈ S(M).
Definition 6.2 (Induced Fault-Aware Kripke Structures of Executable Models). The
fault-aware Kripke structureK = (P, F, S,R, L, I) induced by an executable modelM ,
written asK(M), is defined as follows:
• P = P (M),
• F = F (M),
• S = Σ,
• R = {(σ,Γ, ∅σ′(S(M))Σ ) | (Γ, σ′) ∈ act-min(
⋃
Γ⊆F PΓJE(M)Kσ)},
• L(σ) = {p ∈ P | E∅JpKσ}, and
• I = act-min({(Γ, ∅σ(S(M))Σ ) | (Γ, σ) ∈
⋃
Γ⊆F PΓJI(M)K∅Σ}).
Two conditions must be satisfied in order for an induced Kripke structure K(M) to
exist for an executable modelM : Firstly, the initialization and execution programs must
always assign a value to some variable x ∈ V before x’s value is read. Secondly, the state
expressions cannot reference any local variables x ∈ V (M) as the values of all local
variables are unset in the states of the induced Kripke structure. The labeling function
in Definition 6.2 explains why the state expressions P (M) are not allowed to reference
any faults f ∈ F (M): State expressions are only evaluated over the empty set of faults
for reasons of simplicity and efficiency. However, this is not a limitation as faults can
indeed be referenced in fault-aware LTL formulas separately from propositions. All in
all, these prerequisites guarantee the existence of an induced Kripke structure, allowing
DCCAs to be conducted for executable models. In particular, executable models inherit
the overall fault-aware modeling and specification approach introduced in Chapter 5,
including the fault injection and fault removal operations.
6.2 Unified Model Execution
S# unifies LTSmin-based, fully exhaustive, explicit-state model checking and non-
exhaustive simulations as illustrated by the architecture overview given in Figure 6.4.
Both the simulator and the model checker provided by the S# framework execute S#
models as regular .NET programs once they are compiled with the S# compiler. The
S# compiler slightly extends the regular C# compiler in order to transform required
ports, port bindings, and fault effects: Required ports are mapped to C# delegates that
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S# Compiler
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Figure 6.4. Illustration of the individual parts constituting the S# framework: The run time
initializes S# models compiled by a slightly extended version of the C# compiler. Both the
simulator and the model checker use the run time to execute a model. Model visualizations build
upon the simulator, visualizing the simulated model state. Counterexamples generated by the
model checker can be replayed by the simulator for debugging purposes. DCCA uses the model
checker to check the criticality of all combinations of faults contained in a S# model.
are conceptually similar to required ports albeit with more verbose syntax. S# models
establish port bindings using C#’s nameof operator in order to work around several
C# language limitations that otherwise would have resulted in overly verbose binding
specifications. Fault effects depend on some helper methods provided by the S# run
time in order to check for fault activations, that is, to determine whether one of the
effects or the original behavior of the affected port should be invoked.
S#’s unified model execution approach guarantees consistency between model checking
and simulation as both the model checker and the simulator use the S# run time to
execute the models. The only difference between simulation and model checking is that
the latter is exhaustive, checking all combinations of nondeterministic choices and fault
activations for each macro step whereas the former considers a single combination only.
S#’s DCCA implementation builds upon the model checking integration provided by the
S# framework, but the core algorithm that conducts complete DCCAs is independent of
the analysis technique that is used to check fault sets for criticality; consequently, the S#
framework could also be used to run DCCAs for other modeling formalisms and analysis
tools as long as an appropriate analysis backend is implemented. S#’s model checker
generates a counterexamplewhen a formula is violated that can subsequently be replayed
by the simulator. Counterexample replays can be visualized if a visualization is provided
for a model, allowing for visual inspections of the model states encountered during
model checking. While visualizations support reasoning about formula violations at the
macro step level, the Visual Studio debugger can be attached during a counterexample
replay to debug the individual micro steps executed by the S# model.
6.2.1 Model Execution Architecture
The class diagram in Figure 6.5 gives an overview of the classes and methods that
implement the model execution approach of the S# framework. The ExecutionModel class
implements the model execution semantics: It conceptually generates induced fault-
aware Kripke structures on-the-fly in accordance with Definition 6.2. An ExecutionModel
instance is created from a ModelBase instance, i.e., a composition of S# Component
instances as illustrated by Section 4.5. Consequently, an ExecutionModel instance consists
of a set of Component instances which in turn each have a set of Field instances that
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Figure 6.5. A UML class diagram showing the model execution-related parts of the S# frame-
work, i.e., the classes and some of the methods required to simulate and model check S# models.
The ExecutionModel class is responsible for evaluation of StateExpressions and model execution
with the intended semantics; in particular, it uses a ChoiceResolver instance to determine all
combinations of nondeterministic choices and fault activations. Thus, the Simulator class and
LTSmin are decoupled from model execution semantics, only requiring them to manage States.
constitute the state of their associated Components. The Component instances correspond
to instances of C# classes derived from the Component base class provided by the S#
run time, whereas the Fields correspond to the class-scoped variables declared by a
Component-derived class. The S# framework uses .NET’s reflection capabilities [110]
to search for the fields declared by a C# class. In the height control case study, for
example, overheight vehicles are modeled as a Component with the Fields corresponding
to a vehicle’s position, its speed, as well as the lane it drives on. The combination of all
Field instances transitively contained in an ExecutionModel makes up the ExecutionModel’s
state vector, different values of which are represented by instances of the State class.
Model State. For efficient storage and comparison, the S# framework uses fixed-size
byte arrays as the run time representation of State instances. The method Execution-
Model::Serialize serializes Component states into a State instances, whereas Execution-
Model::Deserialize does exactly the opposite, deserializing a byte array back into Compo-
nent and Field instances. During model checking, millions of states have to be stored,
hence as few bytes as possible should be used to represent a single state. Addition-
ally, many comparisons are carried out during model checking in order to determine
whether a state has already been encountered before. These comparisons rely on state
hashing and byte-by-byte equality checks and are also highly sensitive to the number of
bytes required to store a State. For reasons of efficiency, S# therefore generates the two
serialization methods dynamically at run time via reflection, tailoring them to a specific
ExecutionModel instance to guarantee maximum efficiency with respect to serialization
time and state storage size; Section 6.2.3 discusses some optimization techniques em-
ployed by the S# framework in order to reduce state vector sizes. Moreover, the use of
fixed-size byte arrays for state storage explains S#’s limitations regarding object creation
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Input: m : ExecutionModel, s : State
Output: a set of successor states succs ⊆ State for s
succs ← ∅
whilem.ChoiceResolver.PrepareNextChoices() do
m.Deserialize(s)
m.Step()
succs ← succs ∪ {m.Serialize() }
end while
return succs
Algorithm 3. Conceptual overview of the implementation of the ExecutionModel::Execute
method. For all combinations of nondeterministic choices and fault activations determined by
ChoiceResolver::PrepareNextChoices, the given state is deserialized using ExecutionModel::Deserialize.
Subsequently, ExecutionModel::Step invokes the Update methods of all top-level Component in-
stances contained in the model, thereby implementing the two-phase micro-macro step se-
mantics of S# models, cf. Algorithm 1 on page 44. Once ExecutionModel::Step terminates, the
ExecutionModel’s state is serialized into a byte array using ExecutionModel::Serialize and stored
in the successor set succs that is eventually returned once the ChoiceResolver has exhaustively
enumerated all nondeterminism contained in the ExecutionModel.
during model execution: Storing additional objects in the model’s state vector would
require dynamically-sized state arrays, making certain optimizations impossible or at
least significantly more complex. On the other hand, new objects can be allocated during
a macro step as long as no references to them are ever stored in the state vector.
Model Execution. The method ExecutionModel::Initialize generates all initial states of
an ExecutionModel instance, resetting the Components’ Fields to their original values by
taking all nondeterministic initializations into account, if necessary. Subsequently, Exe-
cutionModel::Execute is able to compute all successors of a state as conceptually illustrated
by Algorithm 3. The ChoiceResolver::Choose method records the number of choices that
can be made by a specific micro step during the execution of ExecutionModel::Step and re-
turns the index of the chosen value; Fault instances internally use ChoiceResolver::Choose
with some additional optimizations outlined in Section 6.2.2. Subsequently, the ChoiceRe-
solver can ensure that all combinations of choices are exhaustively enumerated, returning
the index of the next value to be chosen when the corresponding micro step is executed
again. The ChoiceResolver is unaware of other sources of nondeterminism such as race
conditions of threads, however, thus S# cannot guarantee exhaustive analyses in such
cases, explaining its limitations around uncontrolled nondeterminism as discussed in
Chapter 4. There are two reasons why a state might not have any successors at all
or why there might not be any initial states: Either ExecutionModel::Initialize or Execu-
tionModel::Execute do not terminate or their execution is aborted abnormally due to
an unhandled exception, for example. Both situations are readily discoverable during
analyses as either model checking makes no progress or it is aborted prematurely.
Formula Evaluation. The StateExpression class represents arbitrary Boolean C# ex-
pressions that the S# framework evaluates over the Component instances in order to
determine the validity of the analyzed LTL formula during model checking. The evalua-
tion is expected to be terminating, deterministic, and side effect-free, otherwise the exact
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behavior is unspecified. The method ExecutionModel::Evaluate evaluates a StateExpression
instance for a given State, i.e., the State is deserialized using ExecutionModel::Deserialize, the
corresponding C# code is executed and evaluated by invoking StateExpression::Evaluate,
and the computed result is returned to the model checker that can subsequently check
for violations of the overall LTL formula.
Executable Models. An ExecutionModel instance m formally defines an executable
model M as follows: The propositions P (M) are given by m.StateExpressions. The
faults F (M) simply correspond to the S# Fault instances contained in the model, i.e.,
m.Faults. The state variables S(M) directly map to all Field instances contained in m.
V (M) is equivalent to all local variables declared by a C# program ρcs ∈ Progcs with
a function L : Progcs → 2V assumed to return all locally declared variables x ∈ V of
ρcs . The execution program E(M) is m.Execute while the initialization program I(M)
corresponds to m.Initialize. If there are no modeling faults that cause the S# model m to
get stuck in an infinite loop or to throw an unhandled exception, exploration of the
induced Kripke structure terminates as soon as all reachable states are encountered.
In this case, ExecutionModels always induce fault-aware Kripke structures without any
deadlocks, so all paths through the Kripke structure are of infinite length and can thus
be used to evaluate LTL formulas. In summary:
P (M) ∼= m.StateExpressions, F (M) ∼= m.Faults,
S(M) ∼= ⋃ c : m.Components c.Fields, V (M) ∼= L(m.Execute) ∪ L(m.Initialize),
E(M) ∼= m.Execute, and I(M) ∼= m.Initialize.
In order to map m.Execute and m.Initialize to the world of formal programs, the induced
Kripke structure can be considered to contain pointers to these two functions with
EΓJ−K and PΓJ−K corresponding to regular .NET program execution.
Fault Injection & Removal. S# models trivially satisfy the formal definition of fault
injection, i.e., Definition 5.7 on page 91: The faults and their effects introduce new states
and make new state expressions possible with S#’s execution semantics guaranteeing
that no fault effect is ever executed without a corresponding activation of the effect’s
associated fault. Consequently, new transitions and initial states are only generated in
the induced Kripke structure precisely when the newly injected faults are activatable.
Moreover, fault injection by S# cannot remove any behavior or state label, ensuring
that all requirements of Definition 5.7 are satisfied. Therefore, S# models with injected
faults are always a conservative extension of their original version without faults, both
due to Proposition 5.1 on page 92 as well as due to S#’s fault execution semantics. On
the other hand, the S# framework never removes injected faults from a model; instead,
it makes use of the equivalent alternative justified by Figure 5.6 on page 97 of never
injection faults that are later removed anyway. That is, fault removal is a zero-overhead
operation in the S# framework as faults are removed from a model simply by never
activating them during model execution. Activation independence of TransientFault
and PermanentFault instances is trivially achieved as their attempted activations during
model execution are unconditional.
LTSmin Integration. It is the responsibility of LTSmin to do the actual model checking:
S# only executes an ExecutionModel, implicitly generating a Kripke structure that LTSmin
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in turn checks [116] to determine whether an LTL formula is satisfied. However, neither
the S# framework nor LTSmin ever explicitly build up a fault-aware or classical Kripke
structure, instead using on-the-fly model checking algorithms [124]. If LTSmin detects
a violation, it generates a Counterexample that consists of a sequence of State instances,
which are trivial to deserialize back into sequences of ExecutionModel states using Exe-
cutionModel::Deserialize. For later replays of micro steps, a Counterexample also captures
the nondeterministic choices that the ChoiceResolver made during the generation of the
Counterexample, which also includes information about fault activations. In order to
enable the integration of various modeling languages, LTSmin provides the so-called
PINS interface written in C [116] that S# makes use of. S#’s integration of LTSmin takes
about 250 lines of C++/CLI code, a Microsoft-specific variant of C++ that allows for inter-
operability between C/C++ and C#. The PinsAdapter class maps LTSmin’s C-based PINS
interface to the C# interface of the ExecutionModel class: PinsAdapter::Init initializes and
sets up an LTSmin instance, which in turn repeatedly calls PinsAdapter::Next to compute all
successors of a serialized state using ExecutionModel::Execute. PinsAdapter::Eval prompts
S# to evaluate a StateExpression instance identified by its index for some serialized state
by calling ExecutionModel::Evaluate.
Simulation. Simulations of S#models work similar to model checking except that only
a single path of the induced Kripke structure is explored. Simulator instances are either
guided or unguided: Unguided simulations do not follow a predetermined path through
the Kripke structure. Guided simulations replay the Counterexample instance passed via
the constructor by forcing the nondeterministic Choices made by the model checker upon
the Simulator. Consequently, Counterexample replays cannot only be stepped through
state by state, but also allow debugging each micro step, giving insights into why and
how some undesired state is reached. A simulation stores all computed states, allowing
it to be fast forwarded or rewound by some number of steps using Simulator::FastForward
and Simulator::Rewind, respectively. In contrast to Algorithm 3, Simulator::SimulateStep
computes only one successor of the current state using the sequence of method calls
ExecutionModel::Deserialize, ExecutionModel::Step, and ExecutionModel::Serialize based on a
set of predetermined Choices; if a Counterexample is replayed, the method returns false
once the last state of the Counterexample is reached. Simulator::Reset resets the simulated
ExecutionModel to an initial state or the initial state of the replayed Counterexample.
6.2.2 Fault Execution
The generation of fault-aware Kripke structures from executable models seems to be
counterproductive for the efficiency gains of fault-aware modeling and specification:
After all, fault-aware Kripke structuresK are designed such that the analysis tools do not
have to consider all faults f ∈ F (K) in every state, yet according to Definition 6.2, the
S# framework has to do exactly that. That is, in order to determine all successor states of
a state, the S# framework must compute at least 2|F (M)| transitions plus any additional
nondeterminism not related to fault activations. Even worse, the S# framework has some
additional bookkeeping to do as it requires the act-min function to filter out superfluous
transitions for fault “activations” that turn out to be non-activation-minimal at the
macro step level. The only advantage that Definition 6.2 takes over from fault-aware
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modeling is the reduction of the number of states as no information about active or
dormant faults is tracked. Consequently, the direct implementation of Definition 6.2 in
the S# framework would be detrimental to model checking performance; it is thus only
used to provide the formal justification for the Kripke structure semantics of executable
models, whereas the S# framework uses a significantly more efficient implementation
that allows it to reduce the number of potential fault activations that it has to check. In
the worst case, however, some S# models might indeed require the explicit enumeration
of all combinations of potential fault activations, but all case studies analyzed with S#
so far profit noticeably from S#’s optimizations.
The S# framework performs several automatic optimizations to reduce transition com-
putation overhead. For example, fault activation minimization is performed on-the-fly
instead of after-the-fact, reducing the number of minimality checks that have to be
made. Moreover, fault removal is implemented by never activating the removed faults in
the first place instead of injecting and subsequently removing them, hence fault removal
is guaranteed to be faster than fault suppression via LTL. The three main optimizations
carried out by the S# framework are explained in more detail in the following: The
first two try to avoid the computation of non-activation-minimal transitions whenever
possible by delaying fault activations and by skipping activations in situations where
they are known to have no effect. The third one avoids the construction of fault persis-
tency constraint formulas in fault-aware LTL, instead also taking advantage of model
executability to cope with fault persistency.
Delaying Fault Activations. Definition 6.2 executes the initialization program once
and the execution program repeatedly for all combinations of faults. Typically, most of
the transitions generated in this way are not activation-minimal, therefore requiring
some bookkeeping effort by the act-min function to remove all non-activation-minimal
ones. The S# framework tries to avoid generating these superfluous transitions in the
first place by delaying fault activations: Faults are only activated when the S# run time
is absolutely sure that an activation must be attempted. Considering the S# model
in Listing 6.1 again, for instance, there is no point in executing a macro step with
an attempted activation of fault f if the Choose method in the if statement returns
false, that is, the method GetValue is never invoked and thus f cannot have any effect.
Consequently, the S# framework delays activations until the first time a fault effect
associated with the fault is used in some way. This optimization usually reduces the
number of transitions that have to be computed by an exponential factor. In the pressure
tank case study, for instance, there are four faults, resulting in at least 24 transitions
for each state of the induced Kripke structure without the optimization. The timer’s
¬timeout fault and the pressure sensor’s ¬is full fault, for instance, can only be activated
while the tank is being filled, as the software controller only invokes the components’
corresponding provided ports while the pump is running. The optimization therefore
removes these two faults from consideration when the tank is not being filled, in these
situations reducing the number of transitions by at least a factor of 22.
Skipping Fault Activations. To further increase analysis efficiency, the S# framework
uses the fault activation process outlined in Figure 6.6 to skip an attempted fault activa-
tion in situations where the activation is known to be superfluous: If the fault effect’s
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Figure 6.6. An overview of the fault activation process employed by the S# framework:
Whenever a port is invoked that is potentially affected by a fault effect, a nondeterministic
choice is made that conceptually either tries to activate the fault or that keeps it dormant. If
the S# run time is able to determine with absolute certainty that the activation of the fault is
not going to have an effect, i.e., it is irrelevant whether the overridden behavior of the fault
effect or the port’s original behavior is executed, the choice is undone. Otherwise the fault is
marked for later activation, that is, the entire macro step has to be executed again, this time
indeed activating the fault and executing the behavior of its effect.
behavior returns a constant value, a pattern that is often encountered in the case study
models, the S# compiler generates code allowing the S# run time to check whether the
value returned by the original behavior matches the value that the fault effect would
return. If they match, the activation is known to be superfluous and an attempted
activation would only result in a non-activation-minimal transition. In the pressure
tank case study, for example, the software controller continuously checks for timeouts
and sensor notifications about the tank being full while filling the tank, hence the fault
delay optimization is ineffective. Skipping fault activations, on the other hand, avoids
the computation of these non-activation-minimal transitions: The timer’s HasElapsed
and the sensor’s IsFull provided ports both return false until the tank is almost fully
filled up. As the effects of the ¬timeout and ¬is full faults simply return false in any case,
the S# framework is often able to skip the faults’ activations.
Evaluation of the Fault Activation Optimizations. The overall analysis efficiency
improvements due to the fault activation optimizations are summarized in Table 6.1
for some of the case studies. For instance, only six non-activation-minimal transitions
are computed for the pressure tank case study that are subsequently filtered out by
the act-min function. The hemodialysis machine case study, by contrast, has more
complex off-nominal behavior with side effects, making activation skipping ineffective:
While fault activations are always delayed in any case, fault effects are allowed to have
arbitrary side effects and thus activation skipping is disabled for effects whose behavior
does not simply return a constant value. Even without both optimizations, all case
studies profit from fault awareness as no fault persistency information is stored in the
induced Kripke structures’ states; for example, the height control case study is analyzed
in roughly 12 minutes without fault activation-related optimizations instead of 1.5 days
with state-based fault modeling, cf. Table 5.1 on page 106.
Fault Persistency Constraints. Before LTL formulas can be model checked, they
have to be converted into Büchi automata [13]. During model checking, these automata
are analyzed in conjunction with the actual system model, thus negatively affecting
model checking efficiency if they introduce too many additional states. The worst
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Pressure Height Railroad Hemodialysis
Tank Control Crossing Machine
Transition Count 747 57.4 mio 8.5 mio 9.8 mio
Without Optimizations
Computed Transitions 7,660 10.3x 7,171 mio 125x 224 mio 26.3x 185 mio 18.8x
Analysis Time < 1s 12 min 21.4s 62.4s
Delayed Activation
Computed Transitions 1,857 2.5x 835 mio 14.5x 37 mio 4.4x 108 mio 10.9x
Analysis Time < 1s 89.9s 8.1x 3.7s 5.8x 38.2s 1.6x
Both Optimizations
Computed Transitions 753 1.0x 156 mio 2.7x 20 mio 2.5x 108 mio 10.9x
Analysis Time < 1s 14.2s 50.7x 1.9s 11.3x 38.2s 1.6x
Table 6.1. Evaluation of the S# framework’s automatic fault activation optimizations. The
first line shows the number of activation-minimal transitions. The table reports the number
of computed transitions and the overhead factor compared to the activation-minimal ones
when disabling only the second or both optimizations; the first optimization cannot be disabled
independently as the second one depends on the first one. The analysis times are reported for each
optimization level, also showing the factor relative to the unoptimized analysis times. Without
the optimizations, the number of computed transitions surpasses the number of activation-
minimal ones by at least a factor of 10 for all case studies and even two orders of magnitude
for the height control. By delaying fault activations, the number of computed transitions is
reduced significantly and analysis times also decrease noticeably. With the second optimization,
the pressure tank case study computes only six superfluous transitions, whereas there are no
additional benefits for the hemodialysis machine: The fault effects of this particular case study
are more complex than simply returning a constant value, effectively disabling the optimization.
For the height control and the railroad crossing case studies, by contrast, the second optimization
further reduces the number of transitions that have to be computed such that approximately
only every third computed transition is not activation-minimal.
case complexity of Büchi automaton construction is exponential in the number of
temporal operators, which is problematic as fault persistency constraints introduce many
additional temporal operators. S# models, however, specify persistency constraints as
Fault-derived classes that internally use regular C# code to determine fault activations.
Therefore, faults in S# are conceptually already specified as Büchi automata, allowing
the S# run time to avoid any automaton construction overhead. Furthermore, the
TransientFault class provided by the S# run time is fully optimized such that transient
faults do not introduce any overhead whatsoever, meaning that they only lead to new
states and transitions in exactly those situations in which they are activatable. For
permanent faults or other kinds of fault persistency, some state information must be
tracked, but efficiency is still orders of magnitudes better than state-based fault modeling
as seen in Table 5.1 on page 106 as well as Table 6.1.
6.2.3 State Storage and Serialization
State storage and serialization overhead has a significant impact on S#’s model checking
times and memory consumption. For example, a state vector size of 100 bytes means
that each state encountered during model checking consumes 100 bytes of memory
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Offset Length Field Comment
0 1 Pump::_isEnabled : bool
1 7 padding
8 8 Tank::_pressureLevel : int range-restricted
16 8 SoftwareController::_stateMachine::_state : State enumeration
24 8 Timer::_remainingTime : int range-restricted
Table 6.2. Overview of the pressure tank case study’s state vector layout: The offset column
shows each field’s offset in bits from the start of the state vector, whereas the length column
indicates the number of bits required to store the field denoted in the field column. Fields of
non-Boolean types are grouped by the number of bytes required to store them, rounded up to
the nearest power of two. Consequently, seven bits of padding must be added at offset 1 so that
the 1-byte _pressureLevel field can be stored with the correct alignment at offset 8.
plus some overhead for look-up and storage by LTSmin; thus, roughly 86 million states
can be stored when 8 GBytes of memory are available for state storage. Smaller state
vector sizes not only increase the number of states that can be stored, they also decrease
state management overhead: LTSmin uses hash tables [124] to efficiently determine
whether a state returned by ExecutionModel::Execute has already been encountered before,
i.e., states are hashed to 32-bit integers, the hash values are compared, and when the
hash values are the same, the actual states are compared byte-by-byte to rule out hash
collisions. State hashing and state comparison scales linearly with the state vector size,
so smaller state vectors directly lead to lower state comparison overhead. Furthermore,
the ExecutionModel::Serialize and ExecutionModel::Deserialize methods are called several
times for each encountered state, so they also must be as fast as possible. The S#
framework generates these methods dynamically using run time code generation to
increase efficiency, but the number of fields that have to be read and written during state
serialization and deserialization also impact their execution times. In order to reduce
the overhead associated with state storage and state serialization, the S# framework
automatically compacts state vectors to decrease their sizes. Sometimes, it is even
possible to manually hide a field, removing it from the state vector entirely without
affecting soundness and completeness of the analyses.
State Vector Compaction. The serialization methods generated by the S# run time
group all fields by the number of bits required to store their values in order to reduce
state vector sizes: Boolean values are stored as single bits, individual bytes as individual
bytes, and so on. Additionally, range restrictions specified for a field are taken into
account when doing these compactions, i.e., an integer field marked with [Range(0, 5,
OverflowBehavior.Error)] is stored in a single byte; enums are similarly compressed
by considering the values of their literals. Object references are always stored as 2-byte
values, thus allowing a model to contain at most 216 different objects. Except for Boolean
values, all values are stored in the lowest power-of-two byte count that is able to hold
the value, grouped together by the number of bytes required to store a field. The starting
address within the state vector of each such group is aligned to the same power of two
to avoid potentially slow unaligned memory accesses. Table 6.2 shows the pressure tank
case study’s state vector layout using these state compaction techniques.
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Field Hiding. Some fields store values that remain constant during model execution
or that represent intermediate values that should not be part of a component’s state.
The former case often happens with references to subcomponents that are set during
model initialization but are subsequently never changed during model execution. It
thus makes no sense to continuously serialize and deserialize the component references,
especially since reference serialization is particularly expensive for technical reasons.
Moreover, there are situations in which some value must be preserved across different
micro steps and accessible from different methods, necessitating the value to be stored
in a field. If the field’s value does not need to be preserved between different macro
steps, however, the field should not be part of the state vector. To mark such fields, the
S# framework provides the [Hidden] attribute, named after SPIN’s hidden keyword
that serves a similar purpose [98]. In the following example, C’s state only consists of
the field _i3, as fields declared as readonly are implicitly considered to be [Hidden]:
class C : Component
{
readonly int _i1;
[Hidden] int _i2;
int _i3;
}
The readonly keyword is a mechanism provided by C#, in this case ensuring that the
value of _i1 can only be set in a constructor of C. Consequently, the compiler can
guarantee that the value stored in _i1 indeed remains unchanged after the instantiation
of a C instance. The [Hidden] attribute must be used in situations where C#’s restrictions
are too limiting, e.g., a field might be initialized by a helper method that is invoked
during model initialization. Alternatively, _i2might be updated during model execution,
but its value might always be written before it is read in a macro step; hence, its value
would not need to be preserved in the state vector. Chapter 7 uses the [Hidden] attribute
for the vehicle’s speed in the height control case study for this very reason, for instance.
Hiding a field affects analysis soundness and completeness if the field should have
been in the state vector, typically resulting in incomplete exploration of the induced
fault-aware Kripke structure. At the time of writing, the S# framework provides no
mechanism to check whether a field can adequately be hidden; for readonly fields, the
C# compiler provides some guarantees that, however, can be undermined by the use of
reflection which does indeed allow arbitrary changes to readonly fields.
Element Hiding. Fields of a type that implement IEnumerable<T> such as arrays or
List<T>, among others, can be hidden just like all other fields. However, hiding the field
does not implicitly hide its elements. A situation that is occasionally encountered is that
references to subcomponents are stored in an array field. If neither the array nor the
subcomponents change during model execution, both the array as well as the references
to the subcomponents contained in the array can and should be removed from the state
vector. For instance, Chapter 7 hides the vehicle instances stored in an array from the
state vector of the height control case study model. The following component C declares
two arrays containing references to subcomponents; _a1 is completely hidden from the
state vector, whereas for _a2, only the array reference stored in the field is hidden but
the references contained in the array are not.
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Pressure Height Railroad Hemodialysis
Tank Control Crossing Machine
With Compaction
State Vector Size 4 12 12 40
Time < 1s 14.2s 1.9s 38.2s
Without Compaction
State Vector Size 24 6.0x 40 3.3x 40 3.3x 132 3.3x
Time < 1s 1.0x 17.2s 1.2x 2.7s 1.4x 54.2s 1.4x
Table 6.3. An evaluation of the effects of state vector compaction on the overall analysis times
as well as the number of bytes required to store a state. While the reduced state vector sizes
do not have a large impact on analysis times, the improvements are nevertheless measurable.
The main advantage of state compaction clearly lies in the reduced memory footprint, enabling
analyses of models that are up to six times larger given a fixed memory budget.
class C : Component
{
[Hidden(HideElements = true), Subcomponent]
Component[] _a1;
[Hidden(HideElements = false), Subcomponent] // or: [Hidden, Subcomponent]
Component[] _a2;
}
Evaluation of the State Vector Optimizations. Table 6.3 compares state vector sizes
and analysis times with and without state vector compaction, using field and element
hiding in both cases. Table 6.4, on the other hand, contrasts compacted state vectors with
and without field and element hiding. Both optimizations together noticeably reduce
analysis time and memory requirements during model checking, albeit to a lesser extent
than fault-aware modeling and specification or S#’s fault activation optimizations: The
fault activation optimizations potentially remove exponential factors from the analysis,
whereas the state vector optimizations often only affect constant factors. Field hiding,
however, can also remove exponential factors when the values of the hidden fields are
irrelevant but nondeterministic as for the speed of the vehicles in the height control case
study. Overall, field and element hiding results in more notable analysis speedups in
contrast to state compaction. The reason for the efficiency gains does not primarily lie
in the smaller state vector sizes, but rather in the fact that most fields that can be hidden
store constant references to subcomponents. Deserialization of such object references is
expensive as it requires a dictionary look-up in the current implementation of the S#
framework, explaining the negative impacts on analysis times.
6.3 Analyzing Executable Models
The S# framework provides three main analysis techniques based on its unified model
execution architecture: LTL formulas can be exhaustively model checked, DCCAs can
be carried out automatically, and non-exhaustive model simulations can be executed.
DCCAs build upon S#’s integration of the explicit-state model checker LTSmin, whereas
simulations are the basis for replays of model checking counterexamples, visualizations,
and model tests. Moreover, all of these analysis techniques can be integrated into Visual
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Pressure Height Railroad Hemodialysis
Tank Control Crossing Machine
With Field Hiding
# States 680 1.3 mio 2.5 mio 0.4 mio
# Transitions 747 57.4 mio 8.5 mio 9.8 mio
State Vector Size 4 12 12 40
Time < 1s 14.2s 1.9s 38.2s
Without Field Hiding
# States 680 1.0x 1.8 mio 1.4x 2.5 mio 1.0x 0.4 mio 1.0x
# Transitions 747 1.0x 86.5 mio 1.5x 8.5 mio 1.0x 9.8 mio 1.0x
State Vector Size 12 4.0x 76 6.3x 32 2.7x 512 12.8x
Time < 1s 1.0x 91.2s 6.4x 6.3s 3.3x 7.3m 11.5x
Table 6.4. An evaluation of the effects of field and element hiding on the sizes of the state
vectors and analysis times: Without hiding, memory consumption increases between 2x and
12.8x with analysis times going up by similar factors. For the height control case study, state
and transition counts increase as well because of the removal of the vehicle’s speed field from
the state vector. The hemodialysis machine case study also has hidden fields that do not remain
constant without affecting the outcome of the analyses, but unhiding them causes such an
enormous increase in additional states that they were kept hidden for the evaluation. For the
other case studies, all hidden fields have constant values during model execution.
Studio; for instance, model checking, DCCA, and simulations can be carried out using
testing frameworks such as NUnit [152], allowing Visual Studio’s test runner to display
the analysis results. The integration with standard testing tools for .NET also facilitates
automated regression testing on build servers that uncover accidental changes to a
model when some model checked formulas no longer hold, for example.
Just like S# models can be composed together using arbitrary C# code, cf. the model of
the height control case study presented in Chapter 7, analyses can also be set up and
executed using the full flexibility of C# and .NET: The S# run time provides programmatic
control over model checking and simulations, in particular returning model checking
counterexamples as sequences of actual model states that can be interpreted in various
ways; for example, a counterexample can be output to the console, visually replayed
using a simulation, or debugged by attaching Visual Studio’s C# debugger to a simulation.
Consequently, S#’s .NET heritage is taken advantage of in all phases of a model’s life-
cycle: During development, Visual Studio’s code editing and refactoring features support
the creation of themodels, model instantiation can take advantage of flexible composition
strategies based on various .NET technologies such as reflection, and model analysis can
be tightly integrated into the entire Visual Studio development process and associated
tooling. The S# model life-cycle is illustrated by Figure 6.7.
6.3.1 Model Checking Executable Models
The S# framework provides two model checking backends: The first one is based on an
integration of the explicit-state model checker LTSmin [116] and the second one is a
custom, C#-based implementation of a model checker based on LTSmin’s sophisticated
on-the-fly model checking algorithms [124]. The S# model checker was developed as
the integration of LTSmin has some rough edges due to the different programming
142
6.3 Analyzing Executable Models
A
n
al
ys
is
C
# 
C
o
m
p
ile
r
S#
 C
o
m
p
ile
r
Modeling
Diagnostic Analysis
Transformations
Compilation
Model Instantiation
Model Duplication
Model Copy Initialization
Model Copy Execution
Model Copy Cleanup
Model Cleanup
Figure 6.7. Overview of the model life-cycle in the S# framework starting with the creation
of a S# model: The S# compiler is an extension library for the C# compiler that runs some S#-
specific diagnostics over the model, ensuring, for example, that the ports bound together by an
invocation of the Bindmethod actually exist. Subsequently, the S# compiler transforms required
ports, fault effects, and port bindings such that the resulting code becomes executable C# code
with the desired semantics. The transformed code is compiled to a regular .NET assembly by the
standard C# compiler. For analyses, an instance of the model must be created. Such an instance
is copied for each analysis, allowing the S# run time, for example, to use multiple independent
threads for model checking. The model copies are initialized, executed for analysis, and cleaned
up afterwards. The original model instance is cleaned up as soon as it is no longer needed for
further analyses, causing .NET’s garbage collector to free the model’s allocated memory.
languages, platforms, and tools that LTSmin (C, GCC, Linux) and S# (C#, Visual Studio,
Windows) are based on. As S#’s model checker is a .NET reimplementation of a subset of
LTSmin, model checking with S# is generally considered to be LTSmin-based, regardless
of which model checking backend is actually used. Table 6.5 gives an overview of the
features supported by the two model checking backends; in general, the use of S#’s own
model checker is preferred unless LTL model checking is required.
In the following example, an invariant of a S# model of the pressure tank case study is
model checked. The model is instantiated in line 3 without any sophisticated instantia-
tion techniques due to the case study’s simplicity. Line 4 suppresses the activations of all
faults contained in the model, i.e., the model is checked as if no faults had been modeled
in the first place. The instance of S#’s model checker initialized in line 6 is used to carry
out the analysis in line 7. For invariant checks, the result returned by the invocation
of the CheckInvariant method indicates that the formula holds if it is satisfied by all
reachable states. In this example, the invariant !model.Tank.IsRuptured is analyzed; it
holds as the tank cannot rupture without any fault activations. Consequently, a success
message is written to the console in line 10. Otherwise, the result contains a counterex-
ample that can be immediately replayed or saved to disk for later replay as shown in
line 12. It is also possible that some unhandled exception occurs during model checking;
such exceptions are wrapped in an AnalysisException instance that can be caught as
shown in line 14. In this case, an error message is written to the console in line 16 that
includes the message of the original exception, and the counterexample generated for
the exception is saved to disk. However, not all AnalysisExceptions contain a coun-
terexample, hence the use of C#’s conditional access operator ?. in line 17. For instance,
no meaningful counterexamples can be generated for OutOfMemoryExceptions.
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S# LTSmin LTSmin-Inspired
Integration S#Model Checker
Multi-Core Support × X
Invariant Checks X X
LTL Checks X ×
DCCA × X
Hidden Fields in Formulas × X
Counterexamples × X
Exceptions × X
Table 6.5. Comparison between the two model checking backends provided by the S# frame-
work. As S#’s own model checker is inspired by the algorithms of LTSmin [124], the efficiency of
both model checkers is roughly equivalent. However, there are some integration issues that do
not reliably allow the use of LTSmin’s multi-core algorithms, hence multi-core model checking
with LTSmin is disabled. If it does work, LTSmin achieves the same speedup on a quad-core CPU
as S#’s own model checker. The only disadvantage of the S# model checker is its lack of support
for LTL model checking at the time of writing. However, the model checker is nevertheless used
to conduct DCCAs: The fault removal variant only requires invariant checks and S# does not
encode persistency constraints in LTL formulas. Moreover, only the S# model checker supports
accesses to hidden fields in formulas and the generation of counterexamples. In particular,
counterexample can be generated for unhandled exceptions thrown during model checking.
1 try
2 {
3 var model = new Model();
4 model.Faults.SuppressActivations();
5
6 var checker = new SSharpChecker();
7 var result = checker.CheckInvariant(model, !model.Tank.IsRuptured);
8
9 if (result.FormulaHolds)
10 Console.WriteLine($"Formula holds for all {result.StateCount} states.");
11 else
12 result.Counterexample.Save(/* file name */);
13 }
14 catch (AnalysisException e)
15 {
16 Console.WriteLine($"Exception: {e.InnerException.Message}");
17 e.Counterexample?.Save(/* file name */);
18 }
6.3.2 Deductive Cause Consequence Analysis
The S# framework carries out DCCAs completely automatically by collecting all faults
F contained in a model and checking each combination of these faults for criticality.
S# effectively carries out the fault removal variant of DCCA as it removes all other
faults Γ′ from the model when it checks a fault set Γ = F \ Γ′ for criticality, i.e., the
activations of all faults f ∈ Γ′ are suppressed during model execution. Furthermore, the
S# framework implements the DCCA algorithm illustrated by Algorithm 2 on page 112,
thereby taking advantage of the monotonicity of the criticality property, i.e., all fault sets
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are analyzed by increasing cardinality. For the pressure tank case study, for example, a
DCCA is conducted for the model instance initialized below in line 1 by the invocation
of the SafetyAnalysis.AnalyzeHazard method in line 2, passing along the model that
should be analyzed as well as the hazard, i.e., a tank rupture in this case:
1 var model = new Model();
2 var result = SafetyAnalysis.AnalyzeHazard(model, model.Tank.TankRupture);
3
4 result.SaveCounterexamples(/* path */);
5 Console.WriteLine(result);
The returned result provides access to all minimal critical fault sets found by DCCA
as well as the counterexamples generated for them. When DCCAs are carried out as
regression tests in a continuous build environment, for example, it is thus possible to as-
sert that the minimal critical fault sets match those that have previously been identified;
otherwise, some potentially unintended change to the model invalidated previous safety
analyses and might therefore require further consideration [138]. S#’s DCCA imple-
mentation is aware of unhandled exceptions, treating all fault sets for which unhandled
exceptions are thrown as minimal critical; this feature is used by the testing approach
for self-organization mechanisms presented in Section 8.3, for example. As shown by
line 4 above, the result object provides a helper method SaveCounterexamples that
writes the counterexamples for all minimal critical fault sets to the provided path for
later replay. Furthermore, the result can be written to the console as shown in line 5,
printing the following summary for the pressure tank case study:
1 Elapsed Time: 00:00:00.5703065
2 Fault Count: 4
3 Faults: SuppressIsEmpty, SuppressIsFull, SuppressPumping, SuppressTimeout
4
5 Checked Fault Sets: 13 (81% of all fault sets)
6 Minimal Critical Sets: 1
7
8 (1) { SuppressIsFull, SuppressTimeout }
The summary shows the time required to conduct the complete analysis in line 1. Due
to the simplicity of the case study, the entire DCCA takes only around half a second
before the single minimal critical fault set {¬is full,¬timeout} reported in lines 6 and 8
is discovered. Moreover, the summary shows the number and names of the faults that
are analyzed in lines 2 and 3 as well as the number of fault sets that have to be checked
for criticality in line 5. For the pressure tank case study, 81% of all fault sets have to
be checked for criticality, so the monotonicity of the criticality property does not help
much to reduce the number of required checks in this case.
6.3.3 Simulating, Testing, and Visualizing Executable Models
Model simulations form the basis for model tests, model visualizations, and replays of
model checking counterexamples. For example, model tests enable regression testing
on a build server whenever changes are made to a model and visualizations allow for
visual investigations of the effects of fault activations on the global system behavior.
Counterexamples are often most intuitive to understand visually [61] instead of the
textual outputs often provided by model checkers such as SPIN or NuSMV [38, 98].
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Simulation. The following example shows the typical usage of the Simulator class
and related helper methods provided by the S# framework. In line 1, a new instance of
the pressure tank case study model is created; the activations of all faults contained in
the model are suppressed in line 2 with line 3 enforcing the activation of the pressure
sensor’s ¬is full fault, that is, whenever ¬is full can be activated, it must be activated.
Nondeterministic activation is not possible in a simulation as only one path through the
induced fault-aware Kripke structure is considered, i.e., activations of each fault must
either be suppressed or enforced. A new Simulator instance is created for the model in
line 5. It is possible to simulate a single step as in line 6 or to advance the simulation
multiple steps as shown in line 7. Furthermore, some of the previously simulated steps
can be undone or the simulation can be reset to the model’s initial state as illustrated
by lines 8 and 9, respectively. Fault activations can always be enforced or suppressed
between different invocations of any Simulator methods.
1 var model = new Model();
2 model.Faults.SuppressActivations();
3 model.Controller.Sensor.SuppressIsFull.ForceActivation();
4
5 var simulator = new Simulator(model);
6 simulator.SimulateStep();
7 simulator.FastForward(steps: 120);
8 simulator.Rewind(steps: 10);
9 simulator.Reset();
Model Testing. Unit, integration, or system tests can be written for S# models or
individual components contained within them using regular .NET testing frameworks
such as NUnit [152]. In the early stages of development, for example, new design
ideas can quickly be tested and tried out, even allowing for an exploratory, test-driven
development of the safety-critical system. Tests of individual components, groups of
components, or the entire model serve as regression tests whenever changes to the
model or to the design of the system become necessary. Tests that check the system’s
modeled effects of fault activations or tests that result in the occurrence of a hazard can
also be used as templates for possibly manual hardware-in-the-loop tests or simulations
of the actual system during later stages of the development process [186].
The following example shows an integration test of the pressure tank case study based
on the NUnit test library: It asserts that there is a tank rupture precisely after the first
62 simulated macro steps when both the activations of ¬is full and ¬timeout are enforced.
The test method declared in line 2 is marked with the [Test] attribute so that it can be
executed with Visual Studio’s integrated test runner. The model is initialized in line 4
and all of its faults except for ¬is full and ¬timeout are suppressed in lines 5 to 7. The
Simulator instance is initialized in line 9, subsequently the simulated copy of the model
is retrieved from the Simulator in line 10. As indicated by Figure 6.7, all analysis APIs
provided by the S# framework operate on copies of the original model instance in order
to support multi-threaded analyses. The original Model instance created in line 4 is
therefore not affected by the simulation. The for loop declared on line 12 advances the
simulation by a total of 61 steps in line 14. Line 15 uses the Assert class provided by
NUnit to ensure that after each step, the tank has not yet ruptured. In line 18, the 62nd
step is simulated which should result in a tank rupture as asserted by line 19.
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1 [Test]
2 public void TankRupturesWhenSensorDoesNotReportTankFullAndTimerDoesNotTimeout()
3 {
4 var model = new Model();
5 model.Faults.SuppressActivations();
6 model.Controller.Sensor.SuppressIsFull.ForceActivation();
7 model.Controller.Timer.SuppressTimeout.ForceActivation();
8
9 var simulator = new Simulator(model);
10 model = (Model)simulator.Model;
11
12 for (var i = 0; i < 61; ++i)
13 {
14 simulator.SimulateStep();
15 Assert.IsFalse(model.Tank.IsRuptured);
16 }
17
18 simulator.SimulateStep();
19 Assert.IsTrue(model.Tank.IsRuptured);
20 }
Test-Driving Actual System Components. While the test above only considers
components modeled with S#, actual hardware components such as electric or hydraulic
subsystems or real controller software can also be integrated into S# models to allow
for hardware- or software-in-the-loop testing [12, 51, 52]. However, tests incorporating
real hardware usually take more time as they must be executed taking the real-time
constraints of the hardware into account, whereas the model-based tests execute much
more quickly, only depending on how long it takes the S# framework to simulate the
requested number of steps. Additionally, hardware-in-the-loop tests for hazards such as
the tank rupture test above can be problematic, as in this case, the test would actually
damage the hardware component under test, that is, the test must be aborted shortly
before the hazard actually occurs [186].
The following example shows a simplified excerpt of the implementation of the pressure
tank controller in the C programming language for an Arduino microcontroller [14].
There are two pins declared on line 1, one that is used to read the output of the sensor
in line 4 and one that is used to enable or disable the pump in line 6. The controller
software computes the enablePump value that is used in line 6 to decide whether the
pump should remain active; the actual controller logic is omitted as it is conceptually
similar to the state machine shown in Figure 3.17 on page 46. The loop function declared
on line 2 is invoked once during each macro step in order to check the sensor value and
to update the pump’s activation state, thus representing invocation’s of the software
controller’s Update method in the S# model.
1 int isFullPin, pumpPin;
2 void loop()
3 {
4 int isFull = digitalRead(isFullPin);
5 // Controller logic to compute enablePump omitted
6 digitalWrite(pumpPin, enablePump ? HIGH : LOW);
7 }
Using S#’s support for variability modeling and flexible model composition, real hard-
ware and software components can be integrated into S# models as shown in Figure 6.8
to allow for simulations or potentially even model checking. There are two ways to
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Figure 6.8. Conceptual overview of the integration of actual control software implemented for
an Arduino microcontroller into a S#model: The S#model contains models of the actual sensors,
plants, and actuators. The modeled sensors and actuators are mapped to the input and output
pins of the control software, respectively, instead of connecting the pins to the real sensors and
actuators. Consequently, the effects of sensor and actuator faults on the actual controller can be
analyzed using the S# framework. With standard object-oriented programming techniques, the
interface between the S# model and the actual control software can be generalized such that
the Arduino-based controller can be swapped out with a S# model of the control software or
implementations for other microcontroller architectures.
integrate the Arduino software into a S# model: The first possibility is to compile the
C code for x64 hardware as a dynamic library that is then loaded into the S# analysis
process; instead of the Arduino SDK, a custom library must be linked with the Arduino
software that implements functions like digitalRead and manages the interactions
with the S# framework. On the S# side, a new controller implementation must be
developed that marshals the sensor and actuator data between the S# model and the C
code using .NET’s platform invocation services [110]. Alternatively, the C program can
be run on actual Arduino hardware. In that case, a S# component must be developed
that communicates with the Arduino board. While both approaches require some work
when implementing the actual hardware and software components, the additional effort
further increases the confidence in the soundness, adequacy, and safety of the actual
system. For existing systems, an integration into a S# model might be hard to achieve
retroactively, however, the benefit is potentially large and the required effort might
be acceptable when planned for from the beginning. Chapter 8 discusses an analysis
and testing approach for self-organization mechanisms and adaptive robot systems that
takes advantage of S#’s software- and hardware-in-the-loop analysis capabilities.
Visualizations. As S# models are regular C# programs, their states can be visualized
using various UI frameworks available for C#. For the case studies, for example, the
Windows Presentation Foundation [147] is used as it is a flexible framework with
decent designers and Visual Studio integration. Figure 6.9 shows two screenshots of the
visualizations of the pressure tank and height control case studies. Both visualizations are
interactive, allowing mouse or touch input to activate faults on command, to spawn high
and overheight vehicles, or to change the vehicles’ lanes. Additionally, visual replays of
counterexamples are also supported. Visualizations only indirectly use the Simulator
class provided by the S# framework. Instead, they build upon RealTimeSimulator
instances that wrap Simulator instances as shown in lines 1 and 2 of the example below,
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(a) A replay of a DCCA counterexample showing that
activations of ¬is full and ¬timeout lead to a tank rupture,
indicated by the lightning bolt through the tank. The
lightning bolts at the pressure sensor and the timer
indicate the fault activations. The controller still thinks
that it should continue pumping.
(b) An interactive simulation of the height con-
trol case study. To the right, a high vehicle is
about to enter the tunnel on the left lane while an
overheight vehicle approaches the main control’s
sensors. Vehicles can be spawned interactively
using the buttons on the left.
Figure 6.9. The S# models of the pressure tank (left) and height control (right) case studies
are visualized using the Windows Presentation Foundation; the visualizations are available in
the S# repository [101]. The visualizations can be started, stopped, forwarded, rewound, slowed
down, or accelerated while either replaying a model checking counterexample or running an
interactive, exploratory simulation during which faults are interactively activated on command.
hence the basic simulation and counterexample replay functionality provided by the
Simulator class is reused. The RealTimeSimulator represents an execution engine
for interactive visualizations that delays invocations of the SimulateStep method in
accordance with the model’s step time∆t. For example, ∆t = 1s for the pressure tank
case study, so the RealTimeSimulator’s Run method invoked in line 6 internally calls
SimulateStep on the underlying Simulator instance once per second as specified in
line 2. Whenever the simulation updated the state of the simulated model retrieved on
line 3, the ModelStateChanged event is raised, allowing the visualization to be updated
based on the new state of model as indicated by the event handler lambda function
attached to the event in line 5.
1 var simulator = new Simulator(new Model());
2 var realTimeSimulator = new RealTimeSimulator(simulator, stepTime: 1000 /* ms */);
3 var model = (Model)realTimeSimulator.Model;
4
5 realTimeSimulator.ModelStateChanged += () => /* update the visualization */;
6 realTimeSimulator.Run();
Replaying Counterexamples. To replay a model checking counterexample, an in-
stance of the Counterexample class must be obtained from the results returned by an
SSharpChecker instance as illustrated in Section 6.3.1. Alternatively, a previously saved
counterexample can be loaded from disk as shown in line 1 of the following example.
Subsequently, a Simulator instance is created for the Counterexample instance in line 2
followed by the retrieval of the simulated instance of the pressure tank case study
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model in line 3. The SimulateStep method is used in the loop declared on line 5 to
iterate through all steps the counterexample consists of. Each iteration of the loop body
consecutively makes the individual model states available that led to the violation of the
analyzed formula the counterexample was created for. Thus, relevant state information
could be printed to the console, a visualization could be updated, or a debugger could
be attached to step through the individual micro steps of the counterexample.
1 var counterexample = Counterexample.Load(/* file name */);
2 var simulator = new Simulator(counterexample);
3 var model = (Model)simulator.Model;
4
5 while (simulator.SimulateStep())
6 {
7 // ...
8 }
6.4 Safe Fault Sets Heuristics
By default, S# uses a bottom-up DCCA implementation that only takes advantage of
the monotonicity of the criticality property. If the search was conducted top-down, the
monotonicity of the safe fault set property could be taken into consideration instead. As
most safety-critical systems have rather small minimal critical fault sets, the bottom-up
search strategy is usually preferable as it has to carry out fewer checks. But as soon
as the cardinalities of the minimal critical fault sets increase or the number of minimal
critical fault sets for a hazard becomes larger, a combination of both search strategies
might be beneficial. The naïve approach of randomly checking very large fault sets most
likely does not decrease analysis times, however: Many of the larger fault set are likely
to be critical and checking them might be expensive as the fault removal optimization
becomes less effective the larger the fault sets become; for larger fault sets Γ ⊆ F (K),
only a few irrelevant faults F (K) \ Γ can be removed from the model.
Instead of randomly checking large fault sets for criticality, the S# framework supports
safe fault sets heuristics when conducting DCCAs, thereby combining the strengths
of both the bottom-up and the top-down search strategies. While DCCAs are still
primarily conducted bottom-up, the heuristics are allowed to suggest fault sets of higher
cardinalities that are likely to be safe; if the suggested sets are indeed safe, a potentially
large number of criticality checks can be avoided compared to the pure bottom-up search
strategy: If a suggested fault set Γ ⊆ F (K) of cardinality n in fact turns out to be safe,
up to 2n − 1 checks can be avoided as all 2n − 1 subsets of Γ are immediately known to
be safe as well. In the general case, however, the heuristics cannot be absolutely sure
that a suggested fault set is indeed safe, therefore all suggestions must be checked for
criticality nevertheless. Consequently, heuristics always try to guess fault sets that are
as large as possible while still being reasonably sure that the suggestions are indeed
safe. If a critical set is suggested, additional work is introduced without speeding up
DCCA, potentially even slowing the process down as a critical fault set is checked that
is likely to be non-minimal and would thus have been skipped by the bottom-up search.
Figure 6.10 illustrates the effects of heuristics on the number of fault sets that have to
be checked for criticality.
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Cardinality 0 ∅
Cardinality 1
Cardinality 2
Cardinality 3
f1 f2 f3 f4
f2, f3 f2, f4 f3, f4
f2, f3, f4
(a) The bottom-up search strategy quickly
finds the minimal critical fault set {f1}, al-
lowing it to skip the checks for all fault sets
of cardinality n ≥ 2 that contain f1 due to
the monotonicity of the criticality property.
However, a large number of safe fault sets
has to be checked as the bottom-up search
cannot take advantage of the monotonic-
ity property of safe fault sets. Overall, a
total of nine criticality checks have to be
performed to complete the DCCA.
Cardinality 0 ∅
Cardinality 1
Cardinality 2
Cardinality 3
f1
f1, f2, f3 f2, f3, f4
(b) A heuristic might suggest the fault sets {f1, f2, f3} and
{f2, f3, f4}, assuming them to be safe for the analyzed hazard.
As the former is critical, the suggestion is useless except
that {f1, f2, f3, f4} is immediately known to be critical as
well. In the worst case, such useless suggestions can notice-
ably slow down analyses. The latter suggestion, however,
is indeed a safe fault set, immediately resulting in all of
its subsets to be classified as safe. A bottom-up search is
started for the remaining fault sets, i.e., ∅ and {f1} in this
case. Consequently, only four criticality checks have to be
performed to complete the DCCA thanks to the heuristic.
Figure 6.10. Comparison of the number of fault sets that have to be checked for criticality
using only the bottom-up search strategy (left) versus the bottom-up search strategy amended
with top-down searches by heuristics (right). The model is assumed to contain four faults f1, f2,
f3, and f4, but only {f1} is assumed to be a minimal critical fault set for the analyzed hazard.
Heuristics generally try to guess maximal safe fault sets: These fault sets are the dual
of minimal critical ones in the sense that they cannot be enlarged with any additional
faults without making them critical. Formally:
Definition 6.3 (Maximal Safe Fault Sets). A safe fault set Γ ⊆ F (K) is maximal if no
proper superset Γ′ ) Γ is safe.
Consequently, maximal safe fault sets represent a frontier of large fault sets behind
which all other fault sets are known to be critical. Ideally, all suggestions made by a
heuristic would be maximal safe fault sets for two reasons: Firstly, a suggestion that
turns out to be critical is likely useless if not outright counterproductive, as a large fault
set has to be checked for criticality without providing any meaningful information;
the only exceptions are suggested fault sets that are minimal critical as these would
eventually have to be checked anyway later on. Secondly, suggested sets of higher
cardinalities have a larger potential for reductions in the number of safe fault sets that
no longer have to be checked. However, maximal safe fault sets can typically only be
guessed; if they were known, the minimal critical fault sets could be computed from them
and no DCCA would have to be conducted in the first place. Therefore, heuristics are
imperfect, sometimes suggesting critical fault sets or safe ones that are not maximal.
In Figure 6.10, for example, there only is one maximal safe fault set: {f2, f3, f4}. It is the
only set of the 16 possible fault sets that is safe and that only has critical supersets. When
there are more minimal critical fault sets and, in particular, minimal critical fault sets of
larger cardinalities, there typically are multiple maximal safe fault sets that are partially
overlapping. A case study-independent heuristic would thus be the computation of all
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Initial DCCAs Subsequent DCCAs
w/o Heuristic 1 w/ Heuristic 1 w/ Heuristic 1
Time # Checks Time # Checks Time # Checks
Height Control
Collisions 14.2s 325 3.4s (4.2x) 53 (6.1x) 1.0s (14.2x) 5 (65.0x)
False Alarms 34.8s 261 2.9s (12.0x) 42 (6.2x) 1.9s (18.3x) 6 (43.5x)
Railroad Crossing
Potential Collisions 1.2s 11 1.2s (1.0x) 11 (1.0x) 0.4s (3.0x) 8 (1.4x)
Hemodialysis Machine
Contamination 26.7s 243 6.5s (4.1x) 54 (4.5x) 6.4s (4.2x) 11 (22.1x)
Dialysis Failure 0.9s 14 0.9s (1.0x) 14 (1.0x) 0.8s (1.1x) 7 (2.0x)
Table 6.6. Evaluation of the effectiveness of heuristic 1 for the height control, railroad cross-
ing, and hemodialysis machine case studies. The self-organization case studies require more
specialized heuristics as discussed in Section 8.2 as heuristic 1 cannot effectively handle the high
number and large cardinalities of their minimal critical fault sets. Initial DCCAs are conducted
either with or without the heuristic; in the former case, the heuristic makes its suggestions based
on a partially computed set of minimal critical fault sets. Subsequent DCCAs can reuse previous
analysis results; if the analyzed models remain unchanged between the initial and subsequent
DCCAs, the fault sets suggested by the heuristic are guaranteed to be safe. Overall, heuristic 1 is
highly effective for subsequent DCCAs but also speeds up initial ones noticeably.
maximal safe fault sets based on already known or at least assumed minimal critical ones;
two case study-dependent heuristics are introduced in Section 8.2. More formally, the
maximal safe fault sets heuristic takes advantage of DCCA completeness as follows:
Heuristic 1 (Maximal Safe Fault Sets Heuristic). For a known or assumed set ΛH ⊆
2F (K) of minimal critical fault sets for hazardH and fault-aware Kripke structureK , the
fault sets {F (K) \ {f1, . . . , fn} | fi ∈ Γi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n where ΛH =
⋃n
i=1 Γi} are
likely to be maximal safe fault sets for H .
If ΛH is already known from previous analyses, the maximal safe fault sets heuristic
can significantly speed up DCCAs. Assuming that no changes have been made to the
analyzed model that completely or partially invalidate a previously obtained set ΛH , all
suggestions made by the heuristic indeed turn out to be safe fault sets. On the other
hand, if changes to the model have an effect on ΛH , these often only add, remove, or
change some of the minimal critical fault sets, thus there still is a good chance that the
heuristic succeeds in suggesting at least some safe fault sets. Moreover, the maximal
safe fault sets heuristic can also be used to speed up initial DCCAs for which no minimal
critical fault sets are already known. In this case, the heuristic can be instructed to
suggest the maximal safe fault sets as soon as all minimal critical fault sets up to a
specific cardinality are known. That is, the heuristic can also make its suggestions based
on only a partially known set ΛH , in which case, however, the suggestions can be wrong.
Table 6.6 evaluates the potential gains achieved with the heuristic.
The S# framework enhances the DCCA algorithm illustrated by Algorithm 2 on page 112
by incorporating the heuristics for safe fault sets. As heuristics are often case study-
specific such as the ones for self-organizing resource-flow systems introduced in Chap-
ter 8, the S# framework provides the following interface for custom heuristics:
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interface ISafeFaultSetsHeuristic
{
void Augment(int cardinality, LinkedList<FaultSet> setsToCheck);
void Update(LinkedList<FaultSet> setsToCheck, FaultSet checkedSet, bool isSafe);
}
The set of heuristics to be used must be specified before a DCCA is started, allowing
each case study to benefit from those heuristics that are most effective for it. That is,
only those heuristics should be specified for a DCCA that suggest many safe fault sets
of high cardinalities. S#’s DCCA implementation calls the Augment method for each
level of fault set cardinality, passing along a linked list of fault sets that have to be
checked next. The heuristics are free to add any fault sets to the list that they deem safe,
regardless of the cardinality. Additionally, the list is always checked from front to back,
that is, the order of inserts affects the effectiveness of the suggestion. For example, a
large fault set Γ should generally be added to the front of the list, because when it is safe,
all of its subsets Γ′ ( Γ following Γ in the list can be skipped as they are then already
known to be safe as well. For some heuristics, however, it is occasionally useful to add
suggestions at different locations. Heuristics can also remove sets from the list, in which
case S# ensures that the analyses remain complete, that is, heuristics in general cannot
remove sets they did not previously add themselves. The use of the LinkedList<T> data
type is necessary for reasons of efficiency, as insertions and removals are always O(1)
compared to List<T>where they areO(n) in the worst case. When millions of fault sets
have to be checked for criticality, the use of List<T> introduces unacceptable element
copying overhead, taking up to 90% of the entire analysis time in some cases. The Update
method is used to inform the heuristics about safe and critical fault sets, allowing them
to adjust their future suggestions based on the quality of their past ones.
For example, to set up a S# DCCA for the hazard of false alarms in the height control
case study that reuses previous analysis results, the following code can be used. In line 4,
an instance of the MaximalSafeFaultSetsHeuristic is added to the SafetyAnalysis
instance created in line 3, which is subsequently used when the minimal critical fault
sets are computed in line 6.
1 var model = /* ... */;
2 var result = /* result from previous DCCA */;
3 var analysis = new SafetyAnalysis();
4 analysis.Heuristics.Add(new MaximalSafeFaultSetsHeuristic(model,
result.MinimalCriticalSets));
5
6 result = analysis.ComputeMinimalCriticalSets(model, model.FalseAlarm);
6.5 Related Work
Execution versus Transformation. Many safety analysis tools such as VECS, the
Compass toolset, or AltaRica [15, 135, 151] rely on the standard approach of model
transformations to use model checkers like SPIN or NuSMV [38, 98]. By contrast, S#
unifies simulations, visualizations, and fully exhaustive model checking by executing
the C# models with consistent semantics. Consequently, no model transformations
changing the level of expressiveness are necessary, avoiding significant implementation
complexity while retaining competitivemodel checking efficiency. S# only has to execute
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C# code instead of understanding and transforming it, supporting most C# language
features without any additional work; transformations, by contrast, would require large
parts of the .NET virtual machine to be encoded for model checking or to forgo many
higher level C# features such as virtual dispatch or lambda functions. The two main
challenges of model checking S# models are efficient state serialization and efficient
handling of nondeterminism. The algorithm that allows ChoiceResolver to handle and
track all combinations of nondeterministic choices, however, only requires around 40
lines of C# code. Generating low overhead serialization methods, by contrast, is more
involved, taking about 700 lines of C# code to generate the methods at run time. The
model transformations carried out by the Compass toolset [151], by contrast, require
several thousand lines of Python code; due to the very different levels of expressiveness,
the resulting NuSMV models can become unreadable. Additionally, the toolset provides
its own AADL parser with a grammar description file of 700 lines. The necessary code
for parsing and semantic analysis also introduce significant complexity with several
thousand lines of Python code. S#, by contrast, simply reuses C#’s standard compiler
and adds roughly 600 lines for additional semantic analyses and 1600 lines of C# code
for the necessary code transformations. These additions deal with ports and fault effects,
i.e., those things that lie at the core of the S# modeling language. The S# compiler
therefore does concern itself with standard compiler construction problems such as
expression parsing, good error messages and recovery, or type checks that are of low
theoretical interest for model-based safety analysis. Moreover, model debugging and
testing are inherently supported without any additional implementation effort that
would be required by a transformation-based analysis approach.
State Storage Efficiency. For the pressure tank, height control, railroad crossing, and
hemodialysis machine case studies, serialization causes only around 5% of overhead
during the entire model checking process; the self-organization case studies have higher
overhead as they have to serialize object references, which is more time-consuming due
to the necessary dictionary look-ups. The serialized states are smaller than the state
vectors of a hand-optimized SPIN models of the height control and railroad crossing case
studies, taking only 12 instead of 24 bytes per state. Consequently, the S# framework
in general halves the memory requirements for model checking compared to SPIN.
Symbolic model checking techniques, by contrast, do not consider states individually,
only storing relevant sets of states; they thus usually have lower memory requirements
than explicit-state model checkers.
Explicit-State Model Checking with SPIN. In the worst case of valid formulas, S#
and LTSmin have to enumerate the model’s entire state space, taking 53.2 seconds for
the height control case study using a single CPU core only. SPIN, by contrast, takes
553 seconds to check a hand-optimized, non-modular SPIN version of the model that
semantically corresponds to the S# version. On a quad-core CPU, LTSmin achieves a
speedup of 3.7x, bringing the analysis time down to 14.2 seconds whereas SPIN scales
by a factor of 1.5x only. For a version of the railroad crossing case study with increased
resolution, the S# model takes 126 seconds to enumerate all states, whereas a manually
created SPIN model takes 114 seconds, i.e., it is slightly faster. With multi-core model
checking, however, the S# framework achieves a speedup of 3.8x, bringing analysis
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time down to 33.2 seconds compared to SPIN’s 77.9 seconds due to its suboptimal multi-
core scaling. The main reasons for S#’s superior performance for the height control
case study is that fault-awareness and the fault activation optimizations described in
Section 6.2.2 can only be partially encoded into the SPIN models; they can only be fully
supported by changing SPIN’s core model checking algorithm. S# is therefore able to
ignore irrelevant fault activations more efficiently than SPIN, causing it to compute less
transitions while still finding all reachable states.
Symbolic Model Checking with NuSMV. For the height control case study, symbolic
analysis with NuSMV is faster than using S#: For a hand-written, very low-level and
non-modular NuSMV model that is approximately equivalent to the S#model, the entire
state space is generated almost instantly compared to the 14.2 seconds it takes the
S# framework to do the same. On the other hand, the railroad crossing case study is
checked 2.7 times faster by S# than byNuSMV. The relative efficiency of explicit-state and
symbolic model checking is therefore case study-specific and independent from S#; in
general, highly nondeterministic models seem to profit more from symbolic techniques.
Generally, analysis times of explicit-state model checkers are more predictable than
those of symbolic model checkers, as the latter rely on heuristics that allow them
to consider combined sets of states [13, 38]. For the height control case study, these
heuristics are highly effective, but changes to the model that reorder variables, for
instance, could have unpredictable negative influences on the effectiveness of these
heuristics, suddenly slowing downNuSMV significantly. Moreover, using input variables
to encode fault-awareness does not improve NuSMV’s analysis efficiency for the height
control and railroad crossing case studies. Consequently, NuSMV does not seem to
profit from fault-aware modeling and specification. In general, NuSMV achieves its
efficiency through the low level of expressiveness of its models, in particular restricting
them to synchronous variable updates only.
Language Expressiveness versus Analysis Efficiency. S# models have a much
higher level of expressiveness than either SPIN or NuSMV models, allowing variant
modeling and analysis in a way that is not supported by either model checker directly.
In particular, the models of the self-organization case studies, cf. Chapter 8, reach a level
of complexity that necessitates the use of high-level modeling languages such as S#with
good model development, debugging, and testing support. Additionally, S#’s explicit
support for fault modeling guarantees conservative extension, while SPIN or NuSMV,
for instance, cannot give this guarantee at all. While S# is more efficient than SPIN
due to its fault optimizations and multi-core model checking capabilities, the increase
in analysis time compared to NuSMV for some case studies seems acceptable given
the step-up in modeling flexibility, expressiveness, and fault modeling adequacy. A
transformation of S# models to NuSMV models is not efficiently feasible, as the models
would have to be symbolically executed during the transformation which either has
exponential complexity or requires additional variables [64] that NuSMV cannot effi-
ciently cope with. The underlying reason for the complexity of such transformations is
S#’s support for sequential variable writes within a macro step, whereas NuSMV only
supports non-conflicting, synchronous updates to variables within a step. Consequently,
this mismatch between the models of computations gives S# advantages in modeling
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expressiveness at the cost of symbolic analysis efficiency, highlighting the need for
fault-aware modeling and specification in order to bring explicit-state model checking
of executable models to a competitive level with symbolic analysis techniques.
Other Safety Analysis Tools. VECS [135] is a low-level abstraction of the NuSMV
and Prism input languages, i.e., its level of expressiveness is very similar, thus the
remarks on symbolic model checking with NuSMV also apply to VECS. The Compass
toolset [151], on the other hand, has a higher-level modeling language, albeit still with a
model of computation similar to NuSMV. In general, it is therefore hard to achieve fair
comparisons between these tools and symbolic analysis techniques on the one hand and
S# and explicit-state model checking on the other hand. For instance, it takes about 740
lines to create a scaled-down Compass model of the railroad crossing case study that is
semantically similar to the S# version written in approximately 400 lines of C# code.
Compass performs a safety analysis based on the FSAP/NuSMV platform [24, 26] that is
equivalent to DCCA in 21 minutes using NuSMV instead of the 1.2 seconds it takes S#
to do the same. Of course, the comparison is unfair as forcing Compass semantics onto
S# might likewise slow down analyses.
SoftwareModel Checking. The S# framework is not a software model checker such as
MoonWalker, Java Pathfinder, or Zing [1, 4, 194] even though the underlying techniques
are similar: Programs are executed within the context of an on-the-fly model checking
algorithm [124]. The primary application of softwaremodel checking is the identification
of data races and deadlocks in concurrent programs. In order to be able to do so, the
assumption of zero execution time underlying all S#models is invalid for software model
checking, as the precise timing of the individual operations, i.e., the micro steps, carried
out by the different parts of the analyzed program are indeed relevant. Furthermore,
software model checking is mainly concerned with functional correctness instead of
safety, that is, the analyzed programs do not contain any plant components or faults
that are required for safety analyses.
Summary and Outlook. The model execution approach presented in this chapter unifies various
kinds of analyses that are useful for different purposes during the development of safety-critical
systems. For example, model checking allows for formal safety analyses based on DCCA whereas
simulations and visualizations enable debugging or visual replays of model checking counterexam-
ples. Since all of these analyses are based on model execution, their consistency is guaranteed and
no complicated model transformations are required. Compared to other safety analysis tools, the
implementation of the S# framework is therefore less complex, but thanks to its anchorage in the C#
and .NET world, it can take advantage of all of the tooling available to regular .NET developers. The
formal techniques introduced in Chapter 5 are inherited by executable models and the S# framework
in particular, as model execution can be used to construct fault-aware Kripke structures. The S#
framework, however, never explicitly creates fault-aware Kripke structures during analyses of a model,
instead using on-the-fly model checking and fault activation minimization techniques to further speed
up analyses. Chapters 7 and 8 show the applicability of the formal techniques and their integration
into the S# framework using S# models of the height control and the self-organization case studies,
respectively. The latter chapter also introduces additional DCCA heuristics and discusses a modeling
and analysis approach for run time safety analyses of self-organizing systems.
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Summary. The height control case study is modeled with S# and analyzed
with DCCA. As the original design of the case study is functionally incorrect,
multiple design alternatives are discussed, modeled, and analyzed. S#’s flexible
model composition capabilities are leveraged to conveniently instantiate all valid
combinations of system design variants, assembling together the orthogonally
modeled variants of different controller components in various ways. DCCA’s
analysis efficiency is evaluated using both hazards of the case study as well as all
combinations of modeled design alternatives.
Publications. The S# model of the height control case study is published in [84].
It can be obtained from the S# repository [101], including a S#-based visualization. 7
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The height control case study introduced in Chapter 2 is a classical safety-critical system
in the sense that its structure and behavior is fully determined during development.
Safety analyses can therefore be completely carried out during system design as opposed
to self-organizing systems for which run time analyses are necessary as discussed in
Chapter 8. The first safety analysis of the height control case study was conducted
in 2002 by Ortmeier et al. [158] using a mixture of Fault Tree Analysis and model
checking of unstructured, non-modular, and low-level transition systems. Subsequent
analyses were based on DCCA instead [159], still using a rather low-level modeling
formalism. These analyses concluded that the original specification of the case study
is inadequate, as both false alarms and collisions can in fact happen without a single
fault being activated beforehand, that is, the empty set of faults is minimal critical for
both hazards. Several design alternatives that add additional sensors, for instance, were
proposed to fix the problem [158], necessitating additional safety analyses to check
for newly introduced safety issues. However, each analyzed variant required manual
changes to a copy of the model, making it hard to ensure consistency between them
while also introducing significant modeling overhead. S#’s support for variant modeling
and automated composition of different design alternatives, on the other hand, can be
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leveraged to more conveniently model the different and partially orthogonal variants in
a modular way, automatically composing all combinations together for fully automated
safety analyses based on DCCA.
In the early stages of development, it is often unknown how a system is best designed in
a way that enables it to fulfill its intended functionality without any unacceptable safety
risks. Several different design variants are often conceivable that have to be evaluated
for their development and production costs, correctness, adequacy, and safety, among
other things [131, 161, 186]. Formal safety analyses can be carried out on models of
the system under development before the system is actually built, allowing its safety
to be assessed while it is still comparatively easy and cheap to make modifications to
the system’s design. Such analyses typically unveil unacceptable safety risks that must
subsequently be alleviated by introducing additional safety measures into the system
design, requiring a new round of safety analyses to check whether the changes had
their intended effects. Consequently, the minimal critical fault sets must show that the
changes indeed improve safety to a degree that justifies the development and production
costs of the additional safety precautions.
Similar to design exploration, safety-critical product lines [16, 191] also consist of
multiple system variants developed at design time, albeit designed and distributed
based on the specific needs of a customer. For example, cars are often built in this way,
allowing the customers to purchase additional safety-critical features at an extra cost
such as autonomous cruise control, for instance [115, 190]. Separate safety analyses
have to be carried out for all of the different product configurations to ensure their
safety. But as there often are many different orthogonal features that can be configured
into a system, the amount of safety analyses that have to be conducted increases
exponentially. While S# provides modeling language features based on C#’s object-
oriented concepts to support variability modeling, that is, the specification of different
designs and product features, it does not yet support integrated, simultaneous analyses
of multiple different system variants [191]. However, to some extent it is possible to
reuse analysis results from one variant when analyzing the next one using the maximal
safe fault sets heuristics to increase analysis efficiency [46]. Consequently, S# provides
some first steps towards modeling and analyzing safety-critical product lines, but full
integration of safety analysis and product line engineering with formal methods requires
the development of some additional analysis techniques.
The following presents a S# model of the height control case study adhering to the
systematic modeling approach presented in Chapter 3. The model of the original
case study design introduced in Section 7.1 is extended to incorporate several design
alternatives for the case study’s controller components in Section 7.2. Section 7.3
composes the different system designs together by taking advantage of S#’s flexible
model composition capabilities based on C#’s expressiveness and the standard reflection
facilities provided by the .NET run time and its base library. Subsequently, Section 7.4
presents the results of the DCCAs automatically carried out by the S# framework for all
modeled design variants, discussing the flaw in the case study’s original design. The
entire S# model of the case study is available in the S# repository [101], including an
interactive, S#-based visualization.
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7.1 Modeling the Original Design
In the height control case study, the vehicles constitute the plants that are observed and
controlled by the three subcontrollers the overall controller consists of. The two hazards
that are analyzed can be specified over the vehicles’ positions and lanes as well as the
fact whether the tunnel is closed, that is, whether the traffic lights closing the tunnel are
switched to red. Consequently, a collision occurs when an overheight vehicle reaches
the tunnel entrance on the left lane, whereas a false alarm occurs when the tunnel is
closed even though there is no overheight vehicle on the left lane in the entire height
control area. Neither hazard could accurately be formulated without the vehicles being
part of the model, thus showing the necessity to model the vehicles, or more generally,
the controlled plants, for formal safety analyses. For false alarms, the necessity of the
vehicle models is particularly obvious: False alarms are control failures that the height
control is unaware of, otherwise it would not have mistakenly closed the tunnel. A
false alarm can thus never be accurately detected by the control system alone even if
there are additional safety measures that try to prevent them; after all, such detection
capabilities also make use of hardware components that could fail as well.
The structure of the height control model is shown by the block definition diagram in
Figure 7.1. Even though only the original system design is considered in this section,
the model is already prepared for the additional design variants in Section 7.2: There
are three abstract blocks representing the common parts of all variants of the pre,
main, and end controls. These blocks mostly define the structural aspects while they
themselves specify almost no behavior. Consequently, it is possible to replace different
variants with each other as long as all of these variants adequately implement the ports
declared by the abstract blocks and other parts of the model do not depend on any
concrete subcontroller types. The original designs are structurally very similar to the
abstract blocks as seen in Figure 7.2, with some of the other variants adding additional
sensors, for instance, as discussed in Section 7.2. The original design variants of the
subcontrollers model the height control behavior as originally envisioned; in particular,
the MainControlOriginal uses a counter to track the number of overheight vehicles that
are assumed to be in its observed area. The internal block diagram in Figure 7.3 shows
a model instance with PreControlOriginal, MainControlOriginal, and EndControlOriginal block
instances, therefore representing the original case study design. The VehicleDetector and
TrafficLight instances are modeled as nested ports as indicated by the «port» stereotype in
the blocks’ definitions shown in Figure 7.1.
Another abstraction is introduced through the abstract VehicleDetector block that both
LightBarriers and OverheadDetectors derive from. There are two main reasons for this
modeling decision: On the one hand, modularity increases as additional sensor types
other than LightBarrier and OverheadDetector could be used transparently as long as they
adhere to VehicleDetector’s semantic contract; however, none of the analyzed design
variants currently takes advantage of this possibility. On the other hand, misdetections
and false detections can bemodeled exclusively in terms of VehicleDetector, demonstrating
S#’s fault modeling capabilities by describing the faults’ effects once for all types of
sensors considered in the case study. The individual parts of the case study model as
well as the faults are explained in detail in the following.
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prov HasElapsed() : Boolean
prov Start() : Void
prov Stop() : Void
«enumeration»
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1
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VehicleKind
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Figure 7.1. An incomplete block definition diagram of the height control case study omitting
all fault effects for presentational clarity. The model consists of the plant, i.e., the VehicleSet, and
the HeightControl controller block. The two sensor types are abstracted away behind a common
VehicleDetector block. The TrafficLight is the only actuator in the case study, signaling tunnel
closures. The HeightControl is subdivided into three abstract subcontrollers to support variant
modeling as discussed in Section 7.2. All controller designs share some common VehicleDetector
subcomponents that they use to observe the vehicles. Additionally, MainControl and EndControl
use the Timer block to automatically deactivate themselves after some time.
bdd Original Design
«block,abstract»
PreControl
«block,abstract»
MainControl
«block,abstract»
EndControl
«block»
PreControlOriginal
«block»
MainControlOriginal
values
_count : int
«block»
EndControlOriginal
{incomplete} {incomplete} {incomplete}
Figure 7.2. The original designs of the subcontrollers are closely related to the abstract base
blocks from Figure 7.1, only specifying their respective behavior without introducing any new
associations or operations. The original design of the MainControl adds a new state variable _count
to track the number of overheight vehicles that are assumed to be present in its observed area,
that is, the vehicles that are in between the PreControl’s and MainControl’s vehicle detectors.
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Figure 7.3. A partial internal block diagram showing the connections between the Vehicles and
the Controller of the original case study design. The Timer instances contained in MainControl and
EndControl are omitted for reasons of brevity as their effects in the computations of the subcon-
trollers’ provided ports cannot be shown in an internal block diagram anyway. The connections
between the subcontrollers show how information about overheight vehicles propagates through
the system: When the PreControl detects an overheight vehicle, MainControl is informed via its
VehicleEntering provided port; whenever such a vehicle leaves the main control area on the right
lane, EndControl is activated through its VehicleEntering provided port. The CloseTunnel required
ports of the MainControl and the EndControl indicate whether a tunnel closure is necessary,
invoking the ToRed port of the TrafficLight. The Vehicle instances contained in the VehicleSet
stop their approach towards the tunnel whenever the TrafficLight’s IsRed port returns true. The
VehicleSet is responsible for broadcasting the TrafficLight’s state to all of its Vehicles, as the model
supports an arbitrary number of Vehicle instances; in the following, three instances are used,
two of which are of kind VehicleKind.Overhigh and the remaining one is of kind VehicleKind.High
(not shown in the figure). Regular cars are not considered during formal analyses as they are
unobservable by the VehicleDetectors; they are useful for visualization purposes, however. While
the ObserveVehicles ports are connected, the VehicleSet directly calls the DetectsVehicle ports on
the VehicleDetector instances passed to ObserveVehicles as explained later.
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7.1.1 Abstract Vehicle Modeling
The S# model of a vehicle shown below allows it to drive on either of the two lanes
with a certain speed, chosen nondeterministically, stopping whenever the tunnel is
closed. Initially, a vehicle drives on the right lane and its speed as well as its position
are implicitly set to zero; the kind is specified via the constructor. The position is
range-restricted to fall within [0; Model.TunnelPosition] with the overflow behavior
“teleporting” the vehicle back to its initial position whenever it reaches the tunnel. The
speed is [Hidden] as in all macro steps, the vehicle always chooses a new speed in the
Update method before the speed is used in other micro steps. The IsAtPosition provided
port hides the effects of position and speed discretization from other components: In
order to determine whether a vehicle is at position p, the position at the beginning of
a macro step is computed by subtracting the current speed from the current position,
subsequently ensuring that the resulting position is smaller than p and the current
position is greater than or equal to p; if that is the case, the vehicle has passed p in
the current macro step. The Update method nondeterministically decides when the
vehicle starts approaching the tunnel, that is, as long as the vehicle’s position is zero, it
is free to remain where it is. Once it decides to approach the tunnel, the Update method
nondeterministically chooses a new speed and subsequently updates the position if the
tunnel is not closed. Due to the road layout, the nondeterministic lane changes are only
possible before the end control area is reached.
class Vehicle : Component
{
[Hidden] private int _speed;
public Lane Lane { get; private set; } = Lane.Right;
public VehicleKind Kind { get; }
[Range(0, Model.TunnelPosition, OverflowBehavior.WrapClamp)]
public int Position { get; private set; }
public Vehicle(VehicleKind kind)
{
Kind = kind;
}
public bool IsAtPosition(int pos) => Position - _speed < pos && Position >= pos;
public extern bool IsTunnelClosed { get; }
public override void Update()
{
if (Position == 0 && Choose(true, false))
return;
if (IsTunnelClosed)
return;
_speed = Choose(Model.MinSpeed, Model.MaxSpeed);
Position += _speed;
if (Position < Model.EndControlPosition)
Lane = Choose(Lane.Left, Lane.Right);
}
}
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The following VehicleSet component is introduced in order to allow the overall case
study model to be transparently instantiated with an arbitrary amount of vehicles. Dur-
ing model execution, however, the number of vehicles remains fixed. The Vehicle refer-
ences stored in the Vehicles array never change, hence field and element hiding is used
to optimize the state vector. Each vehicle’s IsTunnelClosed required port is forwarded to
the set’s IsTunnelClosed required port using an intermediate ForwardIsTunnelClosed
provided port as S# does not natively support such port forwardings. In the Update
method, all vehicles contained in the set are updated.
Due to the abstractly modeled vehicle behavior, it is necessary to specify state constraints
to rule out physically impossible scenarios that negatively affect safety analyses in a
completely unrealistic way. In particular, two different Vehicle instances could be at
the exact same location, allowing them to pass a detector simultaneously such that only
one of them is detected. Such a situation cannot happen in real life unless perhaps there
is an accident in which case, however, the involved vehicles are unlikely to continue
their approach to the tunnel. Consequently, state constraints for all pairs of Vehicle
instances are introduced below such that they are forced to have pairwise different
positions or different lanes. Without these constraints, DCCAs overapproximate the
system’s safety as the system is assessed to be less safe than it actually is.
class VehicleSet : Component
{
[Hidden(HideElements = true), Subcomponent]
public Vehicle[] Vehicles { get; }
public VehicleSet(params Vehicle[] vehicles)
{
Vehicles = vehicles;
foreach (var vehicle in Vehicles)
Bind(nameof(vehicle.IsTunnelClosed), nameof(ForwardIsTunnelClosed));
for (var i = 0; i < Vehicles.Length; ++i)
{
for (var j = i + 1; j < Vehicles.Length; ++j)
{
AddSensorConstraint(Vehicles[i], Vehicles[j], Model.PreControlPos);
AddSensorConstraint(Vehicles[i], Vehicles[j], Model.MainControlPos);
AddSensorConstraint(Vehicles[i], Vehicles[j], Model.EndControlPos);
}
}
}
private bool ForwardIsTunnelClosed => IsTunnelClosed;
public bool ObserveVehicles(VehicleDetector d) => Vehicles.Any(d.DetectsVehicle);
public override void Update() => Update(Vehicles);
public extern bool IsTunnelClosed { get; }
private void AddSensorConstraint(Vehicle vehicle1, Vehicle vehicle2, int pos)
=> AddStateConstraint(!vehicle1.IsAtPosition(pos) ||
!vehicle2.IsAtPosition(pos) || vehicle1.Lane != vehicle2.Lane);
}
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sd Vehicle Detection
: LightBarrier Vehicles[i] : Vehicle: VehicleSet
IsVehicleDetected
ObserveVehicles(this)
loop
[for i = 0..#Vehicles]
DetectsVehicle(vehicles[i])
kind = Kind()
pos = IsAtPosition(_position)
detected[i] = (pos && 
Kind == VehicleKind.Overhigh)
detected = any(detected[i]) 
detected
Figure 7.4. A sequence diagram giving an overview of how vehicle detection works within
the case study model for LightBarriers; other VehicleDetector-derived blocks work in a similar way:
When the LightBarrier’s IsVehicleDetected provided port is invoked, it immediately forwards the
call to its ObserveVehicles required port, passing its own instance along. As the port is bound
to VehicleSet’s ObserveVehicles provided port, the set begins to loop through all of its vehicles,
calling the LightBarrier’s DetectsVehicle port for each Vehicles[i]. The LightBarrier, in turn, gets the
VehicleKind from Vehicles[i]’s Kind provided port and checks whether Vehicles[i]’s position matches
the LightBarrier’s one. If both conditions are satisfied, Vehicles[i] is detected; if any such Vehicles[i]
is detected, both ObserveVehicles and IsVehicleDetected return true.
7.1.2 Vehicle Detectors and Traffic Lights
In accordance with the assumption of zero execution time, the resolution of the detectors
is assumed to be sufficiently high such that no vehicles are overlooked. To abstract from
the number of vehicles, there is a chain of port calls involved when a detector determines
whether it detects a vehicle as illustrated by Figure 7.4. A VehicleDetector instance thus
forwards all invocations of its IsVehicleDetected provided port to its ObserveVehicles
required port as shown below. The VehicleSet instance the detector is bound to can
then call the detector’s abstract DetectsVehicle port for each vehicle contained in
the set as shown before, with the concrete detector types actually implementing the
detection behavior. Detectors therefore neither know nor care about the actual number
of vehicles they have to observe. Conversely, the vehicles do not care about the concrete
detector types, all in all ensuring maximum modeling flexibility by adhering to the low
coupling and high cohesion principles through the use of polymorphism [161].
abstract class VehicleDetector : Component
{
public virtual bool IsVehicleDetected => ObserveVehicles(this);
public abstract bool DetectsVehicle(Vehicle vehicle);
public extern bool ObserveVehicles(VehicleDetector detector);
}
The LightBarrier and OverheadDetector components declared in the following are
two concrete subtypes of the VehicleDetector component. A light barrier spans the
entire width of the road, not differentiating between vehicles on the left or on the right
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lane. However, it is positioned at a height such that it can only detect overheight vehicles
passing by. By contrast, an overhead detector is installed over one of the lanes only,
detecting either high or overheight vehicles on that lane. Both detector types therefore
declare constructors that allow their positions along the road to be specified; overhead
detectors additionally expect the lane that is observed. The constructor parameters
are stored in private fields that remain constant during model execution, hence they
are declared as readonly to exclude them from the state vector. The DetectsVehicle
provided port is overridden in accordance with the detection capabilities.
class LightBarrier : VehicleDetector
{
private readonly int _position;
public LightBarrier(int position)
{
_position = position;
}
public override bool DetectsVehicle(Vehicle v)
=> v.Kind == VehicleKind.Overhigh && v.IsAtPosition(_position);
}
class OverheadDetector : VehicleDetector
{
private readonly int _position;
private readonly Lane _lane;
public OverheadDetector(int position, Lane lane)
{
_position = position;
_lane = lane;
}
public override bool DetectsVehicle(Vehicle v)
=> v.Kind != VehicleKind.Car && v.Lane == _lane && v.IsAtPosition(_position);
}
The traffic light is the only actuator of the case study. It is modeled as follows, storing
whether the light has already been switched to red, also allowing the value to be retrieved
via IsRed’s getter, i.e., the provided port implicitly declared by the property. The ToRed
provided port, on the other hand, allows the light to be switch to red, effectively closing
the tunnel and preventing all potentially imminent collisions.
class TrafficLight : Component
{
public bool IsRed { get; private set; }
public void ToRed() => IsRed = true;
}
7.1.3 Modular Controller Modeling
The S# model of the abstract PreControl block is declared in the following. The
component does not declare any behavior, leaving it to the derived types such as
PreControlOriginal, also shown below, to specify it: The vehicle detector is checked to
determine whether an overheight vehicle passes by, invoking the ActivateMainControl
required port if necessary.
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abstract class PreControl : Component
{
[Subcomponent] public readonly VehicleDetector PositionDetector = /* ... */;
public extern void ActivateMainControl(int vehicleCount);
}
class PreControlOriginal : PreControl
{
public override void Update()
{
Update(PositionDetector);
if (PositionDetector.IsVehicleDetected)
ActivateMainControl(vehicleCount: 1);
}
}
The MainControl component declared below is the most complex subcontroller of the
case study. It uses three VehicleDetectors to observe the vehicles in its area and a
timer to deactivate itself after a certain amount of time has passed in order to reduce
the likeliness of false alarms: As long as the main control is inactive, detector readings
are ignored and thus false detections cannot result in tunnel closures. The two required
ports either activate the end control or close the tunnel, whereas the VehiclesEntering
provided port is abstract, forcing all derived types to override its behavior.
abstract class MainControl : Component
{
[Subcomponent] public readonly VehicleDetector LeftDetector = /* ... */;
[Subcomponent] public readonly VehicleDetector PositionDetector = /* ... */;
[Subcomponent] public readonly VehicleDetector RightDetector = /* ... */;
[Subcomponent] public readonly Timer Timer = /* ... */;
public extern void ActivateEndControl();
public extern void CloseTunnel();
public abstract void VehiclesEntering(int vehicleCount);
}
The S# model of original the main control design is shown next. It counts the number
of vehicles that are assumed to be in the area observed by the MainControlOriginal
component. The counter’s upper bound is restricted in the component’s constructor to
facilitate model checking: Without an upper bound, the counter can increase indefinitely,
for instance due to continuous false detections of the pre control’s light barrier which
in turn causes the main control’s VehiclesEntering port to be invoked repeatedly. The
VehiclesEntering provided port is overridden to increase the counter by the number
of entering vehicles. Additionally, the timer is reset every time a vehicle enters the area
in order to give the newly entered vehicles enough time to pass through.
When the main control is active, i.e., its counter is not zero, and the light barrier detects
a vehicle, the other two sensors are checked to determine the appropriate action. In
the original design, the main control errs on the side of caution: If the light barrier
detects a vehicle but neither the left nor the right overhead detectors do, it is assumed
that the vehicle drives on the left lane and thus the tunnel is closed; otherwise, the end
control is activated. Vehicle detections additionally decrement the counter, at least in
situations where the tunnel is not closed; in all other situations, the value of the counter
166
7.1 Modeling the Original Design
is irrelevant as the model does not contain the reset procedure required to open the
tunnel again. If all vehicles have left the area or the timer has elapsed, the main control
is deactivated by stopping the timer or zeroing the counter regardless of the number
of overheight vehicles still assumed to be present in the area. Deactivating the main
control decreases the chances of false alarms while potentially making collisions more
likely depending on the values chosen for the timeout. Particularly in situations where
faults caused the main control to be activated in the first place and there is thus no
overheight vehicle that must be observed, deactivating the main control is important to
decrease the amount of false alarms.
class MainControlOriginal : MainControl
{
private int _count;
public MainControlOriginal(int vehicleCount)
{
Range.Restrict(_count, 0, vehicleCount, OverflowBehavior.Clamp);
}
public override void VehiclesEntering(int vehicleCount)
{
_count += vehicleCount;
Timer.Start();
}
public override void Update()
{
Update(LeftDetector, RightDetector, PositionDetector, Timer);
if (_count > 0 && PositionDetector.IsVehicleDetected)
{
if (LeftDetector.IsVehicleDetected || !RightDetector.IsVehicleDetected)
CloseTunnel();
else
{
_count--;
ActivateEndControl();
}
}
if (Timer.HasElapsed)
_count = 0;
else if (_count <= 0)
Timer.Stop();
}
}
The EndControl component shown in the following declares an overhead detector to
detect high or overheight vehicles trying to enter the tunnel on the left lane. Its timer
is used to deactivate the end control after some time to reduce the chance of false
detections or high vehicles triggering the detector, both of which would cause a false
alarm. The original design of the end control overrides the abstract VehicleEntering
provided port such that the timer is started whenever a vehicle is detected that enters
the area. It reports a collision to be potentially imminent by invoking the CloseTunnel
required port when it is active and its sensor detects a vehicle; as there might not really
be an overheight vehicle that is detected, a false alarm could occur.
167
7 Design Time Analysis of the Height Control Case Study
abstract class EndControl : Component
{
[Subcomponent] public readonly VehicleDetector LeftDetector = /* ... */;
[Subcomponent] public readonly Timer Timer = /* ... */;
public extern void CloseTunnel();
public abstract void VehicleEntering();
}
class EndControlOriginal : EndControl
{
public override void VehicleEntering() => Timer.Start();
public override void Update()
{
Update(Timer, LeftDetector);
if (Timer.IsActive && LeftDetector.IsVehicleDetected)
CloseTunnel();
}
}
The overall HeightControl assembles PreControl, MainControl, and EndControl in-
stances as well as a TrafficLight instance. The subcontrollers are passed via the
constructor to support multiple variants, also setting up the connections between the
ports of the three subcontrollers and the traffic light in accordance with the connections
shown in Figure 7.3. The subcontrollers are updated in their natural order.
class HeightControl : Component
{
[Subcomponent] public readonly PreControl PreControl;
[Subcomponent] public readonly MainControl MainControl;
[Subcomponent] public readonly EndControl EndControl;
[Subcomponent] public readonly TrafficLight TrafficLight = /* ... */;
public HeightControl(PreControl pre, MainControl main, EndControl end)
{
PreControl = pre;
MainControl = main;
EndControl = end;
Bind(nameof(pre.ActivateMainControl), nameof(main.VehiclesEntering));
Bind(nameof(main.ActivateEndControl), nameof(end.VehicleEntering));
Bind(nameof(end.CloseTunnel), nameof(TrafficLight.ToRed));
Bind(nameof(main.CloseTunnel), nameof(TrafficLight.ToRed));
}
public override void Update()
=> Update(PreControl, MainControl, EndControl);
}
Instances of the Timer component are used by all MainControl- and EndControl-derived
components. The timer’s remaining time is clamped to the global Timeout value declared
by the Model class introduced later on. A value of -1 indicates that the timer is inactive,
whereas a timeout occurs and the timer has elapsed when the remaining time reaches
zero. Stopping the timer consequently sets the remaining time to -1 while starting it
sets it to the global Timeout. As each macro step is assumed to represent the passing of
one second, the remaining time is simply decremented in the Update method.
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class Timer : Component
{
[Range(-1, Model.Timeout, OverflowBehavior.Clamp)]
private int _remainingTime = -1;
public bool HasElapsed => _remainingTime == 0;
public bool IsActive => _remainingTime > 0;
public void Start() => _remainingTime = Model.Timeout;
public void Stop() => _remainingTime = -1;
public override void Update() => --_remainingTime;
}
7.1.4 Detector Faults and Off-Nominal Vehicle Behavior
For the height control case study, sensor failures are of primary interest. It is thus
necessary to add the two transient faults Misdetection and FalseDetection to vehicle
detectors as shown below, thereby injecting the faults for all VehicleDetector-derived
types. The faults’ effects affect the IsVehicleDetected provided port, simply returning
false for misdetections and true for false detections. Misdetections might, for example,
be the result of very fast-driving vehicles that cannot be detected if the sensors are not
checked sufficiently often. False detections can be triggered by birds flying through a
light barrier, for instance. As both effects affect the same port, simultaneous activations
of both faults would lead to nondeterministic behavior, needlessly slowing down model
checking as the two faults cannot affect each other. Hence, MisdetectionEffect is
assigned a higher priority to eliminate the nondeterminism; giving precedence to
FalseDetectionEffect instead would not have made any observable difference.
abstract class VehicleDetector : Component
{
// other members as above
public readonly Fault Misdetection = new TransientFault();
public readonly Fault FalseDetection = new TransientFault();
[FaultEffect(Fault = nameof(Misdetection)), Priority(1)]
public abstract class MisdetectionEffect : VehicleDetector
{
public override bool IsVehicleDetected => false;
}
[FaultEffect(Fault = nameof(FalseDetection)), Priority(0)]
public abstract class FalseDetectionEffect : VehicleDetector
{
public override bool IsVehicleDetected => true;
}
}
As high or overheight vehicles are not allowed to drive on left lane in the entire height
control area, vehicles driving on the left lane nevertheless are modeled using faults.
Similarly, the durations of the timers are chosen based on some assumptions about traffic
flow such that all vehicles can usually pass the observed main and end control areas well
within the time frames set by the timeouts. When vehicles take too long to pass through
the height control area due to a traffic jam, for instance, the main or end controls might
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be deactivated prematurely, potentially missing an overheight vehicle that attempts
to enter the tunnel on the left lane. Thus, such violations of the timing assumptions
are also modeled using faults. As it is generally irrelevant which overheight vehicles
drive on the left lane, there is only one fault, LeftOHV, whose activation allows but does
not force all overheight vehicles to switch lanes. For false alarms, it is important to
differentiate between high and overheight vehicles on the left lane, hence there is also a
LeftHV fault for left-driving high vehicles. By contrast, the SlowTraffic fault can affect
all kinds of vehicles, allowing but not forcing them to drive slower than expected.
The integration of the faults’ effects into the Vehicle component is shown below; the
effects are later associated with the corresponding Fault instances in the VehicleSet’s
constructor. ChooseLane and ChooseSpeed are two virtual methods that, by default,
only allow a vehicle to drive on the right lane with its maximum speed; they replace the
previously shown uses of the Choosemethod in Vehicle.Update. The DriveLeftEffect
overrides ChooseLane, allowing a vehicle to nondeterministically choose the lane it
drives on. Similarly, SlowTrafficEffect overrides ChooseSpeed, allowing a vehicle
to nondeterministically accelerate or decelerate as it wishes. Due to the use of S#’s
nondeterministic Choose methods in both fault effects, each Vehicle instance decides
independently whether it is actually affected by activations of the LeftOHV, LeftHV,
or SlowTraffic faults. If no overheight vehicle decides to switch to the left lane, for
instance, the LeftOHV fault is not activatable as it has no effect on the model, causing
the S# run time to remove the corresponding transition as discussed in Chapter 6.
class Vehicle : Component
{
// other members as shown before
protected virtual Lane ChooseLane() => Lane.Right;
protected virtual int ChooseSpeed() => Model.MaxSpeed;
public override void Update()
{
if (IsTunnelClosed)
return;
_speed = ChooseSpeed();
Position += _speed;
if (Position < Model.EndControlPosition)
Lane = ChooseLane();
}
[FaultEffect]
public class DriveLeftEffect : Vehicle
{
protected override Lane ChooseLane() => Choose(Lane.Right, Lane.Left);
}
[FaultEffect]
public class SlowTrafficEffect : Vehicle
{
protected override int ChooseSpeed()
=> ChooseFromRange(Model.MinSpeed, Model.MaxSpeed);
}
}
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As the three faults LeftOHV, LeftHV, and SlowTraffic affect multiple Vehicle instances,
they are declared in the VehicleSet component, using the AddEffects method to
dynamically associate the faults with their effects on the affected Vehicle instances.
class VehicleSet : Component
{
// other members as shown before
public readonly Fault LeftHV = new TransientFault();
public readonly Fault LeftOHV = new TransientFault();
public readonly Fault SlowTraffic = new TransientFault();
public VehicleSet(params Vehicle[] vehicles)
{
// as above
LeftOHV.AddEffects<Vehicle.DriveLeftEffect>(vehicles.Where(vehicle =>
vehicle.Kind == VehicleKind.Overhigh));
LeftHV.AddEffects<Vehicle.DriveLeftEffect>(vehicles.Where(vehicle =>
vehicle.Kind == VehicleKind.High));
SlowTraffic.AddEffects<Vehicle.SlowTrafficEffect>(vehicles);
}
}
7.2 Modeling the Design Variants
The design alternatives considered in the following are inspired by the suggestions made
by Ortmeier et al. [158]. In total, there is one additional pre control and end control
variant each as well as three design alternatives for the main control. Consequently,
there are two PreControl-derived component types, four MainControl variants, and
two EndControl types, in total resulting in sixteen possible combinations. Of these
sixteen combinations, four are not analyzed in detail as their main controls ignore the
improved detection capabilities of their pre controls, which makes these combinations
unrealistic. The following briefly introduces the different variants listed in Figure 7.5,
only showing exemplary S# models for two of them; the remaining variants integrate
in a similar way into the overall model and are available online [101].
PreControlOverheadDetectors. The pre control can be improved by installing one over-
head detector for each lane in addition to the light barrier. These improved detection
capabilities are designed to avoid collisions in situations where two overheight vehicles
drive through the pre control at the same time. With the original design, the main con-
trol’s counter would only be increased by one and the main control might subsequently
be deactivated too soon. The following S#model of the PreControlOverheadDetectors
component declares two additional subcomponents, namely the left and right over-
head detectors. As the variant is able to distinguish between one and possibly two
overheight vehicles passing by, it invokes the ActivateMainControl required port with
more precise information on the number of entering vehicles. However, due to the
technical limitations of the overhead detectors that cannot distinguish between high
and overheight vehicles, the improved pre control also reports two vehicles entering
the main control area in situations where only one overheight vehicle passes through
and a high vehicle is on the other lane.
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«block,abstract»
MainControl
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EndControl
«block»
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MainControlOriginal
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_count : int
«block»
EndControlOriginal
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«block»
PreControlOverheadDetectors
«block»
EndControlLightBarrier
«block»
MainControlTolerant
values
_count : int
«block»
MainControlNoCounter
«block»
MainControlNoCounterTolerant
1
2
Figure 7.5. A partial block definition diagram showing all modeled variants of the PreControl,
MainControl, and EndControl blocks. Some of the variants introduce new associations, while others
add new values or simply declare new behavior without any structural changes. Only new
associations are shown; the associations of the abstract blocks from Figure 7.1 are omitted.
class PreControlOverheadDetectors : PreControl
{
[Subcomponent] public readonly VehicleDetector LeftDetector;
[Subcomponent] public readonly VehicleDetector RightDetector;
public override void Update()
{
Update(LeftDetector, RightDetector, PositionDetector);
if (PositionDetector.IsVehicleDetected && LeftDetector.IsVehicleDetected &&
RightDetector.IsVehicleDetected)
ActivateMainControl(vehicleCount: 2);
else if (PositionDetector.IsVehicleDetected)
ActivateMainControl(vehicleCount: 1);
}
}
MainControlNoCounter. Another possibility to avoid premature deactivations of the
main control when two overheight vehicles enter its area simultaneously is to remove
the counter, thus keeping the main control active until its timer elapses. Removing the
counter acknowledges the fact that the main control is unable to accurately determine
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the number of overheight vehicles it has to observe; the counted value can be wrong both
due to fault activations as well as due to the overhead detectors’ inability to distinguish
between high and overheight vehicles.
MainControlNoCounterTolerant. The previous variant of the main control increases
the probability of false alarms, as the longer the main control remains active, the more
likely it is that faults or a high vehicle on the left lane trigger an alarm. This situation
can be remedied by no longer erring on the side of caution: When the main control’s
light barrier detects a vehicle but neither of its overhead detector do, the overheight
vehicle is assumed to be on the right lane. In such a situation, no alarm is raised but the
end control is still activated as usual to ensure that the presumably detected vehicle does
not enter the tunnel on the left lane. The MainControlNoCounterTolerant component
shown below does not declare any new subcomponents, it merely overrides the Update
method and the VehiclesEntering provided port. In case the latter is invoked, only the
timer is restarted as there is no counter to update. As long as the timer is inactive or the
light barrier does not detect an overheight vehicle, the Update method takes no further
actions. Otherwise, however, it checks both overhead detectors: If neither detector
reports a vehicle, the vehicle detected by the light barrier is assumed to be on the right
lane and thus the end control is activated; by contrast, the original design would have
the vehicle assumed to be on the left lane instead, resulting in a tunnel closure.
class MainControlNoCounterTolerant : MainControl
{
public override void VehiclesEntering(int vehicleCount) => Timer.Start();
public override void Update()
{
Update(LeftDetector, RightDetector, PositionDetector, Timer);
if (!Timer.IsActive || !PositionDetector.IsVehicleDetected)
return;
if (LeftDetector.IsVehicleDetected && !RightDetector.IsVehicleDetected)
CloseTunnel();
else
ActivateEndControl();
}
}
MainControlTolerant. The last one of the considered design variants of the main
control also tolerates high vehicles at the left overhead detector just like the previous
design alternative, but in contrast to the previous variant, it still counts the overheight
vehicles that it assumes to currently pass through its observed area.
EndControlLightBarrier. The end control is responsible for a large percentage of false
alarms as it is completely unable to distinguish between high and overheight vehicles.
It can thus be improved by adding a light barrier into the newly built fourth tube of the
tunnel that consequently only spans the right lane to monitor overheight vehicles. Due
to road layout restrictions, it is impossible to retrofit light barriers spanning only the
left or both lanes which would have rendered the entire height control obsolete in the
first place. Similar to the original main control variant, the improved end control counts
the number of overheight vehicles it assumes to be in its observed area.
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7.3 Automated Composition of the Design Variants
To instantiate a variant of the height control model, the appropriate component instances
must be created, their initial states and subcomponents must be set, and their ports
must be connected. Reflection is used to automatically instantiate all design variants
of the model. The variants of a subcontroller of type T are looked up by the following
GetVariants<T> method, returning all non-abstract subtypes of T. The method uses
C#’s language integrated query syntax (LINQ) and .NET’s reflection capabilities to check
all types contained in the assembly that T is defined in, i.e., it searches all types contained
in the compiled library that the C# compiler creates for model.
IEnumerable<Type> GetVariants<T>() where T : class
=> from type in typeof(T).Assembly.GetTypes()
where type.IsSubclassOf(typeof(T)) && !type.IsAbstract
select type;
Additionally, there is a helper method that is used to determine whether a selection of
subtypes of PreControl and MainControl are compatible, that is, whether they form a
realistic combination where the main control does not simply ignore the pre control’s
improved detection capabilities. Alternatively, valid model configurations could also be
read from a database or be specified in a separate file, for instance. For more complex case
studies and model instantiation procedures, dependency injection [171] with additional
metadata about the capabilities of the individual variants could also be used in order to
increase the flexibility in the specification of compatible variants.
bool IsRealisiticCombination(Type preControl, Type mainControl)
{
var mainControlHasCounter = mainControl != typeof(MainControlNoCounter) &&
mainControl != typeof(MainControlNoCounterTolerant);
return preControl != typeof(PreControlOverheadDetectors) ||
mainControlHasCounter;
}
Assuming a method CreateVariant that instantiates a given variant of a model as dis-
cussed later on, the following CreateVariants helper method can be used to instantiate
all realistic combinations of design variants. Again using LINQ, the Cartesian product
of all sixteen variant combinations is created, unrealistic combinations are removed
using the IsRealisiticCombination method, and for each remaining combination, the
model variant is instantiated using CreateVariant:
IEnumerable<Model> CreateVariants()
=> from preControl in GetVariants<PreControl>()
from mainControl in GetVariants<MainControl>()
from endControl in GetVariants<EndControl>()
where IsRealisiticCombination(preControl, mainControl)
select CreateVariant(preControl, mainControl, endControl);
To instantiate a variant, instances of the variant’s subcontroller types must be created,
again using .NET’s reflection capabilities: Given a .NET reference type t, the library
method Activator.CreateInstance(t) allocates a new object of type t, subsequently
executing its default constructor. Using this .NET method, the CreateVariant method
instantiates the three subcontroller types before it passes them to the constructor of the
Model class, which in turn sets up the remaining parts of the model and connects the
subcontrollers together as shown later:
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Model CreateVariant(Type preControlType, Type mainControlType, Type endControlType)
{
var preControl = (PreControl)Activator.CreateInstance(preControlType);
var mainControl = (MainControl)Activator.CreateInstance(mainControlType);
var endControl = (EndControl)Activator.CreateInstance(endControlType);
return new Model(preControl, mainControl, endControl);
}
All of these helper methods are contained in the following Model class that represents
the different variants of the case study. Like all S# models derived from ModelBase, the
Model class declares the root components of the model’s plants and controllers. The con-
structor assembles the overall model together using the subcontroller instances passed
in as parameters: It first initializes a VehicleSet instance with two overheight Vehicle
instances as well as one high Vehicle; alternatively, the number of Vehicle instances
to create could also be specified as a constructor argument. Before a HeightControl
instance is created, the sensors used by the three subcontrollers are connected to the
VehicleSet by calling the ConnectDetectors helper method for each subcontroller. The
helper method loops through all subcomponents of the given subcontroller that are of a
VehicleDetector-derived type, connecting each detector’s ObserveVehicles required
port to the VehicleSet’s ObserveVehicles provided port. Lastly, the connection be-
tween the VehicleSet’s IsTunnelClosed required port and the TrafficLight’s IsRed
provided port is established in the Model constructor. Once the constructor returns, all
port bindings are set up and model initialization is complete.
class Model : ModelBase
{
// Global constants omitted
// Previously shown variant creation code omitted
[Root(RootKind.Controller)]
public HeightControl HeightControl { get; }
[Root(RootKind.Plant)]
public VehicleSet Vehicles { get; }
public Model(PreControl pre, MainControl main, EndControl end)
{
Vehicles = new VehicleSet(new Vehicle(VehicleKind.Overhigh), new
Vehicle(VehicleKind.Overhigh), new Vehicle(VehicleKind.High));
ConnectDetectors(preControl);
ConnectDetectors(mainControl);
ConnectDetectors(endControl);
HeightControl = new HeightControl(pre, main, end);
Bind(nameof(Vehicles.IsTunnelClosed),
nameof(HeightControl.TrafficLight.IsRed));
}
private void ConnectDetectors(Component controller)
{
foreach (var d in controller.GetSubcomponents().OfType<VehicleDetector>())
Bind(nameof(d.ObserveVehicles), nameof(Vehicles.ObserveVehicles));
}
}
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7.4 Safety Analysis of the Design Variants
For all design variants of the case study, the S# framework is able to automatically
analyze the hazards of collisions and false alarms by conducting DCCAs. The evaluation
results are always reproducible as the analyses are completely deterministic, hence an
analysis of standard deviation and other stochastic properties is unnecessary. As S#
does not support simultaneous analyses of multiple model variants, DCCAs must be
conducted independently for all design alternatives. Nevertheless, the following results
demonstrate the applicability of the S# framework and the underlying formal safety
analysis techniques for the analysis of safety-critical systems at design time, that is, in
parallel to system development. Chapter 8 subsequently discusses safety analyses at run
time, also introducing additional optimizations to increase safety analysis efficiency.
7.4.1 Collisions
Collisions obviously cannot happen as long as no overheight vehicles drive on the left
lane, that is, as long as LeftOHV is never activated. Consequently, the LeftOHV fault is
contained in all minimal critical fault sets computed for the collision hazard. To speed
up DCCAs, S# allows the activation of such faults to be enforced during analysis so that
all fault sets not containing LeftOHV are not analyzed at all, reducing the number of
fault sets that have to be checked for criticality by at least a factor of two. The effect
on the number of checks that actually have to be carried out is even larger for the case
study due to the monotonicity of the criticality property: With LeftOHV enforced, only
325 instead of 4421 fault sets must be checked for the original design, reducing analysis
times from 1325 seconds to merely 14.7 seconds, a speedup by a factor of 90x. In the
following, all design variants are analyzed with this optimization to reduce overall
analysis times; for false alarms, by contrast, no such optimization opportunity exists.
Table 7.1 presents an overview of the evaluation results for the hazard of collisions for all
twelve analyzed case study variants. In S#, the hazard is specified with the expression
m.Vehicles.Any(v => v.IsAtPosition(Model.TunnelPosition) && v.Lane == Lane.Left &&
v.Kind == VehicleKind.Overhigh)
for a Model instance m by making use of .NET’s Any method over arrays. Consequently,
the hazard occurs when there is an overheight Vehicle contained in m that has collided
with the tunnel on the left lane. Simply judging from the amounts of minimal critical
fault sets or their average cardinalities, some of the designs seem better than others
when only considering the hazard of collisions, though the safety of a design is best
assessed by computing hazard probabilities. Established techniques could be used that
compute these probabilities from minimal critical fault sets [80], though these lie outside
the focus of this thesis. For the original case study design, the following four minimal
critical fault sets are found:
• LeftOHV, SlowTraffic. The most severe minimal critical fault set actually identifies
a design flaw of the original system design, that is, the empty fault set would have
been minimal critical had the LeftOHV and SlowTraffic faults not been added to
the model explicitly. Two overheight vehicles might enter the main control area
simultaneously on both lanes, but as the pre control cannot differentiate between one
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Hazard: Collision
# Checked # Minimal
Pre Main End # Faults Fault Sets Critical Sets Time
Org NoCnt LB 15 86 1543 7 (∅ 2.7) 61.3s 15.5m
Org NoCnt Org 13 61 644 4 (∅ 2.5) 25.1s 4.7m
Org NoCntTol LB 15 52 517 5 (∅ 2.0) 3.0s 45.3s
Org NoCntTol Org 13 50 515 3 (∅ 2.0) 11.6s 4.2m
Org Org LB 15 74 903 7 (∅ 2.6) 6.0s 96.6s
Org Org Org 13 53 325 4 (∅ 2.0) 3.4s 14.7s
Org Tol LB 15 44 262 6 (∅ 2.0) 3.5s 56.9s
Org Tol Org 13 42 260 4 (∅ 2.0) 1.7s 20.9s
Det Org LB 19 167 14860 12 (∅ 2.8) 55.7s 49.0m
Det Org Org 17 128 5640 8 (∅ 2.8) 23.2s 13.7m
Det Tol LB 19 86 4102 6 (∅ 2.0) 9.9s 24.8m
Det Tol Org 17 84 4100 4 (∅ 2.0) 3.3s 8.4m
total: 3.5m 2.1h
Table 7.1. DCCAs for the hazard of collisions were conducted for all twelve case study designs
on a 3.4 GHz quad-core CPU with the LeftOHV fault enforced. The design variants have different
numbers and sizes of minimal critical sets; the average cardinality is also shown for each design
variant. The table shows the analysis time differences between DCCAs with and without the
maximum safe fault sets heuristic introduced in Section 6.4; the first numbers in the “# Checked
Fault Sets” and “Time” columns correspond to DCCAs with the heuristic, the second numbers to
DCCAs without it. Total analysis time is reduced from approximately 2 hours to roughly 3.5
minutes with the heuristic as it significantly reduces the number of fault sets that have to be
checked for criticality.
or two vehicles passing its light barrier, the main control’s counter is only increased
by one. If the vehicle on the right exits the main control area before the slower-driving
vehicle on the left lane, the main control is deactivated and the other vehicle can
pass through undetected. Subsequently, the overheight vehicle on the left is able to
pass the end control’s overhead detector undetected when it takes long enough for
the end control’s timer to deactivate the last overhead detector. Consequently, no
actual component faults have to be activated in order for the hazard to occur, only
the observed vehicles have to behave “sufficiently inappropriate”.
• LeftOHV, MisdetectionLB-Pre. A misdetection of the pre control’s light barrier re-
sults in the main control and subsequently the end control never getting activated.
Thus, an overlooked overheight vehicle is free to drive on the left lane, entering and
colliding with the tunnel as none of the remaining sensors that is passes are active.
• LeftOHV, MisdetectionLB-Main. Similarly, a misdetection of the main control’s light
barrier results in the end control never getting activated, even when an overheight
vehicle passes the light barrier on the left lane: No tunnel closure is initiated if the left
overhead detector detects the vehicle but the light barrier does not, in which case the
vehicle is assumed to be a regularly high one. Consequently, the overheight vehicle
can continue on the left lane, pass the inactive end control, and cause a collision.
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• LeftOHV, MisdetectionOD-End-Left. Another possibility of an overheight vehicle
colliding with the tunnel requires a misdetection of the end control’s overhead detector.
If an overheight vehicle drives on the right lane throughout the entire main control
area, the end control is activated when the overheight vehicle leaves the main control.
If it subsequently switches to the left lane, the misdetection fault prevents its detection
by the end control’s overhead detector. Consequently, no alarm is raised and the
overheight vehicle is allowed to proceed towards the tunnel.
The design flaw exposed by the DCCA for the original case study design is fixed by
some design variants with improved pre control detection capabilities, for example.
These variants can indeed detect two overheight vehicles entering the main control area
simultaneously, thus { LeftOHV, SlowTraffic } is no longer a minimal critical fault set.
Additionally, the main control variants without counters are also specifically designed
to counteract this fault set; the minimal critical fault sets show that they indeed succeed
in doing so, except when these variants are combined with the improved end control
which reintroduces the problem as it also counts overheight vehicles.
7.4.2 False Alarms
For the hazard of collisions, it would be best to never deactivate any parts of the height
control at all. The deactivations were introduced into the design in order to decrease
the likelihood of false alarms, accepting a corresponding increase in the likeliness of
collisions. It is therefore necessary to find an acceptable tradeoff between these two
antagonistic hazards, for example using cost functions [80] or genetic algorithms that
search for Pareto optimal tradeoffs using a probabilistic model checker as their fitness
function [68, 187]. However, such approaches for balancing antagonistic safety goals
are outside the scope of this thesis.
Table 7.2 presents an overview of the evaluation results for the hazard of false alarms
for all twelve analyzed case study variants. The different designs have very similar
numbers and sizes of minimal critical fault sets; in fact, there are only two different
sets of minimal critical fault sets for all design variants. For false alarms, the only
design changes that actually have an effect are more tolerant main controls that do not
immediately close the tunnel as soon as an overheight vehicle is presumably detected
on the left lane. All other variants do not influence the minimal critical fault sets at all,
even though they might indeed affect the overall hazard probability by reducing the
number of situations in which false alarms can occur. For example, the improved end
control variant reduces the amount of time the end control is enabled, allowing less
situations in which high vehicles or false detections of the end control’s left overhead
detector cause a false alarm; such probabilistic considerations, however, are outside the
scope of this thesis. In S#, the hazard is specified with the expression
m.HeightControl.TrafficLight.IsRed &&
!m.Vehicles.Any(v => v.Lane == Lane.Left && v.Kind == VehicleKind.Overhigh)
for a Model instance m, that is, the tunnel is closed but there is no overheight vehicle on
the left lane anywhere within the entire height control area. For the original case study
design, the following five minimal critical fault sets are found:
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Hazard: False Alarm
# Checked # Minimal
Pre Main End # Faults Fault Sets Critical Sets Time
Org NoCnt LB 15 62 1029 5 (∅ 1.0) 4.3s 2.7m
Org NoCnt Org 13 43 261 5 (∅ 1.0) 2.3s 24.5s
Org NoCntTol LB 15 98 5124 4 (∅ 1.5) 58.7s 59.0m
Org NoCntTol Org 13 73 1284 4 (∅ 1.5) 10.5s 3.3m
Org Org LB 15 62 1029 5 (∅ 1.0) 5.9s 3.9m
Org Org Org 13 42 261 5 (∅ 1.0) 2.9s 34.8s
Org Tol LB 15 98 5124 4 (∅ 1.5) 293s 3.4h
Org Tol Org 13 73 1284 4 (∅ 1.5) 35.3s 10.1m
Det Org LB 19 112 16389 5 (∅ 1.0) 11.8s 1.6h
Det Org Org 17 85 4101 5 (∅ 1.0) 5.4s 14.2m
Det Tol LB 19 160 81924 4 (∅ 1.5) 529s 3.6d
Det Tol Org 17 127 20484 4 (∅ 1.5) 75.1s 4.3h
total: 17.2m 4d
Table 7.2. DCCAs for the hazard of false alarms were conducted for all twelve case study
designs on a 3.4 GHz quad-core CPU. The table shows the analysis time differences between
DCCAs with and without the maximum safe fault sets heuristic introduced in Section 6.4; the
first numbers in the “# Checked Fault Sets” and “Time” columns correspond to DCCAs with the
heuristic, the second numbers to DCCAs without it. The total analysis time is reduced from
approximately 4 days to roughly 17 minutes thanks to the heuristic that significantly reduces the
number of fault sets that have to be checked for criticality. The heuristic is even more effective
than for the hazard of collisions because the hazard’s minimal critical fault sets are smaller.
• LeftHV. A high vehicle on the left lane can cause a false alarm whenever the main
control is active and an overheight vehicle passes the main control’s detectors simul-
taneously on the right lane. Additionally, false alarms happen when the end control is
active and a high vehicle tries to enter the tunnel on the left, in which case the tunnel
is also closed unnecessarily. If left-driving vehicles had not been explicitly modeled
with faults, the empty set of faults would be minimal critical again, showing that the
overhead detectors’ inability to distinguish between high and overheight vehicles
is not systematically addressed by the original design. In other words, the original
design is functionally incorrect with regard to both hazards.
• MisdetectionOD-Main-Right. As the original main control errs on the side of caution,
a misdetection of its right overhead detector causes the tunnel to be closed when an
overheight vehicle on the right lane triggers the main control’s light barrier. In such
a situation, the main control assumes one of its overhead detectors to have missed an
overheight vehicle and closes the tunnel just in case.
• FalseDetectionLB-Main. For the same reason, a false detection of the main control’s
light barrier without a corresponding vehicle detection by any of its overhead detectors
also causes the main control to close the tunnel as a precaution. After all, the main
control again has to assume an overheight vehicle might be driving on the left lane
that could have been missed because of a misdetection of its left overhead detector.
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• FalseDetectionOD-Main-Left. If an overheight vehicle passes the main control’s
light barrier on the right lane, but a false detection of the left overhead detector causes
it to spuriously report an overheight vehicle on the left lane, a false alarm results.
• FalseDetectionOD-End-Left. A false detection of the end control’s overhead detector
while the end control is active can immediately result in false alarms.
None of the analyzed design variants are able to prevent left-driving high vehicles from
triggering false alarms. Even when the improved end control is used that is specifically
designed to decrease the likelihood of false alarms, { LeftHV } is still a minimal critical
fault set: It is always possible for a high vehicle to pass the end control’s overhead
detector on the left lane before an overheight vehicle passes its light barrier on the right
that would have deactivated the end control. However, as the end control is activated
for shorter amounts of time, overall false alarm probability decreases [158].
Summary and Outlook. The S# model of the height control case study makes use of many
advanced S# modeling features introduced in Chapter 4 for reasons of conciseness and to follow
the systematic modeling approach for safety-critical systems outlined in Chapter 3. Additionally,
the model takes advantage of S#’s flexible model composition capabilities and .NET’s support for
reflection to compose different orthogonal design variants together. The formal safety analyses with
DCCA are based on S#’s integration of the formal analysis techniques presented in Chapters 5 and 6.
The evaluation of the twelve design variants for the hazards of collisions and false alarms shows the
applicability of the S# framework and the underlying formal analysis techniques, also highlighting the
effectiveness of the maximal safe fault sets heuristic introduced in Chapter 6. Compared to previous
analyses by Ortmeier et al. [158], the S# model benefits from the modeling language’s higher level
of expressiveness, in particular for modeling and analyzing the design variants. For the original
case study design, the S# framework is able to compute all minimal critical fault sets within three
seconds; the previous analyses using an SMV-based model checker took a couple of minutes to
find the same minimal critical fault sets, albeit on significantly slower hardware [159]. At the time
of writing, however, S# is not yet able to balance the two orthogonal safety goals, that is, collision
prevention and prevention of false alarms, requiring manual computations of hazard probabilities
using established techniques [80, 156]. Support for probabilistic model checking is being worked
on to support automated and more precise computations of hazard probabilities and to balance
antagonistic safety goals [68].
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Summary. Self-organizing systems present a challenge for model-based analysis
techniques: At design time, their actual configurations are unknown, making it
necessary to postpone the analyses to run time. At run time, however, model
checking-based safety analysis techniques are often too time-consuming because
of the large state spaces and the high number of faults that have to be analyzed. To
make such run time analyses feasible, the self-organizing and non-self-organizing
parts of the systems must be modeled and analyzed separately. Some additional
heuristics and optimizations help to further decrease the number of different fault
sets that DCCA has to check for criticality. Similar techniques are used to test
self-organization mechanisms and adaptive robot systems.
Publications. The run time analysis approach is outlined in [81] for self-organizing
systems and in [51] for adaptive robot systems. The efficiency optimizations are
published in [120] and the testing approach is presented in [52]. 8
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Safety-critical self-organizing systems dynamically adapt their behavior and structure
to changes in their environment, new or failing components, or new goals that the
system should fulfill. The resulting system configurations typically cannot be predicted
at design time, making it impossible to conduct complete safety analyses during system
development. Additionally, high fault tolerance is one of the major advantages of many
self-organizing production systems such as the robot cell and personalized medicine case
studies introduced in Chapter 2 and considered in the following. Such self-organizing
systems therefore have many rather large minimal critical fault sets, increasing the effort
required to find them all using DCCA. Yet, establishing the exact limits of the system’s
fault tolerance, i.e., the boundaries within which the self-organization mechanism is
capable of working around fault activations, is the primary concern for determining a
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self-organizing system’s safety. Consequently, safety analyses of self-organizing systems
are carried out precisely to identify the circumstances in which the system is incapable
of continuing to provide its functionality because of too many component faults that
use up all of the system’s available redundancy.
Self-organizing systems therefore poses a challenge for model-based safety analysis
techniques: On the one hand, the typically unbounded number of possible system con-
figurations makes it impossible to conduct safety analyses solely during development
where enough time is likely available to find the large minimal critical fault sets. At run
time, on the other hand, the exact system configurations are known, but there are signif-
icantly more stringent efficiency requirements for the analysis techniques to be useful.
While the most likely system configurations can be analyzed at design time to rule out
systematic design errors, there is no real alternative to postponing model-based analyses
to run time when the actual system configurations are known. Section 8.1 introduces
a systematic model-based safety analysis approach for self-organizing systems that is
conducted at run time making use of S#’s flexible model composition capabilities. While
model checking at run time, or, more generally, verification at run time are common in
the area of self-organizing systems [201, 202], this chapter focuses on run time safety
analyses that only play a subordinate role in prior work [48].
This chapter has two main contributions: The first one is the systematic classification
of faults as either tolerable or intolerable [9], depending on whether the system’s
self-organization mechanism is able to compensate their activations. Based on this
classification, DCCAs can be modularized by examining these two classes of faults
separately. The second main contribution are two approaches for run time DCCAs
discussed and evaluated in Section 8.2 that reduce analysis times: Safe fault sets heuristics
for self-organizing resource-flow systems as well as a faster but less precise analysis
mode using forced fault activations. Due to S#’s model execution approach, it is also
possible to incorporate actual reconfiguration mechanisms of self-organizing systems
into the S# models, allowing their functional correctness to be tested using DCCA as
outlined in Section 8.3. Moreover, an approach for analysis and testing of adaptive robot
systems is briefly outlined in Section 8.4.
8.1 Modeling and Analysis Approach for Self-Organizing Systems
Nafz et al. [146] and Seebach et al. [180] developed the restore invariant approach
(RIA) to specify, model, and develop self-organizing systems. Even though the actual
system behavior cannot be fully predetermined, there is a corridor of correct behavior
within which the system is free to execute its tasks. RIA enables the specification of
functional requirements of self-organizing systems, making it possible to cope with
self-organization mechanisms and to analyze their functional correctness. By specifying
a predicate over the system’s states, it is possible to efficiently determine whether the
current system state is valid or invalid by checking for violations of the predicate. The
predicate induces a corridor of correct behavior illustrated in Figure 8.1 that the system
remains in as long as the RIA predicate holds and leaves as soon as the RIA predicate is
violated. Once a temporary predicate violation occurs, for instance due to hardware
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Figure 8.1. Conceptual overview of the corridor of correct behavior [146]. The corridor is
formally denoted by the RIA predicate ϑ that must be satisfied during normal operation. While
the system states s1 to s5 lie within the corridor, some event like a hardware failure causes a
predicate violation and consequently a breach of the corridor by reaching invalid state svio1.
The RIA approach guarantees that the system cannot reach another invalid state svio2 from svio1;
doing so would indicate an implementation bug. Instead, the system reconfigures itself in one of
potentially many ways such that the system gets back into the corridor as indicated by states s6a
and s6b. There are also states such as svio3 that permanently violate the corridor; in such a case,
the system’s self-organization capabilities are exhausted and execution is halted.
failures, the self-organizing system reconfigures itself such that its behavior falls back
into the corridor. As long as the system correctly detects invalid system states through
a violated predicate and its reconfiguration mechanism finds at least one new, valid
configuration, the system is able to return into the corridor and all of its expected
functional properties continue to hold.
Since even a self-organizing system has only finite redundancy, multiple fault activations
can lead to situations where the system is unable to find a new configuration. The
system thus stays outside of the corridor and is no longer functioning, i.e., the self-
organization mechanism’s limit is reached. However, the circumstances and situations
in which a self-organizing system is no longer able to find any valid configurations
cannot be easily deduced from the RIA predicate. By contrast, model checking-based
safety analysis techniques like DCCA are in fact able to do so if the hazard is specified
as the non-existence of further valid configurations. The minimal critical fault sets
determined by DCCA for this hazard therefore characterize the boundaries of the RIA
corridor, allowing the evaluation of the system’s overall resilience to component failures.
It is thus possible to judge the effectiveness of the self-organization mechanism and the
actual level of redundancy contained in the system.
A general architecture for systems implementing the restore invariant approach is
illustrated by Figure 8.2. The system consists of a functional part that is for the most
part unaware of all self-organization concerns while it executes the system’s nominal
behavior. Additionally, there is an observer/controller that observes the functional part
for corridor violations. Once a RIA predicate violation is detected, a reconfiguration
mechanism is triggered that tries to bring the system back into the corridor [175]; a
result checker is used to verify that the new configuration is indeed valid. The algorithm
used by this reconfiguration mechanism is intentionally underspecified; it could, e.g.,
use constraint solving or genetic algorithms [165, 178]. Due to its random nature, the
latter might fail to find any valid configurations even though there actually are some.
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The robot cell and the personalized medicine case studies introduced in Chapter 2
are two self-organizing resource-flow systems that make use of the restore invariant
approach. They are based on the same metamodel for self-organizing resource-flow
systems introduced by Nafz et al. [146] and Seebach et al. [180] that is outlined in
Figure 8.3. Table 8.1 explains how the case studies map to the metamodel. There is a set
of system class-specific constraints that make up the RIA predicate for self-organizing
resource-flow systems [180]: For instance, the Roles allocated to an Agent may only
include those Capabilities that it has available and the ports specified in the Role’s pre-
and postcondition require the corresponding input/output connections between the Agents.
Among others, these two constraints define the corridor of correct behavior for all
systems based on the metamodel. However, as the Process Capabilities of the personalized
medicine case study have amounts which they can run out of despite the Capability being
otherwise fully functional, some additional constraints are required for the case study in
order to compensate for this minor deviation from the overall metamodel. In particular,
for all recipes within the system, a Role assigned to a station is only valid when the
station does not have to dispense more of any ingredient type than it has available.
8.1.1 Safety Analysis at Run Time
The S# framework can be used for safety analyses during the development of self-
organizing systems as long as only a few system configurations are considered. Such
design time safety analyses for a selection of likely system configurations help to identify
and fix design mistakes that would result in unacceptable safety risks during system
operation. More complete analyses, however, are only possible at run time when the
actual system configurations are known: Instead of all possible configurations, only
the current one is analyzed, requiring additional analyses whenever the configuration
changes. New configurations typically result from the reconfiguration mechanism being
triggered, for instance by fault activations and subsequent RIA predicate violations;
alternatively, it is also possible that the system tries to find a more optimal configuration.
Additionally, new tasks can enter the system at run time, e.g., new recipes must be
processed in the personalized medicine case study, also triggering reconfigurations.
In the context of self-organizing systems, commissioning describes the process of
bringing a new configuration into a working condition by conducting the appropriate
tests and run time safety analyses. Figure 8.4 gives an overview of the four different types
of commissioning [125] that are available for the S#-based analysis of self-organizing
resource-flow systems. The actual plants and controllers used in reality can be combined
with their S# models in four different ways depending on the intended use:
• Constructive Commissioning. Analyzing the S# models of the plants in conjunc-
tion with the S# models of the controllers results in classical design time analysis, for
instance when analyzing a selection of system configurations during development.
• Virtual Commissioning. The real controller software is analyzed in conjunction
with a S# model of the plants. In this scenario, the actual controller is executed while
plant, sensor, and actuator behavior is abstracted by S#, allowing the effects of faults
to be checked without requiring or endangering actual hardware components.
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Figure 8.2. A system architecture implementing the restore invariant approach [146]. The
observer/controller monitors and reconfigures the functional parts of the system whenever a
corridor violation is detected; new configurations are validated by a result checker.
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Figure 8.3. A class diagram giving a simplified overview of the metamodel for self-organizing
resource-flow systems: Resources are passed along a set of Agents, each applying certain Capabili-
ties in order to introduce a Resource into the system (Produce), to remove a Resource from the
system (Consume), or to conduct a step towards the completion of the Resource’s Task (Process).
The Observer/Controller monitors the Agents and assigns their Roles such that all Resources are
eventually fully processed with the correct order of Capability applications. Such a resource flow
is specified by the pre- and post-Conditions of all Roles within the system, as well as the inputs
and outputs of the Agents that establish their interconnections.
Metamodel Robot Cell Case Study Personalized Medicine Case Study
Resource workpiece pill container
Task task recipe
Agent robots and carts stations and conveyor belts
Produce workpieces enter the system pill containers are loaded onto a conveyor belt
Consume workpieces leave the system pill containers are palletized
Process tool application a specific amount of particulate is dispensed
Table 8.1. An overview of how the metamodel concepts shown in Figure 8.3 map to the robot
cell and personalized medicine case studies. The remaining concepts not listed in the table are
generic, i.e., they do not require specific mapping to the concrete case studies.
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Figure 8.4. Overview of four different types of commissioning [125], combining actual system
components and S# models in various ways: Real commissioning combines the actual plants
and controllers to operate the system, whereas constructive commissioning is the exact opposite
working on the models only. Virtual commissioning analyzes the real controllers in conjunction
with the S# model of the plants; reality-in-the-loop commissioning does the opposite.
• Reality-in-the-Loop Commissioning. The real plants are analyzed in conjunction
with a S# model of the controller, e.g., to validate the modeled controller behavior
against actual plant behavior. In the following, reality-in-the-loop commissioning
is used in the sense that actual system configurations are mirrored back onto the
analyzed S# models for subsequent constructive or virtual commissioning at run time.
• Real Commissioning. The actual installation and operation of a new configuration
in reality reconfigures the real plant and controller components such that actual
production can continue after a preferably short testing phase.
During system operation, new configurations must be commissioned as quickly as
possible in order to avoid costly downtimes. However, it cannot be ruled out that the
new configurations are potentially unsafe, possibly damaging the plant equipment or
causing other hazards. It is therefore often desirable to have a virtual commissioning
phase where the new configuration is extensively analyzed before real commissioning
is started. A tradeoff must be found between the granularity of the analyses that are
carried out and the time it takes to conduct them; they cannot be too time-consuming
in order to avoid prolonged downtimes, but they also cannot be too coarse-grained as
disastrous safety risks might be overlooked otherwise. Section 8.2 discusses this tradeoff
in further detail, presenting a way that significantly increases analysis efficiency while
keeping the chances of missing minimal critical fault sets reasonably small.
Run time safety analyses with S# represent a mixture of virtual and reality-in-the-loop
commissioning as illustrated by Figure 8.5. Before a new configuration is commis-
sioned, its minimal critical fault sets are determined using the optimization techniques
introduced in Section 8.2. While some of these techniques can indeed uphold DCCA’s
completeness guarantees, others give slightly less precise results in the sense that some
minimal critical fault sets can be overlooked. It is therefore necessary to continue the
analyses during and after real commissioning when more time is available for complete
analyses. Additionally, the system must be continuously monitored for new conditions
that result in further reconfigurations. The actual system and an instance of its S#
model are therefore executed in parallel and synchronized continuously, mirroring the
system’s actual states in the S# model to allow for configuration-specific analyses. In
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Figure 8.5. Overview of the run time safety analysis approach with S#: DCCAs are con-
ducted at design time for a few selected system configurations in order to find critical design or
implementation flaws. At run time, additional DCCAs are carried out on the actual system con-
figurations to identify all minimal critical fault sets before the configurations are commissioned.
As long as the system operates within the corridor of correct behavior, the possibly slightly im-
precise DCCAs during virtual commissioning are continuously validated and additional DCCAs
precompute the minimal critical fault sets for the most likely successor configurations. When
the corridor is violated, the reason for the violation and the new configuration determined by
the system’s reconfiguration mechanism is mirrored back to the S# model, using the precom-
puted successor configurations to quickly assess the safety of the new configuration. If the
new configuration is deemed to be safe, it is commissioned to the real system. The individual
parts of this run time safety analysis approach are presented in the following, including some
evaluations. However, the approach was not yet applied to a real system at the time of writing.
that sense, reality-in-the-loop commissioning is used to regularly update the model such
that it accurately reflects the system’s current state and configuration. Thus, only those
configurations are analyzed that are actually encountered during system operation.
Additionally, it is possible to preanalyze likely successor configurations while the system
still is within the corridor: Taking probabilities for the introduction of new tasks, agents,
and capabilities into account as well as the activation probabilities of the faults, the
most likely configurations can be guessed that the system will operate in after the next
reconfiguration. Spare computational resources can be used to conduct DCCAs such
that the minimal critical fault sets are already known when the next reconfiguration is
required, allowing the virtual commissioning phase to be skipped or shortened.
For the robot cell case study, for example, the S#-based commissioning approach works
as follows: Whenever a new task is introduced or a hardware component fails, the S#
model is automatically updated to reflect these changes, for instance by activating the
appropriate fault of the failing robot component. The system’s self-organization mecha-
nism computes a new configuration that is analyzed by S# before it is commissioned
to the actual system. The minimal critical fault sets found by S# are evaluated to stop
the commissioning process if they are deemed too risky, namely when they indicate
that the system is about to reach the end of its available redundancy. Instead of waiting
until the redundancy is indeed fully depleted, countermeasures can be taken to prevent
future potential downtimes, for instance by replacing broken robots and tools or by
adding additional robots that enlarge the smaller minimal critical fault sets.
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Figure 8.6. Overview of the modular safety analysis approach based in the categorization
of faults into tolerable and intolerable ones: For each system configuration that is of interest,
the system model is instantiated twice such that the first one includes only tolerable faults and
contains all aspects that are important for the description of the self-organization mechanism.
The second model includes only intolerable faults and abstracts from self-organization, in lieu
thereof introducing a fault that represents failed or impossible reconfigurations. For both models,
a DCCA is conducted individually. If the model modulo self-organization aspects considers
all possible configurations, their combined results are equivalent to a DCCA conducted on the
overall model. To speed up analyses, the heuristics introduced in Section 8.2 can be used.
8.1.2 Separation of Self-Organization Aspects
Safety analyses are often decomposed such that off-the-shelf components are not ana-
lyzed in detail as the respective vendors already determined their hazards using some
safety analysis techniques. The identified hazards take on the role of component faults
in the safety analyses of the systems that integrate these components [9, 186]; this is
a time-tested practice with a long tradition in Fault Tree Analysis [193], for instance.
Model-based safety analysis techniques can make use of the same principles to reduce
the size of the analyzed models, focusing on the safety issues that result from component
composition rather than the details of the individual component behavior.
This decomposition approach can be extended to self-organizing systems to modularize
both the models as well as DCCAs as illustrated by Figure 8.6: Faults are manually
separated into tolerable and intolerable ones [9], depending on whether the system is
in principle able to tolerate their activations due to self-organization. Tolerable faults
can be detected by the observer and compensated by the reconfiguration mechanism
as long as a sufficient amount of redundancy is left, continuing safe operation after a
reconfiguration. Consequently, the classification of faults can typically be based on the
observer’s ability to detect their effects. However, self-organization cannot cope with all
faults: Intolerable faults are not within its reach, either because they cannot be detected
or there is no appropriate reaction to the errors they cause. Additionally, the system
eventually runs out of redundancy after sufficiently many tolerable faults have been
activated, causing a reconfiguration failure that in turn can be seen as an intolerable
fault at a higher level of abstraction. Additionally, a reconfiguration failure can also
be caused by an incorrect or incomplete reconfiguration mechanism; e.g., a genetic
algorithm cannot guarantee to find a valid configuration even if one still exists [165].
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Consequently, S# models of self-organizing systems not only contain the relevant faults
for the hazards to be analyzed, they also classify all of those faults into the tolerable and
intolerable categories. Self-organization can thus be seen as a fault tolerance mechanism
that tries to avoid failures by error detection and recovery [9]. In conjunctionwith virtual
commissioning, the decomposition approach facilitates model checking-based safety
analyses at run time by reducing analysis complexity: When conducting DCCAs for
either tolerable or intolerable faults, virtual commissioning only considers the system’s
current configuration instead of all valid ones; since the number of valid configurations
might be unbounded as in the case of self-organizing resource-flow systems, DCCAs
would otherwise be impossible. On the other hand, the separation of tolerable and
intolerable faults reduces the number of criticality checks significantly: For a model
containing n tolerable faults andm intolerable ones, modularized safety analyses only
have to consider 2n + 2m fault sets in the worst case. Combined DCCAs for both kinds
of faults, on the other hand, would have to check 2n+m fault sets for criticality.
As indicated by the dashed lines in Figure 8.6, the two individual DCCAs on the two
different models containing either tolerable or intolerable faults can be equivalent
to a complete DCCA conducted on the non-modularized model containing all faults.
However, this correlation only holds if the model modulo the self-organization aspects
would consider all valid configurations. For example, the intolerable fault of some robot
Rn where it inadvertently selects the wrong tool is not critical if Rn is not part of the
resource flow; as the robot is never used, none of its faults can be activated. When
the system reconfigures itself to actually include Rn in the resource flow, the fault
becomes activatable. Consequently, if only a single configuration is considered, the
tool selection fault of Rn might be deemed safe, whereas it might actually be critical if
all configurations were analyzed. Due to virtual commissioning, however, it is neither
necessary nor beneficial to consider all configurations: Analysis times should be as
low as possible and once the system configuration changes, new DCCAs are conducted
anyway. Consequently, if the tool selection fault of robot Rn was not determined to be
critical for the previous configuration where Rn was inactive, it is correctly identified as
critical as soon as the system enters a configuration in which Rn is indeed active.
8.1.3 Characterization of the Corridor of Correct Behavior
DCCAs for the tolerable faults of a self-organizing resource-flow system determine the
limits of its self-organization mechanism when checking for the hazard of a reconfigu-
ration no longer being possible. For a minimal critical fault set Γ computed by such a
DCCA, activations of all of the contained faults f ∈ Γ prevent the system from further
self-organization, causing an irrevocable violation of the corridor of correct behavior.
Thus, DCCAs are able to precisely characterize the boundaries of the corridor of correct
behavior. Each additionally activated tolerable fault can be seen as narrowing the corri-
dor, leaving the system fewer possibilities to reorganize itself until eventually, a minimal
critical fault set is completely activated and no further configurations exist. On the other
hand, introducing additional redundancy into the system widens the corridor again,
increasing the number of valid configurations that the system can continue to function
in. The minimal critical fault sets have to be recomputed after each reconfiguration of
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the system, as they can change in arbitrary ways after a reconfiguration: For example,
when robots are removed from the robot cell or tools break, some minimal critical fault
sets become smaller. On the other hand, newly installed robots introduce new minimal
critical fault sets or make previously existing ones larger.
Formally, a self-organizing system is assumed to be given as a fault-aware Kripke
structureK with a proposition ϱ ∈ P (K) that is set by the reconfiguration mechanism
when it can no longer find a valid configuration. Additionally, the RIA predicate ϑ ∈
P (K) is also assumed to be explicit in the Kripke structure, with a state s ∈ S(K)
labeled with ϑ if the predicate holds in s, that is, the state is within the corridor. A
DCCA of the tolerable faults for hazard ϱ then guarantees that the predicate ϑ is not
permanently violated as long as no minimal critical fault set is completely activated.
In order to prove this claim, the Kripke structure K must be assumed to correctly
reconfigure itself whenever the RIA predicate ϑ is violated, that is, the violation must
be detected and either subsequently fixed or no reconfiguration is possible and the ϱ
flag is set. This notion of correctness specifically does not require the reconfiguration
mechanism to find a configuration if there still is one, thus it is also compatible with
self-organizing systems based on imperfect genetic algorithms. In other words, the
boundaries of the corridor of correct behavior are characterized relative to the strength
of the reconfiguration mechanism. Functional correctness is reasonable to assume as
Nafz et al. [146] formally verified the correctness of the result checker for self-organizing
resource-flow systems that ensures the validity of the configurations computed by the
reconfiguration algorithm. Thus, the reconfiguration mechanism either computes a valid
configuration or none at all; the latter case is formally represented by the ϱ flag being set
in those states without any further configurations. Additionally, Section 8.3 introduces
a testing approach for the functional correctness of self-organization mechanisms.
Definition 8.1 (Correct Reconfiguration). For a fault-aware Kripke structureK , a RIA
predicate ϑ ∈ P (K), and a flag ϱ ∈ P (K) that marks states in which no reconfiguration
is possible,K correctly reconfigures itself ifK |= G(¬ϑ→ (Fϑ ∨ F ϱ)).
Proposition 8.1. For a fault-aware Kripke structureK that correctly reconfigures itself, a
RIA predicate ϑ ∈ P (K), a flag ϱ ∈ P (K) that marks states in which no reconfiguration
is possible, as well as the set Λϱ of all minimal critical fault sets for hazard ϱ, K |=
(
∧
Γ∈Λϱ ¬
∧
f∈ΓF f)→ GFϑ.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that there is a ς ∈ paths(K) such that ς ̸|= GFϑ
despite ς |= ∧Γ∈∆ ¬∧f∈ΓF f . Let k1, k2, . . . be the indices of those states with ς, ki |=
¬ϑ for all i. If there is no such ki, we have a contradiction to the assumption that
ς ̸|= GFϑ. Otherwise for all i, ς, ki |= Fϑ ∨ F ϱ due to the assumed reconfiguration
correctness. Due to Theorem 5.3, completeness of DCCA, there is no i such that
ς, ki |= F ϱ because ς |= G¬ϱ. Consequently, ς, ki |= Fϑ for all i, a contradiction to
the assumption that ς ̸|= GFϑ.
Proposition 8.1 thus formally establishes the relationship between the corridor of correct
behavior and the minimal critical fault sets for the hazard of non-existence of further
configurations: A self-organizing system based on RIA never permanently leaves the
corridor as long as none of the minimal critical fault sets are fully activated.
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8.1.4 Analyzing Overall System Safety
To assess the overall safety of a self-organizing system, all minimal critical fault sets
consisting of system’s intolerable faults have to be determined. As illustrated by Fig-
ure 8.6, a general reconfiguration failure must be introduced that subsumes all tolerable
faults; additionally, it also accounts for the fact that incorrect or incomplete reconfig-
uration mechanisms might be unable to find valid configurations even though some
still exist. Due to this subsumption of all tolerable faults by a single intolerable one,
the minimal critical fault sets become significantly smaller and can be found with less
criticality checks; they contain at most the reconfiguration failure, but no tolerable
faults anymore. If a minimal critical fault set Γ ∈ ΛH for the analyzed system-level
hazard H contains the reconfiguration failure fr, it actually characterizes a set of
minimal critical fault sets: For each minimal critical fault set Γ′ ∈ Λϱ determined by
DCCA for the tolerable faults, the reconfiguration failure in Γ is replaced by Γ′, i.e.,
Λ′H = {Γ ∈ ΛH | fr ̸∈ Γ} ∪ {(Γ ∪ Γ′) \ {fr} | Γ ∈ ΛH ∧ fr ∈ Γ ∧ Γ′ ∈ Λϱ}.
However, this substitution of minimal critical fault sets is only adequate if the underlying
resource-flow system is deadlock-free and fair [185]. In particular, each agent must
select its roles in a fair way and there must be a coordination mechanism that prevents
deadlocks. In the robot cell case study, for example, a cart Cn is not allowed to transport
a workpiece to robot Rm at the same time that Rm has to place another workpiece on
Cn. In the S# model of the case study, fairness is guaranteed by selecting roles in a
round-robin fashion. For deadlock prevention, a very simplistic scheduling mechanism
is contained in the model even though more sophisticated ones could be incorporated
as well: Only one workpiece can be processed simultaneously. While the mechanism
results in suboptimal system performance, it has no impact on the adequacy of the
substitution. In general, however, it can influence other parts of the DCCA results that
are not related to the substitution, depending on the kind of intolerable faults that are
modeled and analyzed. The analyses carried out in Section 8.1.5 are not influenced by
this single workpiece restriction, however.
It is important to check for minimal critical fault sets that do not contain the reconfigu-
ration failure. If some exist, the fault tolerance that the self-organization mechanism is
intended to provide can be bypassed by activations of intolerable faults. As for non-self-
organizing systems, such sets hint at potential improvements that can be made to the
system’s design in order to improve the system’s overall safety. Of particular interest
are additional error discovery mechanisms [9] that are able to broaden the reach of
the self-organization mechanism, thereby turning some of the intolerable faults into
tolerable ones. For self-organizing resource-flow systems based on the metamodel, for
instance, the reconfiguration failure is irrelevant for the hazard of damaged resources,
i.e., resources to which capabilities were applied in the wrong order: Production is
stopped when no valid configuration is found and hence no further incorrect processing
can occur. Consequently, the self-organization mechanisms of these systems are not
designed to reduce the likelihood of damaged resources; otherwise, the reconfiguration
failure would be contained in some or all minimal critical fault sets for the hazard. Addi-
tional detection capabilities that trigger reconfigurations before damaging a workpiece
would therefore improve overall system safety.
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Figure 8.7. A block definition diagram giving a partial overview of the robot cell case study
model. The classes of the metamodel are not shown in full detail as they can be modeled
directly in S# and SysML without any modifications. The RobotAgent and CartAgent blocks
instantiate the Agent class from the metamodel; they contain their respective Robot and Cart
actuators, i.e., the actual hardware components that manipulate the Workpieces. There are two
different implementations of the Observer/Controller metamodel class that can be used in the S#
model: The MiniZincObserverController uses the MiniZinc constraint solver [148] to compute new
configurations, whereas the CSharpObserverController is implemented entirely in C#.
8.1.5 Application to the Robot Cell Case Study
The S# model of the robot cell case study implements the metamodel for self-organizing
resource-flow systems. All classes and associations contained in the original class
diagram are directly represented in the S# model using C#’s object-oriented language
features. The state machines presented by Seebach et al. [180] that describe the behaviors
of the individual agents are implemented using S#’s state machine extensions for C#.
In particular, the state machines control the handshake protocol between the agents
that allows them to exchange resources, thereby establishing the resource flow between
the robots and the carts. The RIA predicate, on the other hand, is specified as a set of
lambda functions that determine violations of the corridor of correct behavior.
The S# model of the robot cell case study shown in Figure 8.7 abstracts from the
distribution of the agents across different processes to simplify the model. Additionally,
the position of the carts is only abstractly represented through the association between
the Cart and Robot blocks, that is, a cart is conceptually located at the associated robot.
Carts move instantly between their connected robots, taking no time for maneuvering.
Robots and carts are controlled by their associated RobotAgent and CartAgent instances
which instantiate the metamodel’s Agent class. The latter represent software components
that control the actual Robot and Cart hardware components; the Observer/Controller
considers the software agents only and does not care about the hardware components.
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The software components control their hardware counterparts through the various
provided ports shown in Figure 8.7. For example, the MoveTo port instructs a cart to move
to a robot, where the robot can be instructed to take or place aworkpiece from or on a cart
using the TakeWorkpiece and PlaceWorkpiece provided ports, respectively. The SwitchTool
provided port causes a robot to switch its active tool; the model assumes tool switching
to be instantaneous. Tool applications are carried out using the ApplyTool provided port
that instantly applies the currently active tool to the workpiece located at the robot. Most
of the aforementioned provided ports return a Boolean value that indicates whether
the operation was carried out successfully. These return values abstractly model the
system’s error detection mechanisms, in response to which available capabilities are
removed from the agents or their input/output relationships are changed. The resulting
violation of the RIA predicate then causes the model to reconfigure itself.
Workpieces track the ProductionActions that have been carried out on them in order
to determine whether they have been damaged during production or whether their
production is complete. To do so, their _requiredActions field stores the number and
order of actions that have to be conducted with the _completedActions field storing the
number of successfully completed actions. If _completedActions matches the number of
_requiredActions, processing is complete. The Resource class contained in the metamodel
is a software representation of the actual workpieces. There is no direct link between
the two; if the system is functionally correct and no faults are activated, the processing
state stored in a workpiece is always consistent with the processing state stored in
the corresponding resource. A workpiece is discarded if it is not fully processed when
a reconfiguration takes place; the model does not contain a mechanism to continue
processing a workpiece after the cell’s configuration has changed.
The model makes no assumptions about the specifics of the actual observer/controller
that is used. Consequently, the two specializations contained in the model, MiniZincOb-
serverController and CSharpObserverController, can be used interchangeably. However, the
original version of the former contained several implementation bugs identified by the
testing approach discussed in Section 8.3 which sometimes caused it to generate invalid
configurations or to overlook the existence of valid ones.
Analyzing Tolerable Faults. For the case study, the tolerable faults consist of broken
tools that can no longer be applied, written as ¬Rcmn to denote that the n-th robot’sm-th
capability c is broken with c ∈ {P,D, I, T,C} for the produce, drill, insert, tighten, and
consume capabilities, respectively. Additionally, there is the fault ¬Rn that indicates
that the n-th robot is no longer able to function at all. Broken carts that can no longer
move around at all are denoted by ¬Cn whereas a specific route between robots Rk
and Rl being blocked is written as ¬CRk↔Rln . For the small cell configuration shown
in Figure 8.8a, five out of the 42 minimal critical fault sets are listed in Figure 8.8b:
Set (1) represents the complete failure of the first cart; in that case, there are no further
connections from the first robot to any others. As only the first robot has the produce
capability and cannot complete the task on its own, reconfiguration fails. In the case of
set (2), the second robot’s insert capability breaks down which cannot be compensated
by any other robot. Minimal critical fault set (3) shows that the loss of the fourth cart’s
route between the second and fourth robot is critical if at the same time neither the
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first nor the third robot can compensate the loss of the fourth robot’s tighten capability.
A similar minimal critical fault set exists where ¬CR2↔R43 is replaced by ¬C3. Set (4)
is trivial as it represents the loss of all four drill capabilities. From set (5) follows that
it is critical if only the third robot is still able to drill, but it can no longer be reached
when both routes to it are blocked. In general, there are minimal critical fault sets that
are trivial to deduce such as set (4); however, as soon as cart routing must be taken
into consideration, the minimal critical fault sets become less obvious, especially when
significantly larger configurations are analyzed. Table 8.2 gives an overview of the
analysis results for configurations of various sizes; the system configuration shown in
Figure 8.8 corresponds to C1 in Table 8.2.
Analyzing Intolerable Faults. Table 8.3 shows the analysis results for the intolerable
faults and the two system-level hazards of damaged or incompletely processed work-
pieces. Intolerable faults that are analyzed concern the workpieces that can be positioned
incorrectly in front of a robot such that they are damaged during processing, or the
processing task fails on them without the corresponding robot taking notice. For each
processed workpiece, these two faults are individually minimal critical for the damage
hazard as all of their activations either immediately lead to damage or do so when the
next tool is applied. Similarly, a robot can unknowingly select the wrong tool, damaging
all workpieces that it works on. However, reconfiguration failures cannot cause any
damage as they stop the entire production process. Consequently, processing remains
incomplete whenever reconfiguration fails, either due to an incorrect reconfiguration
mechanism or when one of the minimal critical fault sets identified by the DCCAs listed
in Table 8.2 is activated. Moreover, a robot or cart not receiving its updated roles after a
reconfiguration is immediately minimal critical for the incomplete processing hazard, at
least as long as the corresponding agent is actually required to process the workpieces
in the analyzed system configuration. For inactive agents, the fault is deemed safe, but
as soon as the system enters a configuration in which such an inactive agent is in fact
part of the resource flow, the virtual commissioning approach correctly classifies the
corresponding fault as critical. Overall, the robot cell case study only has singleton
minimal critical sets of intolerable faults.
8.2 Optimizing Run Time Safety Analysis Efficiency
There are two sources of exponential complexity when analyzing tolerable faults for the
hazard of non-existence of further configurations: All combinations of tolerable faults
have to be checked for criticality and the model checker has to enumerate all possible
combinations of tolerable fault activations during each check. DCCA’s fault removal
optimization helps to alleviate the second problem by removing all faults from the model
that are suppressed by the analyzed DCCA formula anyway. However, the optimization
is often less effective than for non-self-organizing systems due to the larger cardinalities
of the fault sets that have to be checked as not as many faults can be removed from the
analyzed models. Consequently, additional optimizations are necessary to cope with
both the large amounts of faults as well as the large cardinalities of the minimal critical
fault sets. To counter the first problem, S#’s DCCA heuristics mechanism explained in
Section 6.4 is used with the two heuristics for self-organizing resource-flow systems
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R1 (PDDT) R2 (DI) R3 (DTC)
R4 (TC)
C1
C1
C3
C2
(a) The robot cell configuration consists of four
robots with varying capabilities and three carts. C1
has two routes, connecting R1, R2, and R3.
(1) ¬C1
(2) ¬RI12
(3) ¬CR2↔R43 ,¬RT11 ,¬RT13
(4) ¬RD11 ,¬RD21 ,¬RD12 ,¬RD13
(5) ¬CR1↔R31 ,¬CR2↔R32 ,¬RD11 ,¬RD21 ,¬RD12
(b) An incomplete listing of five minimal criti-
cal fault sets of tolerable faults for the robot cell
configuration shown on the left.
Figure 8.8. An illustration of a simple configuration of the robot cell case study showing some
of its minimal critical fault sets returned by a DCCA for the hazard of non-existence of further
configurations. Only tolerable faults are considered by the analysis.
# # ∅ ∅ # Tolerable # Minimal
Robots Carts Capabilities Routes Faults Critical Sets Time
C1 4 3 2.8 1.3 19 42 (∅ 3.0) 10.1s
C2 3 2 3.7 2.0 19 40 (∅ 3.0) 44.4s
C3 4 3 2.8 2.0 23 36 (∅ 3.0) 2.7m
C4 5 2 3.6 2.0 23 70 (∅ 4.0) 3.9m
C5 4 3 3.8 1.3 22 70 (∅ 3.0) 4.0m
C6 4 4 2.8 3.5 28 141 (∅ 6.0) 4.8h
Table 8.2. Overview of the evaluation results for the hazard of non-existence of further
configurations with only tolerable faults considered. The system configurations are manually
chosen and automatically instantiated and evaluated, differing in the number of robots and carts
as well as the average numbers of available capabilities and routes between robots. Configuration
C6 has a large amount of minimal critical fault sets with a maximum cardinality of eleven faults;
more than ten million fault sets have to be checked to find them all.
Damaged Workpiece Incomplete Processing
# Intolerable # Minimal # Minimal
Faults Critical Sets Time Critical Sets Time
C1 16 6 1.5s 7 2.3s
C2 19 12 1.0s 11 8.1s
C3 22 12 2.6s 11 42.7s
C4 17 6 2.6s 8 2.9s
C5 16 6 1.6s 8 1.9s
C6 17 6 2.0s 9 2.0s
Table 8.3. Overview of the evaluation results for the two hazards of damaged or incompletely
processed workpieces with regard to intolerable faults. The analyzed configurations correspond
to the ones in Table 8.2. All minimal critical fault sets have a cardinality of one; the analyses
are aborted after all fault sets of cardinality two are checked for criticality. Both hazards can be
analyzed in roughly two seconds for configuration C6 when only intolerable faults are considered.
By contrast, a non-modularized DCCA would additionally have to consider the 28 tolerable
faults from Table 8.2 that on their own already take almost five hours to analyze.
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introduced in Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2. To cope with the second problem, fault activations
are enforced during the analyses as explained in Section 8.2.3, always activating all
activatable faults instead of the usual nondeterministic choice. While the heuristics
affect neither soundness nor completeness of DCCA, the second optimization can in
fact cause some minimal critical fault sets to be overlooked.
Safe fault sets heuristics are even more important for self-organizing systems than for
non-self-organizing ones: There typically are more faults and thus more combinations of
faults that have to be checked for criticality, and the higher cardinalities of the minimal
critical fault sets mean that many safe fault sets are checked before any critical ones
are encountered. The two heuristics introduced in the following are highly effective as
evaluated in Section 8.2.4: Self-organizing resource-flow systems have many instances
of the same component types, e.g., there are multiple stations and conveyor belts in
the personalized medicine case study. This uniformity can be taken advantage of when
conducting DCCAs by providing heuristics that exploit the similarities between the
different agent instances in order to suggest large safe fault sets.
8.2.1 Fault Subsumption Heuristic
Agents often have severe faults that subsume less severe ones. For example, an activation
of ¬Rn deactivates a robot in the robot cell case study entirely, hence any ¬Rcmn that
disable Rn’sm-th tool for the capability c are no longer activatable. Similarly, malfunc-
tions of individual ingredient dispensers in the personalized medicine case study do not
matter after a complete failure of the corresponding station. Consequently, the overall
agent fault subsumes the individual capability faults. However, the faults still have to
be modeled separately, as the subsuming faults often have additional effects, i.e., they
can be more severe than the combination of all subsumed faults. For example, a station
that failed completely also no longer allows any pill containers to pass through, which
would still be possible if only all of the station’s ingredient dispensers had failed.
Such subsumption relationships between faults are in general not statically deducible
from the S# models, that is, they cannot be inferred automatically without checking
all fault sets first. However, if the faults contained in a model are explicitly annotated
with subsumption information, transitive subsumptions can be taken advantage of by a
fault subsumption heuristic. For the aforementioned station faults, for example, fault
subsumption is annotated in the S# model as follows during model initialization:
CompleteStationFailure.Subsumes(IngredientTanks.Select(tank => tank.TankDefect));
All particulate dispenser stations have a CompleteStationFailure fault and several
ingredient tanks with a TankDefect fault for each ingredient type that they are able to
administer into a pill container. In the example above, the CompleteStationFailure
is declared to subsume all of the TankDefect faults declared by the ingredient tanks;
the declaration uses .NET’s Select method that maps each tank to its TankDefect fault.
Formally, the subsumption relation is defined as follows:
Definition 8.2 (Fault Subsumption). For all faults f1, f2 ∈ F (K) of a fault-aware
Kripke structure K and a hazard H , f1 subsumes f2, written as f1 ≼ f2, if and only if
for all Γ ⊆ F (K) with f1 ∈ Γ, Γ is safe for hazard H implies that Γ ∪ {f2} is also safe
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for H . The set of all faults subsumed by Γ ⊆ F (K) is denoted by S(Γ) = {f | f ∈
F (K) and f ′ ≼ f for some f ′ ∈ Γ}.
The subsumption relation ≼ is both reflexive and transitive, and S(Γ) always is a
superset of Γ due to the reflexivity:
Lemma 8.1. The fault subsumption relationship ≼ is a preorder.
Proof. Reflexivity: Let Γ ⊆ F (K) and f ∈ Γ such that Γ is safe for a hazard H .
Consequently, Γ ∪ {f} = Γ and thus Γ ∪ {f} is also safe for H , hence f ≼ f .
Transitivity: Let f1, f2, f3 ∈ F (K) such that f1 ≼ f2 and f2 ≼ f3. For a Γ ⊆ F (K)
with f1 ∈ Γ and Γ is safe for hazard H , Γ ∪ {f2} is also safe for H because f1 ≼ f2.
Since f2 ≼ f3, Γ ∪ {f2, f3} is also safe for H . As Γ ∪ {f3} ⊆ Γ ∪ {f2, f3}, it follows
that Γ∪{f3} is also safe forH due to the monotonicity established by Theorem 5.2.
Theorem 8.1. For a fault set Γ ⊆ F (K) of a fault-aware Kripke structure K and a
hazard H , Γ is safe for H if and only if S(Γ) is safe for H .
Proof. “⇒”: As F (K) is finite, let S(Γ) = {f1, f2, . . . , fk} and Γi = Γ ∪ {fj | 0 <
j ≤ i} for all i = 0 . . . k. Trivially, Γ0 is safe for H by assumption. If Γi is safe for H ,
choose f ∈ Γ ⊆ Γi such that f ≼ fi+1. Consequently, Γi ∪ {fi+1} is safe for H . As
Γi+1 = Γi ∪ {fi+1}, it follows by induction that Γk is safe for H and Γk = S(Γ).
“⇐”: If S(Γ) is safe forH , the fact that Γ is also safe forH follows from the monotonicity
established by Theorem 5.2 and the fact that Γ ⊆ S(Γ) due to the reflexivity of ≼.
When conducting a DCCA with the fault subsumption heuristic, S# enlarges a fault set
Γ with all subsumed faults, checking whether the enlarged set is safe. If it is, Γ and
all other subsets of the enlarged fault set are also known to be safe, thus reducing the
number of fault sets that would unsuccessfully be checked for criticality otherwise.
Heuristic 2 (Fault Subsumption Heuristic). Before checking a fault set Γ ⊆ F (K) for
criticality for a hazard H , first check whether S(Γ) is safe for H .
If an incorrect subsumption relation is specified in the S# model, the heuristic is still
correct but less effective: Only the “downwards” direction of Theorem 8.1 is taken
advantage of during analyses as the monotonicity of safe fault sets holds regardless of
the validity of the specified subsumption relations. To enable the fault subsumption
heuristic when conducting a DCCA, an instance of the SubsumptionHeuristic class for
a model instance model must be added to the list of active heuristics:
var analysis = new SafetyAnalysis();
analysis.Heuristics.Add(new SubsumptionHeuristic(model));
8.2.2 Minimal Redundancy Heuristic
All analyzed fault sets are safe as long as the system still has redundancy reserves that
it can make use of. For self-organizing resource-flow systems, there are several levels
of redundancy: For example, there are multiple tool instances for the same capabilities
to compensate for broken tools; additionally, there are multiple routes established by
the carts or conveyor belts to transport resources between the agents; and lastly, there
are multiple agents that replicate the routes and capabilities of other agents in order to
replace them when they fail completely.
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The minimal redundancy heuristic takes these levels of redundancy into account by
systematically shrinking the amount of left-over redundancy. For example, if there are
three stations that are fully connected with each other and all of them have particulate
p available, each individual dispensing failure is not critical. The heuristic therefore
suggests to check all fault sets that contain two dispensing failures for p. The quality of
the suggestions made by the heuristic depends on the connections available between
the agents; in the aforementioned example, most of the suggestions would be critical if
only one of the stations is actually able to administer p due to resource-flow restrictions.
For very sparsely connected configurations in which there are only very few possible
resource flows, the heuristic is therefore expected to be at least ineffective if not outright
counterproductive as it suggests many fault sets that turn out to be critical. In between
the best and the worst case, a top-down search strategy can be used for suggested sets
that turn out to be critical: By analyzing all subsets of such inappropriately suggested
fault sets by decreasing instead of the usual increasing level of cardinality, maximal safe
subsets are likely identified faster.
Let C1, . . . , Cn be sets of capability instances contained in the model represented by a
fault-aware Kripke structureK , i.e., they represent disjunct sets of capability instances
required by the system’s tasks to process the resources. For each capability instance
c ∈ ⋃ni=1Ci, the fault fc ∈ F (K) represents exactly the loss of capability c without
any other effects. In the personalized medicine case study, for example, the capability
instances contained in C1 and C2 are all instances of the produce and consume capa-
bilities, respectively. All instances of the process capabilities for each ingredient type
ti, on the other hand, are denoted by the sets C2+i; the faults corresponding to these
capabilities are thus failing dispenser mechanisms. The maximal fault sets that can
possibly be safe are of the form F (K) \ { fc1 , . . . , fcn } where (c1, . . . , cn) ∈
∏n
i=1Ci.
That is, the sets contain all faults except for one of each kind of capability, leaving
exactly one capability of each type intact; e.g., one light gray, one medium gray, and
one dark gray particulate dispenser continue to work while all others do not.
The heuristic can additionally take advantage of fault subsumption information con-
tained in the analyzed S# model. Instead of only removing a specific fault fc, all of
the faults it subsumes can also be removed at the same time, thereby increasing the
cardinality of the fault set. When taking subsumption into account, the maximum safe
sets are thus of the form F (K) \ S({fc1 , . . . , fcn}).
Heuristic 3 (Minimal Redundancy Heuristic). As early as possible, fault sets of the form
F (K) \ S({fc1 , . . . , fcn}) with (c1, . . . , cn) ∈
∏n
i=1Ci should be checked to determine
whether they are safe for hazardH . If some of the sets turn out to be critical forH , analyze
their subsets top-down by decreasing cardinality.
Similar to the fault subsumption heuristic, the capability types Ci as well as the faults fc
for each c ∈ ⋃ni=1Ci in general cannot be determined automatically from a S# model.
For self-organizing resource-flow systems based on the metamodel, however, an auto-
matic detection is indeed possible. A manual instantiation of the MinimalRedundancy-
Heuristic for the personalized medicine case study would look as follows in S# for a
model instance model, taking advantage of C#’s language integrated query functionality
in a helper method that selects the ingredient tank defects for an ingredient type:
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IEnumerable<Fault> GetIngredientTankFaults(Model model, IngredientType type)
=> from dispenser in model.Stations.OfType<ParticulateDispenser>()
from tank in dispenser.IngredientTanks
where tank.IngredientType == type
select tank.TankDefect;
var analysis = new SafetyAnalysis();
analysis.Heuristics.Add(new MinimalRedundancyHeuristic(
model,
GetIngredientTankFaults(model, IngredientType.LightGray),
GetIngredientTankFaults(model, IngredientType.MediumGray),
GetIngredientTankFaults(model, IngredientType.DarkGray));
8.2.3 Fault Activation Enforcement
In order to determine whether a fault set Γ ⊆ F (K) is safe for fault-aware Kripke
structureK and hazardH , the model checker has to enumerate all paths throughK . As
faults can be activated completely nondeterministically, in the worst case there are 2|Γ|
possible combinations of fault activations to consider in each reachable system state.
While the activation minimality of fault-aware Kripke structures reduces analysis effort
compared to the common state-based fault modeling approach, larger fault sets still
require significantly more effort to check when they are indeed safe for the hazard. But
even for critical fault sets, the path proving the set’s criticality might take some time to
be found. In particular, heuristics are imperfect and might thus suggest large critical
fault sets, making analysis slower overall if they guess wrong often enough.
To speed up analyses, DCCAs can be run in a mode where all analyzed faults are forced
to be activated: In this mode, S# no longer relies on nondeterministic fault activations
but always activates all activatable faults. The idea underlying fault enforcement is
that the more faults are activated, the more likely it is that the hazard occurs and the
more likely it can be found faster. In a sense, this fault enforcement approach is the dual
of fault removal, however, it is unable to uphold DCCA’s completeness guarantees as
discussed later on. Formally, fault enforcement removes all transitions and initial states
of a fault-aware Kripke structure that are not activation-maximal as follows:
Definition 8.3 (Fault Enforcement). Enforcing all fault activations in a fault-aware
Kripke structure K = (P, F, S,R, L, I) yields the fault-enforced fault-aware Kripke
structure E(K) = (P, F, S,R′, L, I ′) with an activation-maximal transition relation
R′ = {(s,Γ, s′) ∈ R | ∀ (s,Γ′, s′′) ∈ R . s′ ̸= s′′ → Γ ̸⊂ Γ′} and activation-maximal
initial states I ′ = {(Γ, s) ∈ I | ∀ (Γ′, s′) ∈ I . s ̸= s′ → Γ ̸⊂ Γ′}.
Figure 8.9 shows an exemplary fault-aware Kripke structure that is converted to a
fault-enforced one. All transitions leaving some state s ∈ S(K) with fault activations Γ
are removed for which there is another transition leaving s that activates a superset
of Γ and analogously for the initial states. In particular, s can only have an outgoing
transition without any fault activations if no faults can be activated at all in s. If
there are two distinct transitions with different target states activating f1 ∈ F (K) and
{f1, f2} ⊆ F (K), only the latter transition is kept. On the other hand, two transitions
activating distinct faults f1, f2 ∈ F (K), for example, are both kept as they cannot be
unified. In that sense, the transition relation R(E(K)) is activation-maximal as only
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f1
A B C
D E F G H
f1f1, f2 f1 f2
(a) A fault-aware Kripke structure with two faults
f1 and f2 and eight reachable states that represents
the actual behavior of the analyzed system.
f1
A B C
D E F G H
f1, f2 f1 f2
(b) The fault-aware Kripke structure resulting from
the one on the left after fault enforcement with only
six reachable states.
Figure 8.9. An illustration of fault activation enforcement: The fault-aware Kripke structure
on the left is transformed to the fault-enforced fault-aware Kripke structure on the right by
removing all non-activation-maximal transitions. The number of transitions and reachable states
decreases, explaining the resulting analysis efficiency improvements as the model checker only
has to consider a smaller Kripke structure. However, the behavior of the Kripke structure is
changed by fault enforcement as some states such as D and G are no longer reachable.
those transitions activating the largest fault sets remain in the fault-enforced Kripke
structure. Nevertheless, fault-enforced Kripke structures are also still activation-minimal,
therefore never “activating” a fault that has no effect or duplicating transitions between
the same source and target states for which a subset relationship exists.
In contrast to fault injection and fault removal, fault enforcement yields exactly one
fault-enforced fault-aware Kripke structure as there is no room for creativity. Compared
to fault removal, the operation always succeeds as the resulting Kripke structure is
guaranteed to be deadlock-free: For each state s ∈ S(E(K)), there is always at least
one transition (s,Γ, s′) ∈ R(E(K)) left as, trivially, Γ ⊆ Γ. For the same reason,
at least one initial state remains. As fault enforcement does not introduce any new
behavior, the fault-enforced paths are contained in the original Kripke structure’s set of
paths paths(K), which in turn establishes the usefulness of fault enforcement for more
efficient DCCAs of self-organizing systems as explained later on:
Lemma 8.2. For a fault-aware Kripke structure K and its fault-enforced fault-aware
Kripke structure E(K), paths(E(K)) ⊆ paths(K).
Proof. Directly follows from the fact that I(E(K)) ⊆ I(K) andR(E(K)) ⊆ R(K).
The reverse of Lemma 8.2 does not hold for a Kripke structure K with at least one
activatable fault: Its fault-enforced counterpart E(K) does not contain any paths ς ∈
paths(K) that do not activate any faults, i.e., for all paths ς ′ ∈ paths(E(K)),A(ς ′) ̸= ∅
in that case. When conducting DCCAs over fault-enforced Kripke structures, the
minimal critical fault sets that are found in general differ from the ones found for the
original Kripke structure: All critical fault sets discovered with fault enforcement are
also critical with nondeterministic fault activations as the path showing the criticality
of the set is encountered in both analysis modes; constant activation is one of the many
possibilities that exist with nondeterministic choices. The reverse, however, does not
hold as a fault set is safe only when there is no path showing its criticality, but with
forced fault activation, only a subset of all possible paths is considered. Formally:
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Figure 8.10. A configuration of the personalized medicine case study in which forced and
nondeterministic fault activation result in different minimal critical fault sets: The pill container
on the upper conveyor belt is almost fully processed, but its processing cannot be completed
due to a complete failure of particulate dispenser station #2 that occurs once the pill container
reached the upper conveyor belt. From the pill container’s location, no other particulate dis-
penser is reachable and thus the container has to be discarded. However, the system does not
have a sufficient amount of dark gray ingredients left to produce a replacement, hence the
failure of particulate dispenser station #2 is critical. With forced fault activation, on the other
hand, particulate dispenser station #2 would have failed in the beginning, allowing the pill
container to be routed to the lower conveyor belt, successfully completing its production process.
Consequently, the failure of particulate dispenser station #2 would be safe.
Proposition 8.2. Let H be a propositional logic formula not referencing any faults f ∈
F (K). If a fault set Γ ⊆ F (K) is critical for hazard H in E(K), it is also critical for H
inK . Conversely, if Γ is safe for hazard H inK , it is also safe for H in E(K).
Proof. As safe fault sets are dual to critical ones, it suffices to show the claim for critical
fault sets: If Γ is critical for H in E(K), there is a path ς ∈ paths(E(K)) such that
ς |= onlyΓU=H with onlyΓ as in Definition 5.13. Due to Lemma 8.2, ς ∈ paths(K)
and thus Γ is also critical for H inK .
For many systems, fault enforcement can provide a good approximation of the results
with nondeterministic activation. For self-organizing systems, the optimization is
particularly interesting as it significantly reduces analysis times as shown in Section 8.2.4.
The robot cell case study is even able to profit from the analysis time reductions without
sacrificing DCCA completeness when analyzing the tolerable faults: When a fault set Γ
is checked for criticality, either the remaining redundancy is sufficient to find a new
configuration or the set is indeed critical. If the redundancy suffices, it would also have
been enough had the faults been activated nondeterministically as the order of tolerable
fault activations is irrelevant for the robot cell case study. For the personalized medicine
case study, on the other hand, there are some edge cases where critical fault sets might
be missed as explained by Figure 8.10. The key difference between both case studies
lies in the ingredient amounts: The personalized medicine case study has capabilities
that eventually cannot be used anymore even without fault activations. Consequently,
nondeterministic fault activations at inopportune times might result in pill containers
for which processing cannot be completed. If the remaining amount of ingredients is
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Figure 8.11. A configuration of the personalized medicine case study where ingredient
amounts are so low that they are just barely sufficient to process the system’s active recipes:
Loader station #1 produces pill containers for recipe #1, whereas loader station #2 produces
pill containers for recipe #2. The pill containers of each loader follow the dashed arrows, both
ending at palletization station #1; for pill containers with recipe #2, such a path might be chosen
when the connection between stations #2 and #3 is shorter than the one between #2 and #4,
for instance. Due to this routing, recipe #1 cannot be fully processed as station #3 runs out of
ingredients. However, had the system been analyzed with station #3 only containing six units of
the ingredient, processing would have been completed as the pill containers for recipe #2 would
have been routed to station #4.
low, it might also no longer be possible to produce a replacement as the system does
not have enough ingredients left. Had the fault activations been enforced from the
beginning, the system might have been able to prevent itself from maneuvering into
such a situation as illustrated by Figure 8.10.
For design time analyses without hard timing constraints, it is preferable to use the fully
nondeterministic fault activation mode in order to benefit from DCCA’s completeness
guarantees. During the constructive commissioning phase of self-organizing systems, a
selection of configurations can thus be thoroughly analyzed. At run time, on the other
hand, virtual commissioning requires analyses to be fast, making forced fault activation
an acceptable tradeoff. For the personalized medicine case study, the risk of missing a
critical fault set of a configuration can further be reduced by analyzing the system with
less remaining ingredients than the system actually has available. For example, there
might be a rule saying that all ingredient tanks must be refilled as soon as their fill level
falls below x percent. The system’s safety can then be overapproximated by analyzing
the system as if it only had x percent of all ingredients left, making the system seem less
safe than it actually is. Due to the refilling rule, the system’s ingredients will typically
be restocked before the system enters a state for which the overapproximation is no
longer valid. As shown by Figure 8.11, however, even this overapproximation is only an
estimate that might also overlook some minimal critical fault sets.
All in all, DCCAs with forced fault activations remain a tradeoff between analysis effi-
ciency and analysis completeness. For the robot cell case study, in fact, the optimization
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is always valid due to the workings of the system’s capabilities and its reconfigura-
tion mechanism. For the personalized medicine case study, on the other hand, there
are known cases of missed minimal critical fault sets as exemplified by Figures 8.10
and 8.11. However, none of the configurations evaluated in Section 8.2.4 actually miss
a minimal critical fault set with forced fault activations, showing that the gains in
analysis efficiency are likely worth the risk of incompleteness. Additionally, DCCAs
with nondeterministic fault activation can be conducted while the system is running
with the new configuration, using the additional time and the information obtained
from the previous, incomplete analyses to efficiently conduct a complete DCCA.
8.2.4 Evaluation of Efficiency Improvements
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the two heuristics and forced fault activation,
several different configurations of the personalized medicine case study are analyzed for
the hazard of non-existence of further configurations, considering tolerable faults only.
The analyzed configurations differ in the number of stations as well as their connections
through conveyor belts and thus in the number of faults that have to be checked. The
metrics that are compared are the number of fault sets that have to be checked for
criticality as well as the overall time it takes to complete a DCCA for the configurations
using either neither of the heuristics, only one of them, or both of them in combination.
Table 8.4 shows the results of these analyses; since the heuristics are deterministic, an
analysis of standard deviation and other stochastic properties is not necessary.
Fault Set Suggestion Quality. The fault sets suggested by the heuristics generally fall
into two categories: Either the heuristics suggest a fault set that is already known to
be safe or critical, or they suggest a fault set for which no information is yet available.
In the former case, the suggestion is trivially safe or trivially critical, respectively. In
the latter case, the suggestion is only helpful when the fault set is actually safe for
the hazard, potentially allowing many sets to be skipped that no longer have to be
analyzed. The percentages in the “# checked sets” columns of Table 8.4 indicate what
fractions of the sets suggested by the heuristics were non-trivially safe, i.e., the fractions
of suggestions that actually contributed to the reported analysis time reductions.
For most evaluated configurations, the majority of the fault sets suggested by the
heuristics are critical. Averaged over all analyzed configurations, only 7.4% of the fault
sets suggested by heuristic 2, 0.2% of those sets suggested by heuristic 3, and 0.1% of the
sets suggested by both heuristics combined were non-trivially safe. Phrased differently,
the absolute majority of all suggestions do not contribute to the observed analysis time
reductions, instead actually increasing analysis times. However, a single non-trivially
safe fault set of cardinality n suggested by a heuristic eliminates up to 2n − 1 sets from
consideration, explaining the effectiveness of the heuristics despite their low suggestion
quality. By contrast, the high number of false positives can become problematic when
analyzing in nondeterministic fault activation mode as the time required to analyze
such a false positive is exponential in the number of faults it contains. In general, the
large number of unnecessary checks might negatively impact analysis time, although
for the configurations considered in Table 8.4, the heuristics’ overall positive effects
outweigh the overhead introduced by their mistaken suggestions.
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Analysis Efficiency Improvements. For the first six configurations A to F, the anal-
yses are carried out using both forced and nondeterministic fault activation mode; for
the remaining configurations, only forced activations are considered due to the longer
analysis times. The differences between both modes become more pronounced as fault
counts increase. Both modes yield the exact same minimal critical fault sets in all
analyzed configurations, showing that analyses with forced fault activations indeed
provide close approximations of complete DCCAs. The general efficiency improvements
resulting from the use of the heuristics are substantial in all configurations except for A.
Even though the heuristics still scale exponentially, they do so at a much lower rate,
allowing the largest configuration I to be analyzed in roughly 6 minutes in the best case
instead of 1.3 days. The time required for the analyses grows faster than the number of
analyzed sets as trivially safe or trivially critical sets suggested by a heuristic are not
counted as a checked set. Nevertheless, the S# framework still has to briefly consider
these sets to discard them. Furthermore, the heuristics also take some time to make their
suggestions as they have to consider most of the fault sets that DCCA would otherwise
analyze; for the larger models, the total number of suggestions lies in the millions.
The two heuristics have different strengths depending on the topology of the analyzed
configurations. For example, configurations B and C have a circular topology where
heuristic 3 is less successful than heuristic 2. Heuristic 3 is better suited when there
are more connections between stations, as otherwise its suggestions are mostly criti-
cal: Removing all but one instances of some capability is critical when the remaining
capability instance is unreachable by the allowed resource flows. For instance, the
only difference between configurations C and D is that in configuration D, the circle is
connected bidirectionally, immediately resulting in heuristic 3 to yield better results
than it did in configuration C: 56% of the sets it suggested were non-trivially safe, as
opposed to just 6% in model C. For highly connected configurations such as E andG, the
latter of which is a complete network, the effect becomes even more obvious, resulting
in all suggestions being non-trivial safe sets. In such situations, the combination of both
heuristics reduces analysis efficiency. By contrast, configuration H again illustrates the
weakness of heuristic 3 for sparse networks: Even though the configuration has the same
number of stations and faults as configuration G, it has significantly fewer connections,
consisting of three separate production lines that only have their beginnings and ends
connected together. All in all, using both heuristics together provides neither substantial
efficiency improvements nor analysis time degradations. System configurations for
which no educated guesses based on their topology are possible, combinations of both
heuristics are hence a sound optimization strategy.
8.3 Model-Based Testing of Self-Organization Mechanisms
Self-organization is a complex mechanism that requires significant development effort
to get right. The restore invariant approach and the metamodel for self-organizing
resource-flow systems were developed to provide a standard framework and archi-
tecture for amending a system with self-organization concepts in a structured way
that avoids common pitfalls [77, 146, 180]. Nevertheless, the actual implementations
of the self-organizing systems must still be tested for correctness just like any other
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safety-critical system [131, 186]; only tests carried out on the actual system can show
adequacy. Development faults such as design flaws or implementation bugs are the
typical reasons for functional incorrectness. While for the system’s functionality mod-
ulo self-organization aspects, that is, the functional system depicted in Figure 8.2 on
page 185, traditional testing methods can be used, the observer/controller poses the
same challenges during testing as for design time or run time formal safety analyses: It
is impossible to exhaustively test all system configurations, as their number is in general
unbounded. Additionally, the large number of tolerable faults makes it impracticable to
test all of their combinations even for a single configuration. It is therefore necessary to
select appropriate test cases systematically and to supply test oracles that are able to
determine whether the self-organization mechanisms are correct.
In order to systematically test a self-organization mechanism, the same basic concepts
can be used that enable the run time analysis approach introduced in the preceding
sections. However, run time analyses by themselves are insufficient to test functional
correctness even though continuously monitoring and checking the system for unac-
ceptable minimal critical fault sets can of course also detect development faults. In the
presence of development faults, run time DCCAs would likely determine the empty set
of faults to be minimal critical, which indeed signals a highly important safety issue
that needs to be resolved but does not provide any insights into what the underlying
problem actually is. In particular, run time analyses with S# are unable to determine
whether indeed no further configuration exists or whether the observer/controller is
simply unable to find one due to an implementation bug, for instance. Moreover, tests
should be conducted as early as possible in the development process as the cost of fixing
architecture, design, or implementation bugs increases the later they are found and
fixed during development [161].
The S#-based testing approach for self-organization mechanisms introduced in the fol-
lowing uses model-based back-to-back testing [199]. Back-to-back testing is a standard
testing methodology that is, for example, suggested by ISO 26262 [107] for model-based
development of safety-critical systems. With back-to-back testing, two implementations
of a system are tested against each other in order to determine whether they produce
the same outputs for the same inputs. In the following, a S# model as well as the actual
implementation of a self-organization mechanism are tested back-to-back, with the S#
model’s executability allowing it to be viewed as another, potentially more high-level,
implementation. The testing approach is model-based as the test cases are derived
from the S# model during testing, in particular from the tolerable faults injected into
the model. Ideally, the model and the implementation are developed separately by
different teams to avoid making the same development faults twice; otherwise, the same
faults might be contained in the model as well as in the implementation, in which case
back-to-back testing is unable to identify them.
Even though the general testing approach is more broadly applicable, the following
discussion only concerns itself with the class of self-organizing resource-flow systems
implemented on top of the restore invariant approach. The robot cell case study is
used as the running example, also providing the basis for the evaluation of the testing
approach in Section 8.3.4. Despite the verification of the result checker’s correctness
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Figure 8.12. Overview of the S#-based testing approach for self-organization mechanisms:
The system models and configuration descriptions enable S# to instantiate a specific system con-
figuration, subsequently allowing DCCA to generate the test cases; a test case thus corresponds
to a fault set that is checked for criticality. The test cases are automatically executed by S#’s
automated DCCA execution algorithm, checking the observer and controller oracles against the
behavior of the system under test, i.e., the actual implementations of the observer and controller.
by Nafz et al. [146], it is still necessary to test the actual implementation of the self-
organization mechanism: The implementation of the result checker could contain bugs
that cannot be identified by the formal verification but only by thorough, systematic
testing. Additionally, other self-organizing resource-flow systems might require minor
modifications to the underlying metamodel, e.g., to support the ingredient amounts of
the personalized medicine case study, potentially invalidating the formal verification as
the implementation by design no longer matches the verified model. In this case, testing
is imperative to ensure that the modifications do not introduce any bugs.
Figure 8.12 gives an overview of the general testing approach for self-organization
mechanisms based on S#. The approach consists of three main parts, each of which
is described in further detail in the following sections. The first part consists of the
S# test model of the system containing all relevant tolerable faults. For the robot cell
case study, for instance, the S# test model corresponds to the model that is used during
virtual commissioning. Different system configurations can be instantiated using S#’s
flexible model composition and instantiation capabilities. The second part is the test
platform provided by the S# framework, using DCCA as the test case generation and
execution mechanism; the reduced models that contain only the tolerable faults that
DCCA currently checks for criticality represent the test cases that have to be executed.
The actual configuration that is tested can be determined at run time when the system
is about to operate in the selected configuration. Consequently, virtual commissioning
facilitates both run time analyses as well as testing of self-organizing systems, coping
with the unbounded number of configurations that exist by only considering those
configurations that are actually used. The third part of the approach is the actual system
under test, that is, the real-world implementation of the self-organization mechanism
that is tested, requiring a mapping between the S# model and the actual system.
8.3.1 Platform for Test Case Selection and Execution
The testing approach repurposes DCCA, using it as its test case generation and test exe-
cution environment: For a given system configuration, a complete DCCA is conducted
for the hazard of non-existence of further configurations. During the entire time, the
S# model validates the configurations computed by the system under test in order to
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check their validity; in particular, if no new configuration is computed even though
one still exists, an exception is thrown, causing the test case to be classified as failed.
Test execution is successful when no exception is thrown during a complete DCCA,
i.e., as long as valid configurations exist, the system under test must be able to find
them and all computed configurations must satisfy the RIA predicate. The test approach
therefore assumes the actual reconfiguration mechanism to always find a solution as
long as one exists; genetic algorithms, on the other hand, may fail to do so, which can
be an acceptable tradeoff if more thorough techniques such as constraint solving are
too inefficient. In that case, the testing approach can be used to judge the quality of the
algorithm, identifying situations in which the algorithm is likely to fail.
DCCA can be seen as applying a boundary-interior test selection strategy [99]: Test
cases are selected such that the system is at or near the boundary of expected behav-
ioral changes, i.e., a RIA-based self-organizing system changes its behavior drastically
whenever the corridor of correct behavior is permanently violated as it cannot continue
functioning at all. Thus, DCCA tries to converge towards the boundary of the RIA cor-
ridor where the system under test most likely fails to find new configurations. Without
the use of heuristics, DCCA’s bottom-up search strategy includes many non-boundary
test cases, checking thousands if not millions of safe fault sets that are less likely to
uncover development faults. With heuristics, on the other hand, DCCA converges more
quickly towards the boundary as the heuristics are designed to suggest fault sets that
lie as close to the boundary as possible. Figure 8.13 illustrates these test strategies.
8.3.2 System Under Test
The S# test model describes the intended behavior of the system and interfaces with the
system under test for evaluation purposes: As the S# framework drives the entire testing
process by repurposing DCCA, the S# model must not only be able to reason about
the system’s intended behavior, but also about the actual behavior of the system under
test in order to determine whether the model and the implementation expose the same
behavior. For the robot cell case study, the block definition diagram shown by Figure 8.7
on page 192 shows the integration of the actual system under test into the S# model:
The MiniZincObserverController class interfaces with the MiniZinc constraint solver [148],
representing the self-organization mechanism under test in the form of a MiniZinc
constraint problem that is solved using FlatZinc [148]. Whenever the observer triggers
a reconfiguration, the S#model invokes MiniZinc with an instantiation of the constraint
problem mirroring the state of the S# model, specifying the task to be fulfilled, the
number of available agents as well as their respective, still functional capabilities, and
the routes the carts can take to transport workpieces between the robots. That is, during
test execution, the constraint solver is invoked by the S# model, converting the model’s
system state into the input format that the constraint solver understands. If MiniZinc
finds a solution, the solution is mapped back onto the S# model to determine its validity.
If no new configuration is found, the test model checks its oracles to determine whether
there indeed is no further configuration, reporting a test failure if the mechanism under
test and the test oracle disagree with each other. Consequently, the MiniZinc-based
implementation is tested back-to-back with the S# test model.
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DCCA w/ HeuristicsDCCA w/o HeuristicsDepth-First Approach
no faults
boundary characterized by the 
minimal critical fault sets
all faults
Figure 8.13. Conceptual illustration of three different search strategies for the boundary of
the corridor of correct behavior. The system configurations that conceptually lie at the bottom
are assumed to have no faults activated whereas at the top, all tolerable faults contained in
the S# model of the system are activated. The boundary in between graphically depicts the
different minimal critical fault sets that prevent the system from finding a valid configuration.
Consequently, valid configurations exist below the boundary while above it, no valid configu-
rations can be found. The depth-first search strategy used by model checking without DCCA
would cross the boundary several times, analyzing large numbers of fault sets for which no
configuration can possibly exist; such tests only increase test execution time but do not increase
test coverage in a meaningful way. DCCA without heuristics, on the other hand, employs a
breadth-first search that more quickly converges against the boundary and never crosses it.
However, without heuristics, there are still many superfluous tests well within the corridor
of correct behavior where development faults of the system under test are unlikely to be dis-
covered. Once heuristics are enabled, on the other hand, DCCA quickly converges against the
boundary from both sides, as the heuristics suggest both safe as well as critical fault sets. Since
the heuristics not always suggest minimal critical or maximal safe fault sets, some superfluous
test cases are still generated, but the overall number of test cases is reduced significantly.
8.3.3 Test Model
The S# test model contains the plants’ behavior as well as the test oracles for the ob-
server/controller under test, invoking the latter as explained above. As the system’s RIA
predicate determines valid system states, the predicate is contained in the S# model in
the role of a test oracle in order to determine whether a reconfiguration is necessary,
newly computed configurations are valid, and new role allocations are correctly dis-
tributed to all agents. For example, the following snippet of the robot cell’s S# model
shows the I/O consistency and capability consistency constraints modeled in S# as
lambda functions for a specific agent instance agent; the entirety of all such constraints
forms the RIA predicate. The first constraint checks whether the preconditions’ ports of
the agent’s allocated roles match the agent’s inputs. The second constraint ensures that
the capabilities required by the agent’s allocated roles are still available, i.e., the agent
has not lost any of its allocated capabilities due to some fault activations.
agent.Constraints = new List<Func<bool>>()
{
() => agent.AllocatedRoles.All(role => role.PreCondition.Port == null ||
agent.Inputs.Contains(role.PreCondition.Port)),
() => agent.AllocatedRoles.All(
role => role.CapabilitiesToApply.All(capability =>
agent.AvailableCapabilites.Contains(capability))),
// Additional constraints omitted...
}
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Input: robotAgents, cartAgents, tasks
Output: a Boolean value indicating whether a reconfiguration is possible
m← GetConnectionMatrix(robotAgents) // transitive closure of all connected robots
for all t ∈ tasks do
if ¬∀c ∈ t.Capabilities .∃a ∈ robotAgents . c ∈ a.AvailableCapabilities then
return false
end if
A← {a ∈ robotAgents | t.Capabilities[0] ∈ a.AvailableCapabilities }
for i = 0 to |task.Capabilities| − 1 do
A← {a ∈ m[a′] | a′ ∈ A ∧ t.Capabilities[i+ 1] ∈ a.AvailableCapabilities }
if |A| = 0 then
return false
end if
end for
end for
return true
Algorithm 4. The algorithm that the S# test model uses as its test oracle to determine whether
a reconfiguration is possible for a given set of robot and cart agents as well as the tasks to be
carried out. The algorithm starts by checking whether all capabilities of the tasks the system
has to process are still available; for instance, if at least one task requires a robot to drill a hole,
at least one robot must still have the drilling capability available. Subsequently, the algorithm
checks whether it is still possible to establish a resource flow between the robots such that
the order of tool applications required by the tasks can be adhered to. Therefore, it must be
possible for the carts to transport the workpieces between the robots that still have the required
capabilities, and they must be able to do so in the order required by the workpieces’ tasks.
In fact, the S#model contains two sets of constraints for the test oracle: One is specific for
the observer and the other concerns the controller. The observer-related set contains all
constraints that describe the corridor of correct behavior, hence their violations must be
detected by the observer under test in order to trigger a reconfiguration. Consequently,
the constraints for the observer oracle are evaluated once the observer under test actually
triggers a reconfiguration, checking whether the reconfiguration is justified; conversely,
if the observer under test fails to trigger a reconfiguration even though one is necessary,
the system under test is considered to be unable to find a new configuration. Additionally,
a superset of the observer constraints must be checked whenever the controller under
test computes a new configuration as there are some constraints that affect controller
correctness but are otherwise irrelevant for the observer. For example, the allocated roles
of the robots must be connected together such that all tasks’ required capabilities are
applied in the right order. There is no need for the observer to check this constraint, since
no environmental influences or fault activations can ever change previously distributed
role allocations. Only the tools used by the roles or the connections between agents can
fail, for instance, in which case the observer under test must trigger a reconfiguration.
In addition to the controller constraints that allow S# to determine whether the con-
figuration computed by the system under test is valid, it uses Algorithm 4 to check
whether the real reconfiguration mechanism finds a new configuration as long as one
exists. While this requirement has to be relaxed for self-organization mechanisms based
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# # ∅ Capabilities ∅ Routes ∅ Capabilities # Test
Robots Carts per Robot per Cart per Task Cases Time
4 3 2.8 2.8 6 131000 9.5h
3 2 1.7 1.7 5 49 0.2m
3 2 3.7 3.7 5 26763 69.3m
3 2 1.7 1.7 5 157 0.4m
3 2 1.7 1.7 8 47 0.8m
5 2 1.6 1.6 5 1577 6.9m
3 4 1.7 1.7 5 369 1.1m
Table 8.5. Overview of the evaluation results for the testing approach based on DCCAwithout
heuristics for seven different configurations of the robot cell case study. The reported times
correspond to complete DCCAs, i.e., complete boundary-interior testing of the case study’s
reconfiguration mechanism. The number of test cases corresponds to the number of fault sets
that have to be checked for criticality.
on genetic algorithms, for instance, it is important to check when the implementation
is based on constraint solving: This additional check ensures that no development
faults such as overconstraint problems [95] are overlooked. That is, there could be an
implementation fault that systematically prevents the reconfiguration mechanism under
test from finding valid configurations under certain circumstances. In order for S# to
determine whether a new configuration still exists, it must itself search for valid con-
figurations using Algorithm 4. Such algorithms might be expensive to execute in both
time and space, i.e., they can be a very inefficient test oracle. However, the algorithm
is only executed when the system under test fails to find a new configuration, thus it
is not executed in all test cases. Additionally, in the situations it is in fact executed in,
the system is likely to be almost out of redundancy, in which case there are not many
configurations that still exist, reducing the execution time of Algorithm 4.
8.3.4 Evaluation of the Testing Approach
The S#-based testing approach for self-organization mechanisms is evaluated for differ-
ent configurations of the robot cell case study using an observer/controller based on the
MiniZinc constraint solver. Overall testing times reported by Table 8.5 are significantly
higher than the run time safety analysis times reported in Section 8.1.5 due to the integra-
tion of MiniZinc: The necessary data transformations between the S# test model and the
MiniZinc-based system under test as well as the MiniZinc process startup time result in
significant overhead of at least 100 milliseconds for each reconfiguration. The algorithm
implemented in S#, called CSharpObserverController in Figure 8.7 on page 192, on the
other hand, typically completes reconfiguration requests around three to four orders of
magnitudes faster. Consequently, using MiniZinc for the case study is rather pointless as
a special-purpose algorithm exists that solves the problem significantly more efficiently.
However, other self-organizing systems might indeed require a constraint solver if no
such efficient, special-purpose algorithm exists. The S#-based testing approach can thus
also be used for such systems, with the MiniZinc-based evaluation of the robot cell case
study demonstrating the applicability of the approach.
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Detection of Development Faults. The evaluation of the robot cell case study shows
that the testing approach is indeed able to detect various kinds of development faults. As
required by the back-to-back testing methodology, the MiniZinc-based implementation
of the system was developed separately from the S# model, revealing the following
development faults mostly caused by misinterpretations of informal requirements:
• The first development fault results from an imprecise specification of the output
provided byMiniZinc: When the newly computed configuration is mapped back to the
S#model, the S#model expects the capabilities allocated to an agent to be a zero-based
index into the agent’s array of available capabilities. MiniZinc, by contrast, returns
the zero-based index within the task’s sequence of required capability applications.
• The second development fault is caused by a misunderstanding of the meaning of the
resource state contained in the pre- and postconditions of the allocated roles. The S#
model assumes the state to consist of the capabilities that have yet to be applied on a
resource instead of those capabilities that already have been executed. Consequently,
for a task requiring the application of [D, I, T], the S# model should have mapped the
state to [ ] in the precondition of the first robot and to [D] in the postcondition if the
robot only applies the drill capability. Instead, the precondition’s state is set to [D, I, T]
and the postcondition’s state is set to [I, T], resulting in a RIA predicate violation.
• The third detected development fault affects route handling: The MiniZinc implemen-
tation interprets routes between robots as direct connections, whereas some of these
connections only result from the transitive closure computed by the S# model. In
some situations, MiniZinc consequently computes configurations that require a cart
to directly connect two robots that would actually require at least one intermediate
robot in between; i.e., MiniZinc computes an invalid configuration in this case.
• The fourth development fault also concerns route handling: MiniZinc considers
specified routes to be unidirectional even though the S# model means them to be
bidirectional. At run time, the fault can thus manifest itself as the system under test
being unable to find a new configuration even though at least one still exists; i.e.,
MiniZinc does not make use of all available redundancy.
• The last uncovered fault results from overly strict restrictions in the MiniZinc model
that do not allow the use of intermediate robots in the resource flow. Such robots do
not have any allocated roles but simply pass on any incoming workpieces to some
other cart. Consequently, MiniZinc fails to find a new configuration in some situations
because it is too inflexible with regard to resource routing.
DCCA-based test execution detects the first two development faults with all seven
configurations listed in Table 8.5. The other three development faults, by contrast, mainly
depend on the topology of the system, requiring a sufficient amount of redundancy to be
taken away by tolerable faults in order to maneuver the system into a situation in which
the development faults manifest themselves. Thus, the smaller configurations shown in
Table 8.5 are unable to uncover the development faults related to route handling.
Efficiency of DCCA-Based Testing. DCCA is repurposed for test case selection and
execution in order to decrease the time it takes to detect development faults. The
underlying assumption is that such faults are more likely to manifest themselves in
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situations in which the system is in the vicinity of the boundary of the corridor of
correct behavior, already having used up most of its redundancy reserves. The first two
aforementioned faults are so severe that they are discovered almost instantly regardless
of which of the search strategies illustrated in Figure 8.13 is used by the testing approach.
The remaining three development faults, however, are indeed more likely to occur at or
near the boundary. Compared to a depth-first testing approach based on model checking
that does not take advantage of DCCA, DCCA-based test execution generally does not
reveal the development faults much faster. The biggest exception is the fifth development
fault related to the overly strict restrictions of the MiniZinc implementation; in that case,
DCCA is able to discover the fault in about 420 seconds while the depth-first approach
takes more than two hours. Consequently, more complicated and less likely faults can be
uncovered more quickly with DCCA even without the use of heuristics. With heuristics,
the time required to find the faults decreases by an additional factor of roughly 2x.
8.4 Towards Analysis and Testing of Adaptive Robot Systems
As exemplified by the robot cell case study, future robot systems become more flexible
than their contemporary counterparts by increasing their level of autonomy through
self-organization or adaptation. System and software development for robots therefore
heads towards component-based architectures [32] to cope with these novel challenges,
in particular to support new forms of human-robot collaboration [94]: Detecting human
presence and calculating an appropriate reaction is one of the primary challenges for
the development of collaborative working environments for robots and humans. To
avoid injuries, robot control software has to be able to adapt to hardware failures
and new, unforeseeable situations such as external disturbances. New concepts and
techniques are required on many different levels to ensure both functional correctness
and safety of these systems. For example, revisions of robot safety standards such as
ISO 10218 [109] address ongoing developments by updating and renewing regulations
as well as safety considerations for human-robot collaboration. To comply with these
future standards, scalable, automated, and reliable analysis and testing techniques for
autonomous, adaptive robot systems must be developed. The following discusses some
first ideas for an integrated analysis and testing approach based on the S# framework
that addresses functional quality goals as well as safety aspects.
Component-Based Adaptive Robot Systems. The component-based run time envi-
ronment for robotics by Vistein et al. [197] is able to adapt the robot control software to
new or modified system-level tasks whenever necessary. It supports real-time compo-
nents that access a wide variety of sensors and actuators such as detection mechanisms
for humans or tools that operate on workpieces, respectively. Computational subtasks
allow the execution of real-time-sensitive algorithms and continuous behavior with
dedicated ports restricting and coordinating the communication between different com-
ponents. In particular, new computational tasks can be submitted to the run time
environment during task execution with synchronization rules stopping running tasks
and starting newly submitted ones at the appropriate times. Hence, the run time envi-
ronment is able to change the composition of active components in order to adapt the
overall behavior of the robot system to changing environmental circumstances.
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Figure 8.14. An overview of the integration of S# models and the run time environment for
robotics. The usual feedback cycle between plants and controllers enables the system’s overall
adaptivity. The upper part of the figure shows the controller, i.e., the actual component-based
robot control software whereas the lower part depicts the plant, sensors, and actuators modeled
in S#. The sensor and actuator components used by the controller support both the integration
of real hardware as well as the connection to the S# model. Faults must be integrated into the
S# model in order to allow S# to assess system safety.
Integrating Component-Based Robotics and S#. The analysis and testing approach
for adaptive robot systems integrates the component-based robot run time environment
into the model checking-based verification and safety analysis techniques provided by
S# as illustrated by Figure 8.14: The integration enables virtual commissioning, similar
to how the MiniZinc constraint solver can be integrated into S#-based analyses. The S#
model describes behavioral and structural aspects of the controlled plant as well as the
sensors and actuators available to the controller. Additionally, S# handles the activations
of relevant faults in order to analyze and test the actual control software’s reactions
to these disturbances. Thus, the S# parts of the model test-drive the actual controller
software using S#’s model checker, enabling systematic, explorative, model-based testing
of adaptive, component-based robot systems.
The two parts of the integrated model must bridge a gap between the different run
time environments and programming languages; like most embedded systems [119], the
robotic control software is implemented in C++ and runs in a real-time critical context.
The S# parts of the model can make use of standard technologies such as remote method
invocation in order to interface with the device drivers of the actual robot controller,
for example. However, abstractions of the plant behavior are required to cope with the
infinite amount of possible human-robot interactions. It therefore seems unlikely that
fully exhaustive model checking is possible for these models, in particular due to the
low cycle times of the robot controllers in the range of a few milliseconds. Bounded
model checking might have to suffice, at least facilitating exhaustive analyses for short
periods of time that thoroughly check a few seconds of actual robot behavior. These
restrictions reduce S#’s model checking-based analyses to a form of non-exhaustive
testing, which, however, still enables analyses of both functional correctness as well as
safety concerns through incomplete, yet sound, DCCAs.
Testing Functional Correctness & Safety of Robot Systems. The integrated analy-
sis and testing approach enables tests that verify and validate the robot control software’s
functional correctness and can make use of DCCA for safety assessment. However,
these DCCAs are incomplete, only uncovering potential safety issues for small fractions
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of thoroughly analyzed behavior. For the selection of appropriate test cases, two test
selection strategies seem promising: Human workflows in the collaborative working
environments are typically standardized and repetitive, making it possible to derive
usage profiles with low variance that contain the most likely interactions. As hazards
often result after unpredictable and unforeseeable situations, random testing can be used
to reach a certain base level of test coverage for the remaining, less likely, potentially
unintentional and unsafe human-robot interactions. Overall, the combination of these
two test selection strategies provides high test coverage for highly significant scenarios,
at the same time noticeably reducing the number of test cases without completely
disregarding more unlikely safety-critical situations. Full test coverage, while desirable,
cannot be achieved due to the infinite amount of possible human-robot interactions.
Furthermore, it is necessary to introduce a test oracle into the S# model similar to
the oracles for the observer/controller when testing self-organizing mechanisms. The
test oracles classify the test results as either correct or incorrect and safe or unsafe,
respectively. Due to the high amount of different system states and behaviors, it is
infeasible to enumerate all of them, making it necessary to use predicates to specify valid
states and behaviors at a more abstract level similar to the RIA predicate. Subsequently,
these predicates can be evaluated during test execution to determine whether the tests
fail or succeed [50]. Moreover, mathematical models are required to describe the nominal
behavior of the robot system using, for instance, differential equations to describe the
robots’ dynamics. Especially for the latter, the S# modeling language must be extended
to support continuous behavior; alternatively, adequate abstractions must be found to
map the robot dynamics to S#’s discrete-state, discrete-time model of computation.
8.5 Related Work
Modeling Language Expressiveness. Safety analysis tools such as Scade, VECS, the
Compass toolset, HiP-HOPS, and many others [2, 135, 151, 181] could in principle also be
used to model and analyze self-organizing systems. Compared to the S#-based approach,
however, there are several distinct disadvantages related to the level of expressiveness
of the respective modeling languages: The languages do not feature the same flexibility
with regard to model instantiation and composition that can be used for the S# models.
Consequently, their lack of a built-in run time model adaptation and instantiation
mechanism would have to be compensated with additional tools to mirror the analyzed
system’s actual state onto the models used for analysis. Moreover, the expressiveness
provided by C# is important for the creation of adequate and comprehensible models.
In particular, the metamodel for self-organizing resource-flow systems can be directly
mapped to S# using its object-oriented features as well as its state machine-based
behavioral specification mechanism. Furthermore, the reconfiguration algorithm can be
conveniently expressed using regular control flow-based constructs and external tools
such as the MiniZinc constraint solver can be integrated into the S# model both for
formal analyses as well as testing. The ability to simulate and debug S# models using
C#’s and Visual Studio’s sophisticated debugging engine cannot be underestimated
when modeling such complex case studies; without good debugging support, finding
and understanding modeling faults is significantly harder.
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Alternative Analysis Techniques. The underlying analysis techniques of the afore-
mentioned safety analysis tools do not allow heuristics to be specified that would enable
them to efficiently rule out large amounts of safe fault sets. One of the reasons for their
inability to do so is their tight integration into specific model checkers [26, 30, 122],
whereas the algorithm that drives S#’s DCCA implementation is completely separated
from those parts of S# that do the actual model checking. Thus, S#’s DCCA imple-
mentation and the heuristics could be used for analyzing NuSMV models, for instance,
provided that a NuSMV backend is implemented that interfaces between S#’s DCCA
integration and a NuSMV model of a self-organizing system. Additionally, the safety
analysis techniques by Bozzano et al. [26, 30] that FSAP/NuSMV, xSap, and the Compass
toolset are built upon, cannot take advantage of heuristics without giving up analysis
soundness and completeness: Due to their underlying formalization, the techniques
can only assume the monotonicity of critical fault sets, i.e., they have to make certain
assumptions about the structure of the models as well as the modeled faults and their ef-
fects in order to take advantage of monotonicity. DCCA, by contrast, is defined in a way
such that monotonicity generally holds regardless of the model that is analyzed, thus
making it possible to use the heuristics without affecting soundness or completeness.
Adaptive DCCA. A variant of DCCA was developed for the analysis of self-organizing
systems called Adaptive DCCA [67]. It is claimed that the original DCCA cannot be
applied to self-organizing systems as hazards may sometimes only occur temporarily,
namely when the RIA predicate is temporarily violated before a subsequent reconfigu-
ration results in a valid configuration again. Consequently, Adaptive DCCA extends the
original CTL-based notion of fault set criticality to self-organizing systems by allowing
the hazard to occur multiple times before it is actually considered to be occurring. For-
mally, Adaptive DCCA checks the CTL formulaK |= onlyΓEU=(EG(H ∧ onlyΓ)) in
order to determine whether fault set Γ is critical for a hazard H with onlyΓ defined as
usual. Instead of a single occurrence of H , H must at some point occur continuously
without any additional activations of faults f ∈ F (K) \ Γ. Adaptive DCCA therefore
requires all faults F (K)\Γ to be activation-independent inK as otherwise the existence
of a path in whichH occurs and subsequently onlyΓ holds forever cannot be guaranteed.
If activation independence is not given, Adaptive DCCA might overlook some minimal
critical fault sets. By contrast, the S#-based analysis approach for self-organizing sys-
tems uses the regular definition of safe fault sets by analyzing for different hazards than
Adaptive DCCA: At the system-level with intolerable faults, hazards are damaged or
incompletely processed workpieces. For tolerable faults, the hazard is not a temporary
violation of the RIA predicate but rather the reconfiguration mechanism’s inability to
find further configurations. Consequently, S#-based analyses only require activation
independence to use the fault removal optimization but it has otherwise no effect on
analysis soundness or completeness.
VECS-Based Safety Analysis of the Robot Cell Case Study. Using Adaptive DCCA,
Güdemann [67] performed an evaluation of a highly abstract model of the robot cell case
study modeled with VECS [135], only analyzing a single system configuration with three
robots, two carts, and each robot having the drill, insert, and tighten capabilities; each
robot must have exactly one role with only one capability allocated. Nine faults were
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considered that correspond to the failures of each of the nine capabilities contained in the
system. Themodel is specific for the single configuration and cannot be instantiated with
different numbers of robots, carts, workpieces, or tasks that require other capabilities to
be applied. Additionally, the reconfiguration mechanism is modeled by allowing the
model checker to choose any configuration, requiring an LTL-encoded constraint so
that the model checker ignores invalid configurations. As Adaptive DCCA is based on
CTL and VECS’ model checking backend NuSMV does not support LTL constraints
when checking a CTL formula, DCCAs must be carried out manually using the Cadence
SMV model checker that supports LTL constraints during CTL model checking. The
analyzed configuration has 15 minimal critical fault sets that were found in slightly
over four minutes. Analyzing the same configuration with S# only takes a couple of
seconds without heuristics; however, fewer minimal critical fault sets are found as the
S# model allows zero, one, or more roles for each robot, increasing the system’s overall
fault tolerance and therefore even requiring more fault sets to be checked for criticality,
as there are more safe fault sets compared to the VECS model.
Models@run.time. Virtual commissioning for run time analyses based on S# resem-
bles the models@run.time approach. It also synchronizes the models and the actual
adaptive systems at run time in order to analyze their functional correctness and various
quality attributes [7], including the use of probabilistic model checking for the run time
evaluation of system resilience [45]. However, a systematic approach for run time safety
analyses has not yet been developed [19]. The run time models allow an adaptive system
to reason about what-if scenarios without affecting the actual software or hardware
components, similar to conducting DCCAs for potential future configurations while the
system is still within the corridor of correct behavior. The models@run.time approach
proposes a new modeling language and interpreter for model execution, whereas S#
builds upon the established .NET framework and C# programming language, using
.NET’s type system as its meta-metamodel. Thus, S#’s meta-metamodel is specifically
designed for efficient program execution and run time object composition, both of
which form the basis of S#’s support for run time model composition and instantiation.
Other research directions in the area of models@run.time concern run time safety
certification [192], which, however, lies outside the scope of this thesis.
Optimization Strategies for RunTimeAnalyses. The strategies proposed by Gerasi-
mou et al. [69] for increasing the efficiency of run time analyses are particularly relevant
for S#’s run time analysis approach: The suggested caching strategy is similar to S#’s
maximal safe fault sets heuristic which makes recomputing minimal critical fault sets
more efficient by reusing previously computed ones as likely candidates for the new
ones. The proposed lookahead strategy precomputes analysis results for the most likely
successor configurations before the next reconfiguration has even started. The same
idea is supported by the S#-based approach, allowing the virtual commissioning phase
to be skipped when the minimal critical fault sets of the next configuration are already
precomputed. Additionally, Gerasimou et al. [69] relax optimality requirements for
reconfigurations in order to noticeably increased analysis efficiency. Forced fault activa-
tion is a related idea. In a similar vein, it would also be possible to use statistical model
checking instead of fully exhaustive model checking. With statistical model checking,
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only the most problematic minimal critical fault sets would be computed instead of
conducting complete DCCAs, which might be an acceptable tradeoff to reduce analysis
times. In contrast to forced fault activation, statistical model checking can provide
statistical evidence for the satisfaction or violation of the analyzed property [126]. Con-
sequently, statistical model checking can yield the wrong result just like DCCAs with
forced fault activation, but it is able to limit the probability of making an error.
Run Time Probabilistic Model Checking. Filieri et al. [63] suggest to split up analy-
ses of adaptive systems into two steps in order to facilitate efficient probabilistic model
checking at run time: At design time, symbolic expressions are generated from the
development models of the analyzed system that are parameterized so that they can be
efficiently evaluated at run time when the concrete parameter values are known. These
expressions can also be used for sensitivity analyses, for instance, allowing the system
to reason about the impact that changes to the parameters have on the overall system.
However, large changes to the structure of a self-organizing system might require run
time recomputations of the parameterized expressions, decreasing the effectiveness of
the overall analysis approach.
Summary and Outlook. Self-organizing systems often have an unlimited number of possible
system configurations, making exhaustive safety analyses impossible at design time. The virtual
commissioning approach presented in this chapter takes advantage of S#’s model composition
capabilities to move safety analyses to run time, only analyzing those configurations that a self-
organizing system actually executes at some point. Moreover, faults are classified as either tolerable
or intolerable subject to the ability of the self-organization mechanism to work around their activations.
This separation allows multiple DCCAs with smaller fault sets to be carried out instead of a single
DCCA considering all faults; as DCCA has exponential complexity in the number of faults, analysis
times can improve significantly. Additionally, the two safe fault sets heuristics for self-organizing
resource-flow systems presented in this chapter further reduce DCCA times noticeably. For the
hazard of non-existence of further configurations and system designs based on the RIA approach,
the minimal critical fault sets characterize the corridor of correct behavior, showing potential weak
spots of a system where it is likely to run out of redundancy. Moreover, DCCA can be used as a test
case selection strategy and execution platform for model-based testing of the functional correctness
of self-organization mechanisms and adaptive robot systems.
Despite the progress made in this thesis towards a run time safety analysis approach for self-
organizing systems, there still are many open research questions and further efficiency optimization
opportunities. For example, the two heuristics presented in this chapter are highly effective for the
personalized medicine case study, but less effective for the robot cell case study due to the more
flexible routing possibilities of the carts. Consequently, additional heuristics must be developed.
Furthermore, the maximal safe fault sets heuristic from Chapter 6 must be improved to cope with the
large number of minimal critical fault sets that self-organizing systems typically have. Additionally,
the overall integration of the virtual commissioning approach with real systems has not yet been
attempted at the time of writing; however, the individual steps of the analysis approach such as run
time safety analyses and model-based testing of self-organization mechanisms are fully developed
in this thesis. The use of the S# framework and its analysis capabilities for adaptive robot systems
has only been roughly sketched out so far with many open research questions remaining, e.g., the
effectiveness of usage profiles as a test selection strategy is unknown and a way to adequately
abstract from complex human behavior and human-robot interactions must be found.
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Summary. This chapter summarizes the three main contributions of this thesis
in order to give an overview of the achieved outcomes: A systematic modeling
approach for safety-critical systems based on executable models is introduced,
new formalisms and techniques for efficient formal safety analyses using explicit-
state model checking are defined, and an analysis and testing approach for self-
organizing systems carried out at run time is suggested based on the unified model
analysis features developed for the S# framework. Furthermore, the evaluation
results for the case studies are discussed and an outlook to future work is provided. 9
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The title of this thesis, Design Time and Run Time Formal Safety Analysis using Ex-
ecutable Models, already suggests the three main areas that all of the contributions
presented in the preceding chapters fall into: The formal foundations summarized in
Section 9.1 such as fault-aware modeling and specification, fault injection, as well as
fault removal DCCA enable efficient explicit-state formal safety analyses. The analyses
are carried out on executable models with the help of the S# modeling and analysis
framework for safety-critical systems as recapitulated by Section 9.2. Adequate S# mod-
els of a system are created by following a systematic modeling approach that emphasizes
fundamental fault modeling concepts, bringing forward standard software development
best practices to safety assessment. S#’s model execution approach not only unifies
model checking and model simulations, it also supports the run time applicability of the
formal analysis techniques in addition to design time analyses; Section 9.3 summaries
the evaluation results of the formal analysis techniques and the S# framework for the
case studies. Lastly, an outlook to future work is given in Section 9.4.
9.1 Efficient Formal Safety Analysis
Fault-aware modeling and specification as introduced in Chapter 5 forms the basis for
efficient formal safety analyses using DCCA. The core concept of fault activations is
directly encoded into fault-aware Kripke structures, allowing fault injection to be defined
such that conservative extension is guaranteed, i.e., the nominal behavior contained in
a model is not changed by the addition of off-nominal behavior. Fault removal allows
faults to be removed without affecting the remaining behavior of the model, in particular
allowing previously injected faults to be removed in such a way that a Kripke structure
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results that is behaviorally equivalent to the original one. These main achievements of
fault-aware modeling and specification can be taken advantage of to improve DCCA
efficiency by removing those faults from a model that are irrelevant during a check
for criticality. Furthermore, the conceptual improvements made to DCCA make it
compatible with a broader variety of analysis tools and increase its practical usability.
Applicability of the Techniques. The formal foundations capture the formal re-
quirements for fault injection and fault removal in a tool-independent way, indirectly
describing the allowed changes that most safety analysis tools make during fault injec-
tion. Consequently, different analysis tools such as S#, VECS, the Compass toolset, or
FSAP/NuSMV can all define their own notions of fault injection and model extension,
but in the end, they all have to satisfy the requirements presented in this thesis. On the
other hand, if these tools can guarantee activation independence of the analyzed faults,
they can also take advantage of the fault removal variant of DCCA, provided that they
can remove faults from a model without too much overhead. In particular, fault removal
introduces absolutely no overhead in the S# framework.
Tool Independence. The formal contributions made by this thesis are independent
of the high-level modeling languages such as S# or others that are used for modeling:
As long as these languages support a transformation to fault-aware Kripke structures,
they inherit all of the formal foundations, efficiency improvements, and analyzability
with DCCA. Such transformations are not necessarily required to be carried out by the
actual implementations of the tools as shown for the S# framework: Model execution in
conjunction with on-the-fly model checking algorithms avoids the explicit creation of
any Kripke structures during analyses, thereby further improving analysis efficiency.
Model Checking Efficiency. For safety-critical systems, faults add a huge number of
additional states when using the common state-based fault modeling approach, impeding
the use of model checking-based analysis techniques for larger systems. Fault-aware
modeling and specification helps to significantly decrease the impact of fault injection
on the number of reachable states and transitions by focusing on fault activations instead
of fault persistency. Notably, transient faults are the general case subsuming all other
forms of persistency; with the S# framework, they result in optimal fault-aware Kripke
structures in the sense that no overhead is introduced, i.e., all additional states and
transitions are absolutely necessary to describe their effects.
DCCA Efficiency. Even if general model checking-based analyses are very time-
consuming for large models, it might still be possible to carry out DCCAs reasonably
quick for two reasons: Firstly, the fault removal optimization reduces the number of
faults that have to be considered when small fault sets are checked for criticality, thus it
is likely that small fault sets can indeed be checked for and found quickly. Secondly,
DCCAs are carried out bottom-up using an anytime algorithm that can be aborted at
any time, yielding a correct albeit incomplete set of minimal critical fault sets. Even
incomplete DCCAs can still be useful for safety assessment: The minimal critical fault
sets that are indeed identified by them are often the most relevant ones, as smaller fault
sets typically have a larger impact on the overall occurrence probability of a hazard.
Thus, they highlight the most severe safety issues of a system.
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9.2 Systematic Modeling and Unified Model Execution
The S# framework supports the creation of executable models using the C# program-
ming language and the .NET run time environment. Systematic modeling guidelines
with a particular emphasis on fault modeling concepts foster the creation of adequate S#
models of both nominal and off-nominal behavior. The underlying model of computa-
tion takes advantage of the assumption of zero execution time to reduce both modeling
complexity and analysis times. The main difference between the S# modeling and anal-
ysis framework and other formal safety analysis tools is the executability of its models
and the unified model execution approach that underlies all analyses. Especially for
complex case studies such as the self-organizing systems considered in Chapter 8, the
S# framework has a competitive edge over other tools for safety analysis: Development,
debugging, testing, and simulations of S#models are tightly integrated with formal anal-
ysis techniques. In particular, S# makes it possible to use various .NET tools, including
Visual Studio, throughout the entire model development and analysis process.
Expressive & Modular Modeling Language. S# provides a component- and object-
oriented domain specific language that supports the systematic modeling approach
introduced in Chapter 3. It includes comprehensive support for fault modeling as
well as flexible model composition capabilities for design variant exploration or virtual
commissioning, for instance. Modelingwith S# does not feel different from programming
with C#, as most C# language features and .NET libraries are supported by S# as well.
In particular, the S# modeling language supports the specification of both control flow-
and state machine-based behavior as well as mixtures thereof; the former is especially
useful to model reconfiguration algorithms of self-organizing systems.
EfficientModel Checking & Formal Safety Analyses. The integration of the formal
analysis techniques into the S# framework reduce model checking times by up to three
orders of magnitude, in general making explicit-state model checking of high-level S#
models competitive with symbolic analysis techniques operating on low-level models.
The S# framework conducts DCCAs automatically and efficiently through zero-overhead
fault removal. Systems with many or large minimal critical fault sets can additionally
specify heuristics that help DCCA to find the minimal critical fault sets considerably
faster. Consequently, formal safety analyses of S# models are highly efficient despite
the high-level modeling concepts they can use to comprehensively model complex case
studies such as the self-organizing robot cell.
Simulations, Tests, Debugging, and Visualizations. The S# framework supports
model development through model simulations, model tests, and model visualizations.
Moreover, the S# framework seamlessly integrates into standard .NET tools: The C#
debugger can be used to diagnose model issues during model simulations as if regular
C# programs were debugged. Furthermore, Visual Studio’s refactoring capabilities
can be used during model creation, whereas UI designers are helpful to create model
visualizations. Collaborative modeling in a team is also supported by standard source
control software such as Git and build servers that enable continuous integration,
automatically validating changes with regression tests for the models. The availability
of such tools becomes more important with increasing case study complexity.
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Implementation Effort. S#’s unified model execution approach allows large parts of
the model execution code to be shared between model simulations and model checking
in order to guarantee semantic consistency. Consequently, the framework itself is
implemented in relatively few lines of code considering its feature set: At the time of
writing of this thesis, the core library that facilitates model execution and all kinds of
analyses has about 8500 lines of C# code while the extension library for the C# compiler
consists of roughly 3900 lines of C# code. Both libraries are tested with about 640 tests,
most of which with multiple test assertions; some of these tests are integration tests
that dynamically compile and execute entire S# models. All in all, there are about 22500
lines of test code for S#’s compiler and its core library.
9.3 Design Time and Run Time Safety Analysis
The six case studies introduced in Chapter 2 are modeled and analyzed with the S#
framework to demonstrate the applicability of both the formal techniques as well as
the S# framework for analyses at design time and at run time. With S#, it is not only
possible to model and analyze classical reactive systems such as the pressure tank or
the height control, but complex self-organizing ones like the robot cell as well. To cope
with the inherent complexity of the case studies, the models take advantage of S#’s
systematic, component-oriented modeling approach while analyses benefit from fault-
aware modeling and specification, fault removal DCCA, and safe fault sets heuristics.
Modeling Language Expressiveness. The systematic modeling approach presented
in Chapter 3 and the expressiveness of the S# modeling language help to cope with the
complexities of the case studies, overcoming the modeling-related challenges mentioned
in Chapter 2: For the height control case study, multiple design variants can be modeled
separately and composed together as demonstrated in Chapter 7. Furthermore, S#
facilitates the convenient instantiation of different configurations of the self-organization
case studies. In particular, the reconfiguration algorithms of these two case studies can be
naturally modeled as algorithms instead of necessitating, for instance, a convoluted state
machine-based specification. The railroad crossing case study’s two physically separate
controllers profit from the systematic modeling approach, whereas the hemodialysis
machine case study uses S#’s modeling expressiveness to describe the blood and dialyzing
fluid flows between the individual components of the machine.
Tool Support. Complex case studies necessitate better tool support, firstly to help with
the creation of the models and secondly to assist with their analyses: Code completion
and refactoring tools are invaluable for initial modeling and subsequent changes and
improvements that typically have to be made at some point. Regression testing helps
to ensure that changes to a model do not have unintended side effects, while model
debugging helps with uncovering the causes for such side effects when they inevitably
occur. The S# framework inherits all of this tooling from its integration into Visual
Studio and the standard .NET tool chain.
Analysis Efficiency. Chapter 2 identifies analysis efficiency as one of the main chal-
lenges for all case studies except for the very simple pressure tank. The S# framework
and the underlying formal analysis techniques reduce analysis times in several ways:
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Fault-aware modeling and specification reduces the number of situations in which faults
have to be considered during model checking. For self-organizing systems, virtual
commissioning is used to cope with the unbounded number of possible system configu-
rations in addition to a modularization of safety analyses by distinguishing between
tolerable and intolerable faults. The fault removal variant of DCCA considerably reduces
safety analysis times, typically finding all minimal critical fault sets very quickly; the
majority of the time is spent in verifying that the remaining fault sets are indeed safe.
The safe fault sets heuristics are specifically designed to improve this last part of a
DCCA by reducing the number of fault sets that have to check for criticality.
9.4 Outlook
Even though this thesis provides a comprehensive approach for systematic design time
and run time formal safety analyses of executable models, many open research questions
about a variety of additional aspects remain that also are of relevance in the context of
safety assessment. The following provides an outlook to some future work that could
be tackled based on the contributions of this thesis.
Extending the Model of Computation. The model of computation underlying S#
models allows for efficient analyses without being overly restrictive as demonstrated by
the evaluations of the case studies. However, the S# framework cannot directly express
the notion of time, requiring the explicit addition of timers when time-sensitive behavior
must be modeled. But such timers are inefficiently treated as regular components;
dedicated, more efficient analysis techniques based on clock regions [44] exist that can
potentially be integrated into S#’s model execution approach. Conceptually, explicit
support for time is similar to fault-aware modeling and specification in the sense that an
important concept is explicitly represented semantically in order to reduce analysis times.
Similarly, it might be beneficial to make discretizations of some forms of continuous
behavior automatic to increase model comprehensibility and analysis efficiency.
Support for Probabilistic Safety Analyses. Minimal critical fault sets make it pos-
sible to devise additional safety measures to increase the analyzed system’s overall
safety. Consequently, the completeness guarantee by DCCA is of high importance
during system development. However, the actual probability for the occurrence of a
hazard is also of great interest, both during development as well as for safety certifica-
tion [80, 186]. Therefore, probabilistic analysis techniques are currently being integrated
into the S# framework: Similar to S#’s integration of the LTSmin model checker for non-
probabilistic analyses, probabilistic analyses integrate the explicit-state MRMC model
checker [117]. Probabilities can be specified for fault activations that are tracked during
model execution. In this analysis mode, a fault-aware Markov chain is conceptually
induced that inherits the state and transition count reductions from fault-aware Kripke
structures for transient faults; for other kinds of persistency, state-based fault modeling
must be used as otherwise hazard probabilities would be changed inappropriately.
Safety Analysis at Run Time for Self-Organizing Systems. Safe fault sets heuris-
tics are an important step forward to cope with the inherently high level of redundancy
of self-organizing systems. The two heuristics presented in Chapter 8 work well for
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the personalized medicine case study, but the more complex interconnections of the
robots through the flexible routing possibilities of the carts require some additional
heuristics for the robot cell case study. Furthermore, it might be beneficial to more
tightly integrate the heuristics with the analyzed models: At the moment, the heuristics
can only reason about faults when S#’s DCCA algorithm informs them about some
analyzed fault set to be either safe or critical. If the heuristics also had access to the
analyzed system configurations, they might be able to improve their suggestions; for
example, a configuration that only uses some of the agents, capabilities, and routes
immediately implies that all other agents, capabilities, and routes are redundant, hence
the corresponding fault set is safe. Furthermore, it is an open research question whether
the knowledge of the minimal critical fault sets can be used to guide the system’s re-
configuration mechanism such that the mean time to failure increases. That is, the
minimal critical fault sets could be part of the reconfiguration mechanism’s inputs for
the computation of the next system configuration, allowing it to avoid configurations
that use up the remaining redundancy sooner than other configurations that could have
been chosen alternatively.
Safety Analysis of Robot Systems. Adaptive robot systems pose a significant chal-
lenge for safety analysis approaches: Robots become more autonomous, yet they are
expected to cause no harm for people working near them or interacting with them
directly. From a technical standpoint, the integration of a robot controller into a S#
model does not seem to be particularly challenging, working in a similar way to the
integration of the MiniZinc constraint solver for the S#-based testing approach of recon-
figuration mechanisms. However, there are several open research questions concerning
the overall analysis and testing approach: Firstly, adequate abstractions must be found
for the controlled plants as well as the behaviors of the interacting humans. Secondly,
high-impact test cases must be selected given that it seems unlikely to expect complete
analyses to be possible for such systems; hence, the S# framework degenerates into an
automatic testing tool as for the model-based testing approach for self-organization
mechanisms. Thirdly, it is not obvious how the hazards to be analyzed are supposed to
be specified in the first place. Moreover, all of these challenges have to be tackled in the
context of the approaches and techniques used for analyses of self-organizing systems
due to the increasing adaptivity required for future robot systems.
Summary. Despite all of the aforementioned open research questions, this thesis provides several
notable contributions in the context of model-based safety analysis at design time and at run time: It
advances the formal foundations, increases safety analysis efficiency, and integrates a systematic
modeling approach for safety-critical systems based on executable models with these formal analyses
through unified model execution. Compared to other safety analysis tools and techniques, the S#
framework and all of the supporting contributions provide a unique and comprehensive approach for
model-based safety analysis, combining the strengths of rigorous formal analyses with an expressive
modeling language supported by state-of-the-art tooling.
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Symbols
Domains and Meta-Variables
K a Kripke structure
M an executable model
p ∈ P a proposition of a Kripke structure or executable model
ϑ ∈ P a RIA predicate
ϱ ∈ P a flag signaling that no further reconfigurations are possible
f ∈ F a fault of a fault-aware Kripke structure or executable model
Γ,∆ ⊆ F subsets of faults
ΛH a set of minimal critical fault sets for hazard H
s ∈ S a state of a Kripke structure
R a transition relation of a Kripke structure
L a labeling function of a Kripke structure
I a set of initial states of a Kripke structure or the initialization
program of an executable model
E ∈ Prog an execution program of an executable model
v ∈ Val a literal value of Boolean or integer type
x ∈ V a variable of Boolean or integer type
σ ∈ Σ a variable environment of a formal program
e ∈ Expr an expression of a formal program
ρ ∈ Prog a formal program
ς a path fragment of a Kripke structure
ϕ ∈ Φ an LTL formula
ψ ∈ Ψ ⊆ Φ a persistency constraint formulated in LTL
H ∈ Φ a propositional logic formula specifying a hazard
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Functions and Operators
K1 ≡F K2 path-equivalent Kripke structures modulo faults
K ▹ F a set of extended Kripke structures after fault injection
K ) F a set of reduced Kripke structures after fault removal
K(M) an induced fault-aware Kripke structure for an executable model
E(K) a fault-enforced fault-aware Kripke structure
ςS[n] the selection of the n-th state in path ς
ςF[n] the selection of the n-th set of activated faults in path ς
paths(K) the set of all paths of a Kripke structure
R(·) the set of reachable states of a Kripke structureK or a path ς
A(·) the set of activatable faults of a Kripke structureK or a path ς
act-min(·) the activation minimization function used by formal programs
f1 ≼ f2 a relation between faults indicating that f1 subsumes f2
S(Γ) the set of faults subsumed by fault set Γ
EΓJ·K the expression semantics of formal programs
PΓJ·K the semantics of formal programs
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